

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THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF THE MILITARY POLICE CORPS

MILITARY POLICE

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Articles

Departments

Chief, Military Police Corps Regiment, and Commandant, United States Army Military Police School

Brigadier General Rodney L. Johnson

Well, it's been almost a year since I took over as chief of the Military Police Corps and I can't believe how fast the time has gone. Over the course of the last 10 months, this Regiment has been continually on the move. In an attempt to keep up, I have spent a good deal of that time doing the same, visiting you at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Lewis, Washington; Fort Bliss, Texas; Iraq; and Afghanistan, just to name a few. My travels remind me of a great quote often attributed to Mahatma Gandhi: "There go my people. I must hurry and catch up with them, for I am their leader." That is truly how this year has felt to me. Our folks have been doing such great things, and I often feel like I'm just trying to keep pace with all of you.

Since June of last year, I have seen our soldiers training across the globe and seen those efforts come to fruition on the battlefield. Iraq and Afghanistan are just two of the many locations where our troops are effecting changes that are directly impacting the course of nations. I have watched our soldiers and their families prepare to deploy and have been fortunate enough to witness some homecomings. I have spoken to units filled with privates who haven't even seen their barracks room yet, deploying for their first time. I have visited units deploying for their second or third time, filled with seasoned veterans who can probably tell me more about the war now than I can tell them. I have also had the distinct honor to be both saddened and inspired by those soldiers and families who have made the ultimate sacrifice for strangers in another country. Their loss is one that we feel and honor across the Corps daily. It's both uplifting and humbling to know we have such fine men and women in our ranks. They, and you, truly are leading the Military Police Corps Regiment into the future.

These experiences have only reinforced my top two priorities: No.1, support our troops in the field; and No. 2, send our units well-trained, solid soldiers who have internalized the Warrior Spirit. To that end, our training and futures development branches are working together to ensure that the lessons learned from the field are reflected in our doctrine and our courses. We must ensure that not only are we providing the best possible training to our soldiers and officers so they can support their future units, but also that we are providing them the lessons they need to both survive and lead their troops in turn.

We continue to develop and push to acquire the best and most innovative force-multiplying equipment available. I fully believe that vehicles like the armored security vehicle and the up-armored high-mobility, multiwheeled vehicle and systems like the common remotely operated weapons system (CROWS) are things our soldiers both need and deserve. Our directorates are working hard to get this equipment to you in time to make a difference.

The growth and transformation of the Regiment is an ongoing process, but we are well on our way to increasing our force by almost 64 percent, going from 43,000 to more than 67,000 in the next seven years. Take heart, help is coming. Further, we are fine-tuning the force structure and our training to better serve the needs of the soldiers out in the field.

(Continued on page 3)

Regimental Command Sergeant Major

Command Sergeant Major James F. Barrett

It seems like just yesterday that I was writing an article for the last edition of our professional bulletin. Many great things have taken place around the Regiment since that article. We are moving full steam ahead with transformation and a number of other initiatives. We have activated new units both in the continental United States and overseas. This trend will continue over the next few years. At the same time, we continue to maintain an operational tempo that is higher than at any time during my nearly 27 years as a member of this Regiment.

We are working hard here at the home of our Regiment to support our soldiers and units around the world. In fact, our No. 1 priority has been, and will remain, supporting our units around the world. This support comes in many forms, such as continually checking and updating the courses taught to our soldiers at all levels. This not only includes initial entry training and leader development courses, but our functional courses as well. We will continue to use your feedback as well as our observations while we travel to units around the world to ensure that we give our soldiers the best training possible to meet our challenges in every theater. This is the case with our equipment and doctrine as well.

However, it is our soldiers who are the lifeblood of the Regiment. I continue to travel extensively to see our units around the world. At every location, regardless of the type of unit, our soldiers are doing great things. I truly feel that it is the performance of our leaders and soldiers that has earned us our great reputation. Senior commanders around the world are asking for more military police soldiers. This would not be the case were it not for your outstanding performance.

As you know, we have also had several soldiers who have made the ultimate sacrifice, as well as many wounded. These soldiers and their families are always in my thoughts and prayers. I have made several trips to our medical facilities to visit our wounded soldiers. I am absolutely amazed at their spirit and dedication. They make me proud to be a member of this great Regiment.

Once again, I would like to thank our soldiers, family members, retirees, and civilians for what they do for our Army and our nation every day. I look forward to seeing you around the Regiment.

Of the Troops! For the Troops!

(Chief, Military Police Corps Regiment, continued from page 2)

The majority of the valuable input we're receiving is coming from you, so again I say, what amazing soldiers you are! Leading from the front and pulling this force into the future. I couldn't ask for more.

I plan to continue to strive to understand the issues and challenges you face and address them with you on a one-on-one basis as I make my way out to where everyone is either stationed or deployed. In exchange, I ask you to continue to challenge me and ask me the hard questions when you see me. I look forward to working with each of you as we take this Regiment to new levels. Thank you for all you do.

Assist – Protect – Defend

Is It Time for a Paradigm Shift?

By Colonel Mike Galloucis

For many years within the Military Police Corps, it has been common practice for military police officers to wear "multiple hats." For example, it is not uncommon for some military police officers to serve concurrently as commander, installation provost marshal, and division or corps provost marshal. In the last few years, some officers within the Regiment have even added a fourth title—Director of Public Safety (DPS). In the not-too-distant future, the practice of military police officers adding DPS, or a similar title, will likely be even more widespread than it is today.

The purpose of this article is to discuss the Army's long-standing practice of having many military police officers serve concurrently in more than one position while in a command billet. Specifically, I ask leaders of all ranks within the Military Police Corps a simple question—In the world after 11 September 2001, with its high demands on Active Army and Reserve Component military police units and leaders, does this model still make sense? Based on today's contemporary operating environment (COE), which is not likely to change significantly any time soon, I believe the time may be right for the Military Police Corps to work with the Department of the Army (DA) to make changes so that military police commanders can focus solely on "commander's business," and not have to contend simultaneously with the often conflicting and always time-consuming staff responsibilities.

Having worn multiple hats as a captain (company commander and post provost marshal), major (battalion executive officer and deputy area provost marshal), and lieutenant colonel (battalion commander, post provost marshal, and division provost marshal), I can attest to how challenging it is for one person to juggle the many duties of a commander and provost marshal.

Soldiers of all ranks—certainly the superb soldiers we have in the Military Police Corps—can handle a tremendous workload while consistently exhibiting a high level of performance. However, there is only so much one person can do, no matter how dedicated, diligent, conscientious, and experienced that person is. When one person serves in multiple full-time positions for extended periods, something or someone invariably suffers. As military police, we understand the old adage, "Do more with less." But if doing more with less becomes the steady state instead of a temporary condition, it is then a question of when—not if—suboptimal results will emerge. Can we live with those suboptimal results in today's COE? My opinion is that soldiers in units with commanders who are serving concurrently in other positions should not be the ones who suffer. That is especially true today when so many military police units are deployed; have recently returned from a deployment; or are getting ready to deploy to Iraq, Afghanistan, or elsewhere. Those deployable units, more than other units, deserve to have their commanders' undivided attention.

