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MILITARY POLICE

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AMERICA AT WAR
THE REGIMENT RESPONDS

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USAMPS / MANSCEN
573-XXX-XXXX / DSN 676-XXXX

COMMANDANT
BG Stephen J. Curry 563-8019
currys@wood.army.mil

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
COL Timothy J. Lamb 563-8017
lambt@wood.army.mil

COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR
CSM James F. Barrett 563-8018
barrettja@wood.army.mil

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT—USAR
COL Charles E. Bruce 563-8082
brucec@wood.army.mil

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT—ARNG
LTC Starrleen J. Heinen 596-0131, 38103
heinens@wood.army.mil

14th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE / DSN 581-XXXX
COL Joseph A. Rapone II 596-0968
raponej@wood.army.mil

701st MILITARY POLICE BATTALION
LTC Zechara J. Miller 596-2377
millerz@wood.army.mil

787th MILITARY POLICE BATTALION
LTC Donald J. Kennedy 596-0317
kennedyd@wood.army.mil

795th MILITARY POLICE BATTALION
LTC Debra A. Sannwaldt 596-2384
sannwaldtd@wood.army.mil

USAMPS Directors

DIRECTOR of TRAINING
COL George J. Millan 563-8098
millang@wood.army.mil

DIRECTOR of PERSONNEL PROPONENCY OFFICE
LTC Ronald Jones 563-8041
jonesro@wood.army.mil

DIRECTOR of PLANS & OPERATIONS
MAJ Patrick W. Williams 596-0131, 38027
williapa@wood.army.mil

MANSCEN: (573) 563-XXXX / DSN 676-XXXX

DIRECTOR of TRAINING DEVELOPMENT
COL Edward J. Sannwaldt, Jr. 563-4111
sannwaldte@wood.army.mil

DIRECTORATE of COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS
MP DIVISION CHIEF
COL Robert B. Abernathy 563-8001
abernathyr@wood.army.mil

Managing Editor, Shirley Bridges.....**573-563-4104**
bridgess@wood.army.mil
Editor, Donna M. Grzyb.....**573-596-0131, 35274**
grzybd@wood.army.mil
Graphic Designer, Kathryn M. Troxell.....**573-596-0131, 35267**
troxellk@wood.army.mil

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By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

PETER J. SCHOOMAKER
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

JOEL B. HUDSON
Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army
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BACK COVER: Training the new Iraqi police force: *clockwise from top left,* class time at the police academy in Baghdad (photo by SGT Mark S. Rickert, 372d Mobile Public Affairs Detachment); learning how to safely approach a vehicle at a roadblock (photo by SPC Katherine Robinson); Iraqi police officers and soldiers of the 411th Military Police Company provide security during a house search near Tikrit, Iraq, while two other military police guard the back of the building (photos by PFC Jason Phillips, 89th Military Police Brigade); conducting a personnel search (photo by PFC Blanka Stratford, CJTF-7 Public Affairs Office); congratulations to the graduates of the new new police academy in Sin' Jar, Iraq (photo by PV2 Daniel D. Meacham, 982d Combat Camera).

MILITARY POLICE

THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN
PB 19-03-2, September 2003

Articles

Departments

Chief, Military Police Corps Regiment, and Commandant, United States Army Military Police School

Brigadier General Stephen J. Curry

On 26 September 2003, our Military Police Corps Regiment celebrates its 62d anniversary as a branch of our Army. This is a much-anticipated opportunity for all MP soldiers to pause and reflect on our past year's achievements and the incredibly important work we have done, at home and abroad, for our Army and our nation. Of course, the chance to remember and honor the sacrifices of the many MP warriors who have given their lives over the past year defending this great nation is of the utmost significance. Taking this traditional time to honor our fallen comrades strikes even closer to home this year as several of our selfless and dedicated MP heroes have given their lives during the ongoing operations in Southwest Asia. I encourage all in our great Regiment—wherever we may find ourselves—to actively participate in our traditional anniversary celebration to the greatest extent possible, without any degradation to the ongoing war, the defense of our nation, or the training of our soldiers. Here at the home of the Regiment, the anniversary will consist of our worldwide Military Police Regimental Conference, the Warfighter Team Challenge, and the traditional anniversary week celebration. The weeklong celebration includes the Regimental Hall of Fame inductions, the Memorial Grove tribute and the Regimental Review and culminates with the MP Ball. If you have the opportunity to share this celebration with us, we look forward to seeing you here.

As our theme for this year—America at War: The Regiment Responds—illustrates, we are truly a busy Regiment, and the demand for MP soldiers and forces has never been higher. We are maintaining the frontline in Korea and a peacekeeping presence in Bosnia and Kosovo, while continuing to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan and guarding the high-risk detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. At the same time, we are reestablishing the concepts of civil obedience and law and order in recently liberated Iraq and helping to secure our homeland in the global war on terrorism. Our MP Regiment has given 100 percent and continues to answer the nation's call with professionalism, pride, and dedication.

I am extremely proud of the unwavering commitment and selfless service provided by our MP soldiers—active, Reserve, and National Guard. In particular, the Military Police Corps could not meet its operational requirements throughout the world without the contributions of our terrific MP units in the Reserve and National Guard. Many of our MP Reserve and National Guard units have been mobilized two and three times over the past two years, and we have asked them to place an enormous burden on their families and employers. They have responded as enthusiastic and dependable members of the regimental team and have "done us proud" in whatever mission, operation, or theater we've assigned them. Your Regiment and your Army thank you for your dedication and commitment in defending this great nation.

The year 2004 will bring new and exciting challenges for this very busy Regiment. While we continue our current missions in the far-flung corners of the world, we can't afford to forget that we are an Army and a Regiment that are still transforming and are solidly on the road to achieving the vision of the Future Force. The Army and our Regiment must be ready to fight a different kind of enemy on an asymmetric battlefield—an inescapable reality that is clearly evident in today's streets of Baghdad, Tikrit, and Mosul.

As we face the challenges of this new threat, the Military Police Corps and the multifunctional capabilities we bring to the battlefield will continue to be as relevant to the maneuver commanders in the Future Force as we are in the Current Force. The demands of the rapidly changing concepts of war, stability and support operations,

(Continued on page 3)

Regimental Command Sergeant Major

Command Sergeant Major James F. Barrett

It is hard to believe that it's time for another issue of *MILITARY POLICE*. It seems as though we just published the last issue. I have received several positive comments about the quality of our professional bulletin from soldiers around the Regiment. This is due in large part to the dedication of the folks on the bulletin staff; however, several units from around the Regiment have helped by sending great articles with pictures. These articles detail our soldiers' outstanding contributions and performance. Please continue to send articles.

I don't have to tell you that MP soldiers are some of the busiest soldiers in the Army. I *can* tell you that commanders from everywhere in the United States and overseas are continually requesting more military police. Once again, this is because our MP, corrections, and criminal investigation soldiers—in both the Active and Reserve Component—are performing beyond all expectations. It doesn't take senior officers and noncommissioned officers long to see how competent, innovative, and professional our soldiers are in dealing with a wide variety of situations. After 25 years in this Regiment, I am still amazed at what our young soldiers (many of them 19- and 20-year-olds) accomplish.

While I am deeply honored to serve among the excellent soldiers of our Regiment, I am also concerned about our operational tempo. We had an extremely high deployment rate prior to 11 September 2001, and we have seen that rate rise steadily since that time. It does not appear that the pace will slow anytime soon. Unlike some branches, we must contend with the increased requirements at home while deploying to several theaters overseas at the same time. Again, our soldiers juggle all this better than anyone else can, and they still manage to win Army competitions in almost every category!

As we approach our 62d anniversary as a Corps, there is little doubt that our soldiers will continue to set new standards across the Army. Unfortunately, we have lost some of our great soldiers in the past months—some to accident or illness, while others made the ultimate sacrifice for their nation. My heart goes out to the families of those who were lost and to the soldiers who served with these fine warriors. Truly, they will be missed by all of us.

I would like to thank you—our soldiers, family members, retirees, and civilians—for your outstanding dedication to our Regiment. I hope that you all have a wonderful anniversary week, and I ask that you always remember the fallen soldiers of our outstanding Regiment.

(Chief, Military Police Corps Regiment, continued from page 2)

and humanitarian assistance requirements will cause us to reevaluate our doctrine, training, structures, and capabilities. The soldiers of the Regiment, however, will continue to be the key to our ultimate success, for they are absolutely the best that the Army has to field. Our soldiers, leaders, and families will continue to make us proud, and they will continue to be the "Force of Choice."

Again, my personal thanks go out to all of the great MP men and women who proudly and unselfishly serve this great Regiment, great Army, and great nation. And…Happy Anniversary!

A Special Note From the Commandant

The March 2004 issue of *MILITARY POLICE* will be dedicated to the U.S. Military Police Corps mission in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

METL Development and Training Management in the Military Police Regiment

By Colonel David F. Treuting

With an overwhelming victory in Operation Desert Storm, one would have thought that the Army had validated its way of warfighting. Instead, our performance in that war and in peacekeeping missions in the Balkans has become the catalyst for transformation and the creation of the Future Force vision. This vision suggests that Army combat support and combat arms not only be capable of performing warfighting and peacekeeping missions but also that they be able to do so with a lighter, more mobile, agile force that is just as lethal and survivable. Considering the fact that this is a vision for the future, the multipurpose role and functionality of the Military Police Corps has considerable relevance today. The capability of operating across the full spectrum of conflict comes with a significant expectation for training that cannot and must not be underestimated. With five functions—maneuver and mobility operations, area security operations, internment/resettlement operations, law and order operations, and police intelligence operations—that define that capability for an MP company, is there a particular way that leaders should be applying training doctrine to meet the expectation?

Despite an intensely active role as peacekeeper and peacemaker over the past decade, military police are expected to achieve success in tasks on a scale and scope that are scarcely routine. For very practical reasons, units are much more likely to train on tasks related to stability and support operations than warfighting. These considerations make an answer to the posed question inherently divisive, and a professional discussion on the topic is long overdue. There are very generally two schools of thought that drive training in our MP companies:

The capability of operating across the full spectrum of conflict comes with a significant expectation for training that cannot and must not be underestimated.

- The mission of the combat support MP company is to provide support in the form of the five MP functions during peace, conflict, and war. Reality dictates that war plans are not likely to specify what tasks an MP company will receive. They must, therefore, be prepared to execute any and all of the five functions.
- Every combat support MP company is *designed* to provide MP support in the form of the five MP functions during peace, conflict, and war. Reality dictates that a company can only train on a specified number of collective tasks to proficiency. As a result, efforts must be focused on the most difficult of tasks—warfighting—with an understanding that the soldiers may be called upon to execute lesser tasks that they have not been trained to perform proficiently.

These two schools of thought are very closely related, but they could not be more different in terms of the training planning and execution required to support them. This article explores both approaches and asks a number of rhetorical questions but makes a series of suppositions that lead to one conclusion: respectively, our senior and tactical MP leaders must do a better job of enforcing and supporting prioritized, battle-focused training planning and execution with realistic training objectives that are consistent with the Army's training doctrine.

Training Expectations

The former Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric Shinseki, made his expectations for the force perfectly clear, and every single word is critical to this discussion:

> Ensure that our soldiers are physically and mentally prepared to dominate the next battlefield—no soldier goes into harm's way untrained…. The Army has an obligation to the American people to ensure its soldiers go into battle with the assurance of success and survival. Army forces cannot train for every possible mission; they train for war and prepare for specific missions as time and circumstances permit…. *Do less—do it well*—meet the standard [emphasis added].

The relevance of these comments is the foundation for all that follows, so read them again, or return to them

when you find a "sticky" point in the discussion. There is nothing branch-specific or revolutionary about these words. In fact, they were the rationale that produced Field Manual (FM) 25-100, *Training the Force* (now FM 7-0), and FM 25-101, *Battle Focused Training* (now FM 7-1), 13 years ago, and influenced their resurgence today.

General Shinseki's words disarm the clever leader who declares that these FMs are "just guidelines" and make the words *battle focused, prioritized, trained to standard*—and especially *always* in the oft-quoted cliché "Mission First, People Always"—nonnegotiable. His guidance even suggests how to meet these high expectations: "Do less—do it well—meet the standard."

Do less—do it well—meet the standard.

The definition of a mission-essential task list (METL) only serves to drive the point home: "A mission-essential task is a *collective task* an organization has to be *proficient* at in order to accomplish an appropriate *portion* of its wartime operational mission. Army organizations…*cannot achieve and sustain proficiency on every possible training task* [emphasis added]." Collectively, these references assert that a task be practiced, assessed, and repeated in successive training sessions before we declare *proficiency* in the capability. Is this being done in your unit? Is your company METL a list of prioritized *collective* tasks or is it a prioritized listing of all tasks? If you are an MP battalion or brigade commander, are you ensuring that companies have METLs that meet the expressed intent?

Although these FMs acknowledge the exceptional difficulty that every combat support unit has in light of their daily operational missions, the challenge of prioritizing training remains paramount and non-negotiable. If the reader intends to be truly objective in making a determination of how to apply this expectation to the tactical units of the Military Police Corps, there are several important factors that must be considered.

Translating the METL Process

To start, METL development is intended to work down, up, and across the chain of command with a communication among senior and subordinate commanders that is intended to provide optimal training management for tactical units that have varying limits of time and resources. At each respective level of command, leaders must be allowed to apply training management that is consistent with training doctrine: a senior leader provides the mission and guidance, but the subordinate leader is allowed to determine the METL. Both have a responsibility to ensure that amidst a demand to operate in peace, conflict, and war, there are *priorities* for training.

Nearly a year ago, this process was reaffirmed as our guiding principle for planning training. Of particular note were the adjustments to the METL inputs, which used to be simply *war plans* and *external directives.* In FM 7-0, "directives" have become "guidance" and three new inputs have been added to the process: *combat capabilities*, *operational environments*, and *directed missions*. These may be new terms, but they are far from new concepts. In fact, they are suggestive of a need to improve how and what we choose to prioritize. The input of *enduring combat capabilities*, which is defined as the "unique contribution" that each unit makes to the team effort, is of particular note to the Military Police Corps, considering our unique capability is and always has been maintaining or enforcing law and order as well as protecting the "arteries" to and from a battle-space. Battlefield intelligence, area security, initial internment and resettlement, and even portions of maneuver and mobility support are not unique to military police. These should be considered when determining what tasks will be trained. The more senior the commander, the more inherent the responsibility for ensuring that the soldier at the bottom of the hierarchy has guidance that is significantly more specific than "do it all."

