MILITARY POLICE

THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF THE MILITARY POLICE CORPS

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

GERALD B. O'KEEFE
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MILITARY POLICE

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Chief, Military Police Corps Regiment, and Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School

Brigadier General Mark S. Spindler

I am absolutely thrilled and honored to join the great team of professionals here at the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri—the ***Home of the Regiment!*** I look forward to serving the Maneuver Support Center of Excellence and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. I extend my sincere thanks to the Fort Leonard Wood leaders and Family members who made our transition incredibly smooth and most rewarding. It's great to be Home!

Allow me to begin this introduction by thanking Brigadier General Mark Inch, not only for his sponsorship during this transition, but also for the extraordinary work that he did at USAMPS throughout the past 2 years. The Regiment is strong and heading in an exciting and promising direction—in great part, because of his vision, leadership, and plain hard work. We wish him and his family well as he assumes his new duties associated with leading military police forces and operations in Afghanistan.

Soon, our Army will earnestly begin transitioning from an Army ***at war*** to an Army ***preparing for war***. Difficult fiscal constraints, new and dangerous landscapes, and major changes within the construct of the Army are shaping our defense narrative, compelling the Army to make hard decisions to ensure that land power defense objectives are achieved within this framework. Changes are coming; but because of the proactive work of the USAMPS and the Office of the Provost Marshal General, I believe that the Military Police Corps is in a great position to inculcate these changes. I also believe that future success will continue to rely on the following three mission priorities:

- **Developing leaders . . . first and foremost.** Real change cannot be managed; it must be led by those who are true masters of their craft and who have the fortitude to take on the tough problems and assume an appropriate level of risk. Our top priority remains the development of leaders of character through the melding of the institutional and operational domains. We must take advantage of the experience of our combat-tested leaders to train and educate future military police leaders. Above all, our Corps must be prepared to address the domestic and foreign challenges that lie ahead. Only through great leadership can this be achieved.
- **Developing the future force.** The Army will get smaller, and our Corps will get smaller. We need to work hard to help the Army reshape the future force structure of our Corps. In doing so, we must thoroughly evaluate the needs of the future force to support the joint force commander and we must field innovative solutions to our Soldiers involved in the future fight. We must get this right! In addition, we must continue professionalizing the Corps, continuously developing our police skills and competencies.
- **Living the profession of arms.** We are a unique vocation of trained and certified experts who, under the authority of the American people, apply the science and art of land warfare against our enemies. We must ensure that the Soldiers and leaders who receive training and education here at USAMPS are provided with an instructional base that promotes personal and professional growth and fosters the sense of pride, commitment, and high moral character required to be a member of the Military Police Corps. This represents the bedrock of our identity!

No doubt, there is much work to be done. Uncertainty about what lies ahead could easily lull us into a sense of anxiety and worry, but we should see this challenge as an opportunity to forge the future of the Corps! Every day, in garrison and on the battlefield, we demonstrate unmatched Soldier competency and criticality. The reason that our Corps was originally formed—to preserve the fighting force—remains unchanged. We preserve the fighting force every day by assisting, protecting, and defending throughout all lines of military police operations . . . and we will continue to do so.

Continue to take care of one another and respect one another—Soldiers, civilians, and Family members alike. We are one great Corps, one great team! How proud I am to be a member of this great Regiment, and I look forward to serving with you as we attend to tomorrow's challenges; the Army can continue to count on us!

Of the Troops and For the Troops—Army Strong

Regimental Command Sergeant Major

Command Sergeant Major John F. McNeirney

Developing Military Police Leaders

For the past 72 years, our Military Police Corps has been developing military police leaders who are capable of meeting the ever-changing demands of the Army. We pride ourselves on the success of leaders who have served our great Corps through its highs, its lows, and everything in between. To preserve the force, we are obligated to ensure that leader development remains one of our priorities.

The *Army Leader Development Strategy 2013*[1] describes leader development as a process that aligns training, education, and experience to prepare leaders who exercise mission command to prevail in unified land operations. The *Army Leader Development Strategy 2013* lists seven imperatives that are designed to guide us in the modification of existing leader development programs and policies. Among these imperatives is a requirement to "select and develop leaders with positive leader attributes and proficiency in core leadership competencies for responsibility at higher levels."[2] This is not a new challenge, but one which demands that we develop military police who are accomplished leaders at the tactical level and competent and capable leaders at the operational and strategic levels. Here at the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), we are exploring the possibility of modifying career paths to provide "broadening" opportunities for the development of leaders. We are also reviewing personnel policies and revising professional military education to account for what we've learned about leadership competency gaps throughout the past 10 years.

Military police leaders must first be great Soldiers and masters of the profession of arms. They must be team builders, negotiators, mentors, and role models who empower others. They must also be mentally agile and capable of thinking critically. And they must be able to manage change across large, complex organizations. As we move into a more ambiguous future, success at the strategic level will require that military police leaders operate outside their comfort zone of expert knowledge. Additionally, military police leaders must continue to be excellent stewards of the profession and remain committed to the development of other leaders within the profession.

We will shape the next generation of Military Police Corps leaders through a system of training, education, and broadening experiences. We will leverage existing systems, exercise initiative, and develop innovative methods to prepare military police leaders to meet the expectations of the Army. The understanding that leaders at all levels are responsible for the continual development of leaders within their organizations is central to this strategy. At USAMPS, we are reviewing the programs of instruction for Officer Education System and NCO Education System courses to see where improvements need to be made. We intend to develop NCOs into great leaders who understand military police doctrine and who are masters of our unique military police technical skills.

I encourage military police leaders at all levels to make leader development a priority. Strive to build teams within your organizations; hone the technical expertise of your subordinates; sustain your subordinates' tactical competence; and continue to develop not only great Army leaders, but also great leaders of military police Soldiers—the Army police professionals.

Assist, Protect, Defend!

Endnotes:

[1]*Army Leader Development Strategy 2013*, <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/CAL/repository/ALDS5June%202013Record.pdf>, accessed on 23 July 2013.

[2]Ibid.

Regimental Chief Warrant Officer

Chief Warrant Officer Five Leroy Shamburger

Broadening Experiences Drive Competency and Relationships Across the Military Police Corps Regiment

The *Military Police Force 2020 Strategic Plan*[1] was signed under the authority of Major General David E. Quantock, U.S. Army Provost Marshal General. The *Military Police Force 2020 Strategic Plan* does a great job of identifying military police core disciplines and competencies that must be mastered in order for military police to be viewed as law enforcement professionals and of value to senior Army leaders.

Professionals share the common traits of character, commitment, and competence. The focus of this article is on competency gained through experiential learning and broadening assignments. The technical capabilities that are required for military police to be viewed as law enforcement professionals are outlined in the Military Police Regimental Strategy—better known as the Box Top. The knowledge required for military police to be viewed as policing professionals at each level of the military police organizational structure (platoon, company, battalion, brigade) cannot be provided entirely by the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS). Broadening assignments are managed by the U.S. Army Human Resources Command, and only a few officers have the opportunity for such assignments each year. The National Capital Region offers opportunities for warrant officers; however, no official or unofficial broadening assignments are available for noncommissioned officers (NCOs) at this time.

In the fiscally constrained environment of today, we must think outside the box to gain quality experiential learning and broadening assignment opportunities. And it seems that we are missing out on great opportunities at major installations across the United States. Many opportunities are available at our stations, camps, and posts, with time and effort the only costs. Military police organizations conduct the full spectrum of military police disciplines (security and mobility support, police operations, and detention operations) at most major installations. We could execute miniature (1- to 4-month) internships at the installation level to provide military police officers and NCOs with exposure to other organizations that make up the Military Police Corps Regiment. We have the ability to expose them to provost marshal operations, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) (commonly referred to as CID) organizations, and detention operations without regard for the unit to which they are assigned. This approach could be further enhanced with professional development for officers and NCOs from all military police organizations, with responsibility for the sponsor being rotated between military police organizations. I further encourage the establishment of military police organizational days that include members of all installation military police organizations so that every opportunity is available to build relationships and foster an understanding of others' responsibilities and missions. A better understanding of the organizations, responsibilities, and missions of others could result in improvements in the retention of quality Soldiers by facilitating their movement among organizations within the military police career management field. When the chief of the Military Police Corps Regiment stands before a military police audience and asks who knows someone from another military police career management field, everyone from the top to the bottom of the organization should be able to answer affirmatively.

Although these cross-training opportunities are available in some locations, they have not been institutionalized. Military police leaders must accept this approach as one of their common tactics, techniques, and procedures and must promote it at all levels. In this era of financial constraint, professional development through local internships and broadening experiences will help foster better working relationships and a better understanding at the installation level and across the Military Police Corps Regiment. This will cost time and effort, but it is the right thing to do for Soldiers and for the Military Police Corps Regiment. Therefore, we must think outside the box and find similar opportunities that are available to a larger population of military police Soldiers.

Of the Troops and For the Troops—Assist, Protect, Defend—Prestige, Integrity, and Guts

Endnote:

[1]*Military Police Force 2020 Strategic Plan*, U.S. Army Office of the Provost Marshal General, <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/38004170>, accessed on 9 July 2013. This document was created by the U.S. Army Office of the Provost Marshal General in conjunction with CID, the U.S. Army Corrections Command, USAMPS, and military police leaders of the operational Army.

Enhancing Military Police Readiness

By Lieutenant Colonel Jason S. Liggett

In the spring of 2012, the Provost Marshal's Office, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) set out to design a comprehensive report on the readiness status of military police forces across all FORSCOM installations and on their visibility across the Military Police Regiment. This initiative began when the FORSCOM Provost Marshal recognized the need to collect more readiness information and to disseminate that information to the field. The additional information enabled commanders to leverage all available resources for readiness within FORSCOM.

Because the readiness of enablers, such as military police, is sometimes overshadowed by that of brigade combat teams, the military police-focused report was designed to provide a comprehensive picture of information on emerging reports, venues, and tools available to commanders. It was expanded to provide updates on current and projected FORSCOM Headquarters and Protection Directorate actions. The initial readiness report was generated 9 months ago and, based on feedback from the field, has been updated and published on a monthly basis ever since. The report has received accolades from commanders and senior leaders, who have described it as an invaluable tool in assisting and enabling them to improve the readiness of their respective units. The topic of the readiness report was chosen for presentation at the February 2013 Military Police Warfighter Forum Senior Leader Symposium. This article addresses how the readiness report established the foundation for a proactive readiness approach that allows military police the ability to move toward a predictive readiness posture. The ability to be predictive will likely grow in importance as we continue in our current roles and approach the challenges of expanding mission sets and resource-constrained environments.

Figure 1, page 6, illustrates the construct and methodology of the readiness report. Beginning on the left side of the diagram (with the items under the FORSCOM heading), arrows flow toward the right and back, signifying that this is a cyclic process involving the integration of feedback from the field to address various FORSCOM concerns. The more detail received from the field, the greater the FORSCOM Headquarters staff ability to quickly perform an action—and the greater the ability to identify trends or themes that may affect entities across the Military Police Corps. For any issues that arise, working groups can be established to recommend changes in manning, equipping, or training—or the issues can be elevated. For FORSCOM reports, feedback is assimilated into the readiness report as part of the basis for current Army force generation (ARFORGEN) issues. The unit status report is of particular note, as it is critical to the ability of the FORSCOM staff to target commanders' top concerns. For FORSCOM venues, the quarterly ARFORGEN Synchronization and Resourcing Conference focuses on deployments, redeployments, Combat Training Center rotations, exercise scheduling, and Army test requirements and also includes special-topic and enabler-focused working groups. The Military Police Corps must ensure that division staff and mission support element (MSE) personnel are aware of military police resource requirements. The Unit Equipping and Reuse Conference is another important FORSCOM venue. This conference, which is attended by FORSCOM staff elements, division staff, MSE staff, and the U.S. Army Materiel Command, is an important first step in the reset and reintegration of units. For example, the 42d Military Police Brigade conducted a Unit Equipping and Reuse Conference upon redeployment in January 2013. FORSCOM tools and the FORSCOM portal represent a wealth of knowledge regarding the status or needs of units. Commanders should tap into installation assets that make use of these databases, and their staffs should acquire a working knowledge of these readiness-specific systems.

Once the reports, venues, and tools information is encapsulated into the readiness report format, verification takes place among the stakeholders. In addition to FORSCOM, the integration, synchronization, projection, and analysis efforts include—but are not limited to—the U.S. Army Installation Management Command (IMCOM), the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the Department of the Army (DA), the Office of the Provost Marshal General (OMPG), and the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS). The knowledge is then published in the report.

The Military Police Readiness Report section on the right side of Figure 1 contains a list of items typically included in a readiness report. The list is subject to the addition or deletion of topics based on assessments of current field requirements or on feedback from commanders regarding specific requirements.

The establishment of the readiness report is a proactive measure used to build a readiness knowledge base. Commanders are positioned to move into predictive readiness, as depicted by the arrow in the bottom right portion of



Figure 1. Construct and methodology of the readiness report

Figure 1. The Military Police Corps can now leverage existing reports, venues, and tools to identify future potential readiness issues. The ability to conduct trend analysis has been enhanced, and that ability can be used in future problem-solving models.

Resources that are often underutilized in this process are the MSEs on FORSCOM installations. These elements work with senior commanders' staffs—not to replicate functions, but to provide assistance and continuity. The MSEs are FORSCOM entities with direct ties to FORSCOM Headquarters staff during the ARFORGEN process. They are integral parts of the ARFORGEN Synchronization and Resourcing Conferences and the Unit Equipping and Reuse Conferences. Through their counterparts within the ARFORGEN Integration Branch, FORSCOM Readiness Division, MSEs can quickly obtain action on requests from senior commanders.

This article describes an approach to proactive readiness and a means to move toward predictive readiness. Once a unit has developed a readiness problem statement, this methodology can serve as a template to be used to find plausible courses of action within existing reports, venues, and tools. Once courses of action are developed, the unit can capitalize on stakeholder experience for the verification process. Through a combined effort, a course of action can then be chosen in a unified approach. The knowledge gained can be included in the readiness report and distributed to the field. The sharing of knowledge is the cornerstone to predictive readiness posture, collaboratively encompassing lessons learned to identify and source readiness.

Lieutenant Colonel Liggett is the military police organizational integrator, Force Management Division, FORSCOM, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He holds a bachelor's degree in history from Northern Arizona University and a master's degree in business and organizational security management from Webster University.



Military Policing and Education: Making the Right Investment

Dr. James J. Vardalis

The rapid development, expansion, and diversity resulting from the return of Soldiers to military installations create a variety of new and unique challenges for military criminal justice system personnel. Along with these installation changes comes increased criminal activity. Combat stress, cultural conflicts, new crime methods, and national security issues have contributed to the emerging professional police model.

Emerging Professional Police Model

Not only have crimes and criminals become more advanced, but criminals have also learned how to transform one criminal method into another complicated crime, outpacing law enforcement efforts in many cases. Therefore, the old concept in which military police simply patrol the installation and respond to calls for service is being replaced with one in which police have the skills and abilities necessary to understand technology, comprehend and analyze complex crimes, solve problems, write clear and comprehensive reports to document complicated events, clearly articulate intricate details in a court of law, and tolerate, and appropriately react, to people of different cultures and individuals with varied perspectives.