A few real-world examples drive this point home. In the spring of 2003, the Germany-based 18th Military Police Brigade deployed to participate in the invasion of Iraq. As the unit prepared to deploy, the commander was dual-slotted as the V Corps provost marshal, which he had been since taking command. He was the corps provost marshal throughout the period that V Corps was the Army's primary command and control (C2) headquarters in Iraq. When V Corps transitioned and became Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7), a Reserve Component military police officer handled the provost marshal duties on an interim basis for about six months. Eventually, a provost marshal slot was built into the CJTF-7 Joint Manning Document (JMD), and it was filled at 180-day intervals by Active Army military police colonels through the Worldwide Individual Augmentation System.

". . . there is only so much one person can do, no matter how dedicated, diligent, conscientious, and experienced that person is."

The decision to appoint a second officer to handle the CJTF-7 provost marshal duties made a lot of sense. When that decision was made, the brigade commander had more than 7,000 soldiers under the C2 of the 18th Military Police Brigade. The brigade was responsible for running all police stations, jails, and prisons in Baghdad; conducting hundreds of joint patrols with the Iraqi police; and running an academy tasked with transforming more than 10,000 Iraqis into police officers. When the CJTF-7 leadership asked the brigade commander to consider remaining as CJTF-7 provost marshal, it came with the stipulation that his daily place of duty would be at CJTF-7 headquarters. Given the challenges of commanding his brigade in hostile territory, along with accomplishing such a diverse and unprecedented mission set, the commander informed the deputy commanding general of CJTF-7 that he could not devote adequate time to the provost marshal job while simultaneously commanding a 7,000-soldier brigade. Anyone familiar with the situation—including the officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and soldiers in the 18th Military Police Brigade—recognized that the commander's inspirational and highly visible leadership had a lot to do with the brigade's success during its initial tour in Iraq.

A new four-star command headquarters known as Multinational Force-Iraq, which has a military police colonel on its JMD, has since replaced CJTF-7. This arrangement allowed the commanders of the 16th Military Police Brigade and 89th Military Police Brigade to focus on commanding their brigades during their recently concluded tours in Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The 3d Military Police Battalion at Fort Stewart, Georgia, offers another example of the dilemma often facing commanders who wear multiple hats. The senior military police soldier at that post is serving concurrently as commander of the 3d Military Police Battalion, as Fort Stewart's provost marshal, as the DPS, and as the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) provost marshal. His battalion may be one of several military police battalions transitioning from a law enforcement command structure to a more traditional combat support military police battalion headquarters and headquarters detachment structure under recent force structure decisions approved at DA. If so, that transition could begin during the battalion commander's extended absence to serve a tour in Iraq as a staff officer with his division headquarters. If another officer were slotted as the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) provost marshal, it would enable the battalion commander to oversee the transition of his battalion headquarters and help it prepare for what presumably will be an upcoming deployment.

Another example is the senior military police commander at Fort Lewis, Washington. Before his recent deployment, he was concurrently slotted as commander of the 42d Military Police Brigade, as Fort Lewis' provost marshal, and as I Corps provost marshal. As his brigade headquarters remains fully engaged in a deployment in the coming months, it is easy to wonder whether the brigade commander could have focused more on the deployment of his headquarters if he were able to focus exclusively on deployment-related activities without also having to be concerned with garrison force protection, installation access control, traffic accidents, on-post larcenies, drunk driving, and military police blotters.

Although always challenging for the affected officer, the long-standing practice of one officer wearing multiple hats was defensible before 11 September 2001. However, the events of that tragic morning prove that things will never be quite the same for our beloved nation and should probably never be quite the same for the Military Police Corps. It is relatively easy to make the case that commanders at all levels within the Military Police Corps should focus their effort and energy on the most important charter for all commanders—ensuring that their soldiers and units are prepared to perform their wartime missions. Military police commanders at all levels, along with their senior NCOs and soldiers, are putting their hearts and souls into preparing their units for overseas deployments. However, many of those same commanders are also contending with other duties that have little to do with their command responsibilities, and that is the crux of the issue. In the world after 11 September 2001, shouldn't anything that detracts from that fundamental charter be considered unacceptable?

One only has to look at the operational tempo of today's military police combat support brigades and battalions—the positions where it is commonplace to have dual-slotted commanders—to appreciate why senior military police commanders should be focused solely on commanding. In the last three-plus years, approximately 86 percent of the Military Police Corps' combat support military police brigades; 84 percent of its combat support military police battalions; and 92 percent of its combat support military police

companies for which it exercises C2 have been deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan, or another location away from their home station.

The plain truth is that very few other branches within the Army ask as much of their battalion and brigade commanders as does the Military Police Corps. In my view, soldiers assigned to military police battalions and brigades deserve to have their commanders focused exclusively on training, warfighting, preparing for deployment, maintenance, and stability operations and support operations and not merely on balancing these responsibilities with garrison law enforcement duties as an installation, division, or corps provost marshal. This condition is exacerbated even further today because in many cases battalion and brigade commanders are staying in command longer than the customary 24 months. I am not trying to downplay the significance of the Military Police Corps' law enforcement mission or to suggest that it should be civilianized. But peacetime law enforcement on our installations should not have more importance than preparing our units for deployment to hostile areas or performing our many missions while deployed to those areas. I believe that in today's COE, with its operational requirements and heavy law enforcement and force protection requirements at the installation level, it might be best not to put all of that responsibility on one officer. I believe the Military Police Corps should take a stand on this and not leave it to chance, to the individual decision of commanders in the field, to their senior commanders, or to DA.

"The plain truth is that very few other branches within the Army ask as much of their battalion and brigade commanders as does the Military Police Corps."

Anyone who has served concurrently as a battalion commander and provost marshal can attest to what draws the interest of their command group. Typically, it involves those areas that are the purview of the installation provost marshal. As a young officer, I observed a military police brigade commander briefing his training programs to the new three-star corps commander. The brigade had a good training program that the brigade commander was justifiably proud of and wanted to highlight for his senior mission commander, who had the reputation of being an excellent trainer. Less than 10 minutes into the briefing, the corps commander raised his left hand, waved off the brigade commander and said, "That's all great, but what I really want to know is what you're doing about speeding on post and the backup of traffic that occurs every morning at six o'clock."

While serving concurrently as a battalion commander and provost marshal, I participated in several quarterly training briefings (QTBs) with our division commander. It was evident at each QTB, even with two different commanding generals, that they cared far more about law enforcement issues than about training programs, even though our battalion had an aggressive training program and routinely deployed soldiers for extended periods.