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Translating MP Doctrine

As one of the key sources for determining the collective tasks for a unit's METL—and *the* source for MP mission-to-task training for FM 7-0 and FM 7-1—the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) 19-313-10-Mission Training Plan (MTP), *Mission Training Plan for Echelons Above Corps (EAC), Corps, and Division Military Police Platoons (Combat Support);* and ARTEP 19-313-30-MTP, *Mission Training Plan for Echelons Above Corps (EAC), Corps, and Division Military Police Companies (Combat Support),* are the most significant references available to our company leaders. In fact, you will rarely find a key leader without one of these documents under his arm during training planning and execution. Unfortunately, the interpretation and use of certain doctrinal terms within their first few chapters creates a great potential for confusion that is worthy of clarification.

First, as an example, it defines the MP company's mission and the use of the MP functions: "The company's mission is to provide military support during peace, conflict, and war. This MTP is comprised of five major functions that the company *must* execute to accomplish the mission [emphasis added]." Two pages later there seems to be a contradiction: "Prioritize the tasks that need training. You will never have enough time to train everything. You must orient on the greatest challenges and most difficult sustainment skills."

Although this seems contradictory, the -30 (as ARTEP 19-313-30-MTP is known) is a list of all of the MP collective tasks associated with our designed capability. They give no regard for the time or resources made available to any unit. More specifically, with over 60 percent of the MP Regiment in the Reserve Component and an Active Component that runs the gamut from corps support to division to modified table of organization and equipment law enforcement detachments, the -30 must serve as a tool for all MP companies. Units must perform their own respective analyses of time, resources available, and personnel, and then prioritize which tasks they will train. For example, a Reserve Component internment/resettlement company has a specified mission that allows for a much more narrow training focus than any combat support MP company. An active duty combat support MP company in Korea should have a far different training focus than that of the separate combat support MP company at Fort Benning, Georgia. Division MP companies have an opportunity to receive much more direct guidance on mission expectations than a combat support MP company at Fort Polk, Louisiana. In the end, the combat support MP company may be faced with preparing for a worst-case scenario, so the mission training plan offers the appropriate advice: "orient on the greatest challenges and most difficult sustainment skills."

One last factor should be considered when it comes to determining priorities: perishability of training. Consider how extensively soldiers and leaders must train to maintain proficiency in the most basic tasks of reading a map, firing a weapon, operating a Single-Channel, Ground-to-Air Radio System (SINCGARS), writing and disseminating orders, and coordinating plans. Now consider the relative complexity of bringing all of that together in any collective task, and then remember that we expect our most junior officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to choreograph that execution successfully in combat or conflict. Individual training without collective execution in preparation for war or conflict is analogous to training a football team individually and then expecting the team to come together to win at game time. Maybe the team will do well, but a football player's life doesn't depend on the function of the team.

Analyzing the Two Schools of Thought

School of Thought #1 directs that MP companies must be prepared to execute any and all of the five functions at any time. Although students of this camp may find comfort in the fact that the first sentence is supported verbatim in the -30 and FM 3-19.4, *Military Police Leaders' Handbook*, they must also recognize the unconstrained environmental context. If this school of thought is nevertheless true, then the logical corollaries with regard to preparedness and demonstrated proficiency must follow. Whether we use the terms *functions*, *missions*, or *task areas*, the -30 translates an MP company's capabilities into 71 collective tasks and a minimum of 35 collective tasks for any one of the functions. What this really means to a soldier or leader who must demonstrate proficiency in this capability, can be illustrated in the following example.

Of the 71 collective tasks, it would be more than practical to set aside collective tasks that read more like individual tasks (that is, those related exclusively to nuclear, biological, and chemical activities; unit maintenance; casualty handling; passive air defense; or even law enforcement). Our profession demands commanders and leaders who innovatively accomplish these tasks while in the Red Cycle or incorporate them into scenarios in the Green Cycle. Despite such economy of tasks—and even in consideration of the redundancy of individual and leader tasks represented in each—our MP company example from *School of Thought #1* must be able to collectively demonstrate Army standards of proficiency in all of these tasks:

- Deploy many units by air, land, or sea.
- Secure and defend a unit position.
- Conduct a delay or provide a screening force.
- Conduct movement to contact, deliberate, and hasty attacks.
- Conduct a battle handover to a tactical combat force.
- Conduct MP support to a passage of lines.
- Conduct cordon-and-search operations.
- Set up and run an operational decontamination site.
- Collect and process enemy prisoners of war.
- Conduct civil disturbance control.
- Conduct reconnaissance operations.
- Conduct route regulation enforcement and signing.
- Manage populace control (of any kind).

- Conduct convoy security operations.
- Support river crossings.
- Operate a field detention center for U.S. military prisoners.
- Support area damage control operations.
- Conduct security of critical sites with associated physical security planning.
- Redeploy and fully recover all assigned equipment.

These 19 uniquely different collective tasks are not all inclusive and don't even begin to address intrinsic leadership challenges such as the enforcement of consistency in training standards or observer/controller criterion; expectations and standards for operator and equipment maintenance throughout the training cycle; mandated training requirements; time available; and most notably for nearly every MP company, the preparation required to assume a three-shift workday for the law enforcement or mission/support cycle that most surely follows. Even the mission outlines of the -30 require proficiency in 21 different tasks. Either before or after 11 September 2001 (and even with the most ideal resources at hand and the most vague and subjective assessment standards available), it is difficult to imagine any unit accomplishing this training mission to standard. As this example clearly illustrates, it is not possible. In the end, whether units want to or not, they will invariably prioritize their training. In the end, and by definition, units will not be able to do what this school of thought professes is necessary or even possible to accomplish.

The students of *School of Thought #2,* however, use both the elaboration and specificity of the collective tasks in the MTPs to derive their METL. Since they realize that specific task selection is inevitable and proficiency in the selected tasks may determine the success or survival of soldiers, they base their training upon a worst-case scenario—warfighting. Being prepared to conduct all other tasks equates to having the manuals packed when the unit deploys, relying upon the likelihood of things like mission readiness exercises for lesser contingencies. Leaders that espouse this philosophy understand that all of the critical leader tasks are covered in any of the collective tasks already mentioned. An example of a METL under this school of thought may look like this:

- Coordinate deployment of forces.
- Conduct convoy security operations.
- Conduct a delay or provide a screening force.
- Conduct movement to contact.
- Conduct deliberate and hasty attacks.
- Coordinate redeployment and fully recover assigned equipment.

Though this METL too may be considered by some to be too large, it is considerably less demanding than performing all five MP functions and is arguably realistic for some commanders. In any case, it meets the principled intent of our training doctrine—prioritize!

Conclusion

The Military Police Corps is force structured and equipped to accomplish every single task associated with MP support under any circumstance, but *not at the same time*. Tactical-level MP soldiers and officers appreciate and understand that they may be called upon to execute a particular mission with less training, but they must be afforded a training opportunity that prepares them to do so successfully by design—not by hopes, assumptions, or motivational speeches; that's the contract. At the risk of reducing this topic to an oversimplified conclusion, an MP company METL should consist of collective tasks from our own MTP and nothing more. One of the related problems associated with the incorrect application of METL development is the simple fact that the term METL is too often used as an acronym and not often enough for its literal meaning. MP functions were intended to assist leaders in determining which collective tasks to train to be good at a particular facet of MP support. METLs composed of MP functions or missions not only fail entirely at meeting the intent of limiting what a unit has to train, but they also equate to veiled lists of unobtainable training expectations.

MP brigade or battalion commanders who have all five functions on their METLs must recognize the translation at the tactical level and allow commanders to "do less—do it well—meet the standard." The Army's training doctrine demands a communication process that requires superiors to mentor their subordinates but also to listen to them. It has become increasingly popular for superiors to characterize operational experiences as

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True leadership challenges exist in every unit, but at a certain point, a disregard for the effects that these conditions have upon training readiness turns leadership challenges into a term that today's leaders have learned to avoid—zero defects.

training. Though there is a certain amount of merit to this assertion, this article stresses the need for discretion. True leadership challenges exist in every unit, but at a certain point, a disregard for the effects that these conditions have upon training readiness turns *leadership challenges* into a term that today's leaders have learned to avoid—zero defects.

When augmenting doctrine, operational experiences must be tempered with discretion and a firm understanding of the conditions from which the experiences were obtained. Being able to shoot from the hip and execute tactics or strategy that aren't found in any book is the hallmark of good leadership under stress in conflict, but not everyone operates from as sound a doctrinal foundation as they think. This is a vitally important consideration if we are to properly leverage our experiences with the training requirements for our units. For example, Desert Storm was an impressive victory—one so decisive that it left enemy units surrendering to camera crews when the ground war began. These are hardly the conditions we can expect to see from a determined adversary, and yet the ranks of the Military Police Corps swell with senior NCO and officer experiences that demonstrated a level of "success and survival" in combat that was grossly disproportionate to the training regimen of our units.

It would be extremely easy to dismiss this entire discussion, with all of its references and conclusions, as a list of complaints or intellectual jargon. But such a dismissal would be analogous to turning one's head to avoid the view of a burning building—the building will continue to burn whether the fire is addressed or not. A genuine adherence to METL development requires much more effort and constant review, assessment, and change (but then that was always the point of the process). Review the inputs to ensure that your unit has the right priorities in place. Responsibility for ensuring that some priorities exist rests at the top first, and then works its way down the ladder of command. Whatever the individual answer or conclusion on this topic is, the bottom line is that it is the MP team, squad, and platoon that must execute the tasks in question when it really counts. If we fail to set the conditions for success that are absolutely possible through judicious selection of collective tasks, commanders and senior leaders of the Regiment may bear the discredit, but its soldiers will bear the cost.

Recommendations

No discussion is complete without recommendations, so here they are:

To the MP Senior Leaders, Officers, and NCOs. Remember the age-old adage, "we exist for the success of our young, not ourselves." Continue or do better at opening and encouraging the dialogue with our branch's company commanders, lieutenants, and NCOs on this topic, and be mindful of the pitfalls discussed in this article when doing so. Maximize the effectiveness of this process in word *and* deed, demonstrating to the next generation that prioritization is principled and necessary. Good coaching and mentoring takes *time*, and it involves two-way communication that is not patronizing or undignified. They all know who you are and where you came from; you don't need to remind them or prove it to them by pointing out how little they know.

To the Tactical Level MP Leaders, Officers, and NCOs. Stand up for and do better with the training principles espoused in our doctrine. Follow these principles to a fault when it's your turn to personally lead soldiers and manage training. If you are faced with a situation where training expectations exceed the unit's capability, open the dialogue with your superiors and don't stop until it is fixed or you leave the unit. Do your job. Seek out coaches and mentors.

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FM 7-1, *Battle Focused Training*, 15 September 2003.

ARTEP 19-313-10-MTP, 10 April 1999.

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Colonel Treuting was the assistant commandant of the U.S. Army Military Police School from June 2000 to June 2002, when he became the senior Army advisor to the Louisiana Army National Guard. He was deployed as the chief of operational protection for the Coalition Force Land Component Command as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom from January 2003 to June 2003.

The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Enemy Prisoner of War Mission



By First Lieutenant Randall L. Mueller

War presents the military police with many situations that are never dealt with in peacetime exercises. Some situations can be prepared for, some cannot. If you subscribe to the premise that knowledge is a combat multiplier, you want to be well prepared for the enemy prisoner of war (EPW) mission. Time constraints in professional development courses have left out some essential information about dealing with this mission. It is my hope that this article will prepare future MP leaders for facing this mission.

History

Henry Dunant, a Swiss citizen, wrote a book about the suffering he witnessed among the casualties at the battle of Solferino, Italy, during the War of Italian Unification in 1859. People were horrified at the suffering of the wounded and dying soldiers. The book was a huge success. One influential man, Gustave Moynier, was impressed by Mr. Dunant's book and presented it to a local charity that he chaired, which then established a five-member committee to study Mr. Dunant's proposals.[1] The committee met for the first time on 17 February 1863. This committee became known as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) because of the distinctive emblem that distinguished its members from the others on the battlefield.

In 1863, the ICRC convened an international conference in Geneva to study methods of overcoming the problem of inadequate military medical services. The convention ended with the adoption of ten resolutions providing for the establishment of the future Red Cross and Red Crescent societies. In August 1864, 16 states signed the *Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field*—the first modern international humanitarian law.[2] The first convention merely dealt with the issue of battlefield casualties and said nothing about the treatment of prisoners. The Geneva Convention of 1929 was the first convention to deal with the treatment of prisoners of war. The convention arrangements were first tried out during the Chaco War (1932-1935) between Bolivia and Paraguay. Interestingly, neither of these two countries was a signatory to the 1929 convention.[3]

The 1929 convention has all the proceedings and practices that we are familiar with today. Prisoners are—

- To be separated by rank and sex.
- Only required to give to their captors certain information.
- To be fed, clothed, and protected from public curiosity.

A novel provision of the 1929 convention is Article 27, which provides that the capturing party will pay captive officers the same pay that the equivalent rank in their army receives. This pay was to be remunerated by the officer's country at the end of the hostilities. There is no provision made for the pay of noncommissioned officers or other enlisted persons.[4]

The land warfare laws as they are now practiced are governed primarily by the 1949 Geneva Convention. The ICRC is the primary organization that attempts to ensure that belligerent parties adhere to the convention's principles. The 1949 convention has four parts called *protocols*. The first protocol deals with the treatment of sick and wounded soldiers. The second concerns the care and treatment of shipwrecked sailors. The third protocol is the one of most concern to MP soldiers, because it covers prisoners of war.[5] The fourth deals with civilians and the occupation of countries.

What to Expect Today

The third protocol gives the ICRC the right to inspect prisons. It should be noted that the ICRC will inspect civil prisons in countries that are involved in a conflict—as they did the Shibergan Prison in Afghanistan.[6] In some cases, the ICRC has even built a prison to ensure better living conditions for detainees.[7] Here,

one important ICRC recruiting practice comes into play: the ICRC makes it a point not to hire any local translators for their work in prisoner of war camps. They feel that this places those individuals in a position where undo pressure could be placed upon them, so only third-party translators are used. As an MP soldier, you need to realize that foreign nationals from the ICRC will be visiting your facility. This will be the case even if the facility you are running has a "no foreign" access policy.