Value of a College Education

Numerous recent studies indicate that college-educated criminal justice personnel do a better job of evaluating and selecting solutions than non-college-educated personnel. This is an important consideration, given that many people working within the criminal justice system have been assigned a high level of autonomy in selecting alternative solutions to installation and community problems.

Criminal justice system employees have embraced the significance of higher education because they have recognized that a college degree is a major factor in promoting the concept that the field of law enforcement is evolving into a recognizable professional career that deserves the same community status and benefits as other professions requiring a college education. The practice of law could serve as an excellent paradigm: The job of a lawyer, which once required only basic legal training and on-the-job experience, has been transformed into a highly regarded and well-paid career requiring a college education and commanding the respect of a profession.

Many military police commanders have also recognized the value of a college education and have developed means to encourage military police to seek college degrees. For example, promotions and special-unit assignments can serve as incentives for military police to make an effort toward earning college degrees. Military police are equipped with basic training, mandatory updates, field training officer preparation, and the applied experience; the only missing component is a college degree requirement. This is a major obstacle in transforming military policing from a trade to a professional career. Community and political perceptions about policing are the keys to elevating salaries to a professional level. And many progressive military police commanders support the vision that a college degree will ensure that the field of law enforcement receives the recognition and benefits of professional status. As a result, many military police are investigating college options for the first time—often, with little or no advice.

Selection of a College or University

More than 2,500 U.S. institutions of higher learning offer bachelor's degrees; many of these offer degrees in criminal justice. Because the pursuit of a degree from the wrong institution can be costly in terms of money, time, and career value, the choice of a college or university is an important one. There are two basic categories of colleges and universities:

- **Public.** Public institutions are generally governed by the state. Fees and tuition are set by a board of regents. Graduation rates are very important, and poorly producing programs are often cut.
- **Private (for profit).** Private institutions are established by private businesses for profit (proprietary education). Because they have a profit objective and are not subsidized by state government, fees and tuition are much higher at private institutions. Graduation rates are not all that important because they do not impact the profit. As with any business, advertising is important. Therefore, although significant amounts of money may be applied to the creation of an

impressive, well-designed Web site, the Web site is only the storefront.

Accreditation

Educational accreditation is a means of quality assurance in which educational institutions are evaluated by an external agency to determine if applicable standards are met; and if those standards are met, accreditation is granted. There are six nationally recognized accrediting agencies in the United States, and each is responsible for accrediting the educational institutions within a specific region of the country. The accrediting agencies and associated areas of responsibility are—

- **Southern Association of Colleges and Schools—**Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.
- **Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools—**Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington, D.C.
- **New England Association of Schools and Colleges—**Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
- **North Central Association of Colleges and Schools—**Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
- **Western Association of Schools and Colleges—**California and Hawaii.
- **Northwest Commission on Colleges and Universities—**Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, and Washington.

For more information about educational accreditation, visit the Council for Higher Education Accreditation Web site at <http://www.chea.org>.[1]

If an institution is not accredited by the appropriate, nationally recognized regional accrediting agency, degrees obtained from that institution will not be recognized by law enforcement agencies—and accredited colleges and universities will not accept transfer credits from that institution. Do not be misled by advertisements that use the term *accredited* followed by an array of impressively named boards or panels that are not on the list of nationally recognized accrediting agencies.

Financial Assistance

The GI Bill[2] provides veterans with financial support in obtaining a college education; however, veterans must participate in approved training programs in order to receive GI Bill benefits. Therefore, it is important to thoroughly research all available options.

Military police should obtain information about how to apply for criminal justice scholarships. Some colleges and universities award credit hours for military training and allow those hours to be applied toward a degree; however, there are two questions to consider:

- Are the credits free of cost?
- Is the degree that is posted to the transcript and the diploma a criminal justice degree—as opposed to a general studies or liberal arts degree? Most employment applications require that the name of the degree be listed. A degree in liberal arts—even with an emphasis in criminal justice—is still a degree in liberal arts.

Advanced Degrees

Many colleges and universities now offer two tracks to a master's degree in criminal justice—a traditional research track and a professional, nonthesis track. The traditional track is designed for students who wish to pursue even more advanced (doctor of philosopy) degrees, whereas the professional track is geared toward those who wish to transition into a criminal justice career.

Many colleges and universities require applicants to complete standardized testing—usually the Graduate Record Examination—in order to be admitted for graduate study. The Graduate Record Examination is administered by an outside agency, the scores are maintained for 5 years, and colleges have no control over score distribution. However, most law enforcement-friendly universities recognize the knowledge and ability possessed by seasoned military police officers and will waive the Graduate Record Examination and related entry level testing for qualified individuals.

Conclusion

Too many military police have accepted the challenge of pursuing a college degree while balancing work and family, only to discover that they have wasted their time, money, and efforts on a degree that has no value. Selecting a college or university and committing to the time, cost, and energy necessary to obtain a valuable degree require due diligence from the Soldier. The time spent and questions asked are major factors in making the right decision for an important educational investment.

Endnotes:

[1]Council for Higher Education Accreditation Web site, <http://www.chea.org/>, accessed on 23 May 2013.

[2]The term *GI [Government Issue] Bill*, which originally referred to the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 (Public Law 78-347), is now used to describe a range of benefits, including financial assistance for a college education.

Dr. Vardalis is the head of the Department of Criminal Justice, Tarleton State University, Stephenville, Texas, and the director of the Military Veterans Services Center located there. He is a veteran of the U.S. Marine Corps, and he served in Vietnam.

THE 759TH MILITARY POLICE BATTALION APPLIES COUNTERINSURGENCY LESSONS TO THE GARRISON ENVIRONMENT

By Captain James C. Powers

In July 2012, the 759th Military Police Battalion, Fort Carson, Colorado, conducted a joint planning conference with the installation Directorate of Emergency Services to refocus its patrol distribution plan by assigning each company an area of responsibility modeled on operational concepts from Iraq and Afghanistan. This transition optimized the ability of the companies to develop relationships with their assigned communities. In addition to the areas of responsibility, the battalion developed a systematic approach for military police to engage the communities, identify concerns, discuss possible solutions, and implement changes to prevent and mitigate crime. The mechanism of priority "information" requirements (PIR) was patterned after systems that used priority intelligence requirements in a counterinsurgency environment. This approach fosters military police community relations and builds community partnerships, dramatically shifting the way patrols handle law enforcement. Rather than perpetuating a reactive policing strategy in which calls for service are the impetus for combating crime, the PIR model encourages patrols to engage in proactive policing by identifying community issues that set the conditions for offenses to occur.

Origins of the PIR Model

The events of the last decade of conflict have challenged many preconceived notions of what it takes to mitigate threats in a given environment. In the counterinsurgency environments of Iraq and Afghanistan, civic disorder represented the greatest threat. This threat arose from unaddressed community concerns and a distrust of occupying forces. A breakdown in communication between coalition Soldiers and the communities essentially shaped a population that actively supported, or tacitly approved of, insurgent groups. To retake the initiative, occupying forces needed a tool to connect with communities, identify their concerns, discuss possible solutions, and implement changes. The PIR model evolved into that tool.

The PIR model makes use of intelligence-led and problem-oriented policing models that gained traction in combating crime in the United States after 11 September 2001 by refining them for practical use within the military dynamic. Under the PIR model, units began collecting community atmospherics and conducting area reconnaissance, establishing the PIR framework before fielding questions. Soldiers used PIR to focus conversations with the community, gain the community's perspective, and provide the unit with engagement summaries for analysis. Community feedback allowed units to highlight the community's greatest concerns and to identify trends with the potential to influence future operations. This, in turn, allowed units to gain initiative and target the driving causes and enablers of the insurgency, rather than rely on reactive strategies for combating insurgencies, which left them cleaning up the undeniable evidence that an insurgency had existed.

"Effectively implemented by Soldiers and unit commands under the austere conditions of Iraq and Afghanistan, the PIR model is a familiar and manageable entity that military police formations can use to support military communities through intelligence-led policing."

Application of Counterinsurgency Lessons to the Garrison Environment

The application of the PIR model to a garrison environment provides communities with the same benefits supplied by an engaging and proactive security force. While there are obvious differences between these two operating environments, those differences do not prevent military police from connecting with communities, identifying their concerns, discussing possible solutions, and implementing changes. Rather, the implementation of PIR in the garrison environment offers military communities an unprecedented voice with which to resolve community issues, disrupt systematic criminal activities, and deter disorganized crime. Effectively implemented by Soldiers and unit commands under the austere conditions of Iraq and Afghanistan, the PIR model is a familiar and manageable entity that military police formations can use to support military communities through intelligence-led policing.

Community Feedback

The process for capturing community responses is simple. It begins with military police greeting the public during opportunities where discussions are possible and the public is willing to communicate. This includes patrol members interacting with members of the community centered in the

patrol areas, access control personnel interacting with a subset of traffic entering the installation, and military police leaders interacting with other unit commands within the area of responsibility.

The 759th receives its greatest community feedback during random vehicle inspections at the installation access gates. While some individuals who are chosen for inspection are in a hurry and opt out of participating in the survey, the large volume of access inspections makes this a primary means of addressing PIR.

Following each community engagement, Soldiers capture their conversations on a community engagement summary; and at the end of each shift, they provide the summary to their shift leader. Shift leaders then compile the PIR highlights from each community engagement summary and include them in a closure report, which they provide to company and battalion police intelligence cells for analysis. Gathering community responses over time allows police intelligence cells to refine PIR and, ultimately, to gain a better sense of community concerns. As the situation develops, the police intelligence cell issues modified or entirely new PIR. After capturing enough responses to provide unit leaders with a clear picture of community concerns, the police intelligence cell briefs the command regarding the PIR results on a biweekly basis. This helps discern the commander's intent for PIR refinement and supports resourcing to implement changes. The goal of developing community awareness within the unit is to institute measurable changes that address community concerns and combat criminal trends at the source.

Effective PIR Questions

While responses to PIR questions allow units to analyze a wide range of information, the relevance of community responses substantially depends on the construction of the survey questions. According to Z. Tenay Guvendiren and Scott Downey, the most effective questions used in Iraq and Afghanistan focused on the *why* aspect of a particular criminal issue.[1] Asking the community "Why?" led to complex responses that could be used to identify a variety of concerns at the heart of an issue.

Conversely, PIRs that fail to incorporate the aspect of *why* limit the potential for community response. Similar *what*, *when*, *where*, and *how* questions ignore vital details that are necessary to understand the broader context of an issue. Moreover, the verification of responses to these reactive questions requires a great deal of police resources—and the public is often alienated in the process. Although more effective than asking "What?" or "When?," asking "Who?" also falls short because the offender is just one factor in the common operational picture. Where the main mechanism for combating crime involves arresting and prosecuting criminals, the mechanism is inefficient and wasteful when conditions continue to encourage a disregard of the law for personal gain. It is not that arresting and prosecuting criminals are irrelevant; rather, holding criminals accountable for their actions is an essential part of policing. However, it is not an end in itself.

To maximize the effect of community engagements, PIR questions should be phrased in a manner that encourages community participation. Community members should be prompted to reveal their concerns, and this can best be done by constructing PIR questions around the *why* aspect—for example, "Why do criminals choose to break into homes within this particular neighborhood?" or more importantly, "Why do criminals have the ability to move freely within the community?" These questions allow for complex, multifaceted, and varied answers.

The question of *"Why?"* allows the community to supply information that satisfies the previously unknown aspects of who, what, when, where, and how. Guvendiren and Downey illustrate this concept using a football analogy: "When you play a football game and lose, you want to evaluate 'why' you lost, which envelops 'who' was on your team and 'who' was on the opponent's team; 'what' plays both teams executed; 'how' both were trained or equipped; 'where' the game was located (home field advantage); and 'when' in the season it occurred (experience level). If you lose, you can very logically assume that one or more of these influences passively or actively countered your team's vision of 'success.' "[2] The effective writing of PIR questions, therefore, depends on focusing on the aspect of why; this is the most efficient approach for drawing quality feedback from the community using limited police resources, and it illuminates the underlying issues that contribute to criminal activity.

Measurable Results

The 759th Military Police Battalion implemented the PIR model at Fort Carson and, within the first 3 months, refocused its PIR questions four times in an effort to improve the understanding of issues relevant to the community and to solicit viable solutions from the public. Although community responses varied, the volume of responses allowed police intelligence cell analysts to identify the issues of greatest concern and recommend courses of action. Actions taken as a result of responses to the first set of PIR questions at Fort Carson resulted in a 21 percent reduction in the installation crime rate as compared to crime rates at the same time the previous year.

During the PIR questioning, the community expressed its concern over a rash of break-ins that had occurred in a specific neighborhood. A review of the crime statistics for that neighborhood indicated that no such issue existed; the concerns were based on rumors. During the same period, several respondents expressed a desire for the public availability of crime statistics. By providing the public with crime statistics, law enforcement agencies mitigate the spread of rumors (which strain police resources); thus, providing crime statistics better serves law enforcement personnel and the community. In addition, this form of police transparency helps calm the public by illustrating that residents of installations live in an environment far more secure than that of off-post communities. At Fort Carson, crime statistics were made available to the public through a free online resource. This contributed to a better-informed and more satisfied public.

Many community members also expressed concerns with a lack of dismounted patrols in their neighborhoods. Upon reviewing the PIR results, the battalion police intelligence cell discovered disproportionately high dismounted patrol request rates for four of 19 neighborhoods. The police intelligence cell used this information to produce an overlay that reflected community feedback and compared the results with Fort Carson dismounted patrol records. The comparison revealed a significant gap between community interest and operational reality. To address this shortfall, the battalion police intelligence cell proposed increasing the number of dismounted patrols within highlighted areas. The 759th adopted this proposal and increased its dismounted patrols from 50 per month to 175 per week within the areas of concern. This increase in dismounted patrols addressed community concern, mitigated crime through an increased patrol presence, and provided a more approachable force to the public, as additional patrols stepped out of their vehicles to engage the community.

Professional Policing/Access Control Synchronization Meeting

A biweekly professional policing/access control synchronization meeting serves as the forum in which the battalion police intelligence cell presents police leaders with community concerns and possible solutions. At this meeting, leaders from the 759th Military Police Battalion (including the Military Police Investigations Section and the Traffic Accident Investigations Section of the 148th Military Police Detachment), the Department of Emergency Services, the 48th Military Police Detachment (U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command [USACIDC] [commonly referred to as CID]), and unit provost marshal's offices have the opportunity to analyze crime trends, discuss PIR results, assess law enforcement readiness, and implement changes based on community needs. The synchronization of these law enforcement assets is a vital component of proactive policing to deter crime. In addition, battalion and brigade commanders from across Fort Carson are invited to attend the meetings to discuss policing and community concerns within their formations. This collaboration allows for better-informed police and improved police operations. Framed within the PIR model, the professional policing/access control synchronization meeting is the primary mechanism for addressing crime trends and community concerns regarding law enforcement.