This represents an interesting paradox for the Military Police Corps. On one hand, most senior leaders outside the Military Police Corps (especially those outside of Iraq, Afghanistan, and other war zones) typically view our responsibilities as staff officers as paramount. Conversely, most military police officers serving in a Human Resources Command board-selected command billet choose to focus on their command responsibilities. Why? Because the natural gravitational pull for Army commanders is their training and troop-leading responsibilities—or at least it should be. That ethos is part of the Army culture and is inculcated into us as junior officers.

This is not a self-correcting dilemma. Leaders outside the Military Police Corps do not fully appreciate the complexity of the discussion and have more than enough on their plates right now. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that those senior leaders will intervene to modify the status quo without prodding.

I believe the Military Police Corps should take a close look at this issue. One approach would be to assemble several active and recently retired military police colonels and lieutenant colonels who have worn multiple hats concurrently and seek their recommendations. Military police officers within the US Army Military Police School or the Office of the Provost Marshal General (PMG) can then formulate these recommendations into a presentation for the PMG and the Commandant. The ensuing discussion may result in no change to the status quo, or it may result in the senior leadership of the Military Police Corps looking for ways to change its long-standing

practices and taking steps to get senior military police commanders back solely to the business of commanding their units. If the latter option is pursued, it will be an uphill climb because it is a formidable challenge to acquire spaces in today's Army with all of the ongoing transformation efforts underway. Regardless of the outcome, it is certain that the Military Police Corps will remain the Army's "Force of Choice" for the foreseeable future. I believe the Military Police Corps will be a better regiment for looking closely at a model that directly impacts many of its senior officers and indirectly affects thousands of military police soldiers throughout the Army.

Author's note: My point in writing this article was to stimulate discussion on an important issue for the Military Police Corps. If it does nothing more than that, I will have accomplished my self-imposed mission. I acknowledge that there are other perspectives on this same issue. I believe it is healthy for the Military Police Corps to periodically examine its "sacred cows" to see if they still serve the Corps well in today's COE. If they still make sense, the Corps should sustain them. If they no longer make sense, it should look for ways to change them. None of the commands mentioned in this article prompted me in any way to write the article or to use their organizations as an example for the key points made. The main points and thoughts contained in this article are my own.

Colonel Galloucis is assigned to the Pentagon as a member of the Army staff. His field-grade assignments as a military police officer include serving as chief of operations, Office of the Provost Marshal General, Washington, DC; commander, 924th Military Police Battalion, Fort Riley, Kansas; and operations and training officer and later executive officer of the 728th Military Police Battalion in Korea. He is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College and the National War College.

Letter to the Editor

Dear sirs,

I just returned from the International Association of Chiefs of Police where I picked up a copy of the MILITARY POLICE Bulletin, the 63d Military Police Corps anniversary edition (October 2004). I served in the Army from 1969–1972 in the Military Police Corps, spending a year in Vietnam (1970–1971) with the 66th Military Police Company, 18th Military Police Brigade, assigned to the [Criminal Investigation Division].

I just wanted to say how proud I was to serve my country then and also how proud I am today of our military. Every time I see a soldier in uniform, I thank them for serving this great land. I fly the flag proudly every day and tears well up in my eyes every time I hear our national anthem. I pray for the safety of our soldiers in war zones and ask that they come home soon, safely. I do not want to see Iraq become my Vietnam all over again.

I was in Washington, DC, in August and September and visited the Vietnam Memorial again, as well as the World War II Memorial (my father served in the Army in the European theater) and was moved by the power of them both. I pray that we do not have another memorial having to be built. If everyone could visit these hallowed monuments, just maybe we could work toward a peaceful solution.

Please pass on to all of our soldiers my prayers and regards for them. God bless you all and God bless the United States of America.

Bernie Winer
Cooper City, Florida



Military Police Operations in Fallujah

Task Force Enforcer headquarters coordinates raids at multiple points in a village on the western edge of Fallujah.

By Lieutenant Colonel John Hammond

Scalpel Versus Bayonet

Fallujah, Iraq, is arguably one of the most dangerous places on earth. It is also home to more than 300,000 Iraqis (many of whom are fervent supporters of the previous regime) and a large number of foreign terrorists. On two occasions in 2003, the V Corps commander called on the Military Police Corps to form a unique type of task force (TF) to conduct unconventional operations. When the insurgent attacks in Fallujah had spiraled out of control and a new strategy was needed to address the situation, V Corps organized a TF with special capabilities to address this dangerous development. The TF combined the skill sets of the military police with the intelligence-gathering capabilities of counterintelligence (CI) and psychological operations (PSYOP) teams. This formidable asset was then integrated, with great success, with the combat arms elements operating in this troubled region.

The primary mission for this new TF was to identify, locate, and capture or kill threat forces operating in a specific area. The ability to execute a cordon and search operation is not a skill unique to the military police; many units perform this mission. However, based on their training and experience, the military police achieve a greater level of precision. This reduces the collateral damage sometimes associated with this type of operation. Failing to control collateral damage will ultimately aid the enemy. Local civilians usually know who the insurgents are. If innocent civilians are killed, it angers the general population, who eventually will provide either passive or active support for the insurgents. A successful raid is a surgical event that is performed with speed, surprise, and skill. Although any unit can perform this task, the military police platoon operates more like a scalpel and less like a bayonet. Both will get the job done, but one may be a little messier. That is why the military police were selected for this mission.

The success of this concept is far-reaching and could serve as a model for future operations in the Global War on Terrorism. Military police will continue to execute this type of mission in Iraq and in any future theater in that war. The execution of the raid is only one aspect of this operation, which also includes intelligence gathering and targeting. Precision, speed, and stealth are critical components that are the calling cards of the military police platoon executing this mission. Unfortunately, soldiers who have taken part in a military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT)

exercise feel confident that they are proficient in cordon and search operations. Since most large combat arms units operating in Iraq are not accustomed to working with military police, they perform the raids themselves and leave the military police to their traditional missions of security operations. The problem is that the rumbling of tracked vehicles can be felt and heard from a mile away. This sometimes signals the raid and results in the loss of surprise, the escape of target insurgents, and an increased risk to the soldiers executing the raid.

Battalion Mission

In the following paragraphs, I will provide some insight into the mission set for my battalion and the subsequent results. To avoid security concerns, I will speak in generalities. Specific tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) can be addressed in a separate venue. I hope that the valuable lessons learned from this unique operational capability will not be lost in today's fluid environment. Military police commanders should continue to train on the core mission of cordon and search operations and educate their commands about the unique skills of the military police. US forces are fighting an asymmetrical war that requires battlefield commanders to adjust their strategies and tactics constantly and to fight using unconventional methods. The enemy has learned this lesson well and continues to evolve. Adjusting doctrine and tactics is a critical element in safeguarding soldiers. Precision raids will continue to play a major role in defeating the enemy.