Confidentiality is a hallmark of the work done by the ICRC. The visiting teams' reports are only shared with the authorities of the detaining power and with their higher headquarters. The work of the ICRC is only possible if there is mutual trust and goodwill on the part of all the participants. Discretion is crucial to the success of their mission.[8] When the delegates interview a detainee, they do so in private. As a result, only the delegate, the detainee, and an interpreter (if necessary) are in the room during the actual interview. Privacy during the interview process is seen as critical in getting the detainees to speak candidly about their treatment after they were captured. The ICRC has four main goals regarding prisoner treatment:

- To prevent or stop disappearances and extrajudicial killings.
- To prevent or end torture and ill-treatment.
- To improve detention conditions where necessary.
- To restore contact between detainees and their families.[9]

...only the delegate, the detainee, and an interpreter (if necessary) are in the room during the actual interview. Privacy during the interview process is seen as a critical in getting the detainees to speak candidly about their treatment after they were captured.

The idea of disappearances and extrajudicial killings may seem far-fetched in an area under the operational control of the U.S. Army, but the ICRC deals with many warring factions in various countries. You only need to look at Rwanda to see a country that experienced many killings while it was supposedly under the control of United Nations peacekeepers. Bosnia has a history of extrajudicial killings as well.

Torture is another idea that has no place in the Army. Unfortunately, it has an ill-defined place in the lexicon of the ICRC, which refuses to define the term based on the view that what is torturous is drawn largely from the concept of what is taboo in a given society. This can create some friction when dealing with the delegates. What Americans view as torturous and what the delegates view as torturous may not be the same thing. Thus, if allegations are made, it is crucial to get specifics about what was supposedly done. Without knowing exactly what the complaints are, you may go about trying to solve the wrong problem. Since the delegates view the problem with a different perspective, ask for their opinion about remedying the situation. This allows you to see their underlying concern and explore how to meet with their approval. These may or may not be workable solutions. Do not expect the delegates to tell you which prisoner made the complaints. Shielding the identity of the prisoner is viewed as integral to the process.

The delegates always seek to improve the physical lot of the detained individuals. They seek better food and better living and recreational conditions as part of their mandate. To you and your soldiers, this can seem maddening. You might feel that you can never do enough to make the delegates happy. You will probably feel that some of the prisoners in your custody are eating better and living better than they did before their capture. How they lived before their capture is not relevant. Once they are in U.S. custody, we must maintain good standards for them, the standards that the United States agreed to when it signed the convention. One of the leadership challenges you will have is that your troops, no matter how well-trained and well-disciplined they are, will and must consider these noncombatants to be the enemy. It is a challenge to the company-level leadership to help the troops maintain the balance necessary to keep sharp. The distinctions between an enemy soldier and an EPW must be dealt with constantly.

Allowing captured troops to communicate with their families is one of the most important things the ICRC does. For captured soldiers, the ability to communicate with their families is a relief; they want their families to know that they are alive. The ICRC gives them a means by which to do this—the Red Cross message. These are simple messages that EPWs may send to their families. The simple, two-sided form contains the name and address of the person to whom the message is to be sent, the name of the sender, and a small message. These messages, both incoming and outgoing, are screened to ensure that they do not contain any information about the facility where the person is being held or any other information of intelligence value. It is the responsibility of the ICRC to ensure that the messages are delivered. The detainees look forward to the chance to send messages to their families—they enjoy

messages from home just as much as any American soldier. These messages are considered to be personal property and should be added to a detainee's personal property inventory. In this way, the property can remain with the individual if he is transferred or released.

Conclusion

The ICRC has existed for 140 years. While the scope of its activities has changed, its basic mission has not. In any future conflict that the U.S. Army Military Police Corps engages in, whether it is stability and support or internment and resettlement operations, chances are that the ICRC will be there too. By knowing what to expect, we can facilitate future EPW operations.

Endnotes

[1]International Committee of the Red Cross, *Founding and Early Years of the Red Cross (1863-1914)*, <*www.icrc.org/Web/Eng*> (29 July 2003).

[2]International Committee of the Red Cross, *The Chaco War (1932-1935)*, 12 June 2002, <*www.icrc.org/Web/Eng*> (29 July 2003).

[3]Ibid.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Burt Herman, "Famished Prisoners Welcome Full-Blown Red Cross Feeding Program," *The Associated Press*, 21 April 2002.

[7]"Rwanda: ICRC Awaits Opening of New Detention Facility," *ICRC News*, 9 June 1995, p. 36.

[8]Gary Hill, "ICRC: Keeping Prisoners of War and Political Prisoners Safe," *Corrections Compendium*, 25 May 2000, pp. 8-13.

[9]International Committee of the Red Cross, "Protecting Prisoners and Detainees in Wartime," <*www.icrc.org/Web/Eng*> (29 July 2003).

First Lieutenant Mueller is a platoon leader in the 377th Military Police Company, U.S. Army Reserve, Cincinnati, Ohio. He entered the Army as an enlisted soldier and is a graduate of the University of Cincinnati and Indiana University.

The Bond of Friendship

By Major Julian P. Charvat

Since the early 1970s, the U.S. Army Military Police Corps Regiment and the Royal Military Police of the British army have exchanged officers. In the early 1980s, the British exchange officer and a small-group leader became friends, and by 1996, they were the leaders of their respective regiments. The friends, Brigadier Ian Fulton and Brigadier General David Foley, decided to formalize the relationship between their two organizations.

Traditionally, the British army had held alliances with armies around the world, but it could only formalize such relationships with British Commonwealth countries. The Royal Military Police decided that there should be some formal way of recognizing the relationship between the U.S. Army and the U.K. armies, so they posed the question to the U.K. Ministry of Defence. Approval was given for a new idea—a Bond of Friendship.

Brigadier General Stephen Curry and Brigadier Maurice Nugent shake hands after re-signing the Bond of Friendship.

The Bond of Friendship was signed by Brigadier Fulton and Brigadier General Foley in Chichester, West Sussex, England—the home of the Royal Military Police—on 15 March 1996. This was the first official Bond of Friendship ever signed. To mark the anniversary each year, the British exchange officer and the U.S. Army Military Police Corps Regiment chief traditionally toast the friendship with port, the British toasting drink.

V Corps Military Police Help Restore Law and Order

By Specialist Kristopher Joseph

The first efforts to restore law and order in post-Saddam regime Iraq began 9 May 2003 when the Iraqi police and the U.S. MP soldiers under the command of V Corps's 18th Military Police Brigade conducted joint patrols in the war-torn streets of Baghdad.

The 549th Military Police Company is part of the 3d Military Police Battalion, 3d Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia, and is currently attached to the 18th for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Fresh from a deployment rotation in Bosnia, the 549th came to Southwest Asia as the J.P. Holland winner for best MP company in the Army and was given the honor of being the first U.S. MP unit to be on the road with Iraqi police.

The joint patrols are putting the Iraqi police in charge. The military police are to offer training advice and give assistance if the Iraqi officers need extra help. "We are here to lend credibility to their police force," one soldier said. "It's their laws and their country. We are going to back them up." A patrol then began. After circling their patrol sector, the Iraqis stopped at one of their abandoned police stations. Inside, the officers familiarized the U.S. military police with their operations. In the course of the briefing, the Iraqi police took the Americans on a room-by-room tour of the station, noting that some rooms were used by Saddam Hussein's much-feared secret police. The Iraqi officers even turned over documents that revealed information that the secret police had used to root out and quell those who opposed Saddam's rule.

As the group prepared to leave the station, the 549th received a radio message reporting that a witness claimed to have seen a man attempting to rape a young girl. The joint police team returned to the Joint Operation Center to get the full picture. When they arrived, the witness told them that the man in question was armed but wounded in the leg, and the girl was safely in the custody of the witness. After some coordination, the U.S. military police and the Iraqi police went to the home of the accused man. Stopping a block from the man's house, the joint team huddled to work out their arrest procedures. The Iraqi police took the lead and entered the home, while the U.S. military police secured the area's perimeter. Moments later, the Iraqis emerged from the home with the accused man and his accomplices in custody. The police found an AK-47 assault rifle and a cache of ammunition in the house. Across the street, a crate of grenades was also uncovered.

Photo by SPC Kristopher Joseph

SPC Michael Williams, first platoon, 549th Military Police Company, exchanges pleasantries with an Iraqi policeman as U.S. military police and Iraqi police prepare for the first joint patrol in Baghdad, May 9.

The collapse of the regime weakened Iraq's infrastructure, leaving it vulnerable to organized crime. With little money and scarce food and resources, the Iraqi police will have their hands full with citizens trying to take advantage of the current economic conditions. Getting the Iraqi police remobilized is a big first step in handing the society back to the people. There are still many issues to iron out. Former V Corps commander, Lieutenant General William S. Wallace, said that thousands of Iraqi police—more than half of the entire force—have responded to the call to return to duty. But there are big challenges ahead, the general added: a lack of mobility, a shortage of equipment, the challenges of ensuring that the Iraqi police are paid a reasonable wage, and reestablishing Iraqi officers' authority. Until these issues and more are settled and the U.S. military feels that the Iraqi police are fully capable to operate on their own, the joint patrols are scheduled to continue.

Specialist Joseph is assigned to the V Corps Public Affairs Office, Mannheim, Germany.

The Evolution of Police Intelligence Operations

By Thomas P. Duggan, Jr., Chief Warrant Officer 2 Eugene Matthews, and Major Ed Lowe

The noncommissioned officer (NCO) moves cautiously through the village. Recent tensions within the village and the surrounding townships have made the mission of U.S. soldiers more difficult and dangerous. Winning the hearts and minds of the people will pose an even greater challenge to the military leadership than previously anticipated. However, armed with the commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), the NCO and his squad of military policemen move down the street. With an interpreter nearby, the NCO asks one of the village leaders about recent increased enemy activity in the area and if he knows the location of the guerilla forces. With a simple nod, the village leader indicates that he knows nothing about such activity. However, he does reveal the names of a few individuals simply to appease the American patrol. Yet, he does not understand that the recent collection of information and subsequent analysis of that collection effort exposed one of the individuals whose name was provided as one of the key suspects in heavy enemy activity in another American sector. The individual's whereabouts are quickly determined and U.S. Special Forces soldiers pick him up the next day. This is police intelligence operations (PIO) in action. One would surmise that this activity occurred in Kosovo or Afghanistan. However, such a scenario could very well have taken place in Vietnam.

A pamphlet on counterinsurgency lessons learned on population and resource control dated November 1967 stated that every "U.S. division and separate brigade with the intention of operating against the VC [Vietcong] infrastructure should have a national police field force (NPFF) battalion, company, or similar unit attached and should establish a Combined Police Intelligence Operations Center." While performing traditional law enforcement and law and order missions, Army law enforcement continuously feeds essential relative data and information to higher headquarters. PIO combines the elements of human intelligence (HUMINT), criminal intelligence (CRIMINT), and police information to develop actionable intelligence products and enhance force protection.

Today, more than ever, the focus is on the success of PIO, from the local community to the global community. Many organizations still view PIO as simply statistical information gathering for areas such as traffic patterns and increase or decrease of offenses. Some believe that an agency must have a specific number of personnel or serve a population of a type, volume, or makeup in order to have or use police intelligence. While PIO should encompass statistical analysis of information, it also provides a much needed and underutilized aspect of criminal intelligence analysis. While the statistical intelligence provides vital information to the overall strategic success of an organization by identifying where resources should be focused, criminal intelligence can aid the successful prosecution or resolution of many investigations. The same keys to success are used in both strategic and operational planning, collection, analysis, and reporting. The term, which changes the focus and to a degree the success of PIO, is actionable intelligence products. Even at the tactical level, the impact of PIO on operational- and strategic-level planning and operations is often immeasurable. The following vignette reveals adherence to this theory.

During Operation Uphold Democracy (October 1994), an MP team from the 988th Military Police Company was conducting a traffic control post as part of a cordon-and-search operation in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. While performing the task, two civilians approached the MP team and informed them of criminal activity in the neighborhood. During the

interview, the MP team prepared a sketch of a house and the surrounding area. The team also obtained information describing the criminals and their weapons. Recognizing that the criminal activity was in fact the actions of a political/mercenary group named "FRAP," the MP team radioed the platoon leader and forwarded the field interview to higher headquarters. Two days later, a unit from the 10th Mountain Division assaulted the house, capturing weapons, ammunition, and equipment.

Approved as an MP function in October 1997, PIO supports, enhances, and contributes to the commander's force protection program, common operational picture, and situational understanding. The PIO function ensures that information collected during the conduct of the other four MP functions is provided as input to the intelligence collection effort and turned into action or reports. PIO has three components:

- Collect police information
- Conduct the police information assessment process
- Develop police intelligence products

PIO is accomplished throughout the conduct of all Army law enforcement (ALE) responsibilities including maneuver and mobility support operations (MMSO), area security (AS) operations, internment and resettlement (I/R) operations , and law and order (L&O) operations. Tactical MP commanders and their staffs should recognize the value of CRIMINT and police information resources provided by ALE while conducting PIO across the full spectrum of Army operations.

Since PIO is conducted by ALE personnel, it enables the law enforcement community—regardless of geographic location—to contribute to the overall intelligence picture. PIO is a resource that supports the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) and contributes to risk management as well as force protection by maintaining a steady focus on criminal intelligence aspects that traditionally have not been covered by military intelligence units. In addition, military intelligence units do not have the physical assets to collect the type of information collected under PIO. However, they play an integral part in the eventual analysis of that information, turning it into solid intelligence products that help focus commanders at all levels on the intelligence priorities.

For example, the use of pattern analysis developed through PIO allows mission commanders to direct limited resources to areas where destabilizing elements such as saboteurs, terrorists, indigenous criminals, and others opposed to U.S. interest thrive. Through cooperative efforts, ALE and host nation authorities can identify, minimize, or neutralize criminal threats.

ALE staffs develop synchronized channels for information sharing and dissemination to enhance the overall intelligence collection effort. As information is received, the data is analyzed and forwarded to higher headquarters, multinational security forces, interagencies, and host nation authorities. ALE personnel must work closely with the S2/G2, civil/military operations center, and civil affairs personnel to ensure that proper security measures are applied when sharing information.

Routine development of CRIMINT includes a dedicated process of planning, collecting, evaluating, collating, analyzing, and disseminating PIO products to MP units, other military units, military intelligence units, staff sections, and civilian agencies for potential action on the information turned into intelligence.