Conclusion

From its origins in combating the insurgencies of Iraq and Afghanistan, the PIR model provides a link between security forces and their communities. Incorporating aspects of intelligence-led policing into domestic police organizations, the PIR model allows military commanders to target community concerns and to improve conditions that drive public unrest. Applying these principles at Fort Carson, the 759th Military Police Battalion, in coordination with the Department of Emergency Services, recognized PIR as part of a familiar and manageable process that could be used to support the military community through proactive police engagement. By adopting and continuously refining processes that bridged the gap between Fort Carson police and the community, solutions to improve law enforcement efficiency and customer service were developed. These solutions were the result of the adoption of the PIR model—a systematic approach for military police to engage the community, identify concerns, discuss possible solutions, and implement change.

Endnotes:

[1]Z. Tenay Guvendiren and Scott Downey, "Putting the PRIORITY Back Into PIR: PIR Development in a COIN Environment," *Small Wars Journal*, 2009, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/216-guvendiren.pdf?q=mag/docs-temp/216-guvendiren.pdf>, accessed on 29 May 2013.

[2]Ibid.

Reference:

Marilyn Peterson, "Intelligence-Led Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture," *New Realities: Law Enforcement in the Post-9/11 Era*, U.S. Department of Justice, September 2005.

Captain Powers is the commander of the 69th and 148th Military Police Detachments, 759th Military Police Battalion. He holds a bachelor's degree in interdisciplinary studies from the U.S. Military Academy–West Point, New York, and a master's degree in business and organizational security management from Webster University.

FLETA Board Grants Reaccreditation to USAMPS and Initial Accreditation and Reaccreditation to Three Progams

By Gary Mitchell, Ph.D.

The Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation (FLETA) Board granted academy reaccreditation to the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), initial program accreditation to the Special Victims Unit Investigations Course and the Staff and Faculty Training Course, and program reaccreditation to the U.S. Army Civilian Police Academy at the 25 April 2013 meeting in Brunswick, Georgia.

USAMPS representatives accept FLETA accreditation awards.

The USAMPS, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, annually trains more than 20,000 students in basic and advanced law enforcement practices and processes. The USAMPS is committed to ensuring that Soldiers, military police leaders, and Department of the Army (DA) civilians receive realistic, top quality training in an environment that fosters learning. The training programs prepare these personnel to effectively perform their duties in military police and law enforcement units.

The Special Victims Unit Investigations Course provides students with the skills and abilities required to serve as investigators within criminal investigation organizations. Students learn to conduct the full array of special victims operations and to generate associated products related to sexual assaults and sensitive victim interviews.

The Staff and Faculty Training Course is a 2-day course that follows the 3-week Army Basic Instructor Course. It prepares Army Basic Instructor Course graduates for assignments as USAMPS instructors, instructors/writers, or training developers. The Army does not provide funding for the program; all program activities are supported with existing personnel and resources.

The Civilian Police Academy serves as the sole training source for all DA civilian police and security guards. In recent years, significant numbers of Army military police personnel have been deployed to high-threat areas. As a result, DA has increased the number of civilian police and security guards to protect Army garrisons and to guard critical facilities. The focus of the Civilian Police Academy program, which consists of more than 400 academic hours, is on force protection, antiterrorism, first responder skills, law enforcement core competencies, and compliance with Army and Department of Defense directives.

The FLETA Board is the accrediting body for all federal law enforcement training and support programs. To achieve accreditation, agencies must undergo an independent review of their academies and/or programs to ensure compliance with FLETA standards and procedures in the areas of program administration, training staff, training development, and training delivery—with 20 additional standards for academies. Accreditation is a cyclical process; each year, agencies submit annual reports in preparation for reaccreditation, which is a new and independent review of the academy/program that takes place every 3 years.

For more information about FLETA, visit the FLETA Web site at <www.fleta.gov>.

Dr. Mitchell is the executive director of the FLETA Office of Accreditation and the secretary of the FLETA Board. He holds a doctorate of philosophy degree in business administration with a focus on organizational leadership.

The New MSCoE Digital Training Facility

By Mr. Robert B. McFarland

The new Maneuver Support Center of Excellence (MSCoE) Digital Training Facility (DTF), Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, offers professional military education students an enhanced educational experience. The DTF is a 62,000-square-foot, stand-alone, state-of-the-art educational facility with a focus on the use of Army common digital communication systems, gaming platforms, and constructive simulation exercises to educate and train the institutional force (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command [TRADOC]) and the operational force (U.S. Army Forces Command [FORSCOM]) for the current operational environment. In addition, new technologies can be incorporated as they arise.

Before the opening of the new DTF, digital training took place in the MSCoE Battle Simulation Center. A phased transfer of equipment and instructors began in September 2012; and within a month, instruction was underway in the new DTF. By November 2012, the DTF was operating at full capability and all instruction that was previously conducted in the Battle Simulation Center was occurring in the DTF. More than 12,000 TRADOC and FORSCOM Soldiers were trained in the Battle Simulation Center and DTF during 2012, and it appears that the number will be exceeded for 2013.

Planning for the DTF facility began in 2001. In 2004, an engineering firm presented the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers with a 35 percent design plan. The funding necessary to proceed was received in 2008, and an architectural firm was hired to complete the initial part of the project. The Kansas City District, Northwestern Division, Corps of Engineers, supplied the project manager. The second part of the project—the actual construction—began in the fall of 2011.

The DTF supports the Army decision to embrace the use of digital platforms for the training and education of TRADOC and FORSCOM forces. These digital platforms, which are available in a variety of configurations, fall under the auspices of several program offices. The MSCoE DTF supports—

- Mission command instruction on common digital communication systems (such as Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below [FBCB2] with Joint Capabilities Release [JCR] software and Command Post of the Future [CPOF]) and on other digital systems (such as Tactical Ground Reporting [TiGR]). Furthermore, unique applications such as the Joint Effects Module (JEM) and the Joint Warning and Reporting Network (JWARN) are integrated to support the education of U.S. Army Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear School (USACBRNS) students.
- Gaming instruction through the use of gaming products such as Virtual Battlespace 2 (VBS2)™, UrbanSim, Enhanced Learning Environments With Creative Technologies (ELECT) Bilateral Negotiation Trainer (BiLAT), and Moral Combat. Each of these games is designed to help achieve a learning objective based on the needs of the Soldier student. Game selections are designed to accommodate individual learners or collective groups. In some instances, instruction may progress from individuals to groups.
- Constructive simulation exercises using capabilities for current and future simulations, with varying degrees of support requirements depending on the type of simulation used—primarily low-overhead simulation/stimulation capability types such as the Army Low-Overhead Training

Toolkit (ALOTT) and its suite of simulation tools. The ALOTT is used in the following cases:

- Major combat operations brigade and above command staff processes.
- Major combat operations battalion and below command staff processes.
- Defense support of civil authorities operations brigade and above command staff processes.

The DTF is equipped with—

- Twenty 16-person, tactical-operation centers.
- Two 52-person FBCB2/constructive simulation laboratories.
- Three gaming laboratories capable of accommodating 145 people.
- Three mission command system laboratories capable of accommodating 172 people.
- Three after action rooms with moveable walls (which provide a secure setting when required), each capable of accommodating 63 people, or a total of 189 people.
- One video teleconference room capable of accommodating 30 people.
- Two dedicated server rooms (one of which is secure).
- Administrative space for 54 people.
- Six hardstand external connection points for tactical vehicles.
- A storage area with a loading dock.

The unique role of Fort Leonard Wood as an installation that supports the training and education of TRADOC and FORSCOM organizations and units through the use of virtual, constructive simulations and gaming devices provides the opportunity to create the integrated training environment that the Army envisions for the force. The MSCoE DTF offers common training tools for the institutional base and students attending professional military education courses and then facilitates the transition of those graduates who remain part of the operational force at Fort Leonard Wood into the home station environment, where they have the opportunity to use those tools.

The DTF is primarily designed for the MSCoE TRADOC mission, but has further potential as a training platform for other venues, limited only by the imagination and the white space on the training calendar. For example, the DTF could be used for functional and multifunctional unit command post exercises, homeland security exercises, joint training exercises, and other interagency exercises. As the Army continues to pursue a live, virtual, constructive simulation and gaming integrated training environment with which to train its forces, the MSCoE DTF—properly resourced and managed—brings that vision one step closer to reality.

Mr. McFarland is the education and training supervisor, Training Instruction Branch, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and Training (G-3), MSCoE. He is a retired Army infantry lieutenant colonel and former battalion commander. He holds a bachelor's degree in wildlife resource management from Southwest Missouri State University (now Missouri State University) and master's degrees in management from Webster University and in military arts and science from the School of Advanced Military Studies, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Soldiers receive instruction in the new, state-of-the-art DTF.

402D FA BRIGADE

Takes Aim at Training Military Police Soldiers

By Captain Derrick W. Dew

Field artillery (FA) Soldiers at Fort Bliss, Texas, continue to stay at the forefront of training mobilized U.S. Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve military police Soldiers for deployment. Most of the units mobilized through Fort Bliss deploy in support of detention operations for Operation Enduring Freedom or at the detainee facility at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba. Many military police units have recently become focused on detention operations, and the 402d FA Brigade is at the tip of the spear when it comes to validating the ability to conduct detention operations. To date, more than 15,000 Soldiers have been trained—with more than 7,000 of those being military police.

Mission

The mission of the 402d FA Brigade is to advise, assist, and train Reserve Component units during premobilization periods; conduct the mobilization, training support, and readiness validation of deploying Reserve Component forces; oversee demobilization operations at Mobilization Training Center Bliss; and as directed, execute culminating training events and provide training to joint, combined, interagency, and Active Army forces.

Colonel Carolyn Birchfield, the commander of the 402d FA Brigade, has placed an emphasis on the ability of the brigade to effectively provide a tough, realistic, and relevant culminating training event for training audiences. According to the brigade vision statement, "The 402d FA Brigade is a premier training organization that transforms and remains adaptive to provide the best possible combat-ready forces for deployment to any theater of operation." In today's ever-changing strategic and tactical operating environment, the brigade is envisioned as remaining adaptive. Providing quality detention operations training drives the mostly maneuver-centric brigade staff to learn and apply military police doctrine to create a premier training experience for mobilized units at Fort Bliss.

Detainee Operations Training

Members of mobilized units who are slated to conduct detainee operations in Afghanistan receive a combination of individual Soldier predeployment training and battalion staff training and validation. The 402d FA Brigade is responsible for validating the ability of the battalion staff to conduct detention operations at the Parwan Detention Facility, Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan. To provide realistic training scenarios for mobilized battalion staffs, the 402d FA Brigade and the training audience participated in numerous predeployment site surveys conducted at the Parwan Detention Facility. The ability of the brigade to provide the most realistic scenarios possible better prepares the staff for deployment. Mobilized units receive intensive instruction on the military decisionmaking process and are given several opportunities to practice the process. Mission scenarios are designed to incorporate the eventual transition from coalition guard force to Afghan-centric guard force, and the focus of the culminating training event is on the strategic sensitivity of this mission. Examples of training scenarios presented to units include the movement of a detainee, a fire or other disturbance within the detention facility, and the death of a detainee. These scenarios shape mobilized battalion staffs into cohesive teams that are capable of executing delicate missions.

Detention operations at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base are unlike those anywhere else in the world. Mobilized units slated to conduct detainee operations at Guantanamo Bay receive specific training that is commensurate with the international attention associated with the joint detention group located there. Battalion staffs that conduct detainee operations at the joint task force level or the joint detention group level must be able to very effectively carry out mission analyses and the military decisionmaking process. Given the highly visible and ever-changing environment at the Guantanamo Bay facility, timely and accurate reporting is required. Battalion staffs and subordinate companies work tirelessly to ensure that units are prepared before deployment. The 402d FA Brigade assists in designing relevant mission scenarios to better prepare units for the sensitive and demanding mission at Guantanamo Bay.

Conclusion

Whether in Afghanistan or at Guantanamo Bay, the 402d FA Brigade and the Mobilization Training Center Bliss strive to provide mobilized units with the training necessary to successfully complete their missions in theater. The Military Police Corps is undergoing a paradigm shift from combat support operations to a law enforcement/detention operations skill set. At the forefront of this shift is an FA brigade that understands what the Corps demands from its Soldiers.

Rough Riders! Saddle Up!

Captain Dew is the plans officer (S-3) for 2d Battalion, 362d FA Regiment, 402d FA Brigade. He holds a bachelor's degree in political science from Auburn University, Auburn, Alabama, and a master's degree in organizational business and security management from Webster University.

INTERAGENCY FELLOWSHIP WITH THE U.S. BORDER PATROL

By Major Jeremy Kerfoot

Interagency Fellowship Program

The Command and General Staff College, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Interagency Fellowship Program, established in 2009, provides a unique opportunity to help build our Army's strategic bench. This program offers Army majors a chance to better understand the role of our interagency partners. Fellowship Program participants gain personal knowledge about the requirements, capabilities, missions, and procedures of federal agencies and departments and nongovernmental organizations through participation in a 9- to 12-month fellowship, which takes place in conjunction with Intermediate Level Education common core training in the National Capital Region. The program offers a collaborative, experiential, educational partnership in which all participants gain knowledge and expertise in solving today's complex problems.

My time as an interagency fellow was spent working in the national headquarters of the U.S. Border Patrol in Washington, D.C. I served as a planner in the Strategic Policy, Planning, and Analysis Division, where I worked on national-level border security strategy and implementation.

History of the Border Patrol

Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the Border Patrol was realigned under a new organization—the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agency. Their mission involves securing our Nation's borders at and between ports of entry and helping to sustain legitimate travel and trade. Along with its CBP partners—Office of Field Operations and Office of Air and Marine—the Border Patrol plays a key role in securing the border and preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States. It works with federal (including military), state, local, and tribal law enforcement partners in a holistic approach to border security. The Border Patrol contributes a unique skill set and capabilities that can be shared across security domains as part of a joint, interagency effort leading to comprehensive border security that meets national security objectives.

The Border Patrol has experienced unprecedented growth in personnel, infrastructure, and technology since the attacks of 11 September 2001. The resource base that has been built during the past 2 decades has enabled the Border Patrol to focus on developing and implementing a strategy that is based on risk. High-risk areas and flows are identified, and responses are tailored to meet those threats. For 2012–2016, the Border Patrol has adopted a new strategic plan that focuses on identifying and mitigating risk. This risk-based approach is encompassed in the core pillars—information, integration, and rapid response.



The continuing evolution of the integration of the Border Patrol with the other CBP components (Office of Field Operations and Office of Air and Marine) allows for border security at and between all U.S. air, land, and sea ports of entry. Combining the capability to react by air, land, and sea

increases the effectiveness of the Border Patrol. Aerial and marine surveillance enable information sharing with agents on the ground, permitting the interdiction of security breaches and the mitigation of risk. Further Border Patrol collaboration with the U.S. military—notably Joint Task Force–North (JTF-N) in South Texas—improves the execution capability of the Border Patrol and the logistics and intelligence capabilities of the military; it also results in joint cooperation along the U.S. borders.