The first organization to conduct this operation in Fallujah was TF Gauntlet, in support of the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR). Shortly after arriving in Fallujah, TF Gauntlet received additional assets from the 3d ACR, and these combined assets resulted in great success and improved TTP. The situation stabilized in Fallujah, and the soldiers of TF Gauntlet returned to their battalion. In late May 2003, the situation in Fallujah had once again deteriorated. I received word to stand up a second TF, similar to TF Gauntlet, to conduct operations in Fallujah. This new organization was designated TF Enforcer by V Corps.

My initial concern in preparing for this mission was that it would require me to execute two battalion level operations in two separation regions of Iraq at the same time. When I received the mission, my battalion was decisively engaged in securing the V Corps logistical hub. I was fortunate to have a great staff of talented officers and noncommissioned

Task Force Enforcer executes a combined arms cordon and search raid in Fallujah with direct support from the Saber Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment.

Mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, and machine guns were secured by one of the many successful raids by Task Force Enforcer.

officers (NCOs) from which to draw for my second headquarters. New units would then comprise the remainder of the TF. Although it was a challenge to perform these simultaneous missions, it was not impossible. A military police battalion placed in support of a division can execute a traditional mission of combat support while simultaneously executing direct-action operations in support of a brigade commander in a division trouble spot. However, I would recommend that the two missions take place in the same region. The real challenge was balancing the needs of both missions. My executive officer oversaw operations at the first site while I deployed to Fallujah with the assault command post (ACP), as V Corps designated that as my main effort. I urge all battalion commanders to develop an ACP and train on it before deployment. Developing an ACP will provide a unique asset for deployments and will result in a better-trained staff.

TF Enforcer initially consisted of a military police ACP, a military police company, two CI teams, and two PSYOP teams. I received additional attachments of a division military police company and an infantry company. My orders were to conduct unconventional military police operations. My mission was to neutralize the organized criminal threat and the remaining Fedayeen Saddam and Baath Party forces operating in the region, in conjunction with the 3d ACR and the 2d Brigade Spartans of the 3d Infantry Division (ID).

Fallujah was unlike any other place I saw in Iraq or Afghanistan. It was the Hell's Kitchen of Iraq, and most Iraqis would never travel there. Many of its 300,000 people have strong ties to the former regime. Fallujah sits at the crossroads from Syria and Jordan, where porous borders allow foreign terrorists to flow into Iraq. Before the fall of Saddam, there was no law other than loose tribal control in Fallujah. Saddam reached an arrangement in this lawless region through ruthless enforcement by the Fedayeen Saddam and the Baath Party. Local thugs maintained control and Saddam rewarded them for their efforts.

US forces recaptured Fallujah in 2004, and the news media reported that they did it with more than

15,000 Marines and soldiers. When I reported there in 2003, the 3d ACR had fewer than 1,000 troops. One squadron, which was performing an economy-of-force mission, had the insurmountable task of securing Fallujah and rebuilding the city's infrastructure. TF Enforcer was formed to assist with the direct-action mission and brought with it critical intelligence-gathering capabilities. Actionable intelligence is essential to this type of operation, and developing this capability was my highest priority. It would take time for US assets to produce the actionable intelligence needed, which meant that the TF had to go looking for it the hard way. In the beginning, patrols conducted daily reconnaissance by fire to provide an initial intelligence picture. This mission presented additional challenges as Fallujah was very built-up and the possibility for attack was everywhere. Fallujah resembles Mogadishu, Somalia, in its design and volatility. Each night, soldiers patrolled the worst portions of the city in search of insurgents to draw intelligence from. There were nightly ambushes that primarily consisted of rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), hand grenades, and AK47 attacks. Intelligence was the lifeblood of the TF. Good intelligence meant that the TF could choose the time and place of an engagement. The CI teams played a major role in the success of the TF, and it was essential to have direct control over them. It took time to develop, but eventually a solid intelligence network allowed the TF to construct a relatively accurate model of the insurgent operation. The PSYOP teams efficiently supported this effort and often provided intelligence that confirmed information gained from other sources. To complete the intelligence network, a solid police intelligence operation within the Fallujah police headquarters was established.

Commanders at every level must lead from the front if they hope to succeed in this rapidly changing asymmetrical environment. Every successful commander I observed or worked with in either Iraq or Afghanistan followed this practice. To maintain my own situational awareness, I traveled with a different patrol each night and oversaw most direct-action raids. To gauge their condition, I talked with the soldiers each night before we went out on patrol. Over time, the ambushes certainly began to take their toll, and I decreased the operational tempo accordingly. It was extremely challenging to balance the mission with the operational effectiveness of soldiers subjected to the strain of this terrible environment. It is impossible for commanders to gauge this if they are not out front with their troops. Battalion commanders are responsible for maneuvering platoons on the battlefield, while captains maneuver squads. This principle requires leaders to have eyes on their operational elements during combat operations. My platoon leaders, in conjunction with their company commanders, planned and executed most missions, while I approved the plans, monitored the situation, and coordinated additional resources if needed. I felt this was necessary since the situation was extremely fluid and the rules of engagement (ROE) were confusing. Although my forward presence could be seen as cumbersome by those more comfortable with a decentralized leadership philosophy, it was quite necessary. This technique allowed platoon leaders to remain focused on their mission, while I worked response issues and provided on-the-spot guidance when the situation took a drastic turn. This allowed us to transition rapidly to a dynamic mode or quickly put a lid on a mission and "bring it down a notch" when necessary. Raids were conducted by day and patrols were conducted at night. It was a dangerous routine, but intelligence improved every day and the TF began taking down bigger targets and slowly gaining control of the city. If soldiers do not see their leaders taking the same risks as they do in this hellish environment, it will certainly affect their morale. In addition, if commanders are not out on patrol with the soldiers, it is impossible to maintain accurate situational awareness and adjust tactics in a timely manner.

The operational climate in Iraq can change quickly, requiring an immediate change in mission or demanding additional guidance. To respond to this condition of battle, we established a mobile tactical operations center (TOC) that developed better command, control, and security for patrols operating in the city. The mobile TOC was designed to overcome the delays in the quick reaction force response time, eliminate communications failures, and provide a forward command and control element able to respond to changing situations. It linked multiple patrols with the rear command post at the forward operating base. In some cases, it operated in conjunction with hunter-killer teams to maneuver forces. In other cases, it coordinated actions during deliberate raids. The mobile TOC allowed a coordinated response to an ambush by maneuvering organic assets or by requesting additional support from the air cavalry or infantry. Air cavalry assets were frequently requested and coordinated during patrols or raids.