ALE personnel develop and exchange police information and criminal intelligence with other police forces in the area of operations, to include joint and potentially coalition partners. This exchange is conducted in tactical and nontactical environments. The information is obtained through daily contact with civilians, nongovernment organizations, and private volunteer organizations and through the interaction with other law enforcement, intelligence, and security forces. PIR drives the collection effort and better paints the overall intelligence picture. The following vignette illustrates the effectiveness of PIO and forums during stability and support operations in Kosovo.

Task Force 504 MP established the Police Intelligence Collection and Analysis Council (PICAC) in support of Task Force Falcon 3B's peacekeeping operations in Multinational Brigade (East), Kosovo. PICAC was a joint law enforcement forum with an exclusive membership of key leaders and decision makers that spanned national and international law enforcement, security, and intelligence agencies to include United Nations (UN) Civil Police (UNCIVPOL); UN Border Police and UN Security; Task Force Falcon ACE chief, analyst, and targeter; Criminal Investigation Division commander and investigators; and the joint law enforcement intelligence and operations officers who came together weekly for a fusion and targeting forum. The PICAC was responsible for the detention of more than a dozen "wanted" felons, to include subjects of war crimes. In fact, during one PICAC meeting a CIVPOL investigator from the Kacanik municipality mentioned a criminal's name in association with a known gang. The criminal had been convicted for

attempted murder, had not served his term, and remained at large with no way to identify him. The Task Force Falcon ACE chief immediately telephoned his office to crosscheck the criminal's name in the ACE databases. Task Force Falcon ACE was able to provide a picture of the criminal during that same forum, enabling UNCIVPOL to identify and arrest the man the next day.

Insurgents, enemy agents, and enemy military units may employ a variety of criminal actions to include murder, robberies, black marketing, riots and civil disturbances, terrorist activities, counterfeiting currency, drug trafficking, and smuggling to accomplish their goals. The proactive development and processing of police information and criminal intelligence can directly and significantly contribute to the success of military intelligence in the early detection of insurgent activities.

PIO provides significant information through military intelligence channels. Specific collection and analysis efforts that may support military intelligence efforts include any information or intelligence that identifies possible indicators of offenses that might be undertaken to disrupt friendly operations.

Other efforts could include the following:

- Determining the existence of criminal elements and their connection with other criminal activities.
- Identifying international criminal activities that may disrupt the national economic, social, and political infrastructure due to the type of criminal activity and the associated bribery of government officials.
- Infiltrating government agencies, labor unions, legitimate businesses, political parties, and fraternal groups.

Certain strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence collection efforts by military and civil intelligence agencies may assist the police in accomplishing law and order operations and gathering criminal intelligence. The S2/G2 includes this information in the basic intelligence estimate and/or counterintelligence annex. Psychological operations and civil affairs units and MP patrols are also dependent on this type of intelligence focus. Where ongoing counterintelligence investigations or sensitive counterintelligence source operations are involved, this shared information lessens duplication of effort and possible compromise of ongoing operations. Areas of mutual interest to the information collectors and those involved in the analysis process that should be included are—

- Past and present political trends of the various governmental agencies and organizations.
- The impact on, and reaction by, majority and minority socioeconomic groups.
- Taboo, mores, and national characteristics that indicate a tolerance of war, violence, crime, corruption, and revolution.
- Renewal of old taboos, mores, customs, and superstitions that can be used to influence, manipulate, or captivate elements of the population.
- Infiltration of educational institutions, established professions, unions, political organizations, fraternal and religious groups, and government positions by criminals, terrorists, political radicals, and insurgents.
- Degradation of sociopolitical institutions identified with the government or national stability.
- Movements and causes that may be initiated as peaceful and moralistic demonstrations and progress through civil disturbances to acts of anarchy, insurgency, and revolutionary warfare.

PIO teams develop pattern analysis and templates (doctrinal and situational) to characterize criminal activities in the area of operations. Additionally, PIO teams maintain event matrices to describe anticipated criminal threat activities and possible courses of action. PIO teams assist the MP/Criminal Investigation Division commander to translate CCIR into HUMINT tasks, activities, and prioritization of collection efforts. Furthermore, as HUMINT tasks are completed, the raw data is collected, analyzed, interpreted, and distributed through proper channels. The process continues with the preparation of staff estimates and the development of police intelligence. PIO teams give priority to police intelligence determined to have immediate tactical or operational value.

Collective tasks that support MP functions and contribute to PIO include—

- Criminal intelligence operations.
- Maneuver and mobility support operations.
- Area security.
- Law and order operations.
- Internment and resettlement operations.
- Information dissemination.
- Police intelligence collection and reporting.
- Antiterrorism operations.
- Force protection.
- Counternarcotics operations.
- MP investigations.

After the events of 11 September 2001, the value of information and subsequently intelligence products expanded exponentially with respect to other ALE

activities and operations. MP operations in recent years (Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq) have proved the success of PIO and have—through the cooperation of other military units such as military intelligence, civil affairs, and interagency organizations— solidified a place for PIO as one of the five MP functions. The Interim PIO Handbook published in the summer of 2002 fully revealed the capabilities and dynamics of what PIO can bring to the supported commander. As this function continues to evolve and mature in stature, MP commanders should always identify ways to incorporate PIO into their operations—either in the tactical or nontactical environments.

Mr. Duggan is the senior PIO analyst for the Army's Advanced Law Enforcement Training Division at the U. S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

Chief Warrant Officer 2 Matthews is chief, Police Intelligence Operations, for the Army's Advanced Law Enforcement Training Division, USAMPS.

Major Lowe is the chief, Doctrine Division, USAMPS.

759th Military Police Battalion

Lineage and Honors

Constituted on 19 August 1942 as the 759th Military Police Battalion.

Activated on 15 September 1942 at Fort Ontario, New York.

Reorganized and redesignated on 17 September 1947 as the 759th Military Police Service Battalion.

Reorganized and redesignated on 20 November 1950 as the 759th Military Police Battalion.

Allotted on 26 November 1952 to the regular Army.

Inactivated on 1 November 1953 in Germany.

Activated 6 June 1968 at Fort Dix, New Jersey.

Organic elements inactivated on 1 November 1970 at Fort Dix, New Jersey.

Campaign Participation Credit

World War II

Naples-Foggia
Rome-Arno
Southern France (with arrowhead)
Rhineland
Ardennes-Alsace
Central Europe

Southwest Asia

Defense of Saudi Arabia
Liberation and Defense of Kuwait
Cease-Fire

Decorations

Army Meritorious Unit Commendation (streamer embroidered) Southwest Asia

Police Intelligence Operations in USAREUR

By Major Shawn T. Driscoll

Information exchange among the Military Intelligence Detachment, the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) and the Office of the Provost Marshal (OPM) has always been a challenge. The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and another potential terrorist incident in Heidelberg, Germany, have made this exchange routine in U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR).

In August 2002, the USAREUR OPM established a Police Intelligence Operations (PIO) cell within the Law Enforcement Branch. The purpose of the new office was to work with the USAREUR G2 (Intelligence) and 202d CID Group to "fuse" intelligence collected by the different agencies to detect, analyze, and prevent terrorist and criminal threats directed against USAREUR personnel and installations. Positive information flow between military intelligence, the CID, and the OPM was established and became routine during the criminal investigation that followed the arrest by German police of an Army and Air Force Exchange Service employee and her boyfriend, who were suspected of plotting to bomb the USAREUR headquarters.

The "fusion group," now known as the Force Protection Integration Group (FPIG), meets weekly to exchange information and concerns to support the USAREUR commanding general and the local commanders. It is a formal structure that supports intelligence planning, collection, analysis, and dissemination. These regular meetings have paved the way for daily dialogue concerning current cases involving potential terrorist or other criminal activity.

The FPIG consists of two elements: the action officer group and the senior (colonels) group. The action officer group reports to the senior group. The FPIG meets every other week at the G2 (Intelligence) in Heidelberg. Initial meetings focused on addressing and resolving open investigations with counterterrorism or force protection implications. With the resolution of these investigations, the FPIG shifted to focus on the processes or key issues that could improve our force protection posture and information flow. Figure 1 depicts the information flow among the PIO-supported provost marshals and FPIG members.

The USAREUR PIO has established the information-sharing processes and improved law enforcement and military intelligence contacts and reporting in theater. The PIO has successfully—

- Reviewed and resolved—in coordination with the FPIG—approximately 12 criminal cases, each agency working with its "tools" to assist the case lead.
- Developed new reporting and tracking procedures that eliminate "back doors" to installation access (tracking identification card theft, checking employee backgrounds, registering vehicles, and authorizing installation passes). A sample format for an attempted entry form is on pages 18 and 19.
- Established the routine use of the Land Information Warfare Activity Information Dominance Center (IDC), a Department of the Army operations support activity assigned to the Intelligence and Security Command, and host-nation data files in conducting background checks. The IDC is an "all source" intelligence fusion center that provides



Figure 1. Criminal intelligence flow process

access to and analysis of current information. The IDC works in concert with the Joint Analysis Center and the U.S. European Command.

- Developed procedures that will formalize the operational guidance to the field about the PIO/FPIG function. Also developed a requirement to establish a supporting capability within each area support group and base support battalion.
- Reclassified a permanent civilian job (police intelligence analyst) in the OPM and hired a civilian contractor in support of PIO.

Police Intelligence Analyst Duties

- Serves as a criminal threat (CT) analyst responsible for researching and analyzing the threats to USAREUR interests and personnel posed by terrorist and criminal groups and organizations.
- Researches and analyzes events that may adversely impact operations and provides assessments to determine the terrorist threat levels, threat countermeasures, and force protection and crime prevention requirements.

Civilian Contractor Duties

- Processes, analyzes, and develops intelligence products using computer-aided collection, analysis, production, and dissemination automation.
- Conducts criminal analysis using Analyst's Notebook®, a software program for analyzing a variety of data.
- Ensures connectivity between the PIO and all appropriate computer-based intelligence, including the Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) and other law enforcement and intelligence databases and networks.

Major Driscoll is assigned to the USAREUR Office of the Provost Marshal, Law Enforcement Branch, Heidelberg, Germany. He went there from a two-year assignment as the 6th Area Support Group provost marshal in Stuttgart, Germany.

***Number of People Involved*: _____**

	Person #1	Person #2	Person #3	Person #4
Name:				
Passport / ID #:				
Driver's License #:				
Ethnicity:				
Gender:				
Estimated Age:				
Estimated Weight:				
Estimated Height:				
Hair Color:				
Eye Color:				
Hair Type:				
Facial Hair:				
Clothing:				
Language Spoken:				
Glasses:				
Distinguishing Marks:				

Additional Information:

Figure 2. Sample format for an attempted entry form

Time: _____ Date: _____

Kaserne/Housing Area:_____ Exact Location:_____

( ) TIER I: Attempt to gain access to an installation/facility without proper documentation (installation pass/ID) and/or escort/sponsor.

ACTION: Collect personal information and deny access; if no identification or sponsor, call local MP station.

( ) TIER II: Attempt to gain access to an installation/facility by force by any intrusive means. (i.e., Rushing the gate, breaching fence line, using altered or fraudulent ID).

ACTION: Contact local MP station, detain individual (s) and collect personal information.

***Person Filling out Report*:**

Name: _____ Rank: _____ Unit: _____
Phone (Work and Home): _____

Witnesses (if any):
Name: _____ Rank: _____ Unit: _____
Phone (Work and Home): _____

Vehicle Information:

Sedan ( ) Van ( ) Truck ( ) # of Axles:_____

Station Wagon ( ) Motorcycle ( ) Other ( ) (Describe below)

Describe: _____

Color: _____ Make: _____

License Plate #: _____ Model: _____

License Plate Country of Origin: _____

Estimated Model Year: _____

Other Identifying Characteristics: _____

Immediately contact military police at: xxx-xxxx

Figure 3. Continuation of sample format for an attempted entry form

Land of the Morning Calm, Land of the Daily Demonstration:

Leveraging Police Intelligence Operations to Combat Civil Disturbances

By Major Chad B. McRee

In the past year, U.S. forces in Seoul, Republic of Korea (ROK), have experienced a large number of demonstrations and civil disruptions targeting our personnel, our installations, and our presence. One precipitating event for this unrest occurred on 13 June 2002 when two Korean girls were struck and killed by a tracked vehicle that was traveling in convoy formation adjacent to a 2d Infantry Division training area. As a result of this incident, the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) and the Korean National Police (KNP) tracked, reported, combated, and braced for more than 700 peninsulawide demonstrations (97 percent of which are anti-United States in nature). The largest gathering involved more than 100,000 protesters. Demonstrations often focus on ideas such as *P'yong-tong-sa* (People Who Open the Doors for Reunification and Peace). One active group is called "Citizens Against the Planned Move of USFK to Pyongtaek."

Due to the magnitude of this civil unrest, unprecedented coordination between multiple agencies has been required to predict and proactively respond to potentially violent demonstrations. Neither the Joint Intelligence Staff Directorate nor the multiple defense intelligence resources were able to predict the civil disturbances, conduct a timely analysis, or recommend sound courses of action for response. Therefore, the USFK provost marshal became responsible for developing a predictive analysis system for anticipating demonstrations and advising the command about dealing with them.

The police intelligence operations (PIO) function has become the most important operational-level function for the U.S. and ROK forces dealing with civil disturbances in Korea. The USFK Provost Marshal Operations-Intelligence Fusion Working Group (OIFWG) conducts PIO to generate most of the peninsulawide civil demonstration analysis and then implements appropriate response actions. While there are certainly some who believe that the conventional intelligence community should be orchestrating these actions, the following challenges led to the USFK provost marshal's willingness to step up to the plate and get the job done:

- The intelligence community was focusing on the traditional hostile elements, using a traditional

intelligence preparation of the battlefield process.

- From a daily workload perspective, the traditional threat (North Korea) did not disrupt day-to-day activities to the extent that the civil disturbances did, but the threat in the North continued to be the intelligence community's principle focus.
- Multiple U.S. intelligence sources were disseminating information, but none of them were systematically painting a picture for the command.