A U.S. Army cavalry scout uses a Long-Range Scout Surveillance System to survey the Arizona-Mexico border for suspected illegal activity.

Unified Land Operations

The Border Patrol uses a comprehensive approach in conducting terrorist interdiction operations and the disruption of transnational criminal organizations. It shares information and coordinates with interagency affiliates and international partners to protect the integrity of the border. Through combined efforts, including the use of unmanned aerial systems and the intelligence fusion of the National Targeting Center–Passengers, the Border Patrol interdicts and arrests those who could potentially do the most harm to Americans. The Border Patrol represents the largest human intelligence presence along the U.S. border and significantly contributes to the intelligence picture that is shared across the intelligence community.

The Border Patrol partners and collaborates with the U.S. military in unified land operations, often enhancing the combined, joint effort used in addressing complex mission sets. From its partnerships with JTF-N, to emerging biometrics capabilities in conjunction with the U.S. Special Operations Command and the Biometrics Identity Management Agency, the Border Patrol helps demonstrate interagency coordination by combining the best efforts of all organizations in tackling issues that threaten national security.

The most contemporary demonstration of the ability of the Border Patrol to partner with the military across unified land operations is reflected in its solid partnership with JTF-N. The Border Patrol most recently partnered with JTF-N during Operation Nimbus II to help gain and maintain control of the southwest U.S. border using border security operations conducted by Border Patrol agents in conjunction with military logistical and intelligence support. Together, the Border Patrol Special Coordination Center and the JTF-N conduct mutually beneficial operations that improve border security and meet the JTF-N mission objective of supporting our Nation's federal law enforcement agencies in identifying and interdicting suspected transnational threats within and along approaches to the continental United States. The Border Patrol Special Coordination Center serves as the single point of contact through which the Border Patrol requests and coordinates Title 10, U.S. Code (USC), *Armed Forces*,[1] Regular Army and Reserve Component military forces support. In addition, the Border Patrol coordinates with individual state National Guard units to conduct border security enforcement actions along state borders with Mexico and Canada. Where the federal government cannot conduct full operations, state governors often take on border security functions, ensuring integrated efforts between National Guard units and the Border Patrol. Federal and National Guard troops provide surveillance, intelligence, and logistical support to Border Patrol arrest and interdiction operations. These combined efforts support the Border Patrol mission and military training objectives in unique and innovative ways. The military partnership with the Border Patrol (and in a broader context, the CBP) provides these interagency partners with a solid doctrinal base for planning and operational execution. Capitalizing on point-of-integration operations, JTF-N helps combine and integrate several national security assets to better address the homeland security issues of terrorist threats and transnational criminal organizations.

In the biometrics arena, the Border Patrol and the military have forged a critical partnership to identify and apprehend

suspected terrorists or criminals who have legally or illegally entered the United States. The military, along with the Border Patrol (through CBP), have begun sharing domestic and foreign biometric databases; these databases have recently been integrated into the Federal Bureau of Investigation Automated Fingerprint Identification System and the Department of Defense Automated Biometric Identification System to interdict suspicious persons before they enter U.S. territory. The Border Patrol partners with U.S. Special Operations Command to interdict terrorists and transnational criminal organizations—especially those coming through South America. Using the military's foreign enrollment database, the Border Patrol screens apprehended aliens during processing to determine whether any other matches exist from anywhere else in the world. Through this database sharing and collaboration, interagency connectivity is improving.

Continued Partnership

The Command and General Staff College Interagency Fellowship Program has facilitated an ongoing partnership with the Border Patrol for the past 3 years. These fellowships have leveraged Army field grade officers' knowledge and military education in helping the Border Patrol mature in the realm of planning, formulating its future strategic and organizational initiatives. Interagency fellows have helped develop, plan, and execute the Border Patrol Strategic Plan—a document that is intended for employees of the organization, but which also serves as a border security blueprint that departmental leaders and members of Congress will use to assess the progress of border security execution. Interagency fellows have partnered with Border Patrol leaders to develop a doctrine base that solidifies lessons learned and best practices for the growing organization and to review planning methodology to codify the leaders' strategic vision. These micro- and macro-level partnerships demonstrate the ability of the Border Patrol to partner with the military in conducting unified land operations to meet the national security objectives of the United States.

The Border Patrol—A Necessary Agency

The Border Patrol is a premier law enforcement organization, recognized around the world for its expertise, capabilities, and professionalism. It plays a critical role in securing our Nation's borders against all threats. The agency approaches this mission from a risk-based perspective, allowing the application of information, the integration of assets, and rapid responses in the most targeted, effective, and efficient manner. It works with federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement partners to achieve a holistic approach to border security. This is accomplished by establishing a unity of purpose, advancing operational integration, jointly planning targeted operations, developing intelligence, performing intelligence fusion, and creating integrated partnerships. Whether in partnership with the U.S. military or other governmental agencies, the Border Patrol contributes a unique skill set and capabilities that can be shared across security domains in a joint, interagency effort that leads to comprehensive border security and meets national security objectives.



A Border Patrol agent scans the U.S. border for suspected illegal activity.

Importance of Interagency Fellowships

Our leaders must be able to effectively work with our joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational teammates. They must be continually challenged with a competitive learning environment, as we must prevail in this environment. We must recognize officers with the highest potential and provide them with the most challenging experiences. To educate our officers throughout their career timelines,[2] the Army offers multiple broadening opportunities outside the realm of traditional professional military education. Offering a broadening capability—especially in law enforcement—to Military Police Corps officers and noncommissioned officers is critical to enhancing our skill set bench and to ensuring that we remain the force of choice for the U.S. Army well into the future.

Endnotes:

[1]Title 10, USC, *Armed Forces*.

[2]"Statement of BG Sean B. MacFarland, Deputy Commandant, Army Command and General Staff College, Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Armed Services Committee on 'Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Two Decades After the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel,' " 30 November 2010, <http://democrats.armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=a9b1c316-c34f-4737-8fd2-fd9e5f59b063>, accessed on 1 July 2013.

Major Kerfoot is the executive officer, U.S. Army Protective Services Battalion (CID), Fort Belvoir, Virginia. He served as an interagency fellow with the U.S. Border Patrol from 2011 to 2012. He holds bachelor's degrees in political science and history from Virginia Tech and a master's degree in business and organizational security management from Webster University.

"Burnishing the Steel, 2013–2016"

Linking Strategy and Vigilance to Prevent Terrorism

By Lieutenant Colonel Craig Benedict (Retired)

In his autobiography, iconic heavyweight boxer Jack Dempsey describes how he bathed his face in beef brine to toughen the skin. "If I ever got cut, I wouldn't bleed," he states. "Eventually, my face got as tough as a saddle."[1] He further explains, "[Bernie] taught me to chew pine gum, straight from the trees, to strengthen my jaw. Then, after a spell, he would test me to see if I had done enough chewing by throwing a left hook at my jaw. Invariably, I would be knocked down. After dusting myself off, I would chew some more of the bitter-tasting stuff."[2] Have we developed this same resistance with regard to protecting Army communities against a terrorist attack?

A recent poll suggests that terrorism is a diminishing concern for Americans,[3] which seems odd considering a U.S. intelligence official's claim that terrorism is "a persistent and diversifying threat to the [United States] and overseas interests."[4] If gaining public support is critical to the success of our antiterrorism efforts, then this public perception presents a problem for the Army. The challenge across the Army community is to figure out how to sustain vigilance without increasing tensions or appearing to cry wolf. How do we maintain a routine watchfulness for potential terrorist activities while still accomplishing assigned missions with the prudent use of limited resources? The recently approved Army Antiterrorism Strategic Plan (ATSP), Phase III, "Burnishing the Steel, 2013–2016"[5] serves as the Army guide to combating the apparent fatigue and complacency regarding antiterrorism. The ATSP represents a continuation of efforts to improve terrorism protection throughout the Army; yet, it is far more than routine. It accounts for the evolution of terrorist methods, adjusts for changes in Army structure, and fills identified gaps in current security procedures. Through a combination of goals and objectives articulated in the ATSP, we can sustain awareness, synchronize efforts, and foster resourcefulness.

Strategic Concept

In today's environment, terrorism represents the most likely form of direct attack against the U.S. homeland or U.S. interests abroad. And Army entities appear on the target lists of many prospective terrorist groups. According to the document entitled *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, ". . . violent extremists will continue to threaten U.S. interests, allies, partners, and the homeland"[6]—and virtually all other national security documents contain similar language. This threat demands a comprehensive and coordinated response. The Army response is contained in the ATSP. While the environments and tactics of prospective terrorists differ, the fundamental objective is the same—"the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies."[7] To protect against this prospect, the Army has focused its policies, procedures, and doctrine on the terrorist threat.

In simplest terms, a strategy refers to a plan of action. The Department of Defense (DOD) defines a strategic plan as "a plan for the overall conduct of a war."[8] The ATSP represents a plan for the overall conduct of antiterrorism operations within the Army. It provides a broad framework of actions aimed at protecting Army personnel and missions from terrorist attacks, while also allowing the flexibility needed to adapt to the situation on the ground. The guidance outlined in the ATSP defines the general expectations for improvement, within which Army organizations may assign their own goals and objectives.

The ATSP applies to all Headquarters, Department of the Army (DA), agencies; Army commands; Army Service component commands; direct reporting units; the Army National Guard; and the Army Staff. It covers installations, facilities, and units involved in Army activities around the world. Practically speaking, the ATSP impacts the entire Army community. All Army entities—from an infantry battalion in Afghanistan to an Army National Guard unit in New York—are bound by the common purpose of preventing a successful terrorist attack.

"Burnishing the Steel, 2013–2016" is the third installment of the ATSP. The previous two installments focused on improving antiterrorism defenses at installations (Phase I) and broadening the scope of antiterrorism to include all elements of the Army (Phase II). Although strategic objectives have not yet been fully achieved, progress has been focused and

decisive. For Phase III, the emphasis is placed on the following fundamentals:

- Sustaining the progress that has been achieved.
- Driving the action necessary to address remaining gaps in Army antiterrorism efforts.
- Continuing the search for shortfalls that might present vulnerabilities with regard to terrorist attacks.

Antiterrorism Vision

During the early stages of World War II, Viscount Sir William Slim, the British commander in Burma, described one of the causes for early Allied defeats as something that "affected all our efforts and contributed much to turning defeat into disaster—the failure to give the forces in the field a clear strategic objective for the campaign."[9] The absence of objectives sets the stage for random, disconnected actions that contribute little toward comprehensive success—or worse yet, for no action at all.

The Army antiterrorism vision expresses the Army strategic objectives. It contains the most critical strategic element and provides the focus necessary to ensure an opportunity for success. For Army antiterrorism operations, this means preventing a successful terrorist attack—the essence of any Army antiterrorism program. The supporting emphasis is on the stakeholders (the entire Army community) and all the environments in which the vision is applied. Terrorists do not unduly limit their focus, and neither should we.

In his book entitled *In the Arena: A Memoir of the 20th Century*, former Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger writes, "A defensive strategy has to cede to the other side the time, place, and manner of attack and, ultimately, the battle. That puts a higher premium on preparedness and acquiring the tools necessary to deter or defeat any kind of attack."[10] The ATSP serves as the tool that the Army uses to plan antiterrorism preparedness at all times and in all locations.

Antiterrorism Intent

As early as 600 A.D., Byzantine tactical doctrine reminded soldiers: One "must not always use the same modes of operations against the enemy, even though they seem to be working out successfully. Often enough, the enemy will become used to them, adapt to them, and inflict disaster on us."[11] And Scottish historian and philosopher Thomas Carlyle once observed, "Today is not yesterday: we ourselves change; how can our works and thoughts, if they are always to be the fittest, continue always the same?"[12]

Some argue that DOD antiterrorism policies have changed very little since the 1996 terrorist attack on Khobar Towers.[13] Indeed, current installation antiterrorism standards reflect lessons learned from that attack. However, the developers of the ATSP recognized the need to anticipate the future; the encouragement of innovation and resourcefulness is one of the critical elements of the ATSP. The ATSP emphasizes the need for the thoughtful and appropriate application of change according to the times—an Army hallmark that is aligned with finding a way to win through innovation.

Army Antiterrorism Vision

"The Army accepts as reality the intent of those that would use terrorism as a tool to destroy people, disrupt our mission, and deter us from our responsibilities. In turn, we accept the obligations to not only prevent terrorist attacks targeting the Army community, but to respond effectively to an attack should an enemy attempt to break through our protective posture. The entire Army must be involved with this important endeavor so that every organization, every unit, and every person that is part of the Army community understands their role and responsibilities. All leaders must insist on effective antiterrorism measures. Through resourcefulness and careful planning, Army strengths will prevail over terrorists' intent. In turn, there is little doubt that we will successfully prevent terrorist attacks and are ready to respond to an attack if necessary."

—Stand-To![14]

Antiterrorism Priorities

Defensive plans and programs, such as those for antiterrorism, are guided by a broad set of priorities developed from a wide variety of possibilities. The establishment of priorities fosters consistency in thoughts and actions, helps avoid completely random execution, and assists in the application of limited resources. Priorities express the intent of Army leaders and assign significance to certain functions or geographic areas. Senior leader emphasis should drive resource allocation, but still leave room for creative and imaginary thought. This approach links all solutions to a few solid precepts (such as the antiterrorism principles of assess, detect, defend, warn, and recover), expanding the possibilities for success.

Two priorities are highlighted within the ATSP—(1) training, education, and awareness and (2) information sharing. According to Army leaders, these priorities represent the most critical concepts that contribute to Army achievement of the antiterrorism vision. The broad priorities relay senior leader intent, and the echelons of command apply within the constraints of each concept.

The assignment of priorities at the DA level translates to the synchronized assignment of priorities at Army commands. While DA strategic priorities assign importance, they do not restrict local commands from making the best decisions possible for their specific situations.

Goals of "Burnishing the Steel, 2013–2016"

The goals of the ATSP, Phase III, "Burnishing the Steel, 2013–2016" are to—

- Reflect current Army structure and operations.
- Embed antiterrorism concepts through training and doctrine.
- Improve reporting and evaluations.
- Develop and disseminate consistent antiterrorism-related intelligence.

- Advance antiterrorism planning and programming.
- Develop priorities, coordinate requirements, and effectively apply resources in collaboration with stakeholders.

Execution

Strategies are nothing without execution. Without action, the words expressed in the broad strategies have little value. President Abraham Lincoln acknowledged this truth when, in November 1862, after repeated failures by Union generals, he exclaimed in exasperation, ". . . [the people] have got the idea into their heads that we are going to get out of this fix, somehow, by strategy! That's the word—*strategy*! General [George] McClellan thinks he is going to whip the rebels by strategy, and the army has got the same notion. They have no idea that the war is to be carried on and put through by hard, tough fighting . . ."[15]

Cognizant of the possibility of a wilting strategy, the developers of the ATSP delineated a wide array of objectives that demand action. In this third phase of the strategy, the emphasis is on integrating various security-related functions (law enforcement, physical security, cyber security, operations security) to build a seamless defense against terrorism. Improvements in Army leader antiterrorism training and organization are emphasized; and the sharing of threat information, the leveraging of information systems and tools, and the expansion of the partner network are reinforced. "Burnishing the Steel, 2013–2016" includes objectives for coordination with cyber security, protection, personnel recovery, and other functions. It also addresses preparing for the possibility of insider threats and accounting for the unique characteristics of terrorism encountered by various overseas commands. The energy of the ATSP is sustained by addressing changes in terrorist tactics. The ATSP also complements changes in Army structure and fills gaps resulting from identified Army antiterrorism program shortfalls. Army defenses against terrorist attacks are maintained and improved through regular ATSP reviews and adjustments.