A National Guard military police company served as the direct-action element of the TF. Once intelligence was deemed actionable, the military police soldiers executed the raids. This National Guard unit had a large number of civilian police officers, many with

experience in special weapons and tactics. Although they were very proficient in cordon and search operations, they conducted extensive rehearsals on a daily basis and performed rock drills before any deliberate raids. They executed two types of raids—dynamic (forced entry) raids and knock-and-talk (permissive) raids. The dynamic raid is the traditional cordon and search operation with an explosive entry. Tanks or explosives were sometimes used to knock holes in walls. Many raids were conducted in conjunction with units of the 3d ID. It was common for the TF to conduct a deliberate raid with combat arms comrades that involved tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, military police, and aerial security from Kiowa or Apache helicopters. Air cavalry is an asset that military police never train with. However, it is a critical component that can protect the military police from attack and provide real-time intelligence on the target site. Military police commanders must make every effort to train with aviation units while conducting cordon and search operations. In all, close to 400 separate structures were taken down during raids, with no friendly casualties. Well over 100 prisoners were taken, along with hundreds of weapons, mortars, RPGs, missiles, bombs, and explosives. A major counterfeiting operation was eliminated, providing incredible intelligence. The raids located and secured tons of explosives, ammunition, and bomb-making materials. The direct-action element of this operation was incredibly successful, especially when combined with our combat arms counterparts.

To effect these complex operations, TF representatives met daily with their counterparts from the 3d ACR and 3d ID to deconflict direct-action missions and patrols. This ensured that the appropriate force was brought to bear on a target gained through actionable intelligence. Every deliberate mission was planned, coordinated, and rehearsed. This included our unique mobile checkpoints. Establishing and maintaining checkpoints in hostile territory was extremely dangerous but always yielded results. Checkpoint locations were selected in advance and conducted in conjunction with a combat patrol. These checkpoints were maintained only for short times, reducing the enemy's ability to assemble and attack. Also, word traveled quickly when the TF set up a checkpoint, and the insurgents took a new route.

This snapshot of operations in Fallujah will provide future military police commanders with some planning considerations. The success of both TF Gauntlet and TF Enforcer in Iraq was clear, but I fear the concept of this operation, along with the ACP, was lost when I left Fallujah in September 2003. The remaining elements of my TF were dismantled then and a valuable tool was lost. I hope the lessons learned in Fallujah are not wasted and that future commanders can benefit from this experience.

Military police execute an explosive entry during operations in Fallujah.

Lieutenant Colonel Hammond is deputy director of strategic plans at Joint Force Headquarters, Massachusetts National Guard. Previous assignments include: commander, 211th Military Police Battalion; operations and training officer, 26th Infantry Brigade; executive officer, 181st Infantry Battalion; troop commander, 110th Cavalry Squadron; platoon leader, 972d Military Police Company; and other staff assignments. He holds a bachelor's degree from the University of Massachusetts at Boston and a master's degree from Boston University. He is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College, the Combined Arms and Services Staff School, the Military Police Brigade/Battalion Precommand Course, the Military Police Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the Armor Officer Advanced Course, and the US Army Military Police School Physical Security Course. He has been awarded the Bronze Star Medal, the Army Commendation Medal with "V" device, the Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal, and the Global War on Terrorism Service Medal.

Iraqi police from Najaf Province perform box drills during training exercises.

Look Outside the Station Walls for Iraqi Police Change

By Captain David M. O'Dea

Within a few hours of arrival in Najaf, Iraq, in July 2003, the 2d Platoon, 988th Military Police Company from Fort Benning, Georgia, was placed in charge of the Kufa Police Station and the 300 Iraqi police who secured that critical district. The 988th Military Police Company, as part of the 716th Military Police Battalion and in conjunction with the 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, and later multinational forces, also had to secure the holy city of Najaf as part of its mission.

Najaf is unique in Iraq for many reasons. The locals are fond of saying that the politics in the city reach back thousands of years. Every building or holy site seems to have a story, and everyone in the city knows Najaf's history and feels a fervent desire to declare that he is a Najafi. In many respects, Najaf is to Shiite Islam what the Vatican is to Roman Catholicism. It is the center of gravity for Islamic religious leaders, who sometimes fight each other through surrogates. To survive and accomplish anything in Najaf required an understanding of the politics involved. To build and staff a police station required developing relationships and making dramatic structural realignments.

According to American soldiers who have been in charge of Iraqi police, one central challenge to rebuilding the police is a lack of Iraqi leaders. A fundamentally different organizational approach has left a gap between officers, who may do nothing, and regular beat cops, who often execute missions without any guidance. Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) do not exist in the Iraqi police, and the lack of sergeants leaves little direct supervision. When the 988th Military Police Company first arrived in Najaf, Iraqi police officers were more intent on drawing pay than in leading. The beat cops were more interested in drinking tea and sleeping than in staying out on active patrols. After six weeks of trying conventional methods of reprimanding, training, and teaching, with only modest temporary success, it became apparent that a new approach would be needed in the Kufa Police Station.

The first phase of this process was to find out how many Iraqi police officers there actually were and what their organization looked like. It became clear that many Iraqi police officers drew pay without attendance and that few in the Iraqi police leadership cared about this, so long as they drew their own pay.

Also, many of the senior Iraqi police leaders at the station were actively stealing thousands of dollars per month from police payroll funds. Through reliable translators and solid police work, US military police were able to expose the corrupt police officers and obtain criminal convictions through Iraqi courts. By making a strong example of corrupt police officers early on, US forces attacked the heart of an internal patronage system that allowed officers to buy their way out of work. This gave the American military police a grasp on Iraqi police officer accountability, and the Iraqi police began to understand that unethical behavior would be confronted and dealt with severely.

Still lacking in the Iraqi police force were true leaders willing to step up and take charge of the station without direct American leadership. Those leaders within the police force often were looking only to profit personally from their positions, while ignoring corruption in their own ranks. Such was the status quo under the old regime. With this embedded, systemic corruption, it became clear that the solution to police leadership was not within the police force itself. The solution was to look outside the police force for real leaders. It became obvious that the strongest Iraqi police leaders were those who had military experience and that to get the station functional, US forces needed to shift everything dynamically.

The 988th Military Police Company selected a junior Iraqi police captain, who recently had served as a captain in the army, to take charge of the police station. He was promoted to police chief because of his leadership on numerous warrants and high-risk missions when other career Iraqi police leaders had shied away. While other leaders hid, he stood out front, giving an operational order on the mission to be conducted. He was a natural leader who spoke English well and demonstrated his reliability on multiple sensitive missions. The 988th Military Police Company gave him the mandate to fix the organization, put the best people in charge, and run the station as it watched closely.