Because of these issues, the USFK provost marshal directed his chief of operations to organize a working group that brought the intelligence, the MP, the public affairs, and the KNP communities (and their supporting directorates) together to accomplish the following:

- Identify and track civil gatherings to predict unrest and conduct risk assessments for commanders.
- Construct a method for disseminating timely and highly accurate peninsulawide information.
- Prepare an accurate common operational picture briefing for the command.[1]

The OIFWG meets on a recurring basis and analyzes the installation threat data relating to the demonstrations and their impact on the military community. First, the group conducts a risk analysis of each demonstration as it pertains to the anticipated behavior of the group that is conducting the civil gathering; then, it identifies the appropriate level of installation and host-nation response. This data is also used to recommend appropriate safety measures for the community personnel. An officer or noncommissioned officer within the 8th Military Police Brigade S2 serves as a member of the OIFWG and provides information about the various dissident groups. He catalogs and tracks these groups in an effort to identify themes and anticipated actions that can be linked to other terrorist-type violent actions.

The processes used by the OIFWG directly contribute to the daily Crisis Action Team (CAT) update that the provost marshal gives to the senior leadership. The common operational picture is focused by the work of the OIFWG, which involves verifying, validating, and tracking the intelligence on a particular demonstration. All pronouncements presented at the CAT update are closed out through the OIFWG process and briefed the following day. This process is important because the information flushed out in the OIFWG directly impacts senior-level force protection/antiterrorism decisions.

The tragic incident of June 2002 (and its aftermath) validated the need for the U.S. Army Military Police Corps to retain PIO as a principal function. The essence of PIO is captured by the OIFWG on a daily basis, and this process can be easily adapted to any environment. Military police should be leveraged to play a critical enabling role in the combined arms fight for several reasons:

- PIO focuses on the nontraditional warfighting threats that have already been discounted.
- "This kind of war" falls directly into the PIO arena. Threats caused by civil disruptions, criminal operatives, and global terrorism—coupled with the mere change in social violence—will impact our military operations during wartime, peacekeeping, security, stability and support operations, and armistice.
- The USFK MP community in Korea can call upon numerous U.S. and foreign law enforcement agencies to help identify threats, conditions, and social views that are generally discounted as unimportant by the warfighter. This "insider trading" can determine the right force package that is needed to nullify the disruption, therefore making it transparent to the conventional warfighter.

During one demonstration, KNP deployed more than 5,000 riot control Police in preparation for the potential move to Yongsan Army Garrison. KNP "circled the wagons" to contain demonstrators that wanted to march from their gathering location. The demonstrators' efforts were thwarted by this enormous KNP tactic.

Orchestrating demonstration updates for the entire country is an enormous undertaking, and the OIFWG has implemented some initiatives to help the provost marshal use his information resources. One is the Global Command and Control System-Korea (similar to the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network [SIPRNET]). These systems have been installed at all Provost Marshal Offices throughout the peninsula. This system facilitates their sending local real-time reports with proximity map resolutions that provide more precise information and graphics. Hot lines, which link directly from the local KNP stations, have been installed at all 15 of the USFK military police desks. The desk radio/telephone operators just pick up the phone, and it rings at the other end.

Another initiative is a biweekly national- and local-level police coordination meeting. The players can coordinate and understand the current imperatives and tactics, techniques, and procedures. Maximizing the media to disseminate information was also very effective. Daily television updates were placed on the local command television channels. The Armed Forces Network broadcasted radio "demonstration updates" twice daily (they're akin to traffic reports heard in the Washington, D.C., area), and serious, high-risk demonstrations triggered the "ticker tape" on the television channels. The Joint Police Information Center operates a "115" telephone line that personnel may call to receive the most up-to-date information about demonstrations, such as the areas to avoid and the actions to take if you encounter a demonstration.

Demonstrations have certainly burdened the system in the ROK. They've caused curfews to be adjusted, wreaked havoc on traffic patterns, and disrupted several extracurricular events. But through it all, the alliance between USFK and the KNP has been strengthened. The KNP has gained a far better understanding of U.S. concerns and considerations, while the USFK military police have learned about cultural differences and dealing with large-scale demonstrations**.** We've all come to realize that interdependence is vital to maintaining the stability and security of the ROK.

PIO serves the entire command. It has access to criminal intelligence information that the conventional intelligence gatherers might not. As criminal elements continue to gain notoriety as definitive players on the modern battlefield, military police must offer this extraordinary capability to support the warfighter. Police agencies have the best knowledge of criminals and their activities, and PIO will continue to gain importance and focus on areas that have been systematically overlooked by the conventional systems as being of little value to the fight. However, as the Military Police Corps continues to be the "force of choice" for combating civil threats in Iraq, Afghanistan, and certainly Korea, PIO will gain popularity due to its enormous enabling capabilities.

Endnotes

[1] This informational briefing, the Crisis Action Team (CAT) update, is a daily requirement for the Commander, United Nations Command/U.S. Forces Korea.

Major McRee is the chief of operations for the USFK Joint Provost Marshal Office. He has served as an MP soldier from the team level to the Joint Staff at the Pentagon. He has been assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas; V Corps and the Berlin Brigade, Germany; III Corps, Fort Hood, Texas; U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia; the Pentagon Joint Staff; and XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College and holds a master's in administration from Central Michigan University.

Correction

In the April 2003 issue of *MILITARY POLICE*, page 66, we incorrectly stated that the 504th Military Police Company was activated on 2 October 1990. The correct date is 2 October 1950.

Guns Up! 142d Military Police Company Conducts Live-Fire Training in the Republic of Korea

By Captain Monique Guerrero

Near a small South Korean village that lies just below the Demilitarized Zone, a U.S. base cluster has been experiencing small probing attacks. The base cluster commander believes the enemy has a staging area a few terrain features away to the east. The base cluster commander has requested MP support to respond to this threat, and the 142d Military Police Company, 94th Military Police Battalion, is conducting area security missions in the vicinity. In the early morning mist, a squad of regulators performs a final precombat inspection of its gear, checks its camouflage one more time, and steps out in the direction of the enemy…

Since 11 September 2001, America has undergone many changes. The tragic events of that day increased the focus on homeland security and force protection requirements throughout the military community. The 8th Military Police Brigade was not exempt from these changes as field training came to a near halt and soldiers stood guard on the gates for months. As the world watched and waited to see what America would do, the soldiers of both the 94th and 728th Military Police Battalions continued to ensure the safety of our assets in Korea.

For five long months, the military police stood the gates and conducted random antiterrorist measures around the clock as the war on terrorism began and force protection requirements were at their highest. As time went on, the brigade reduced its protective posture and a transformation took place across the peninsula. On 7 June 2002 the 8th Military Police Brigade bid farewell to Colonel Timothy Lamb and welcomed Colonel Peter Champagne. Colonel Champagne brought with him a vision and philosophy that emphasized combat readiness and focused on tough, realistic mission-essential task list (METL)-based training. As force protection levels gradually returned to near-normal conditions, he shifted the focus from force protection and reemphasized the brigade's wartime mission. The legacy of Colonel Lamb's "fight tonight" mentality was now becoming a reality. Companies revamped their METLs, training sections took a hard look at how the unit conducted ranges and lane training, and the brigade transitioned from 4- to 6-week green cycles. The warrior mentality caught on like wildfire as the units dusted off their modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) and got back to the basics.

The capstone events in Colonel Champagne's vision were live-fire exercises. The 94th Military Police Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Scott Jones, realized that vision in April 2003. The 142d Military Police Company conducted the first live-fire exercise in the battalion. After only two green cycles, the commanders were confident that the soldiers could perform the squad dismounted response force live-fire exercise lane. They were right.

The battalion S3 spent many weeks conducting land reconnaissance, planning the scenario, and resourcing the mission. They also conducted observer/controller certification to ensure that the squads would receive instruction and feedback from highly qualified leaders. Meanwhile, the company was focusing on its own leader certification, on tactical exercises without troops, and rock drills to ensure that leaders and soldiers alike clearly understood the components of the tasks. The train-up was conducted over two green cycles, with the squads undergoing a rigorous exercise evaluation in October 2002 on a similar mission. There were five critical tasks they would be trained and evaluated on: issue an operation order (OPORD), occupy an objective rally point, conduct movement to contact, conduct actions on the objective, and consolidate and reorganize.

The live-fire exercise took place over a 5-day period. The battalion S3 and the observer/controllers set up operations at the base of the live-fire exercise range. The 142d Military Police Company headquarters element established a life support area approximately 2 kilometers away. The squads were greeted by their observer/controllers at the life support area at 1500 the evening before execution. They were issued the tactical OPORD and conducted a dry-fire walk-through of the lane. The squad leaders continued to conduct their troop-leading procedures and issued the squad OPORD that night on a sand table.

The next morning at 0430, the first squad moved out of the life support area and began the tactical road march to locate the objective rally point. Locating the objective rally point was no easy task, and reaching it was even more challenging because of the mountainous terrain and the heavy combat load. Once in the objective rally point, the squad leader established security and set out to conduct a leader's reconnaissance and emplace the support-by-fire position. With the reconnaissance complete and the plan confirmed, it was time for the assault element to move into its final attack position. The assault element would have to conquer two major obstacles to do so. The first was movement down some very steep terrain and the second was a large danger area with a group of buildings in the middle. The soldiers negotiated these obstacles and teams moved up to the attack position. Then they called for the support element to open up, while launching M203 rounds at the objective to initiate the attack. The M249s quickly picked up a rhythm and laid hundreds of rounds on the objective.

The assault element was armed with M4s, M16s, M203s, hand grenades, and smoke. The lane ahead of them was approximately 300 meters long and had multiple sets of enemy targets. As the assault element bounded toward the objective, the squad leader signaled the support element to shift fire. The noise reached a crescendo throughout the valley as the squad pressed forward and the support element maintained a constant rain of bullets on the flank of the objective, where an enemy infantry fighting vehicle sat. More smoke signaled the support element to lift its fire as the assault element was about halfway to the objective. The support element then provided rear security for the exit route.

The objective was designed to evaluate the squads' ability to react to many situations in a chaotic environment and test the skills of the specialty teams. There were "enemy" mannequins that had to be disarmed and searched for hidden documents, and observer/controllers inflicted a friendly casualty or two, which tested the abilities of the aid and litter team. While the squad leader was ensuring that these teams were conducting the mission to standard, in the right order, and in less than two minutes, the team leaders were collecting analysis and control element reports and ensuring the squad had adequate security. As the squad began to move off the objective, the squad leader called in a 9-line medical evacuation and a request for extraction by a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter that was waiting in support.

After extraction, the squad returned to the live-fire exercise site and moved into the S3 operation area for the after-action report. The observer/controllers facilitated the after-action reports, which were supplemented by video footage taken from multiple angles throughout each squad's mission. This process allowed the soldiers to observe what the observer/controller saw and provided instantaneous visual feedback to reinforce the observer/controller's learning points. The lane was challenging and intense, the train-up and leader certification was thorough, and the live-fire exercise a success. Even the camouflage, sweat, and occasional trickle of blood could not disguise the sense of accomplishment of each soldier who walked off that lane.

Captain Guerrero commands the 142d Military Police Company, 94th Military Police Battalion, 8th Military Police Brigade, Seoul, South Korea. She was assigned to the 98th Area Support Group in Weurzburg, Germany. She has a bachelor's in criminal psychology from Central Missouri State University, Warrensburg, Missouri, and a master's in human relations from the University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma.



Lessons Learned From the Combat Training Centers

By Captain Anna Maria Slemp

The U. S. Army military police are recognized as the "force of choice" because of the diverse and flexible support skills they bring to a command. Our national command authority and our senior Army leadership recognize the value of military police across the full spectrum of operations. "The military police have been under a huge, huge strain," writes Robert Oakley, a visiting fellow at the military's National Defense University, in May 2003.[1] Mr. Oakley also states in an April 2003 Wall Street Journal article that "military police have one of the highest operational tempos, facing near-constant deployments overseas."[2] Nevertheless, the military police always perform above and beyond the call of duty.

This article is intended to provide a composite list of the MP lessons learned from three of the combat training centers (CTCs): the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Folk Polk, Louisiana; the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California; and the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), Hohenfels, Germany. "Because even the best combat troops are [often] ill-suited for the tricky, demanding, and critical work [that was] once called 'peacekeeping' and [is] now termed 'stability operations,'"[3] the MP role in military operations has grown in importance since 11 September 2001. This article gives unit commanders helpful tips for a successful training center rotation.

Since 11 September, military police have performed all of the five MP functions, ranging from critical-site security in the United States to crowd-control, law enforcement, and area-security operations in Afghanistan. When military police are not immediately available when needed, chaos often reigns.[4] The CTC unit leaders and cadre were responsible for the valuable training our soldiers received before deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan. The value of these CTC training scenarios was evidenced by the victory of the coalition forces during the first Gulf War and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The realistic training, provided by World-Class Opposing Force elements, is the closest thing to real combat that most soldiers will experience.

Military police are constantly learning and applying their specialized skills, from basic training to operational units in the field. Military police have the reputation for being prepared for many of the operational missions that they complete at the CTCs. Overall, military police perform expertly and efficiently in scenarios such as casualty evacuation, sustainment operations, brigade support, area-security operations, mounted land navigation, temporary-route signing, and convoy/VIP escorts. However, CTC trends have revealed that there are consistent areas in which MP leaders and soldiers need additional training. On several occasions, these trends were witnessed at each of the three CTCs. In this article, the areas needing improvement are identified as issues, and the issues are followed by the recommendations from the CTC cadre.