In the 4th century B.C., Spartan defensive doctrine deliberately did not call for building walls around cities to protect against possible enemy attacks. The Spartans believed that walls might impart a sense of safety and encourage indifference toward watchfulness and rigorous training. They believed that awareness and "swords" represented the most effective prevention and response to threats.[16] Although most ancient Greek cities did not completely ignore the obvious benefits of walls, they recognized the value of preparedness. We still use walls today; but as with the Spartans, awareness and planning provide the most formidable defense against a terrorist attack. To a great extent, our protection depends on our ability to identify the prospective terrorist before an attack and to effectively respond during the event. By implementing local plans, Army commands at all levels represent the teeth of the strategy. Local commands, in particular, leverage the eyes and ears of the community and, by doing so, link strategy, planning, and action to sustained vigilance.

President Ronald Reagan once observed, "Well, to those who think strength provokes conflict, Will Rogers had his own answer. He said of the world heavyweight champion of his day, 'I've never seen anyone insult Jack Dempsey.' "[17] "Burnishing the Steel, 2013–2016" outlines how to proceed toward the desired end state—building that type of strength. It assigns responsibilities and rough timelines in a cohesive, integrated, and systemic approach. It guides efforts to build necessary protective measures beyond the physical elements. By setting broad priorities, integrating antiterrorism elements with other functions, highlighting improved information sharing, and cost effectively encouraging resources application, the ATSP serves as a blueprint. In a sense, it is our beef brine that will lead us to the toughness espoused by Jack Dempsey.

Endnotes:

[1]Jack Dempsey and Barbara Piatelli Dempsey, *Dempsey: The Autobiography of Jack Dempsey*, W.H. Allen/Virgin Books, 1977.

[2]Ibid.

[3]"Terrorism in the United States," Gallup poll, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/4909/terrorism-united-states.aspx>, accessed on 6 June 2013.

[4]"Understanding the Homeland Threat Landscape," Hearing Before the House Committee on Homeland Security, testimony of the Honorable Matthew G. Olsen, Director, National Counterterrorism Center, 25 July 2012, <http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony-Olsen.pdf>, accessed on 6 June 2013.

[5]"Burnishing the Steel, 2013–2016," Army Antiterrorism Strategic Plan, Phase III, 14 February 2013.

[6]*Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, January 2012, <http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf>, accessed on 6 June 2013.

[7]Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 8 November 2010 (as amended through 15 April 2012).

[8]Ibid.

[9] William Slim, *Defeat Into Victory*, Cassell and Company Ltd., London, 1956, p. 536.

[10]Caspar W. Weinberger and Gretchen Roberts, *In the Arena: A Memoir of the 20th Century*, Regnery Publishing Company, Washington, D.C., 25 November 2001, p. 301.

[11]Charles C. Peterson, "The Strategikon: A Forgotten Military Classic," *Military Review*, Vol 72, No. 8, August 1992, p.70, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/strategikon/strategikon.htm>, accessed on 14 June 2013.

[12]Thomas Carlyle, "Characteristics," *The Edinburgh Review*, Vol. LIV, December 1831, <http://www.efm.bris.ac.uk/het/carlyle/charact.htm>, accessed on 14 June 2013.

[13]The Khobar Towers attack, which took place on 25 June 1996, consisted of the terrorist bombing of a housing complex in the city of Khobar, Saudi Arabia. At the time of the attack, Khobar Towers was being used as quarters for foreign (including U.S.) military personnel.

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The Mighty 102d:
All-Hazards Military Police

By Captain Justin Pelletier

Most of us in uniform have served overseas at some point. Most of us have read the lines of fear etched into the faces of those living in a war zone. And almost all of us have put on the uniform and gone to work to keep that destruction and despair out of our own neighborhoods. But sometimes a force of nature, rather than the fierceness of man, inflicts the ravages of war. In 2012, Superstorm Sandy devastated New York, causing 87 deaths and $71.4 billion in damages.[1] According to Dr. Jeff Masters, Weather Underground, the total energy of the storm peaked at 329 terajoules—roughly equivalent to the combined energy of five atomic bombs the size of the one dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, in 1945.[2] The area affected was about 1,150 miles in diameter. So just a little more than a year after the 102d Military Police Battalion, Auburn, New York, responded to Hurricane Irene (and amid recent and impending deployments to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Guantanamo Bay), our country again called upon us for help. And again, we were first into the storm.

Contact

Task Force 102 was pre-positioned at Farmingdale Armed Forces Reserve Center, Long Island, to provide an immediate response to the storm that was predicted to strike the New York City metropolitan area. The task force consisted of four military police companies (Headquarters and Headquarters, 105th, 107th, and 206th located throughout New York) organic to the 102d Military Police Battalion, attachments from the 442d Military Police Company, and attachments from the 1st Battalion, 69th Infantry Regiment. Strong preparatory training and coordination allowed Task Force 102 Soldiers to travel to Long Island from throughout the state and become integrated into operations within 24 hours of receiving the alert. In the hours leading up to storm landfall, Soldiers and appropriate vehicles were embedded in fire departments across Long Island.

As waves greater than 30 feet tall passed through Long Island Sound and wind-battered water surged 9 feet above high tide and into streets and buildings, Soldiers from Task Force 102 worked with police and firefighters throughout the dark night of 29 October 2012—which, at one point, was illuminated by an exploding electrical substation just across the river on Manhattan's 14th Street—to rescue 308 civilians from the devastation. The search and rescue efforts of Task Force 102 were exemplified by two 102d Military Police Battalion Soldiers who recently received the New York Medal for Valor for their actions that night. Those Soldiers waded through chest-high flood currents strewn with floating cars and downed power lines to rescue at least 20 local residents from house fires and rising water.

Defense Support of Civil Authorities

The *Military Police Force 2020 Strategic Plan* is based on the assumption that state governors will continue to rely on military police for the defense support of civil authorities (DSCA). The fifth goal of the *Military Police Force 2020 Strategic Plan*—to maximize the versatility of military police capabilities—invites us to discover commonalities between best practices among the different roles of military police across unified land operations.[3]

In 1917, T.E. Lawrence stated, "Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them."[4] These words are echoed across U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. Most military police forces have practiced this principle while providing mentorship to host nation law enforcement during the past decade. We've found that Lawrence's words are equally applicable to DSCA activities.

Through our battalion experiences spanning several combat deployments and two domestic emergencies, we have learned that—for counterinsurgency and DSCA operations—we need to focus on working ourselves out of a job. According to Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*, the primary characteristics of DSCA operations include military responsiveness to the authority of civilians and military departure when civil authorities are able to continue

without defense support.[5] Just as with downrange operations, our greatest Superstorm Sandy success was in backing up local emergency responders, civilian government organizations, and community volunteers.

During Superstorm Sandy, our Nation implemented a dual-status (Title 10, U.S. Code [USC], *Armed Forces*,[6] and Title 32, USC, *National Guard*[7]) chain of command for the first time. The commander of the New York Army National Guard forged a seamless integration between the Army National Guard Soldiers, Army Reservists, Regular Army Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen to accomplish the assigned mission. Based on the purported success of Regular Army Soldiers reporting to Army National Guard commanders,[8] it appears almost certain that all military police will need to prepare for DSCA operations.

Theory Into Practice

In the days that followed Superstorm Sandy landfall, residents and local governments faced significant challenges in maintaining stability while recovering from the disaster. The storm resulted in nearly a million power outages on Long Island alone. After the first night without power, spray-painted signs threatening vigilante violence appeared around several homes on Long Island. Within a few days of the massive outages, one of the most affluent areas in the world began to mirror a war zone. The power failures, combined with distressed petroleum and transportation infrastructure, placed an increased strain on gas supplies; and people struggled to fuel their vehicles and generators. Shoot-outs and knife fights raged in hours-long gas lines. Some miscreants pilfered electronics stores and residences while overburdened police responded to other emergencies.

Through close coordination with Army and Air National Guard embeds at the Nassau and Suffolk County Emergency Operations Centers,[9] Task Force 102 learned of the specific needs within its area of responsibility. Because of the embedded coordination, the task force responded in subordination to the needs of the civilian government. Task Force 102—

- Established refueling points and dispatched maintenance teams to keep civilian emergency vehicles running, maintained 10 traffic control posts, and assisted with 1,150 police calls—all of which contributed to a 44 percent reduction in crime compared with pre-Sandy levels.
- Established several points of distribution, where food and water provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency were handed out to the hardest-hit communities within the area of responsibility. The task force distributed 226,000 meals and 403,000 bottles of water to residents who had no heat, no hot water, and no other access to sustenance. The task force also provided emergency medical support at the points of distribution.
- Dispatched teams to clear roads that had been closed due to fallen debris. Trained chain saw operators cleared 72 trees in a 62-block area to ensure access for first responders. Local public works departments quickly cleared the rest of the area.

Soldiers add fuel to civilian emergency vehicles at a refueling point.

To bolster local morale, the task force also provided door-to-door debris removal for 195 homes in the hardest-hit areas.

- Transported, tested, and fueled 800 generators and emplaced them at 22 polling sites to enable voting in the 2012 presidential election. It became evident that the need for a military police force capable of tactful support to elections was not unique to the remote, struggling democracies of the world. Just as we strive to avoid the appearance of impropriety in elections abroad, we carefully adhered to our mandate and followed the lead of the State Board of Elections.
- Worked through nongovernmental organizations to provide needed assistance. For example, only 9 days after Superstorm Sandy struck, Nor'easter Athena knocked out power from about 60,000 homes where it had been regained since the storm. With nearly 200,000 Long Island homes in the dark a week and half following storm landfall, we helped the American Red Cross establish warming shelters for those who had nowhere else to go when the temperatures dropped.
- Leveraged opportunities to support informal volunteer networks that were well equipped to provide assistance. One of these networks, operating from the Friedberg Jewish Community Center in Oceanside, New York, made use of personal relationships to determine whose homes were destroyed and then ran hourly convoys to directly deliver food, water, clothing, and cleaning supplies to those in most need. The volunteers' knowledge of affected areas and their ready supply of human capital eased our withdrawal of humanitarian relief to their neighbors.

Conclusion

Self-sufficiency is a basic human desire that becomes especially important after disaster strikes. The identification and supplementation of the efforts of strong, well-organized civilian networks help the members of those groups realize that they have the tools necessary to sustain relief. And without language barriers and concerns of corruption, military police who are accustomed to fighting wars abroad should find that

their capabilities can be easily adapted to support various domestic needs. Much of our counterinsurgency work involves teaching populations how to survive without us. With DSCA, we focus on providing American communities with temporary assistance while reminding them that they do not stand alone against the forces of chaos—that together, we can weather any storm.

Endnotes:

[1]Eric S. Blake et al., "Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Sandy (AL182012), 22–29 October 2012," National Hurricane Center, National Weather Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 12 February 2013, <http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL182012_Sandy.pdf>, accessed on 8 July 2013.

[2]Jeff Masters, "Hurricane Sandy's Huge Size: Freak of Nature or Climate Change?" Weather Underground, 13 November 2012, <http://www.wunderground.com/blog/JeffMasters/comment.html?entrynum=2293>, accessed on 8 July 2013.

[3]*Military Police Force 2020 Strategic Plan*, U.S. Army Office of the Provost Marshal General, <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/38004170>, accessed on 8 July 2013.

[4]T.E. Lawrence, "The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence," *The Arab Bulletin*, 20 August 1917, <http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_27_Articles_of_T.E._Lawrence>, accessed on 8 July 2013.

[5]ADP 3-28: *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*, 26 July 2012.

[6]Title 10, USC, *Armed Forces*.

[7]Title 32, USC, *National Guard*.

[8]Donna Miles, "Sandy Response Reaffirms Value of Dual-Status Commanders," American Forces Press Service, U.S. Department of Defense, 11 January 2013, <https://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=118975>, accessed on 8 July 2013.

[9]The Nassau and Suffolk County Emergency Operations Centers control county police and fire assets and are synchronized with state emergency management offices—which, in turn, coordinate through the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to access resources from the U.S. Coast Guard and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

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[14]*Stand-To!*, 22 January 2009, <http://www.army.mil/standto/archive/2009/01/22/>, accessed on 14 June 2013.

[15]Mary A. Livermore, *My Story of the War: A Woman's Narrative of Four Years Personal Experience,* A.D. Worthington, Hartford, Connecticut, 1890, p. 556.

[16]Plato, *Laws*, Great Books (19th printing), Vol. 7, Book VI, 1971, p. 710.

[17]Ronald Reagan, "Address to the Nation on National Security," 26 February 1986, <http://reagan2020.us/speeches/address_on_national_security.asp>, accessed on 20 June 2013.

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The Military Police Creed

I am a Soldier and proud member of the United States Army Military Police Corps Regiment.

I am Of the Troops and For the Troops.

I believe there is no higher calling than to ASSIST, PROTECT, and DEFEND my fellow Soldiers, their families, and the basic ideals of our Constitution that guarantee our freedom and our American way of life.

I am always ready to help individual Soldiers retain or regain their dignity.

I assist commanders in performing their missions; safeguarding their commands; and maintaining discipline, law, and order.

I am proud of the Military Corps Regiment and fully understand the awesome responsibility given to all military police Soldiers.

At the same time, I am humble because I know that I am a servant of my country and my Army.

To perform my duties properly, my honesty, integrity, and courage must be balanced by competence, alertness, and courtesy.

I know I am constantly in the public eye, and my behavior sets the standards of excellence of my fellow Soldiers.

To my unit, my commander, and myself, I promise sustained, just, and honorable support.

To my country, the Army, and my Regiment, I promise the skills of my training, my physical ability, my mental initiative, and my moral courage, for I am a Soldier in the

MILITARY POLICE CORPS REGIMENT.

The Use of Military Police in the SFAAT Mission Set

By Major Brian Heverly

Currently, the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) is largely ignored, as our focus is now on the Afghan National Army (ANA). The window for military police to be involved at the tactical level in the security force assistance advisor team (SFAAT) phase of the Afghan mission has passed. However, this article illustrates that military police can contribute to the transition of a host nation police force that was initially trained as a paramilitary organization to a rule of law enforcement organization that is capable of preventing insurgent and criminal forces from filling the gap in and around urban areas as counterinsurgency operations are successfully completed. As insurgents are pushed out of urban areas, the population looks to the paramilitary police forces to begin enforcing the rule of law in a professional manner. Military police can contribute by serving on an SFAAT or by providing subject matter expertise to an SFAAT.