To handle ethical violations in the station, the company also created the first internal affairs division at the Kufa Police Station. It staffed the division with a reliable individual, another former military leader who had demonstrated his utility to the coalition and to other police officials. By hiring individuals from outside the police force and putting individuals who had not grown up in the bribery- and coercion-based police system in charge, the organization got reliable leaders who took responsibility for the station. The company's approach was quite simple—it could teach strong leaders how to manage police, but it could not make unethical leaders honest.

With new leaders in charge, a clear picture of the organization emerged, with officers leading sections and beat cops having a leader who accounted for them each day. This approach was so successful—and Kufa's progress so clear—that the US commander directed that one American NCO be placed in charge of two or three police sections, such as "shift work" or "investigations," to mentor and assist Iraqi counterparts in building the Iraqi section. With new leaders in place, the American signature was reduced after just four months from a full platoon required 24 hours a day, to one officer and four NCOs required for just four hours daily to supervise an entirely Iraqi-run operation. By empowering Iraqi police to take ownership and by establishing clear expectations, what had been a daunting and sometimes repetitive task became one where the company's presence became almost unnecessary. Iraqi leaders took pride in being in charge of the most professional station in the province.

Captain O'Dea served as the platoon leader for 2d Platoon, 988th Military Police Company, from December 2002 to December 2004. He now serves as the executive officer for Delta Military Police Company, Fort McPherson, Georgia.

Iraqi SWAT Teams

Iraq, with help from US trainers, plans to have special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams in each of 20 major Iraqi cities. Teams have already served as quick reaction forces during the January national elections. The Basra SWAT team was also a major player in a successful raid on an improvised explosive device factory in that city.

Four weeks of specialized training cover basic human relations, police conduct, weapons training, mechanical breaching procedures, and close-quarters combat. The final week focuses on specialties like sniper operations, offensive driving, and surveillance techniques.

Seven teams have been trained and equipped and two more are in training, according to officials at the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq.

From Army News Service, 22 March 2005

Military Police Transformation

By Lieutenant Colonel Eric Belcher

Transform *v.* 1. to alter markedly the appearance or form 2. to change the nature, function, or condition

Transformation *n.* an act or instance of transforming or the state of being transformed

Webster's II, 1984 [1]

The words "transform" and "transformation" have been heard a lot lately, but what do they really mean for the Military Police Corps? The definitions above give a broad view of these commonly used words, but the Army's current transformation is about more than just changing "the nature, function, or condition" of its forces. The Human Resources Command is doing more than just altering the appearance and form of Army forces, and it is doing this to better support the Global War on Terrorism while simultaneously transforming the Army. It is synchronizing the personnel management system to the Army's battle rhythm to support a nation at war. This is not business as usual. The Army is transforming while it fights and that requires a cultural change in how personnel are provided for the force. The Army is changing its culture and will do so quickly to ensure that it optimizes capabilities and becomes more joint and expeditionary in nature. The Military Police Corps has an enormous role to play in this culture change.

The Army is changing the way it organizes to fight. Active duty brigades will transform into 38 modular brigade combat teams (BCTs) and 5 Stryker BCTs (SBCTs) by the end of fiscal year (FY) 2007. The National Guard will have 34 BCTs by FY09. A decision on whether or not to add five more BCTs to the Active Army will be made in FY06. These BCTs are standardized designs and can easily tailor themselves for specific operational and tactical requirements. There are four types of BCTs: heavy, light, Stryker, and airborne-air assault. Each has a broad range of capabilities and is designed to function independently from other organizations with much of its support being organic. Through transformation, the Military Police Corps will inactivate all division military police companies. However, organic to the brigade troops battalion of each BCT will be a 41-soldier military police platoon. This new platoon will have three squads with four teams each and will serve as a template for the future design of all military police platoons to standardize platoon structure throughout the Military Police Corps.

Each BCT will have a military police planning section consisting of a captain (provost marshal) and a sergeant first class to plan, coordinate, integrate, and synchronize military police support for brigade operations. This team will also help the brigade staff assimilate additional military police units if the need arises to plus-up military police forces for a mission set. Further, the provost marshal and sergeant first class will help the military police platoon leadership to plan, train for, and execute military police missions. Additionally, the provost marshal is a special staff officer to the brigade commander. He has additional unique responsibilities that include Title 10 and regulatory compliance and reporting requirements for law enforcement and criminal investigations, antiterrorism, physical security, and detainee operations.

The Army will manage most of the BCTs through the life cycle process, which means a three-year tour for soldiers assigned to these brigades. The old way of managing careers and timelines will change. Lieutenants will get promoted to captain while in the brigade. Many military police soldiers will be promoted and will serve in positions not normally associated with their ranks. The personnel management system is being transformed to ensure that careers are only positively affected by these changes.

The focus and changes associated with going to brigades managed through the life cycle process will make the Army more relevant and ready. It will provide more cohesive and combat-ready formations. It will also provide a more stable and predictable lifestyle for soldiers and their families, make combat units more agile and tailorable, and provide more high-demand units and skills. Since the Reserve Component is also transforming, there will be commonality across the entire Army by FY10.[2]

Division and corps headquarters are changing as well. The new Unit of Employment X (UEx) will replace the current division headquarters and will have modular command posts with greater capabilities. It will also absorb some of the capabilities from the corps headquarters, which is also being eliminated. More specifics will follow, but the current UEx design has a provost marshal cell of 13 soldiers, an increase from the 6 found in the current divisions.

The good news does not stop there. The Military Police Corps (Active Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard) will see a significant increase in force structure and authorizations over the next six years. To support Army operational requirements, the increase of Active Army units and the accelerated activation of selected Reserve Component units will occur during the next three to four years. In support of near-term actions, the Office of the Provost Marshal General, the US Army Military Police School (USAMPS), and the Army's force management personnel are urgently developing the implementation plan for Army leadership approval. Within a few months, new military police units will activate as a result of the internment/resettlement (I/R) redesign approved by the Army Chief of Staff and the decision made by senior Army leadership to increase the size of the Military Police Corps within all Army components. The current phased plan calls for—

- Accelerating Reserve Component unit activations.
- Activating five Active Army military police combat support battalion headquarters.
- Activating three Active Army I/R battalion headquarters.
- Converting the eight programmed Active Army military police guard companies to combat support military police companies.
- Activating 13 new Active Army combat support military police companies.
- Activating additional Active Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) detachments.

All of this will occur while planning for the return of selected military police units from Europe to the United States.

Between January and July 2005, the Army National Guard will activate the following units up to two years earlier than originally planned: a military police brigade headquarters in California and three military police companies, in Alabama, Louisiana, and Georgia. Between March and September 2005, the Army Reserves will accelerate activation of the following units up to one year early: an I/R battalion, a combat support battalion, a military police company, and a law and order detachment.