Issue	Recommendation
NTC *Platoon operation orders (OPORDs) lack the required details, and graphics are not usually developed to support the written OPORD.*	Units that do well in this area normally articulate a sound home-station training program that requires the platoon leader and the squad leaders to give OPORDs under the observation of an evaluator who then gives them feedback on their content and presentation. The use of a detailed OPORD format—taken directly from Field Manual (FM) 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations* (currently under revision as final draft FM 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Production*), and FM 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*—ensures that paragraphs are fully developed. It is critical for soldiers to understand graphic control measures and operational overlays completely before mission execution to ensure mission accomplishment and avoid potential fratricide incidents. Planning for casualty evacuation and logistics resupply should focus on the execution phase.
JRTC and CMTC *Units are not using troop-leading procedures (TLPs).*	Platoons should use TLPs (refer to FM 7-8, *Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad,* Chapter 2-2) for daily operations. Upon receipt of the mission, leaders should establish a tentative time line using backward planning to maintain the "1/3 to 2/3" guideline. Leaders at every level must strictly enforce and supervise the TLPs. Details on TLPs can also be found in FM 3-19.4, *Military Police Leaders' Handbook,* Chapter 2.
NTC *Platoon/squad rehearsals are not effectively translating the tactical plan into visual impressions that each soldier can understand.*	Platoons should develop a standard operating procedure (SOP) for rehearsals and techniques. Units need to practice conducting rehearsals as part of their home-station training program. Rehearsals take time, and the time required varies with the complexity of the task, the possible contingencies, the type of rehearsal, and the level (team or squad) of the participants. At a minimum, an FM radio rehearsal and a map reconnaissance should be conducted to ensure that the tactical plan is synchronized, verified, and understood by each soldier in the platoon.
JRTC and CMTC *MP platoons are not conducting effective pre-execution checks (PECs)/ precombat checks (PCCs).*	PECs/PCCs are available for reference in FM 3-19.4, *Military Police Leader's Handbook;* FM 7-8, *Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad;* and FM 7-1, *Battle Focused Training.* Most platoons tailor these to fit their mission requirements. PECs/PCCs need to be incorporated into the TLPs. Leaders must discipline themselves to conduct PECs/PCCs personally and not settle for a verbal confirmation from someone else. Checklists need to be suitable, feasible, and acceptable but not excessively time-consuming. Well-established work priorities and sound load plans assist in the effective use of time. Furthermore, leaders must anticipate the logistical requirements of future operations. Here is an example: The squad leader understands (but still needs to verify) that there is a significant likelihood of encountering a minefield during his upcoming mission. As part of his PEC/PCC, he has a squad member assemble and test the mine detector.
NTC, JRTC, and CMTC *Platoons leaders are not integrated into the brigade staff during planning operations and the military decision-making process.*	Recommend that the MP platoon be task-organized as a brigade asset, receiving orders from the brigade staff and acting as an integral part of that staff. Also, the division provost marshal, the MP company commander, and the MP platoon leader should conduct home-station informal sessions with the brigade staff on MP functions, capabilities, and employment (FM 3-19.4, FM 3-19.1, *Military Police Operations,* and FM 3-19.40, *Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations*), to increase awareness of MP support to the brigade's mission. Further, recommend that the MP company commanders conduct additional training on the roles and responsibilities of the provost marshal (FM 3-19.1) and the military decision-making process (FM-101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations*) with platoon leaders to facilitate increased integration.

Issue	Recommendation
JRTC and CMTC *MP platoons do not track their subordinate elements on the battlefield effectively.*	MP leaders must develop and enforce SOPs that arm subordinate elements with the critical information that ensures their security on the battlefield. Control measures must be established (checkpoints, phase lines, and boundaries) and understood by every soldier. Proper reporting procedures must be maintained. Soldiers must clearly understand the current situation, the capabilities, and the most probable course of action of the enemy, as well as a detailed understanding of adjacent unit locations. Situational understanding should be developed in a manner that depicts critical information clearly.
JRTC *A movement control plan was not developed to fully use military police.*	The brigade should develop a movement control SOP while at its home station, and the platoon leader should continue to provide input on MP employment, capabilities, and limitations in supporting movement control (FM 3-19.4 and FM 3-19.1).
CMTC *MP units do not effectively sign the routes in the brigade rear.*	Be prepared to conduct route-signing operations. Have available route-signing kits or makeshift route-signing supplies (small boxes, for example). This preplanning will alleviate the need to put the limited number of MP assets on tactical command posts.
NTC *The platoon operational orders do not significantly address direct-fire planning, which would prepare the platoon to close with and destroy the enemy.*	To better synchronize the fight, platoon leaders should use the fundamentals of direct-fire planning. Tactical reference points, engagement areas, sectors of fire, direction of fire, restricted fire line, and final protective line are all terrain-based fire-control measures that should be addressed in paragraph III of the OPORD and emphasized during subsequent rehearsals. Threat-based measures include fire patterns, target array, priorities of fire, weapons posture, triggers, and weapon control status. These planning measures should be graphically depicted on an overlay or sketch and disseminated to the lowest level. The application of the fundamentals of detailed fire-control planning will result in the massing of the effects of fire, the avoidance of target overkill, the prevention of fratricide, and the employment of the best weapon for the target.
NTC *Military police seldom display tactical proficiency when in contact with enemy forces.*	The MP firepower can destroy enemy personnel and engage lightly armored vehicles from a defilade position. Learn your area of operation to identify ambush sites to avoid or use to your advantage. Develop squad battle drills during which contact is made using the least force possible, and once contact is made, maneuver the teams to gain a better position for firing at the enemy. OPORDs should cite the MP actions to be taken when the enemy is contacted and the immediate actions that each team should complete. OPORDs should also include plans to mutually support the squads that are acting to mass firepower when needed and retain the flexibility to choose when and where to engage the enemy.
JRTC and CMTC *MP platoons are not sufficiently involved in enemy prisoner of war (EPW) operations.*	Military police must be involved in EPW/civilian internee (CI) operations. If there are other operational requirements for the MP platoon, it is advisable to require (at a minimum) MP supervision/advisement over the processing and reporting. The platoon should enforce the guidelines for processing EPWs/CIs with the company and division tactical SOP; FM 3-19.4; FM 3-19.40; and STP 19-95B1-SM, MOS 95B, *Military Police, Skill Level 1, Soldier's Manual*, Task #191-376-4101, *Process Enemy Prisoners of War/Civilian Internees (EPWs/CIs) at a Collecting Point or Holding Area*. Additionally, brigades should develop a contingency EPW support package that identifies the necessary classes of supplies that are required to conduct and sustain EPW/CI operations (FM 3-19.40, Chapter 2). Brigades should also place the construction of the EPW cage on the brigade support area execution matrix to ensure proper focus and priority.

Issue	Recommendation
JRTC *Units did not fully exploit the value of a host-nation liaison campaign.*	Recommend that MP platoons conduct detailed planning in their efforts to execute effective host-nation liaison (FM 3-19.1, FM 3-19.4, and FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*). This plan should be coordinated and synchronized with key brigade staff members (S2 [intelligence], staff judge advocate, civil affairs, and psychological operations) to ensure compliance with the commander's intent. Initial contact with host-nation officials should be conducted at the earliest opportunity to establish a viable exchange of information and support. The police intelligence interim doctrine is an excellent source for guiding the conduct of these types of operations.

Conclusion

Overall, it is evident that units deploying to the CTCs are working hard to complete their missions and take away as much as they can before going to war. With the help of technology, units are applying their newly acquired skills to keep up with the high operational tempo. However, unit leaders must not forget that the basics are the cornerstone for even the most technologically advanced equipment—if you don't know what you're looking for, you don't know where to look. If soldiers don't know what is *right*, they are going to continue to do what they *think* is right. It is the leader's responsibility to ensure each and every soldier has a drive and a hunger for *successful* and *safe* mission accomplishment. If we do not arm soldiers with the proper knowledge and equipment (with plenty of rehearsals) to solve problems, then we can only expect them to come up with less-than-acceptable solutions.

Endnotes

[1] Seth Stern, "How To Keep Iraqi Streets Safe—Bullets Not Allowed," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 6, 2003.

[2] Greg Jaffe, "Does The Army Really Need Additional Military Police? Adding Police to Handle Unrest In Iraq Could Tax the Pentagon," *The Wall Street Journal*, April 23, 2003.

[3] David Wood, "Shortage of MPs Complicates Iraq Occupation," *Newhouse News Service*, May 12, 2003.

[4] Jaffe.

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FM 3-19.1, *Military Police Operations*, 31 January 2002.

FM 3-19.4, *Military Police Leaders' Handbook*, 2 August 2002.

FM 3-19.40, *Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations*, 1 August 2001.

FM 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*, 11 August 2003.

FM 7-8, *Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad*, 1 March 2001.

FM 7-1, *Battle Focused Training*, 15 September 2003.

FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*, 14 February 2000.

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STP 19-95B1-SM, *Soldier's Manual for MOS 95B, Military Police, Skill Level 1, Soldier's Manual*, January 2003.

The following contributors provided lessons learned:

Captain Ryan Roberson, Fort Irwin, California.

Sergeant First Class Ronald Snider, Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels, Germany.

Captain Robert A. Davel and Sergeant First Class Daniel R. Burton, Fort Polk, Louisiana.

Captain Slemp was the deputy chief of the U.S. Army Military Police School Doctrine Division, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. She also served as a training company commander in the 14th Military Police Brigade, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. She is currently deployed to the U.S. Central Command area of operations as a public affairs officer.

Leadership on the Move:

Leader Development in an Experiential Learning Environment

By Captain Amy E. Wallace

Since 11 September 2001, the operational tempo (OPTEMPO) in U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) has affected an entire generation of junior MP leaders by negating traditional collective training at the company level. According to Field Manual 7-0, *Training the Force*, "The three core domains that shape the critical learning experiences throughout a soldier's and leader's career are the operational, institutional, and self-development domains."[1] This article focuses on how learning through real-world mission experience is occurring before junior leaders can experience traditional operational and institutional collective training. We do not yet know how skipping this crucial step in leadership development will affect the Military Police Corps in the long term; however, it is necessary to try to capture the aggregate education resulting from the experience thus far. From team leaders to platoon leaders, experiential learning has superseded traditional leader development, as OPTEMPO and short-fused missions frequently leave little time to train. Forward-deployed MP companies in USAREUR are attempting to mitigate the detrimental affect of this reality in several ways by—

- Capitalizing on institutional knowledge from the commanders and senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs).
- Taking credit for the missions our soldiers execute in lieu of formal training.
- Embracing thorough after-action reviews and leader development training.

Mission execution is the name of the game. In-transit security missions, port security operations, critical-site security, response-force operations, and cordon-and-search operations are just some of the missions that USAREUR MP companies have been asked to perform on a moment's notice. These missions are added to the daily community law enforcement, installation quick-reaction force, and force protection duties that training and tactical operations sections routinely juggle.

What does this mission task list have to do with junior MP leader development in USAREUR? Everything! Mission execution *is* their training. For the USAREUR military police, this quote from FM 7-0 is pertinent: "Training continues during the time available between alert notification and deployment, between deployment and employment, and even during employment."[2] Unfortunately, we often don't have the luxuries of time and collective training. Commanders must be innovative and evaluate real-world missions according to unit mission-essential task lists (METLs) and mission training plans (MTPs) to take credit for training and ensure their compliance with Army Regulation 350-1, *Army Training and Education*, and USAREUR Regulation 350-1, *Training in USAREUR* (see the table on page 30). The bottom line is that our junior leaders are developing and refining their skills through mission preparation and execution before taking part in formal collective training—they are the product of putting the cart before the horse. I call this process *reverse-cycle development* (Figure 1, page 30). In FM 25-101, *Battle Focused Training*, Chapter 1, Figure 1-5, the training management cycle depicts the traditional standard for training and wartime mission preparation (Figure 2, page 30). FM 25-101 was superceded by FM 7-1 in September 2003.

A gap between individual readiness and mission execution often exists at the company level because traditional red, amber, and green collective training cycles cannot be accomplished before deployment. Typically, soldiers are in-processed, assigned to a position in a platoon, and then deployed to execute a mission. How do units in USAREUR still achieve mission accomplishment with this new trend of reverse-cycle development? Units mitigated the short-term effects of missing collective training at the company level by capitalizing on the institutional knowledge of the commanders and senior NCOs who remained after 11 September 2001. Since collective training at nearly every level is missing, on-the-job training and leader development is replacing dedicated training cycles. Unit commanders are constantly trying to exploit training opportunities and educate junior leaders in nontraditional ways. This is an attempt to bridge the gap between practical experience and the senior leadership's grasp of doctrine and collective training.

Experiential learning is good! Educationist Kurt Hahn said, "There is only one thing more painful than learning from experience and that is not learning from experience." Soldiers are certified by completing the following training to prepare them for the myriad of missions they will execute while assigned to USAREUR:

- Community in-processing
- Force protection training, levels I and II
- USAREUR individual readiness training

Experiential learning correlation

Doctrine-Based Training		Experiential Learning Examples
Team	Team certification	In-transit security executed by 3 to 6 soldier teams on classified supercargo mission
Squad	Squad situational training exercise	Quick-reaction force consisting of 10 soldiers providing first response combat/ lifesaver and outer perimeter security for a bomb threat
Platoon	Platoon external evaluation	Platoon operations in support of the Kosovo Force/Stabilization Force, and Operation Enduring Freedom
Company	Company Army training/ evaluation program	Operational center for managing all dispersed and specialized small-unit missions above, simultaneously

- Community law enforcement training
- Emergency Vehicle Operators Course
- Driver training
- Common task training
- Rail certification training

At the team level, mission orientation is instilled almost immediately. MP teams are sent on in-transit security missions throughout the USAREUR area of responsibility. They act as agents of the U.S. Army, representing the intent of their highest level of command to foreign agencies. The team leader on the ground usually commands with contact and guidance from higher headquarters (limited by geography and cellular telephone coverage).

Platoons and squads deploy and serve in general and direct support roles for MP commanders, combat tactical ground force commanders, and combat service support task force commanders. Lieutenants and noncommissioned officers make direct coordination with host-nation support, advise and brief commanders at the highest echelons, and are subject matter experts in every area of interest necessary to provide a safe and secure environment for mission success. Companies are using experiential learning through detailed after-action reports and leader development training to mitigate the inevitable effects of reverse-cycle development.

What are the long-term side effects on the future of the Military Police Corps if the USAREUR OPTEMPO doesn't slow down long enough to resume a traditional training cycle? This hasn't been determined yet. The development of our future MP leaders may be at stake. Eventually, the institutional knowledge in the units will cycle out, and the lack of doctrinal training that should be inherent in the system will catch up to us. What will remain are future company commanders, platoon sergeants, first sergeants, and staff leaders who have a lot of mission experience but a weak training paradigm. Forward-deployed MP companies in USAREUR are doing what they can to reduce the short-term consequences of the post-11 September OPTEMPO by passing knowledge from senior leaders down to the most junior. The short-term fix is in place at the unit level; however, the Military Police Corps may need to examine solutions to long-term setbacks to reconnect the missing link between evaluated collective training and experiential learning.

Endnotes

[1] FM 7-0, *Training the Force*, 22 October 2002, pp.1-5.

[2] FM 7-0, pp. 1-3.

References

AR 350-1, *Army Training and Education*, 9 May 2003.

FM 25-101, *Battle Focused Training*, 30 September 1990.

USAREUR Regulation 350-1, *Training in USAREUR*, 18 February 1993.