Although the SFAAT phase of the counterinsurgency fight typically falls under the purview of Special Forces, conventional forces have been called upon to execute this mission in recent years and military police battalions can play a vital role. Using Afghanistan as an example, this article addresses—

- The identification of a gap in focus on the circles of success (areas that are relatively free of organized terrorist or insurgent personnel and activity) created by the successful prosecution of counterinsurgency.
- The way that host nation police forces straddle the governance and security lines of effort (LOEs).
- Examples of law enforcement skill sets neglected by current advise-and-assist team models.
- The way in which a combat support military police battalion can be applied as an economy of force against the mission set on a tactical level.

Military police can provide subject matter expertise in the SFAAT environment, lending advice and assistance to emerging host nation police forces and battlespace integrators across the spectrum of military police functions.

Through various iterations of training teams and as part of company and battalion mission sets, military police at the team, squad, platoon, and company levels have conducted training of Afghan and other host nation police forces for years. Military police organizations have arguably executed advise-and-assist missions on the operational level. The biometric task force that is helping to establish an Afghan crime laboratory capability is one example. And units have assisted in the internment and resettlement arena at the national level. The main focus of this article is on what is arguably a current gap at the tactical level—military police battalion headquarters exercising mission command (task-organized with subordinate companies in a general support role to a battlespace integrator's area of responsibility or as individual or small-group subject matter experts to the same battlespace integrator and SFAAT) while partnered with an AUP provincial or zone headquarters.

Throughout the past decade, the coalition worked to build the Afghan National Security Forces while simultaneously pursuing various insurgent groups. According to current doctrine, success with counterinsurgency missions is defined as moving insurgents away from population centers (where they can hide and gain support) into rural areas (where they shrink, lose relevance, or become susceptible to conventional targeting); and coalition forces successfully executed counterinsurgency missions in conjunction with Afghan National Security Forces. The current focus of coalition forces is on building the ANA capacity. The ANA is to maintain the success that has already been experienced and to serve as the lead organization in continuing the fight after coalition forces leave the country.

As a result of the success experienced in the counterinsurgency environment of Afghanistan, small circles of success have been created in and around the population centers of cities, towns, and villages. These areas allow for government progress and economic stability and growth.

The ability of the host nation police force to enforce the rule of law in the circles of success is vital to maintaining relative stability in the area. To ensure survivability, police force training must initially be conducted with a focus on military tactics, techniques, and procedures. However, as success in the counterinsurgency fight is realized, the host nation police force must mature into a rule of law enforcement organization. The population center is protected by the outer ring established by the host nation army—in this case, the ANA. Except

in deliberate missions and in conjunction with the AUP, the ANA does not operate within population centers; instead, it is responsible for the circles of success.

Insurgents migrate to areas of least resistance. Without a force operating within the circles of success to keep enemies out or to embolden the populace to refuse them support, they would naturally move back in and reoccupy the circles of success as they were displaced from rural areas. And there are not enough ANA or coalition forces to be present everywhere at once. Therefore, the AUP and other law enforcement organizations must fill the gap and keep the enemy out of the circles of success.

From the beginning of the conflict in Afghanistan until recently, the AUP has operated almost solely as a paramilitary force, working hard to establish circles of success. The skill sets needed were predominantly those necessary to survive on the battlefield—Skill Level 1 infantry tasks with a mere smattering of law enforcement skills. Coalition training focused on force protection and enemy identification and engagement.

The AUP and LOEs

Due to the success of the counterinsurgency fight, the AUP is now transitioning to a rule of law enforcement organization. It is straddling the security and governance LOEs. While the AUP must still fight and survive on the battlefield from time to time, it is more often being called upon to conduct criminal investigations and warrant-based searches and arrests and to facilitate internment systems from the point of arrest through long-term imprisonment according to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan constitution. In some areas, the AUP is the only Afghan government representative with which the population will ever come into contact.

Through all evolutions of advisor/training teams and SFAATs, coalition forces (including military police at the squad, platoon, and company levels) have focused on the skill sets that the ANA and AUP have needed to be successful in security LOEs. This training yields organizations that can provide security by protecting the population from the physical threat posed by insurgents. During the initial phases of the counterinsurgency fight, these skill sets are crucial; they are used to keep members alive and to allow them to close with and engage the enemy.

However, at some point, police organizations must transition from serving solely as fighting units to units that can provide rule of law enforcement, countering insurgents and criminal threats. Once a population center is relatively secure, the ANA shifts its focus to the rural areas where the enemy fled. The AUP maintains the security of the population against the return of the insurgents while simultaneously facilitating and executing governance through its role as a rule of law enforcement organization.

AUP as Law Enforcement

Overall, the AUP is capable when it comes to fighting and winning against the various insurgent groups operating within Afghanistan. However, outside of national Afghan law enforcement training academies, the coalition has not focused on rule of law enforcement skill sets. Members of the AUP receive initial training in law enforcement skills through the Afghan National Police Academy. And those who become officers or noncommissioned officers or who require specialty training attend additional academy courses throughout their careers. But coalition forces do not regularly conduct law enforcement training at the district and provincial headquarters.[1] If current SFAATs partner with the AUP at all, they focus on infantry-centric skill sets such as survivability on the battlefield. They are designed to advise and assist conventional military leaders and their staffs; they are not configured to address law enforcement skills. And as coalition forces retrograde from Afghanistan, SFAATs will continue to focus on the ANA. Although mobile training teams may arrive, they are few and far between and they focus on national-level geographic areas. And while embedded police mentors still exist throughout the country, the ability of these career law enforcement professionals to get to the AUP is limited since they rely on coalition forces for security and movement. In cases where embedded police mentors live on coalition bases adjacent to AUP headquarters, most of their time is consumed with assisting AUP leaders in administrative areas.

The baseline skill sets that the AUP does not currently possess—or at least does not use—include criminal investigations, warrant (search and arrest) processing, evidence processing, and detention facilities management. The AUP is capable of collecting evidence, which is a skill that members learn through academy instruction; however, even that instruction is not complete, as it focuses on sensitive-site exploitation rather than on the handling and processing of evidence through the Afghan system. It is the handling of evidence, the chain of custody, and the onward movement to trial that challenge the AUP and the Afghan judicial system.

Trained AUP criminal investigators are not always assigned at the district level; and when they are, their expertise ranges widely—from those who recently attended the officer academy to those who have been investigators for decades. As the theater matures and targeting gives way to the host nation warrant process, the AUP may or may not know what is required for different warrants. However, judicial personnel (prosecutors and judges) are familiar with the proper procedures. The AUP and the people become frustrated when the legal system turns criminals away because a prescribed process was not followed. Military police personnel, with judge advocate general assistance, could help inform the AUP and provide oversight until the AUP could correctly execute the process on its own. Although the AUP is capable of detaining, restraining, and arresting individuals, it could also benefit from military police assistance and oversight from the point of arrest (where standards of execution vary widely) to the point of release or imprisonment.

Military Police Battalions as SFAATs

Military police companies, battalions, and headquarters can be task-organized to fit police-specific SFAAT models or to provide subject matter expertise to existing SFAATs. In keeping

with the example of Afghanistan, military police battalion headquarters and headquarters detachments can be positioned to advise and assist provincial-level AUP headquarters, with an appropriate number of companies to provide SFAAT coverage to the districts in the province. A significant portion of the SFAATs consist of senior personnel who have the experience necessary to provide advanced-level training.

Assuming an economy-of-force mission that does not allow for the deployment of 100 percent of an organization's (company or battalion) modified table of organization and equipment, there are two ways in which military police can fulfill the vital SFAAT mission set—(1) as a separate, AUP-focused organization operating in general support to the battlespace integrator, coalition force headquarters, responsible for the province in which they are operating and (2) as individuals task-organized to existing SFAATs at the ANA battalion level.

With the first option, the battalion staff (including battalion maintenance and property book officers) is partnered with provincial commanders, their staffs, and respective counterparts. The battalion is responsible for advising and assisting with day-to-day operations and conducting any centralized training deemed necessary by the provincial police chief. Companies are deployed with enough Soldiers (according to current force protection requirements) to provide security for movement around the area. At the district level, company commanders and first sergeants partner their noncommissioned officers in charge with multiple district chiefs of police, leaving their platoon leaders and platoon sergeants to coordinate event and convoy security and to supervise training events. Operations sergeants coordinate all company activities or supervise mobile training teams, which enhances the assistance capabilities of the companies. The focus of mobile training teams can be tailored to the needs of the specific districts. For example, a mobile training team could conduct training focused on evidence collection and handling, which would be comprised of several sessions and would rotate through areas of responsibility. Assuming that battalion and company teams could live on forward-operating bases established throughout the province, the total manning required to cover a province could be 70 or less personnel—one battalion team of about 20 personnel (including security personnel) and two company teams of about 25 personnel each (also including security personnel).

With the second option, the battalion headquarters is assigned the same partnered mission. However in this case, the headquarters ties in to the battlespace integrator at the brigade combat team level to provide subject matter expertise and oversight of the professionalization of AUP law enforcement advisement and assistance conducted by SFAATs operating in the area of the battlespace integrator. The SFAATs have at least one senior military police noncommissioned officer and several sergeants or below who can provide law enforcement training while the rest of the SFAAT provides staff assistance. This means that the SFAATs would take a geographic approach to coverage, rather than participate in the unit-specific partnering currently conducted. When not conducting training, military police can easily be incorporated into the security force. This option requires the addition of about 20 military police for partnering at the provincial level, as the military police within the SFAATs are included within the existing task organization.

For both options, the battalion headquarters can form mobile training teams which can provide specialty training that companies cannot. For example, the battalion property book officer and logistics officer (S-4) can conduct mobile property accountability classes, the battalion internment/resettlement noncommissioned officer can advise and assist with the management of detention facilities, and the intelligence officer (S-2) can provide crime analysis training. Adjacent and subordinate units can take advantage of the law enforcement expertise present within the battalion headquarters.

Conclusion

The decision to focus SFAAT efforts on the ANA was made in light of public will, political and tactical reality, and U.S. force strength—all balanced against desired end states; of course, the enemy also had a vote. This article is not intended to question that decision or to describe a standard or doctrinal solution—only to use the current situation in Afghanistan as an example of SFAAT use.

The use of military police battalions and Soldiers in the form of SFAATs is the solution to transitioning a paramilitary host nation police force to a rule of law enforcement organization in a theater in which counterinsurgency operations have successfully separated insurgents from population centers. As representatives of a central government, police forces within the circles of success surrounding population centers are required to maintain stability, combat criminal activities, and protect the population from insurgents. In this way, host nation police forces straddle governance and security LOEs.

When considering SFAAT coverage and contemplating which organizations could benefit from SFAAT advice and assistance, host nation police forces should be taken into account. They need assistance with such transitions, and military police are ideally equipped to help. This is especially true as members of the Military Police Corps continue to build upon their law enforcement expertise at their home stations and through their broadening experiences with industry and other law enforcement organizations.

Endnote:

[1]The AUP is organized (from smallest to largest units) into checkpoints/precincts, districts, provinces, and zones—with zones answering to the National Headquarters of the Ministry of the Interior.

Major Heverly serves as the deputy provost marshal, Fort Bliss, Texas, where he is assigned to the 72d Military Police Detachment, 93d Military Police Battalion. He holds a bachelor's degree in criminology from Indiana University of Pennsylvania.

AUP TAKES CONTROL OF PSS 16

By First Lieutenant Megan Conroy

An Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) commander and the platoon leader for 2d Platoon, 563d Military Police Company, shook hands, signaling the send-off of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from Police Substation (PSS) 16 in the heart of Kandahar City, Afghanistan. The departure was bittersweet for the 2d Platoon, which had been embedded with the AUP at PSS 16 for the previous 4 months. The AUP took complete control of PSS 16 and is now responsible for its overall security and daily operations.

AUP in control of force protection at PSS 16.

Through the experiences of living alongside members of the AUP and conducting more than 100 joint patrols throughout the streets of Kandahar City, the relationship between the AUP commander and the leader of the 2d Platoon and the relationships between AUP patrolmen and 563d Military Police Company Soldiers had grown strong. The Soldiers of the 2d Platoon (Wolf Pack) learned how to live within a different culture and how to operate with a foreign force. And the experience provided the military police Soldiers with the opportunity to mentor and train the AUP in the areas of police tactics and community policing. Military police Soldiers shouldered great responsibilities and were instrumental in accomplishing the tactical-level mission during the continuing conflict in Afghanistan.

When the 563d Military Police Company arrived in southern Afghanistan in late May 2012, the platoons were dispersed throughout Kandahar City, where they were embedded with their AUP partners in various PSSs—including PSS 16, where the 2d Platoon was embedded. Due to its location in a graveyard near the ISAF base of Camp Nathan Smith, PSS 16 soon became known as "Graveyard Base" among ISAF and AUP units. The AUP commander in charge of PSS 16 and five checkpoints controlled more than 80 patrolmen while conducting daily operations. For several months, the leader of the 2d Platoon worked closely with the PSS 16 commander, planning dismounted patrols and mentoring him on patrol techniques and logistics. She also employed her Soldiers to share their military police training with the Afghans. "Working with [the leader of the 2d Platoon] and the American Soldiers has been very beneficial for my Afghan police," said the PSS 16 commander. "The partnership we have is very strong, and the benefits of working together are evident from the number of patrols we conduct on a weekly basis."

In addition to PSS 16, PSS 4 is also located within Kandahar's Subdistrict 4. And the PSS 4 commander has been a colleague of the PSS 16 commander for years. In an attempt to find ways to improve and maintain the security in Kandahar City, the PSS 16 commander, the PSS 4 commander, and the leader of the 2d Platoon met often to discuss daily operations and review information gathered by the ISAF and the Afghan National Security Forces.

Left: A U.S. Soldier provides overwatch for the AUP during partnered traffic control point operations. Right: Members of the AUP and ISAF stand guard outside PSS 16.

In early July 2012, the PSS 16 commander was replaced. The replacement and the leader of the 2d Platoon met and discussed security upgrades for PSS 16. The new PSS 16 commander conducted an assessment to determine the weaknesses of the PSS and to develop requirements to better protect the patrolmen. He enforced the substation security measures and required the AUP to provide force protection alongside 2d Platoon Soldiers. He expected the American partners to notify him when PSS 16 base defense drills were to be conducted, and he ensured that the AUP participated in the drills.

The new PSS 16 commander proved to be an excellent one; and although his relationship with coalition forces was very strong, it eventually became clear that the presence of the ISAF at PSS 16 was no longer necessary. Gradually, and under the watchful mentorship of the Americans, security responsibilities were transferred to the AUP. During the transition, the PSS 16 commander stated, "I am very proud to take command of PSS 16; but at the same time, realize how much my police depend on the Americans for assistance. The transition will be difficult, but I know this is in the best interest of Afghanistan."

An AUP officer discusses security with the leader of the 2d Platoon.

The Afghan assumption of security responsibilities was mirrored in other areas such as training and operational planning, enabling American Soldiers to completely pull out of the substation—leaving the AUP in full control of operations. A squad leader from the 2d Platoon expressed confidence in the ability of the AUP to handle the operational aspects of PSS 16. He stated, "Over the past few weeks, we have been slowly giving more control to the AUP regarding daily operations such as towers and [entry control point] guard. They have not shown any hesitations with the additional duties and seem to be adjusting well."