The bulk of near-term military police force changes are Active Army activations and conversions that will begin in early FY06. Five law and order detachments will be used as partial bill-payers, and they will convert to combat support battalion headquarters. (Units at Fort Stewart, Georgia; Fort Drum, New York; Fort Riley, Kansas; and Fort Benning, Georgia, will convert in FY06. A unit at Fort Bliss, Texas, will convert in FY07). In FY06, regional confinement facility table of distribution and allowances (TDA) headquarters at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and Fort Lewis, Washington, and the US Disciplinary Barracks TDA battalion headquarters at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, will be used as partial bill-payers to activate I/R battalion headquarters. A fourth I/R battalion headquarters will be activated at Fort Leavenworth in FY07. Eight Army National Guard companies will convert

to combat support companies. (Companies at Fort Stewart; Fort Drum; Fort Lewis; Fort Riley; Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Campbell, Kentucky; and Fort Eustis, Virginia, will convert in FY06. A company at Fort Hood, Texas, will convert in FY07.) From FY07 through FY09, 13 new combat support companies and 10 new CID detachments will activate. This is a total of 40 military police units either activating or converting from now through FY09.

The total military police personnel authorization gains from the FY04 Military Police Corps end state through the currently projected FY11 end state are approximately 9,714 for the Army National Guard; 1,145 for the Army Reserves; and 3,835 for the Active Army.

In addition to the aforementioned force structure changes, USAMPS is also redesigning the combat support company. The company is—

- Going from four platoons to three platoons.
- Staying with three squads, but increasing from three to four teams.
- Adding a weapons platform for the platoon sergeant.
- Moving the fourth lieutenant from platoon leader to company executive officer.
- Reducing total personnel strength from 179 to 171.

The redesign also includes adding a liaison noncommissioned officer (NCO) and an I/R NCO to the combat support battalion operations and training section.

There is one aspect of the Army's culture that will not change. Soldiers will remain the centerpiece of all units. They are the most effective, flexible, and adaptive asset the Army possesses, and everything is designed to support them. Soldiers will fight and win in whatever organization to which they are assigned. They must be properly trained, equipped, and informed as they accomplish the mission.[3]

The current transformation in the US Army and the Military Police Corps is significant. These changes will do a great deal to support the Global War on Terrorism while helping to synchronize the Army's personnel battle rhythm to support a nation at war. Adding military police force structure and changing Army units to more efficiently accomplish future missions is not only prudent, it is timely and necessary. These changes will help all of the great military police men and women serving our country in foreign lands. The relevance and significance of the Military Police Corps remain very strong. The added and adjusted force structure should ensure that the future Military Police Corps remains ready to assist, protect, and defend wherever and whenever necessary.

Endnotes

[1] Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary, Riverside Publishing Company, 1984.

[2] Summarized from the Army Campaign Plan, 2004.

[3] Ibid.

Lieutenant Colonel Belcher is chief of the Military Police Branch at the Human Resources Command. *Special thanks to Major John Voorhees, military police organizational integrator; Mr. Bill McCrea and Mr. Bob Abernathy, USAMPS, for their expertise and assistance with this article; and the rest of the Military Police Branch team, consisting of Lieutenant Colonel Randy Durian (lieutenant colonel and major assignment officer), Major Rolanda Colbert (captain assignment officer), Captain Eric Krantz (future readiness officer), and Mr. Wayne Carroll (lieutenant assignment officer), all of whom provided advice and counsel for this article.*



Military Police in the Hot Zone

A student searches for latent fingerprints at a mock crime scene.

By Chief Warrant Officer 3 Dale Antry

For years, military investigators have conducted crime scene investigations in areas contaminated by chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) devices. However, until now there has not been formal training for military investigators on how to protect themselves in these situations. After the events of 11 September 2001 and with today's increased threat from CBRNE weapons, the US Army Military Police School decided to develop training to prepare military investigators to enter a crime scene where there is a CBRNE danger, otherwise known as a "hot zone." Criminal Investigation Division (CID) agents and civilian employees who have both extensive training and personal experience in responding to hazardous material scenes teach the new Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)/CBRNE Crime Scene Processing Course.

The course stresses the technical, tactical, and leadership competencies related to processing crime or accident scenes in environments contaminated with CBRNE hazards. The two-week course also emphasizes the Incident Command System, which is the organizational management system mandated by the federal government. The course provides hands-on instruction in the four levels of personal protective equipment (PPE). Training includes working in all levels of PPE: Level A (the highest level of protection), with a fully encapsulated chemical protective suit and a positive-pressure, self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA); Level B, with a splash-protective outer garment and SCBA; Level C, with a splash-protective outer garment and air-purifying respirator; and Level D, which is normal duty clothes. Students learn the "dirty-clean" method of evidence collection—a two-person technique that ensures that no cross-contamination of evidence occurs.

However, the most significant concept emphasized throughout the course is that no person operates alone. Every action at the crime scene is performed by no less than a team of two persons. Also, unlike any conventional crime scene, a hot zone cannot be entered and exited easily. Anything that leaves a hot zone must be decontaminated, so crime scene investigators must operate in teams for evidence reconnaissance and collection. First, reconnaissance teams enter the scene to locate and document evidence. After leaving the hot zone, they report back to the collection team and provide a detailed briefing. This enables the evidence collection team to prepare all the equipment necessary for evidence collection, eliminating the need to make multiple entries and exits.

Wearing Level A personal protective equipment, students practice the dirty-clean method of evidence collection.

The course challenges students academically and physically. They get instruction on a host of different topics, to include hazardous materials, improvised explosive devices, laws and regulations pertaining to WMD and terrorism, biological and chemical hazards, and the Incident Command System. To pass the course, students must score at least 70 percent on a 150-question test. The course ends in an evaluated practical exercise in which students apply all that they learned throughout the course. During the exercise, students respond to a realistic mock crime scene and process it wearing the appropriate level of PPE. Their performance is evaluated and graded to ensure that they can operate in a hazardous environment once back at their duty stations.

Most commonly associated with the use of WMD, CBRNE also becomes a concern when conducting other types of crime scene investigations. An example would be an arson scene where the levels of poisonous gases, such as carbon monoxide and hydrogen cyanide, remain elevated long after the fire has been extinguished, leaving the level of oxygen dangerously low. Clandestine drug labs also pose extremely dangerous health hazards.

Some recent graduates of the course have said that it should be mandatory for all CID special agents. With more and more reports of suspicious activity and terrorist-related incidents occurring, this course is ideally suited for CID special agents. It would increase the capabilities of their investigative arsenal. Other students have commented that the training is extremely challenging and not just another "check-the-blocks" course.

For more information on the WMD/CBRNE Crime Scene Processing Course, see the Army Training Requirements and Resources System, visit the US Army Military Police Corps Web site at <*www.wood.army.mil/usamps/default.htm*>, or call Mr. William Anderson at 573-596-0131 ext 38136.