Captain Wallace commands the 272d Military Police Company, 95th Military Police Battalion, Mannheim, Germany. Her former assignments include platoon leader for the 410th and 64th Military Police Companies at Fort Hood, Texas, and S3 and S4 for the 95th Military Police Battalion.



Figure 1. Reverse-cycle training



Figure 2. FM 25-101, the training management cycle

Bottom-Up Review

By Colonel Ed Sannwaldt, Major Stu Saulpaugh, and Major Jennifer Curry

In late 2002, the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff G3 (Operations, Plans, and Training), Lieutenant General Richard Cody, directed the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) to conduct a bottom-up review (BUR) of the Military Police Corps structure. The objective of the BUR was to identify and provide MP/Criminal Investigation Division (CID) manning and force structure recommendations that would enable these units to meet requirements emerging in the current and future operational environments. USAMPS also recognized that any recommended force structure solutions must also be compatible with its vision for MP support to the emerging unit-of-action (UA) and unit-of-employment (UE) concepts resulting from the Army transformational efforts.

The first of two objectives of the BUR was to redesign the existing MP internment/resettlement (I/R) structure. The goal of the redesign was three-fold:

- Create the capability to confine high-risk detainees (similar to those being confined at Guantanamo Bay)
- Make Active Component I/R specialists (military occupational specialty 31C soldiers) more deployable
- Make Reserve Component I/R units more flexible to deploy to conduct high-risk detention operations or provide Active Component prison facility backfill

One significant design change called for converting the existing table of distribution allowances (TDA) structures at Active Component confinement facilities to modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) structures. This redesign will provide the Army with an immediately deployable capability to perform high-risk detention operations across the spectrum of conflict.

Another significant change was the recommended redesign of the Reserve Component I/R battalions. Existing I/R battalions will be converted and enhanced by creating an internal I/R company that is capable of being detached from the battalion for deployment. Each I/R company will have the capability to confine up to 300 U.S. military prisoners or 100 high-risk detainees. When augmented by an MP guard company, the I/R company can confine up to 300 high-risk detainees. Existing enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) and displaced persons battalions will be redesigned with an integrated, newly designed I/R company. This will allow each of these I/R battalions to retain their current EPW and displaced persons capability and gain the additional capability of handling 30 maximum-custody/high-risk EPWs.

The second objective of the BUR was to design a concept for a future MP force structure that would be more modular and scalable to better support future full-spectrum operations. The concept envisions the MP force pooling at one of the two echelons above the UA: UEx (first level above UA) and UEy (two levels above UA) currently being considered in the UE concept development. MP brigades designed to support the UA and UEx commanders will be multifunctional, with organic combat support, law and order, CID, I/R, and customs capabilities. The MP brigade commander will tailor functional packages (such as battalion task forces or company teams) for the UA and UEx commanders based on the mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available, and civilian considerations (METT-TC). These multifunctional brigades will be primarily Active Component.

The UEy will be supported by single-function, primarily Reserve Component, MP brigades. These brigades will—

- Conduct operational-level MP operations.
- Provide support to joint/international/ multinational forces.
- Provide staff and technical oversight of MP functions.

In short, the MP structure revisions will enhance our ability to remain flexible, deployable, scalable, and modular and ensure that the critical functions that military police bring to the battlefield continue to be available to support combatant and maneuver commanders.

Colonel Sannwaldt is the Director of Training Development, U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center (MANSCEN), Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

Major Saulpaugh is the acting chief of the Military Police Concepts Branch, Directorate of Combat Developments, MANSCEN, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

Major Curry is an Active Guard and Reserve U.S. Army Reserve officer assigned to the Military Police Division, Directorate of Combat Developments, MANSCEN, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

Advanced Law Enforcement Training Division: A Transition

By Mr. Lee Chewey

The Military Police Operations and Investigations Division of the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) developed the first counterdrug training in the Army. The division began by teaching the drug investigations process exclusively to MP investigators and personnel from the Criminal Investigation Division. Major General Charles A. Hines (the USAMPS commandant at the time) and Mr. Richard D. Hinson (the division's first chief) established the Advanced Law Enforcement Training Division (ALETD) in 1992. This was the genesis of the Counterdrug Training Program, and it wasn't just for soldiers. For the first time, federal, state, and local civilian law enforcement officers were being trained through this one-of-a-kind Department of Defense program.

Some retooling of certain antiterrorism courses was all that was needed to begin the first counterdrug curriculum and make it fit the needs of military and civilian law enforcement personnel. In all, four courses were offered to civilian police officers: Counterdrug Investigations, Field Tactical Police Operations, Special Reaction Team, and Narcoterrorism Personal Protection. Military students attended the Special Reaction Team and the Protective Security courses. At first, the USAMPS Special Operations Branch of the Department of Security Operations supported the ALETD counterdrug training.

As the counterdrug training became popular and the demand for it (especially from civilian law enforcement agencies) grew, the Special Operations Branch had to be reassigned to ALETD in 1994. This gave ALETD two dynamic programs that trained both military and civilian law enforcement professionals in antiterrorism and counterdrug operations. ALETD experienced rapid growth, and by 2002, twenty-two highly specialized courses were being offered, training approximately 5,000 students yearly. More than half of these students were trained in the counterdrug courses.

Another successful course began in 1992 and was attached to the Counterdrug Training Program: the Rehabilitation Instructor Training Course (RITC), which trained confinement professionals to be drill instructors for the state boot camp programs that were formed to rehabilitate first-time youth offenders. RITC is nationally recognized as helping this offender population become productive members of our society.

After the 11 September 2001 attacks, ALETD's training focus shifted from counterdrug to antiterrorism immediately. This surge of requirements for antiterrorism training during 2002 caused ALETD to increase its staff by approximately 25 percent. The existing training curricula and programs had to be reviewed and modified extensively. New courses needed to be developed—courses that were quickly identified in the Army's lessons learned about its preparedness and ability to react/respond to the terrorist threat.

The "laser beam" is still primarily focused on antiterrorism, two years after the 11 September attacks. Midyear 2002, the Department of Defense directed that USAMPS stop conducting counterdrug training after 30 September 2003. It would probably surprise a lot of people to learn how many of the specialized skills taught in the counterdrug training courses cross over into the antiterrorism training. With that said, many of the counterdrug courses taught by this talented and experienced ALETD cadre can be changed to focus on antiterrorism with little or no adjustment. Because of their professional, knowledge-based skills, much of the cadre has already been working in both programs seamlessly. During this 2003 fiscal year, ALETD has already shifted some of its counterdrug instructors into a newly formed Antiterrorism Branch. This allows for a complete and easy transition by the end of the fiscal year.

Change is never easy and rarely ends. USAMPS is also reorganizing its Directorate of Training. These changes are streamlining the professional education process to meet future specialized law enforcement training requirements more effectively. Expect many new and innovative training courses, because USAMPS is determined to answer the call and prepare the Army to protect the force while accomplishing the mission.

Mr. Chewey is the ALETD chief. He has served 6½ years with USAMPS and ALETD. He retired from the 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment (Airborne)-Delta as a master sergeant.

The Military Police at Lackland Air Force Base

By Sergeant First Class Steven Parker, Sergeant First Class Richard Emery, and Staff Sergeant John Chandler

Company D of the 701st Military Police Battalion at Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas, is where military working dog handlers and their canine partners start their careers. This is also where our MP personnel come to attend the Traffic Management and Accident Investigation Course. This is a very rewarding assignment that allows a soldier to work in a joint service environment that trains and prepares soldiers and canines for worldwide deployment.

History

Since World War II, the unit has been known by different names. Originally, it was under the operational control of the Quartermaster Corps in Front Royale, Virginia, and later, the infantry at Fort Carson, Colorado. The Army Dog Training Center at Fort Carson was primarily used from 1954 to 1957 to train military working dogs (MWDs) for the U.S. Air Force. In 1957, the center was deactivated and responsibility for the training was transferred to the Sentry Dog Training Branch at Lackland in 1958.

An Army detachment consisting of six dog handler instructors, one noncommissioned officer, and one clerk went to Lackland to serve as a support unit. Over the years, the detachment trained thousands of soldiers and canines. During the Vietnam War, the Army was responsible for training scout dogs, combat tracker dogs, mine dogs, tunnel dog teams, and marijuana detector dog teams at Fort Gordon, Georgia. In June 1973, the interservice training review executive committee decided to centralize all MWD training at Lackland. (This was the same year that the last marijuana detector dog graduated from the U.S. Army Military Police School [USAMPS] at Fort Gordon.)

January 1974 was the start of the new centralized U.S. Army Military Working Dog School at Lackland. The U.S. Army Military Police School Training Detachment was also established there on 2 October 1974. On 10 November 1982, the detachment was redesignated as the Lackland Training Detachment of the 701st Military Police Battalion, assigned to Fort McClellan, Alabama, and attached to Fort Sam Houston, Texas, with duty at Lackland. On 5 December 2002, the detachment was redesignated as Company D, 701st Military Police Battalion, 14th Military Police Brigade. The company's mission is to:

- Provide expert instructors to the Department of Defense Military Working Dog School and the Traffic Management and Accident Investigation Course.
- Advise the USAMPS Commandant and Director of Training about the training and employment of MWDs and the Traffic Management Accident Investigation training.
- Provide the operational Army with current training techniques and procedures.
- Provide command and control, training, and administrative and logistical support to students and staff.

MWD Handler Course

The 341st Training Squadron oversees the MWD Handler Course, with instructors from all four branches of service. Because college credit is awarded for this course through the Community College of the Air Force, instructors must have an associate's degree to teach. Instructors must also complete a six-month subject matter qualification process before they are allowed to teach without a subject matter instructor present. The Army has nine instructors teaching in this course.

An instructor introduces search patterns to a new canine recruit.

Students are trained in two blocks of instruction. The first is a six-week block during which students learn the aspects of handling a *patrol dog*. The first four days involve classroom instruction. Students learn about maintaining dog gear, performing safety procedures, maintaining kennels, managing health, using first aid, applying the principles of behavioral conditioning, documenting training, and maintaining utilization records. Other classroom instruction includes these topics:

- Concepts of utilization
- Use of force
- Vehicle patrol
- Performing as a decoy

On the fifth day of training, the students are assigned an MWD. Once the students have established rapport with the dog, the hands-on portion of their training begins. Students learn dog training principles: basic obedience, running the dog over obstacles, building search procedures, locating a suspect in a building, scouting, locating a suspect in a field or wood line, controlled aggression, how to apprehend a suspect, and control under gunfire. At the end of the six weeks, each student must complete a performance test for the instructor supervisor before being certified as a patrol dog handler.

In the second block of instruction, students learn about handling a *detector dog*. The first day of the five-week block is classroom instruction during which students learn more about behavioral conditioning, protocol training, detecting an odor, and proficiency training (how to maintain a dog's level of training). Other classroom instruction includes the following:

- Using detector dog teams
- Documenting training and utilization records
- Securing explosives, chemicals, and drugs
- Using detector dogs legally and safely

Students also learn about handling a detector dog in a variety of areas: barracks/buildings, warehouses, vehicles, and aircraft. Students run through many scenarios. Some simulate narcotic searches, and others are set up as explosives searches. By using both scenarios, students see the different aspects of detection work. At the end of five weeks, students are once again given a performance test before being certified as detector dog handlers. Students graduating from the handler course know the basics. Like all personnel who are new to a job, the handlers need advanced training after they are assigned to a kennel. On average, the handler course trains and certifies more than 400 MWD handlers annually.

Members of all the services and their canines represent the dog training school at a ceremony in San Antonio, Texas.

Dog Training Section

The Dog Training Section (DTS) is a multiservice Department of Defense organization with 80 personnel. Twenty-four Army military police are attached to the 341st Training Squadron. The DTS trains the dual-certified explosive/patrol detector dogs and drug/patrol detector dogs for all branches of the military to deploy worldwide. On average, the DTS produces 250 dual-certified MWDs annually. During the last two years, the DTS produced more than 500 MWDs. Following 11 September 2001, the DTS produced 157 MWDs in a six-month period with a personnel strength of just 60 percent. This was a remarkable achievement that the DTS had never accomplished before.

Beginning in October 2002, the DTS developed a new MWD course to monitor dog training. The class is divided into four blocks. Block one consists of building socialization/rapport with the assigned handler. Block two is basic obedience (commands such as sit, down, and stay). Block three is detection, and block four is patrol. This is based on a 100-day training cycle to dual-certify and ship MWDs to the field. Explosive/patrol detector dogs are trained and certified to detect (at or above a 95 percent accuracy rate) nine different explosive odors in many different areas: offices, barracks, theaters, and warehouses, and inside luggage, aircraft, and vehicles. Drug/patrol detector dogs are trained and certified to detect (at or above 90 percent accuracy rate) four different drug odors in many different areas: barracks, warehouses, and offices, and inside luggage, aircraft, and vehicles. After the MWD is trained in explosive/drug detection, it is then trained in patrol, which consists of

obedience, out and guard, building search, gunfire, and scouting.

Out and guard is a technique that has been used by many other countries and law enforcement agencies. For years we trained our MWDs to attack a suspect and return to the handler on command. Now we train them to attack and guard the suspect until the handler can approach and detain the individual. This training incorporates field interviews, attack, search and reattack, escort, and stand off.

All phases of patrol training include both combat support and law enforcement aspects. If a building has been found unsecured, a MWD team can clear it better and faster than an MP team. In a combat-support role, a MWD team can help an infantry platoon clear a building in an urban combat situation. Only the amount and type of training the MWD has received will limit its use.

Traffic Management and Accident Investigations Course

This course, taught by the 324th Training Squadron, consists of 17 school days (133 course hours) designed to teach multiservice military law enforcement personnel and occasionally local police officers. This course is not an entry-level course, but intermediate-level accident investigation training designed to bring the student's abilities nearly to an advanced level within 17 days. After graduation, students are well prepared for most accident investigations and the next level of instruction at other advanced courses. The facility at Lackland has two classrooms: one with large drafting tables for plenty of space for the diagramming (drawing a sketch of the accident scene) exercises and another equipped with computers for report writing and diagramming exercises.