Several high-ranking officials from the Kandahar Provincial Police Headquarters visited PSS 16 to witness the disembed process. During the transition, the PSS 16 commander signed for more than $70,000 worth of ISAF equipment, including tents, trailers, and storage containers. The AUP now has complete control of PSS 16 and is continuing to make improvements to the substation. Although the 2d Platoon no longer resides with the AUP, the relationship between the Soldiers of the 563d and their AUP counterparts remains strong. The 2d Platoon continues to serve in overwatch mode during partnered patrols with the Afghans, providing assistance to the AUP as the Afghans position themselves to take full control of security in Kandahar City.

First Lieutenant Conroy is the platoon leader, 2d Platoon, 563d Military Police Company, Fort Drum, New York. She holds a bachelor's degree in microbiology from Carlow University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

796TH MILITARY POLICE BATTALION DURING WORLD WAR II

By Master Sergeant Patrick V. Garland (Retired)

Author's Note: While performing research for a previous article, I realized that the early history of the 796th Military Police Battalion had been virtually lost. During a recent visit to the U.S. Army Military History Institute, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, I was unable to locate any battalion records. In addition, letters that I have received from the U.S. Army Center of Military History and the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration indicate that those organizations hold very scant information regarding battalion World War II activities. Furthermore, the 796th Military Police Battalion Association Web pages lack any real history of the unit before its reactivation in 1946. Through contact with battalion veterans and their families, I have endeavored to reconstruct the history of the 796th in order to secure some recognition for those who so admirably served in this Military Police Corps unit. I would like to acknowledge the significant contributions of former First Sergeant Fred Waggett, who has been compiling data on his wartime buddies for more than 20 years.[1] He deserves most of the credit for this article; however, any mistakes are mine. I would also like to acknowledge the family of former First Sergeant Glenn Snyder, who kindly loaned personal records and photographs for this project.

On 29 June 1942, cadres were drawn from the 726th and 745th Battalions, Camp Beauregard, Louisiana, and transferred to Dodd Field, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, where the 796th Military Police Battalion was activated on 1 July. The commander of the new battalion was Major Arno Von Koenneritz, who was supported by an adjutant, First Lieutenant Vernon H. McClintock, and a logistics officer (S-4), First Lieutenant Stephan C. Henley. Companies A and C were commanded by First Lieutenant Paul L. Heilman, and Companies B and D were led by First Lieutenant Rufus A. Hirsch. Once the battalion was organized, members completed a basic training program. Personnel also performed administrative and security duties at the alien internment camp at Fort Sam Houston. On 24 July, Lieutenant Colonel John W. Fletcher assumed command of the battalion.

In November, the 796th Military Police Battalion was moved to Fort McIntosh, Texas, where it remained until February 1943, when it was moved to Camp Shanks, New York. At that time, the battalion—which was under the direction of the Director of Intelligence, Security Division, New York Port of Embarkation—consisted of 29 officers and 729 enlisted men. The 796th received a contingent of new Soldiers in December, elevating the unit to its authorized strength. The battalion was then sent to Fort Custer, Michigan, where Soldiers received 3 months of additional training before returning to Camp Shanks.

On 31 March 1944, the 796th Military Police Battalion left Camp Shanks, traveled down the Hudson River via ferry, and boarded the Queen Elizabeth—one of Britain's finest luxury liners. The ship was divided into red, white, and blue areas; and at 1300, the battalion crowded into the converted "after salon" within the blue area. The Queen Elizabeth then set sail, carrying the men of the 796th to war.

The 796th arrived at Gourick, Scotland, with no casualties (except possible seasickness). The men remained onboard until 7 April, when Company A, one platoon from Company B, and an advance party of headquarters and medical detachment personnel boarded a train and left for the staging area at Parkhouse, Tidworth, Wiltshire, England. But when the train arrived at its destination, an air raid was underway. The British trainmen uncoupled the engine and left the American Soldiers locked in the train. Fortunately, the train was not hit by bombs. However, when the trainmen returned, a heated discussion between the Americans and the British ensued. The British explained that, due to a huge engine shortage, they needed to remove the engine to prevent it from being hit. After all, although the Soldiers could be replaced, it might not be possible to replace the engine! Shortly after the advance party arrived at Parkhouse, the rest of the battalion followed.

At Parkhouse, various companies of the battalion performed town patrol, convoy escort, and traffic control duty in and around the 18th District–Southern Base Section, which encompassed Hampshire, Berkshire, and Wiltshire Counties. Company B was assigned to Hampshire County, which included the towns of Romsey, Winchester, Basingstoke, Reading, and Salisbury. The battalion was then moved to Chilworth Park—a staging area near Southampton.

On 18 August, the 796th Military Police Battalion left Chilworth Park for Southampton, where the Soldiers boarded a British troopship, His Majesty's Ship (HMS) Hampshire, which set sail for France shortly thereafter. The trip across the English Channel was uneventful until disembarkation—a process that required the Soldiers to climb down cargo nets into a Higgins boat, which was designed to carry a platoon, but looked more like a canoe. The swells in the channel were reaching heights of more than 15 feet, so the sailors marked a point below which the Soldiers should not proceed. Instead, the Soldiers were instructed to catch the Higgins boat as it rose. With equipment, weapons, and ammunition, this proved to be somewhat tricky. The 796th suffered its first loss during these maneuvers. In his haste to board the Higgins, one of the Soldiers descended below the designated line and when the Higgins rose, it smashed him into the side of the troopship—and down he went, with no chance for recovery.

Once established in France, the companies of the 796th were assigned to a variety of locations. Company D left Transit Area Number 2 for the city of Rennes, which was located in Northwest France. Company B moved to Fougeres, Ille-et-Vilaine, Brittany, France. In addition, the battalion provided detachments to the towns of Saint-James, Plestin-les-Graves, Lannion, Laval, Vitré, Saint-Brieuc, Nantes, and Dinan.

Military police began a period of intense, around-the-clock activity in support of the Red Ball Express, which was a huge truck convoy system that was created by Allied forces to supply forward-area combat units which were quickly moving through Europe following the 6 June 1944 D-Day invasion of Normandy. A fast, but limited, reconnaissance was conducted. Advance engineers furnished special Red Ball Express directional signs. Static traffic posts were selected and manned, and patrols in 1/4-ton trucks and on motorcycles were stationed in readiness. Military police posted and maintained signs. Pointsmen assumed duties at major crossroads, entrances and exits to traffic control-regulating posts, and blind corners in urban districts.

In his autobiography, *A General's Life*, General Omar N. Bradley wrote, "On both fronts, an acute shortage of supplies—that dull subject again!—governed all our operations. Some 28 divisions were advancing across France and Belgium. Each division ordinarily required 700–750 tons a day—a total daily consumption of about 20,000 tons."[2] More than 6,000 trucks kept gasoline and other vital supplies rolling in as American troops and tanks pushed the Germans back toward their homeland. One Red Ball Express veteran recalls kicking ration boxes off the truck to demoralized military police who had no rations and had not been relieved of their duties for days.

Military police were usually stationed at intersections to ensure that convoys stayed on course, or they directed traffic at blown bridges or through the narrow streets of villages such as Houdan, where medieval timbered houses crowded the main, winding thoroughfare. And they were always on the lookout for pilferage. When military police were not around, large, rectangular signs with huge red balls in the center kept the convoys rolling on the right roads. And convoy directors always carried maps to their destinations.

By 2150 on 26 September 1944, three platoons from Company B had established traffic control detachments on the Red Ball Express highway. Part of Company B also aided the 26th Infantry Regiment with the evacuation of *Waffen-Schutzstaffel* (SS) prisoners of war to the rear. The prisoners of war were loaded onto trucks in a standing position, chest to back, facing forward—and as many as possible were put on a truck to prevent even the remote possibility of an escape. This arrangement allowed for a smaller security detachment to control the convoys. Two points along the Red Ball Express highway where combat units picked up their supplies—Chartes and Dreux—became targets of the infamous French Forces of the Interior, which constantly tried to steal equipment from Allied trucks. The French Forces of the Interior posed a major problem when they physically attacked prisoners of war who were being readied for transport to the rear; in a couple of instances, the skirmishes evolved into French Forces of the Interior shootings.

New express lines with different designations—some for specific tasks—began to form. For example, the White Ball Express was established in early October, with routes extending from Le Havre and Rouen to the Paris area. By the end of the month, Company B was in full control of the White Ball Express highway between Le Havre and Beauvais. The Company B headquarters was located in Yvetot, and men were detached to Tôtes, Saint-Saëns, and Neufchatel-en-Bray. Six men were stationed in the village of Tôtes; their only connection with the company or battalion was via a "bikie" (motorcyle rider) who came by about once a day.

On 16 December, there was a German breakthrough in the Ardennes area of Belgium and the Battle of the Bulge began. Paratroopers were dropped behind friendly lines in Germany to destroy communications and supply lines in the area occupied by the 796th Military Police Battalion. The battalion was alerted, crossroads were blocked, numerous roadblocks were established, and guard strength was increased at all bridges and vital installations. All personnel were checked for proper identification, as some enemy personnel wearing American uniforms or civilian clothing were working within American lines. Due to immediate security measures enacted by the battalion, no serious disruptions of communications or supply lines occurred.

During the Battle of the Bulge, the Germans launched Operation Greif—a special German, false-flag operation, which was the brainchild of dictator Adolf Hitler. The operation—commanded by the notorious Waffen-SS commando Otto Skorzeny—consisted of using specially trained German soldiers in captured Allied uniforms and vehicles to cause confusion in the rear of the Allied front. A lack of uniforms, transport aircraft, and English-speaking soldiers limited the operation; however, this so-called Trojan Horse Brigade caused considerable confusion.

In the initial confusion at the beginning of the Battle of the Bulge, about two dozen German soldiers—most of them in captured U.S. Army jeeps—managed to get through the lines and begin changing signposts, creating panic among the American troops they encountered. However, some of the

saboteurs were captured by the Americans. Because they were wearing American uniforms, their interrogators threatened to execute them as spies unless they divulged their mission. Figuring that they would meet that fate anyway (which they did), the Germans falsely told the Americans that their mission was to go to Paris to capture or kill Allied commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower.

American military police were put to work trying to hunt down Skorzeny's men. Checkpoints were soon established throughout the Allied rear, greatly slowing the movement of personnel and equipment. Military police drilled personnel on facts that every American could be expected to know, such as the name of Mickey Mouse's girlfriend, well-known baseball scores, or the capitals of specific states. General Bradley himself was briefly detained when he correctly answered that the capital of Illinois was Springfield; apparently, the Soldier who had questioned him mistakenly believed that the capital was Chicago.

In the Red Horse assembly area, which extended from Le Havre (along the Seine River) to Mantes-Gassicort, the 796th Military Police Battalion painted and posted more than 2,000 informational and route marking signs. The signs served their purpose under the most difficult weather conditions—often with temperatures below 0°F and with 2 feet of snow on the ground. The men found it difficult to properly perform their duties under such extreme conditions; however, they completed their assigned mission.

The 796th received its first group of reinforcements in January 1945; they were former combat men who had returned from the front lines due to injuries. By February, the battalion had entered Belgium and was again assigned to a variety of locations. In the area around Charleroi, Company A and part of Company B painted and posted more than 5,000 route marking signs. These units also established and operated the district bivouac area at Fontaine-l'Évêque. Company C moved to Antwerp—one of the most important continental ports of entry at that time. The Germans tried every means within their power to destroy the docks at Antwerp; they first sent bombers, then V-1 buzz bombs, and finally improved V-2 missiles. Company C personnel were subjected to numerous buzz bomb raids. Company D moved to Ghent, where it assumed normal military police duties. Later, companies from the battalion were ordered to support Operation Varsity, which was an American-British airborne operation that took place on 24 March 1945, near the end of World War II.[3] The operation, which involved several thousand aircraft and more than 16,000 paratroopers, was the largest airborne operation in history to be conducted on a single day in a single location. In preparation for the operation, Company C moved from Antwerp to Arras, France—a distance of 210 miles. There, the company established a security guard for 17th Airborne Division troops awaiting a tactical jump behind enemy lines at Wesel, Germany, along the Rhine River. The company headquarters was established at Airstrip B-48 at Amiens, France. Company B moved to an airborne encampment near the town of Poix, France, to reconnoiter the area and to establish and provide security for airfields and compounds for another section of the 17th Airborne Division, which was scheduled to arrive later. Members of the company were told that that their job involved a dual detail—they were to keep the paratroopers in and the nosy locals out.[4]

Following Operation Varsity, the 796th Military Police Battalion was relieved of duty in the Channel Base Section and began assembling at Charleroi and Mons, Belgium, to await movement orders. Rumors were rampant that the battalion would be transferred to the Pacific Theater. On 17 June 1945, the battalion departed the assembly areas for Arles, France—a staging area near Marseille. The distance of about 600 miles was traveled by train and motor convoy.

Shortly after arriving at the Arles staging area, Company B was assigned as the security force for the Delta Base Section Disciplinary Training Center—a prison facility for U.S. military personnel who had been convicted and sentenced by general courts-martial. Other members of the battalion were transferred to Detachment A, 2913th Disciplinary Training Company. (One of these, Glenn Snyder [whose family contributed to this article], was promoted to first sergeant and appointed as the administrative noncommissioned officer of the prison.) At these locations, selected prisoners were assigned to prisoner companies, where they underwent a rigorous training regime—which, if successfully completed, provided them with an opportunity to return to active duty status.

Following these assignments, most of the men from the battalion were returned to the United States. At that point, the battalion existed only on paper at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe and in the minds of the men who left it. The battalion was reactivated in 1946 and moved to Vienna, Austria, where it was repopulated with men from other military police units. Also in 1946, all disciplinary training centers in France and Italy were ordered closed; prisoners who were still serving sentences were transferred to a military prison in Wurzburg, Germany.

Endnotes:

[1]Fred Waggett, chronology of the 796th Military Police Battalion, unpublished.

[2]Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, *A General's Life: An Autobiography by General of the Army Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair*, Simon and Schuster, 1983.

[3]Waggett.

[4]Ibid.

Master Sergeant Garland retired from the U.S. Army in 1974. During his military career, he served in military police units and criminal investigation detachments and laboratories. At the time of his retirement, Master Sergeant Garland was serving as a ballistics evidence specialist at the European Laboratory. He remained in this career field until retiring from civilian law enforcement in 1995.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company 89th Military Police Brigade

Lineage and Honors

Constituted 19 February 1966 in the Regular Army as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 89th Military Police Group.

Activated 15 March 1966 in Vietnam.

Inactivated 21 December 1971 at Fort Lewis, Washington.

Activated 13 September 1972 at Fort Lewis, Washington.

Reorganized and redesignated 16 July 1981 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 89th Military Police Brigade.