The course has a traffic pad—an 800- by 600-foot area—that encompasses five traffic accident mock-ups: three vehicle-to-vehicle accidents, one vehicle-to-motorcycle accident, and one vehicle-to-pedestrian accident. There is also a rollover mock-up for our advanced course, which will be operational next year. At the traffic pad, students are given an accident scenario and are required to take measurements, draw diagrams, take photographs, and complete an accident report. By the final exam, all students have worked at least four accident scenes and have used the various applications learned in the course. Topics include the following:

- Analyzing accident components
- Investigating hit-and-run accidents
- Diagramming
- Examining legal issues
- Photographing accidents
- Planning traffic management
- Understanding the implications of drug and alcohol impairment
- Writing accident reports
- Computing formulas (used to find the skid speeds and other estimated speeds involved in an accident).

There are two written tests and a 12-hour final exam. There are several progress checks during the diagramming, photography, and formulas week. (This is when we lose the most students.) The student attrition rate of 15 to 20 percent is due mostly to poor organizational skills, not to difficulty with the course's mathematics. Commanders selecting soldiers for attendance should evaluate the soldier's organization skills, maturity, and self-study habits, and should send them to the education office to take the general mathematics College-Level Examination Program #07030. Taking this exam will refresh the soldier's math skills in preparation for formulas week.

The course has some great ventures on the horizon. In the next few months, we will receive a new technology package: PalmPilots®, laser equipment, diagramming and report writing software, and laptops that will reduce the time of our final exam by 7 to 9 hours. The impact of traffic investigation in the field can be enormous. It can provide commanders, families, legal authorities, civil engineers, and insurance companies with a quicker, more accurate and professional product that provides an answer or conclusion to an accident. Instructors train approximately 250 to 300 students annually, with classes running back-to-back each month, and conduct one to three mobile training team visits overseas per year. The U.S. Army Military Police Corps has three instructor positions. The course is reviewed continuously to meet the demands of technology and the Department of Defense operational force.

Sergeant First Class Parker is the course chief of the Dog Training Section at the Department of Defense Military Working Dog School, Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas.

Sergeant First Class Emery is a traffic accident instructor with the 32d Training Squadron, Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas.

Staff Sergeant Chandler is an instructor supervisor for the Military Working Dog Handler Course at the Department of Defense Military Working Dog School, Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas.

Unusual Duty Locations of Military Police

By Dr. Ronald E. Craig

During the Second World War, the newly formed U.S. Army Corps of Military Police was called upon to provide qualified personnel for duty in locations around the world. Some of those locations were in exotic and unusual places.

In March 1942, American troops arrived in the small Canadian town of Dawson Creek, British Columbia. The soldiers were to begin one of the largest construction projects of the war: building a road connecting the continental United States and the Alaskan Territory. When completed, the road would stretch 1,500 miles—from Dawson Creek to Delta Junction, Alaska—over some of the roughest terrain in the Western Hemisphere. The road was crucial because of the Japanese threat to the Aleutian Islands and possibly the Alaskan mainland. While the road was being built, Japanese troops invaded the Aleutian Islands in June 1942, making the threat a reality.

By April 1942, 11,000 American military engineers and 16,000 civilian workers were busy with the construction project. With that number of soldiers in the area, military police were needed to maintain order. Although the military road was completed in 8 months and 12 days, the military police were necessary as long as military personnel were still in the area.

The men of the 253d Military Police Company arrived in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, in June 1944. A detachment of 20 soldiers was left in Edmonton to police the American military and civilian personnel there, and in July, the remainder of the company moved to Fort Nelson in northern British Columbia. Four officers and 92 enlisted men patrolled the rough Alaskan-Canadian highway from Edmonton to the Yukon Territory's Whitehorse, covering approximately 1,150 miles. They were authorized to police the military personnel and the civilian contract workers. The soldiers also rode trains and provided security and order between Dawson Creek and Wainwright in Alberta, Canada. A detachment of 40 men policed the Dawson Creek area, and 6 men were stationed at Blueberry, British Columbia, to record the number of vehicles traveling the highway. Due to the arrival of winter, the unit moved south to Dawson Creek in October and then to Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

By April 1942 (when construction of the Alaskan-Canadian highway began), the U.S. government restricted travel to and within the Alaskan Territory to prevent sabotage and espionage. All persons of Japanese ancestry—U.S. citizens and resident aliens—were removed from the territory, and no others were allowed to enter. The travel of German and Italian resident aliens was also restricted; they could not leave their community without a travel permit. Eventually, all persons residing in the territory had to obtain a travel permit.

Enforcing the regulations that governed these restrictions was the duty of the Alaskan Department provost marshal, who established stations in 34 towns. In June 1942, the 761st Military Police Battalion was activated at Fort Richardson, Alaska, to help enforce the travel restrictions; but due to a shortage of personnel, there was only one military police soldier for every 1,355 square miles. The battalion was divided into 35 detachments (that ranged in size from two men to a platoon with one detachment located at each station and the thirty-fifth at headquarters). Military police arrested aliens without travel permits, searched baggage, seized contraband, processed travel applications, issued travel permits, censored photographs, and confiscated liquor.

On the other side of the world, the first 4,000 American troops arrived in Northern Ireland and were quartered near Belfast on 26 January 1942. Included in this first contingent were the 34th Infantry Division and a detachment of the 34th Military Police Company. Another 8,000 troops arrived in Northern Ireland on 2 March, including the balance of the 34th Military Police Company. By the middle of May, the 1st Armored Division and its MP platoon were stationed in County Down, and by the last of May there were over 32,000 American troops in Northern Ireland.

The Northern Ireland Base Command was activated on 1 June 1942, and by July, U.S. Army Air Corps troops and planes arrived with MP units. In October and

November 1942, most troops left Northern Ireland in preparation for the invasion of North Africa (except for additional Army Air Corps units that were still arriving). During the last week of November, the 879th Military Police Company (Aviation) arrived at an air station 18 miles west of Belfast. The company guarded the interior of the air station with sentry dogs, patrolled roads by jeeps and motorcycles, served as gate and perimeter guards, and performed convoy escort and special guard duties. They also investigated traffic accidents, operated a station guardhouse, and patrolled the local town.

Other MP companies also served in Northern Ireland. The 1145th Military Police Company (Aviation) arrived in Northern Ireland in early July 1943, and in October, the 1195th Military Police Company (Aviation) joined them. In February 1944—without a change in duties or location—the 879th, 1145th, and 1195th Military Police Companies were consolidated into the 984th Military Police Company.

Another unusual locale for American military police was on the northern coast of South America—tropical British Guiana (now Guyana). A platoon of military police was stationed at an air base 25 miles up the Demerara River from Georgetown. The air base was needed so that personnel could patrol the southern Caribbean Sea and aid in protecting South America. The air base also served as a forwarding depot for equipment that was being provided to U.S. allies as a result of the U.S. Lend-Lease Act of 1941.

It was an extremely isolated location—only the dirt roads and the river could be used to move supplies. Two officers and twenty-five enlisted men patrolled the air base, assisted by a Puerto Rican Guard Company and the native auxiliary military police. The American military police also patrolled a fenced-in area where the women civilian workers lived. The fenced compound was established to prevent and quell disturbances and stop unauthorized trespasses. In Georgetown, 12 military police were quartered in a local house. They patrolled the town to maintain order, arrested American military and civilian personnel, and checked boats that arrived from the air base.

From Alaska to Northern Ireland to South America, a few of the more than 200,000 World War II American military police enforced the law and maintained order gallantly and honorably. Performing duties in locations far from the theaters of war was extraordinarily tedious and did not always appear important, although their performance was critical to the war effort. Unusual locations could not reduce their dedication to their duty and their country.

Dr. Craig has been the U.S. Army Military Police Corps historian for more than three years. He is a Vietnam veteran and served in the U.S. Marine Corps for 14 years. He taught a variety of Native American studies courses at Montana's Fort Peck Community College and Rocky Mountain College. He was the director of the Native American Studies Department at Fort Peck from 1995 to 2000. He has numerous professional publications to his credit. Dr. Craig holds a master's in history from the University of Montana at Missoula and a doctorate of philosophy in history from the University of New Mexico at Albuquerque.

Letters to the Editor

MILITARY POLICE welcomes letters from readers. If you have a comment concerning an article we have published or would like to express your point of view on another subject of interest to MP soldiers, let us hear from you. Your letter must include your complete address and a telephone number. All letters are subject to editing for reasons of space or clarity.

Our mailing and e-mail addresses are—

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320 MANSCEN Loop, Suite 210
Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473-8929

<pbd@wood.army.mil>

615th Military Police Company

Lineage and Honors

Constituted on 13 May 1944 as the 615th Military Police Escort Guard Company.

Activated on 25 May 1944 at Fort Custer, Michigan.

Inactivated on 15 September 1945 at Camp Maxey, Texas.

Redesignated on 24 November 1952 as the 615th Military Police Company and allotted to the regular Army.

Activated on 8 April 1965 at Fort Hood, Texas.

Inactivated on 28 March 1973 in Vietnam.

Activated on 21 October 1977 in Germany.

Deactivated from Augsburg, Germany, November 1997.

Reactivated in Grafenwoehr, Germany, on 16 April 1998 and continues to serve the communities of the 100th Area Support Group (Grafenwoehr, Vilseck, and Hohenfels).

Campaign Participation Credit

Vietnam

Defense
Counteroffensive
Counteroffensive, Phase II
Counteroffensive, Phase III
Tet Counteroffensive
Counteroffensive, Phase IV
Counteroffensive, Phase V
Counteroffensive, Phase VI
Tet 69/Counteroffensive
Summer-Fall 1969
Winter-Spring1970
Sanctuary Counteroffensive
Counteroffensive, Phase VII
Consolidation I
Consolidation II
Cease-Fire

Decorations

Meritorious Unit Commendation, (streamer embroidered) Vietnam 1966
Meritorious Unit Commendation, (streamer embroidered) Vietnam 1966 to 1967
Meritorious Unit Commendation, (streamer embroidered) Vietnam 1967 to 1968
Meritorious Unit Commendation, (streamer embroidered) Vietnam 1968
Meritorious Unit Commendation, (streamer embroidered) Vietnam 1971 to 1972
Navy Unit Commendation, (streamer embroidered) Saigon
Army Superior Unit Award

Deployment Teambuilding at the Army Management Staff College

Ms. Mary Ann Hodges

Fifteen soldiers from the 1st Information Operations Command at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, attended a first-ever Deployment Teambuilding session at the Army Management Staff College (AMSC) on 24 July 2003. These soldiers will soon deploy for six months to multiple locations in Iraq.

Why teambuilding? An Information Operations planner at 1st Information Operations Command, who was previously deployed to Kosovo and knew the inherent problems that could develop when integrating a small group of subject matter experts into an already existing staff, searched for a resource that could provide actionable skills on group dynamics. He wanted tools to assist the team members in coordinating, synchronizing, and integrating actions in the information environment of a very diverse group, a multinational coalition, in order to accomplish a common goal.

After finding that there was neither an in-house capability for such training nor a comprehensive Army course catalog, the planner contacted AMSC at <*www.amsc.belvoir.army.mil*>. The chairman of the Department of Leadership and Management at AMSC worked with the staff to develop a course that met 1st Information Operations Command requirements. The chairman saw a great opportunity to support soldiers on the battlefield, a goal he says is part of the charter of the sustaining base program.

According to the chief of the 1st Information Operations Command Field Support Division, it is quite unusual for a large Army educational institution to be flexible enough to react so quickly since the time lapse was a mere ten days from the initial call to the scheduled class. If all goes well, 1st Information Command will look into the possibility of adding the AMSC course as a regular part of predeployment training for field support teams deploying from Fort Belvoir to support land component commanders worldwide.

Submitting an Article to *MILITARY POLICE*

Articles may range from 2,000 to 4,000 words. Send a paper copy along with a disc in Microsoft® Word to *MILITARY POLICE*, 320 MANSCEN Loop, Suite 210, Fort Leonard Word, Missouri 65473-8929 or e-mail to <*pbd@wood.army.mil*>. In the subject line type "MILITARY POLICE."

Any article containing information or quotations not referenced in the text should carry appropriate endnotes.

Contributors are encouraged to include black-and-white or color photographs, artwork, and/or line diagrams that illustrate information in the article. Include captions for any photographs submitted. If possible, include photographs of soldiers performing their missions. Hard-copy photographs are preferred, but we will accept digital images in TIF or JPG format originally saved at a resolution no lower than 200 ppi. Please do not include them in the text. If you use PowerPoint® for charts or graphics, save each illustration as a separate file and avoid excessive use of color and shading in graphics and slides. Please do not send photographs embedded in PowerPoint or Microsoft Word documents—send in original photograph format.

Articles should generally come from contributors with firsthand experience of the subject being presented. Articles should be concise, straightforward, and in the active voice.

Include your full name, rank, current unit, and job title. Also include a list of your past assignments, experience, and education; your mailing address; and a fax number and commercial daytime phone number.

Include a statement with your article stating that your local security office has determined that the information contained in the article is unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable to the public. We do not require a hard copy of the clearance.

All submissions are subject to editing.

Military Police Regimental Conference and Anniversary Week, CID Conference, and Warfighter Team Challenge 2003

Events written in *italics* are *Regimental Anniversary Week* activities. Underlined events are CID Conference activities. Events marked with an ***** are Warfighter Team Challenge activities. All other events are Regimental Conference activities.

Wednesday, 17 September

0800 Vendor Display Ribbon Cutting Ceremony
0800-1700 Vendor Displays
1200-1700 Regimental Conference Registration
1800-UTC Regimental Conference Icebreaker

Thursday, 18 September

0800-1800 Warfighter Registration*
0800-1800 Regimental Conference
0800-1700 Vendor Displays

Friday, 19 September

TBD Warfighter Team Challenge*****
0700-1730 Regimental Conference

Saturday, 20 September

TBD Warfighter Team Challenge*****
0700-1700 Regimental Conference Golf Outing
1900-UTC Regimental Conference Dinner

Sunday, 21 September

0500-1000 Warfighter Road March*****
0700-UTC CID Conference
1200-1330 Warfighter Awards Ceremony*****
1330-UTC *Regimental Picnic*

Monday, 22 September

0700-1800 Regimental Conference

Tuesday, 23 September

0700-1100 Regimental Conference
1130-1330 *Hall of Fame Induction Luncheon, Ceremony*
1400-1430 *Hall of Fame Photo Unveiling*
1530-1630 *Memorial Tribute*
1730-UTC *Regimental Review and Reception*

Wednesday, 24 September

0700-UTC CID Conference

Thursday, 25 September

0600-UTC *Regimental Run*

Friday, 26 September

1000-UTC *Regimental Golf Tournament*

Saturday, 27 September

1800-UTC *Regimental Ball*

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

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