Campaign Participation Credit

Vietnam

Counteroffensive	Tet 1969/Counteroffensive
Counteroffensive, Phase II	Summer–Fall 1969
Counteroffensive, Phase III	Winter–Spring 1970
Tet Counteroffensive	Sanctuary Counteroffensive
Counteroffensive, Phase IV	Counteroffensive, Phase VII
Counteroffensive, Phase V	Consolidation I
Counteroffensive, Phase VI	Consolidation II

Southwest Asia

Defense of Saudi Arabia

Liberation and Defense of Kuwait

Cease-Fire

War on Terrorism

Campaigns to be determined

Decorations

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1967–1968

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered IRAQ 2004

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered IRAQ 2006–2007

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered IRAQ 2009–2010

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1966–1971

DOCTRINE UPDATE

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence Capabilities Development Integration Directorate Concepts, Organization, and Doctrine Development Division			
Publication Number	**Title**	**Date**	**Description**
Current Publications			
FM 3-39	Military Police Operations	16 Feb 10	A keystone manual that describes military police support to Army forces conducting full spectrum operations within the framework of joint operations. It emphasizes the importance of simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations and contains a critical discussion of civil support operations. **Status:** Under revision; projected for publication 4th quarter, fiscal year (FY) 2013.
FM 3-39.40 (will be FM 3-63)	Internment and Resettlement Operations	12 Feb 10	A manual that describes the doctrinal foundation, principles, and processes that military police and other elements employ when dealing with internment/resettlement (I/R) populations. **Status:** Under revision; projected for publication 1st quarter, FY 15.
FM 19-25	Military Police Traffic Operations	30 Sep 77	A manual that addresses traffic operations in garrison and combat environments. **Status:** Under revision. The information in field manual (FM) 19-25 will be incorporated into Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-39.10 and ATP 3-39.12. Once ATP 3-39.12 is published, FM 19-25 will be rescinded.
FM 3-37.2 (will be ATP 3-37.2)	Antiterrorism	18 Feb 11	A manual that establishes Army guidance on integrating and synchronizing antiterrorism across the full spectrum of conflict and into the full range of military operations. It shows how antiterrorism operations nest under full spectrum operations, the protection warfighting function, and the composite risk management process. **Status:** Under revision; projected for publication 3d quarter, FY 14.
ATTP 3-39.10 (will be ATP 3-39.10)	Law and Order Operations	20 Jun 11	A manual that addresses each element of the military police law and order mission, including planning considerations, police station operations, patrol operations, police engagement, traffic operations, and host nation police capability and capacity. **Status:** Under revision; projected for publication 1st quarter, FY 15.
FM 3-19.11 (will be ATP 3-39.11)	Military Police Special-Reaction Teams	13 May 05	A manual that serves as a guide for commanders, staffs, and trainers who are responsible for training and deploying military police special-reaction teams. **Status:** Under revision; projected for publication 4th quarter, FY 13.
FM 3-19.13 (will be ATP 3-39.12)	Law Enforcement Investigations	10 Jan 05	A manual that serves as a guide for military police, investigators, and U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) (commonly refered to as CID) special agents operating in tactical and garrison environments. **Status:** Under revision; to be published 4th quarter, FY 13.

DOCTRINE UPDATE

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence Capabilities Development Integration Directorate Concepts, Organization, and Doctrine Development Division			
Publication Number	**Title**	**Date**	**Description**
ATTP 3-39.20 (will be ATP 3-39.20)	Police Intelligence Operations	29 Jul 10	A manual that addresses police intelligence operations which support the operations process and protection activities by providing exceptional police information and intelligence to support, enhance, and contribute to situational understanding, force protection, the commander's protection program, and homeland security. **Status:** Current.
ATTP 3-39.32 (will be ATP 3-39.32)	Physical Security	3 Aug 10	A manual that establishes guidance for all personnel responsible for physical security. It is the basic reference for training security personnel and is intended to be used in conjunction with the Army Regulation 190 (Military Police) Series, Security Engineering Unified Facilities Criteria publications, Department of Defense directives, and other Department of the Army publications. **Status:** Under revision; projected for publication 3d quarter, FY 14.
FM 3-19.15 (will be ATP 3-39.33)	Civil Disturbance Operations	18 Apr 05	A manual that addresses continental U.S. and outside the continental U.S. civil disturbance operations and domestic unrest, including the military role in providing assistance to civil authorities. **Status:** Under revision; projected for publication 3d quarter, FY 14.
ATTP 3-39.34 (will be ATP 3-39.34)	Military Working Dogs	10 May 11	A manual that provides commanders, staffs, and military working dog (MWD) handlers with an understanding of MWD capabilities, employment considerations, sustainment requirements, and the integration of MWDs in support of full spectrum operations. **Status:** Under revision; projected for publication 1st quarter, FY 15.
ATP 3-39.35	Protective Services	31 May 13	A manual that provides guidance for protective service missions and the management of protective service details. **Status:** Current.
FM 3-19.4 (will be TM 3-39.30)	Military Police Leaders' Handbook	2 Aug 02	A manual that addresses military police maneuver and mobility support, area security, I/R, law and order, and police intelligence operations across the full spectrum of Army operations. It primarily focuses on the principles of platoon operations and the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) necessary. **Status:** Under revision; projected for publication 1st quarter, FY 15.
TM 3-39.31	Armored Security Vehicle	20 Aug 10	A manual that provides military police forces with the TTP and related information necessary for the employment of the armored security vehicle. **Status:** Current.
Note: Current military police publications can be accessed and downloaded in electronic format from the U.S. Army Military Police School Web site at <http://www.wood.army.mil/usamps/>. Comments or questions about military police doctrine can be e-mailed to <usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.cdidcoddmpdoc@mail.mil>.			

MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE LEVEL AND ABOVE COMMANDS

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM	CWO	UNIT	LOCATION
David Quantock	Dawn Rippelmeyer		OPMG	Alexandria, VA
David Quantock	Timothy Fitzgerald	T.L. Williams	HQ USACIDC	Quantico, VA
Mark Spindler	John McNeirney	Leroy Shamburger	USAMPS	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
David Quantock	Jonathan Godwin		Army Corrections Cmd	Alexandria, VA
Burton Francisco	Jerome Wren		46th MP Cmd	Lansing, MI
Sanford Holman	Kurtis Timmer		200th MP Cmd	Ft Meade, MD
Mark Jackson	Richard Woodring		8th MP Bde	Schofield Barracks, HI
Eddie Jacobsen	Gerald Capps		11th MP Bde	Los Alamitos, CA
Bryan Patridge	Scott Dooley		14th MP Bde	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Sioban Ledwith	Steven Raines		15th MP Bde	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Alexander Conyers	Thomas Sivak		16th MP Bde	Ft Bragg, NC
Donna Martin	Henry Stearns		18th MP Bde	Sembach AB, Germany
David Chase	Keith Devos		42d MP Bde	Ft Lewis, WA
Thomas Clark	Joseph Klosterman		43d MP Bde	Warwick, RI
Kelly Fisher	Joseph Menard Jr.		49th MP Bde	Fairfield, CA
Robert Dillon	Peter Ladd		89th MP Bde	Ft Hood, TX
Stephen Potter	Terry Berdan		177th MP Bde	Taylor, MI
Malcom McMullenis	Vacant		290th MP Bde	Nashville, TN
Therese M. O'Brien	Edward Simpson		300th MP Bde	Inkster, MI
Phillip Churn	Andrew Lombardo		333d MP Bde	Farmingdale, NY
Thomas Byrd	Andre Proctor	Kevin Roof	3d MP Gp (CID)	Hunter Army Airfield, GA
Robert Burk	Vacant	David Albaugh	6th MP Gp (CID)	Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA
John Voorhees Jr.	Crystal Wallace	Steve Grant	701st MP Gp (CID)	Ft Belvoir, VA
John Bogdan	Michael Borlin		Joint Detention Gp	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

MILITARY POLICE BATTALION LEVEL COMMANDS

Sara Albrycht	Peter Harrington	Dan Eaves	5th MP Bn (CID)	Kleber Kaserne, Germany
Geoffrey Stewart	Tara Wheadon	Keith McCullen	10th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Bragg, NC
Lawrence Stewart	Mathew Walters	Phillip Curran	11th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Hood, TX
Larry Dewey	James Henry	Paul Bailey	19th MP Bn (CID)	Wheeler Army Airfield, HI
Thomas Russell-Tutty	James Sanguins	Mark Arnold	22d MP Bn (CID)	Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA
Ronald Bonesz	Marcus Jackson		33d MP Bn	Bloomington, IL
Bob Willis Jr.	Michael Bennett		40th MP Bn (I/R)	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Stanley Oneal	Carrol Welch		51st MP Bn	Florence, SC
Michelle Goyette	David Burton		91st MP Bn	Ft Drum, NY
William Benner	James Schultz		92d MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Richard Ball	Timothy Lamb		93d MP Bn	Ft Bliss, TX
Todd Schroeder	Lisa Piette-Edwards		94th MP Bn	Yongsan, Korea
James Walker II	James Breckinridge		95th MP Bn	Sembach AB, Germany
Elvis Hugee	Eric Mills		96th MP Bn (I/R)	San Diego, CA
Kevin Comfort	Patrick Quirk		97th MP Bn	Ft Riley, KS
Michael Fowler	Thomas Ciampolillo		102d MP Bn (I/R)	Auburn, NY
Craig Maceri	Scott Smilinich		104th MP Bn	Kingston, NY
Jerry Baird Jr.	Alpheus Haswell		105th MP Bn (I/R)	Asheville, NC
Clintis McCray	James Young		112th MP Bn	Canton, MS
Andrew Collins	Kimberly Mendez		115th MP Bn	Salisbury, MD
Barry Crum	Fowler L. Goodowens II		117th MP Bn	Athens, TN
Robert Hayden	David Morgan		118th MP Bn	Warwick, RI
Luis Munizmartinez	Armando Estradamiranda		124th MP Bn	Hato Rey, PR
Monica Alpi	Rene Torresestrada		125th MP Bn	Ponce, PR
Randal Brown	Mikeal Crummedyo		136th MP Bn	Tyler, TX
Tanya McGonegal	Chadwick Moneypenny		151st MP Bn	Dunbar, WV
William Allen	John Watts		160th MP Bn (I/R)	Tallahassee, FL
Barry Collins	Michael Gentry		168th MP Bn	Dyersburg, TN
Jonathan Adams	Donald Madden		170th MP Bn	Decatur, GA
John Benson	Nelson Reyes		175th MP Bn	Columbia, MO

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MILITARY POLICE BATTALION LEVEL COMMANDS (continued)

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM	CWO	UNIT	LOCATION
Howard Zimmerman	Nelson Reyes		185th MP Bn	Pittsburg, CA
Paul Deal	Daniel Lawler		192d MP Bn (I/R)	Niantic, CT
Isaac Martinez	Richard Yohn		193d MP Bn (I/R)	Denver, CO
John Treufeldt	Marshall Ware		198th MP Bn	Louisville, KY
Michael Izzo	Jimmy Patrick		203d MP Bn	Athens, AL
Rodney Ginter	Jonathan Stone		205th MP Bn	Poplar Bluff, MO
Kenneth Dilg	Jon Sawyer		210th MP Bn	Taylor, MI
Allen Aldenberg	Brian Branley		211th MP Bn	Lexington, MA
Michael Treadwell	Randy Abeyta		226th MP Bn	Farmington, NM
James McGlaughn	Robert Engle		231st MP Bn	Prattville, AL
John Baird	Steven Slee		304th MP Bn (I/R)	Nashville, TN
Marcia Muirhead	Christopher Whitford		310th MP Bn (I/R)	Uniondale, NY
Charles Seifert	John Schiffli		317th MP Bn	Tampa, FL
Frank Stanley	Louis Ditullio		324th MP Bn (I/R)	Fresno, CA
Dominic Wible	Peter Schimmel		327th MP Bn (I/R)	Arlington Heights, IL
David Heflin	Richard Clowser		336th MP Bn	Pittsburgh, PA
Anthony Hartmann	Keith Magee		340th MP Bn (I/R)	Ashley, PA
Moses Robinson	Juan Mitchell		372d MP Bn	Washington, DC
David Albanese	Brett Goldstein		382d MP Bn	Westover, MA
Kevin Keen	Edward Simpson		384th MP Bn (I/R)	Ft Wayne, IN
Jerry Chandler	Clayton Sneed		385th MP Bn	Ft Stewart, GA
Jason Small	Pohl		391st MP Bn (I/R)	Columbus, OH
Sean Siebert	Allen Freeman	Manuel Ruiz	393d MP Bn (CID)	Bell, CA
William O'Bryne	Timothy Eddy		400th MP Bn (I/R)	Ft Meade, MD
Randy Ames	Richard Cruickshank		402d MP Bn (I/R)	Omaha, NE
Susan Kusan	Jason Litz		437th MP Bn	Columbus, OH
Mike Self	Shola Walker		502d MP Bn (CID)	Ft Campbell, KY
Caroline Horton	Jeffrey Maddox		503d MP Bn	Ft Bragg, NC
Lamar Parsons	Russel Erickson		504th MP Bn	Ft Lewis, WA
Robert Davel	Richard Lopez		508th MP Bn (I/R)	Ft Lewis, WA
Glen Schmick	Jonathan Narcisse		519th MP Bn	Ft Polk, LA
Darcy Overbey	Michael Baker		525th MP Bn	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
Richard Millette	Mark Bell		530th MP Bn (I/R)	Omaha, NE
Marshall Bacote	Norman Garnes		535th MP Bn (I/R)	Cary, NC
Kevin Smith	Troy Gentry		607th MP Bn	Grand Prairie, TX
Curtis Schroeder	Michael Cosper		701st MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Rolanda Colbert	Stephen Hansen		705th MP Bn (I/R)	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Steven Yamashita	Scott Anderson		709th MP Bn	Grafenwoehr, Germany
Leevaine Williams Jr.	Willard Smoot		716th MP Bn	Ft Campbell, KY
Eric Brunken	Myron Lewis		720th MP Bn	Ft Hood, TX
James Eisenhart	Robert Eichler		724th MP Bn (I/R)	Ft Lauderdale, FL
Theresa Farrell	Bradley Cross		728th MP Bn	Schofield Barracks, HI
Kenneth Powell	Craig Owens	Robert Mayo	733d MP Bn (CID)	Ft Gillem, GA
Stacy Garrity	Jason Wells		744th MP Bn (I/R)	Bethlehem, PA
Christopher Heberer	Barry Oakes		759th MP Bn	Ft Carson, CO
Emma Thyen	Shawn McLeod		761st MP Bn	Juneau, AK
Mark Howard	Jesse Perry		773d MP Bn	Pineville, LA
Kenneth Richards	Richard Weider		785th MP Bn (I/R)	Fraser, MI
Richard Heidorn	Richard Epps		787th MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Stephen Gabavics	Bryan Lynch		793d MP Bn	Ft Richardson, AK
Kyle Bayless	Angelia Flournoy		795th MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Matthew Stubbs	Paul Ohland		850th MP Bn	Phoenix, AZ
Richard Felices	Rhonda Brown		Benning CID Bn	Ft Benning, GA
Andrew Sullivan	Marvin Marlow		Washington CID Bn	Ft Myer, VA
Barbi Aleandre	Andrew Falk		Protective Services Bn	Ft Belvoir, VA

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