Chief Warrant Officer 3 Antry is the course manager for the WMD Course at the US Army Military Police School at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He holds a bachelor's degree in criminal justice administration from Columbia College and is certified by the University of Missouri as a hazardous materials technician.

Warriors Prepare for Battle

By Captain Jeremy Kerfoot

Dawn breaks with an eerie hum across the Hohenfels Training Area in the rolling hills of Germany. There are neither the usual rumbling of tanks from an armored division nor the clamor of Bradley fighting vehicles rolling down the mud roads of the training area. Instead, in the distance—closing in fast—there are the sounds of a military police squad. They are on a mission to secure the entire training area. They are not permanent party military police soldiers conducting community law enforcement. They are members of the 709th Military Police Battalion patrolling the training area in high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles at the first Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) military police rotation.

Dubbed "Warrior Focus," CMTC Rotation 05-02 was a first in military history. What made this training so significant was that the 709th Military Police Battalion, headquartered in Hanau, Germany, had sole use of the CMTC and its assets to train two combat support military police companies for deployment to Afghanistan. The training took place from 30 November to 14 December 2004. Warrior Focus was an exercise to certify and prepare the two companies for combat operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

With the entire CMTC for its use, the 709th Military Police Battalion and its subordinate units prepared months in advance for Warrior Focus. From team certification exercises to squad lanes and then on to equipment maintenance, all pointed toward the goal of training at the Hohenfels Training Area. The battalion spent countless hours coordinating with CMTC officials and creating scenarios for all players involved. The CMTC provided opposing forces (OPFOR) for a professional enemy to fight against the two military police companies and observers/controllers to critique the training unit.

The layout of the training exercise was unique. The administrative and logistics operations center, consisting of the administrative, logistics, and mayoral cells, was located in a rear area. The personnel and logistics sections of the battalion headquarters occupied Camp Albertshof and continued to provide support while maintaining an active, real-world capability with nontraining units. The battalion tactical operations center, along with military police and military intelligence units, occupied CMTC Forward Operating Base (FOB) West, otherwise known as Warrior FOB. Within hours of initial setup, the two military police companies in training were operational and ready for their mission.

A new addition to CMTC at Hohenfels was the detention facility located on Warrior FOB. Named Camp Vigilant, it was built to the standards

Members of the 212th Military Police Company begin an assault on the cordon and search lane.

specified by the 709th Military Police Battalion. Military police and military intelligence professionals, as well as the CMTC, provided input during construction of the detention facility. Built specially for Warrior Focus, it housed up to 100 persons under US control and allowed military intelligence soldiers to conduct interrogations in properly designed booths.

During Warrior Focus, the two military police companies had two missions: to conduct area security missions and operate the detention facility. Area security involved scenarios that placed the companies in their area of operations to conduct entry control point operations, combat checkpoint operations, convoy security operations, quick reaction force operations, and cordon and search operations. They were tested by the OPFOR, from incidents involving a single enemy to attacks by platoon-sized forces. Leaders at all levels were challenged to maneuver and complete their missions under combat conditions. The companies were evaluated over five days, with four platoons switching among area security lanes for four days, then conducting company level cordon and search operations on urbanized terrain on the fifth day.

The second mission was to operate the detention facility. Each of the two companies operated the facility for five days, managing the inprocessing, outprocessing, feeding, medical care, and general welfare of all the internees under its control. The company operating the facility was also responsible for security and safety inside Camp Vigilant. Its soldiers were challenged with scenarios ranging from an attempted escape to a bombing at the facility's front gate. They also had to use an interpreter to communicate with foreign detainees. Scenarios also included a Red Cross visit and medical checkups for the internees. Military police dog handlers also trained the soldiers on the proper use of military working dogs in a detention facility.

Completing the picture of Warrior Focus were the supporting units that brought it all together. E Company, 165th Military Intelligence Battalion, provided interrogators for the detention facility. The military intelligence assets were available to the military police commander at the detention facility. Military police soldiers learned a lot from their military intelligence counterparts. Also on hand for the detention facility training were role players from additional military police companies and contracted civilians, all of whom portrayed internees. Members of the 9th Military Police Detachment, whose real-world mission is to run the Mannheim Correctional Facility, provided expertise on how to run a detention facility. All the participating units at the detention facility were putting lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom to good use.

Military police enter a building to begin clearing procedures.

Soldiers of both military police companies in training conducted combat operations 24 hours daily. Despite the grueling German winter, they had only one thing in mind—the mission ahead. The units will soon conduct final precombat inspections and load-ups for their deployment to Afghanistan to support the Global War on Terrorism. They were challenged during Warrior Focus and met the challenge head-on. Both units were certified on the training requirements and the units' soldiers have a better idea of what they will encounter in the hills of Afghanistan. The first CMTC military police rotation was a complete success according to all involved. It met its mission of preparing two military police companies for their deployment. Rotations such as Warrior Focus will not be a one-time event. Plans are in the works for Warrior Focus II in the summer of 2005 to prepare additional battalion units for their upcoming deployments. CMTC rotations and training events such as Warrior Focus are needed to help the Military Police Corps remain the force of choice. Combined arms training and training alongside support units will foster good working and learning relationships.

Captain Kerfoot is the adjutant of the 709th Military Police Battalion. He deployed to Israel and Iraq as a platoon leader in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. He holds a bachelor's degree in history and political science from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.

Combat Maneuver Training Center at Hohenfels

The Hohenfels Training Area is the second largest of the three US-controlled major training facilities in Europe and serves primarily as a maneuver area. It is located in the German state of Bavaria. Historical finds near the Vils and Naab rivers indicate settlement of the region as early as 700 BC, although human life can be traced back nearly 4,000 years. The area was mentioned in 15 BC by the Roman Emperor Augustus, who sent his army north across the Alps to stop the southward movement of the Celtic and Gallic tribes.

The Hohenburg castle was built around 1000 AD. The name Hohenfels, meaning "High Rock," refers to the elevated location of the castle. The castle changed hands several times over the centuries. After destruction and decay, it was rebuilt in 1584. Its role as the home of nobility ended in 1641 when it was badly damaged by lightning that struck the gunpowder tower. Later, private owners tore it down, leaving nothing but the ruins that remain on the training area today.

From US Army, Europe History Office

Deployments at Record Pace

By Major Brian C. Sankey

The Global War on Terrorism and current military operations in Iraq have required an unprecedented level of operational deployments across the breadth of the Military Police Corps, both Active Army and Army Reserve. The Criminal Investigation Division Command (CIDC) is sharing that burden along with the rest of the Military Police Corps, as the soldiers of the 1001st Military Police Battalion (CID) can attest.

In August 2004, the CIDC was gearing up to support Operation Iraqi Freedom and had several hurdles to negotiate. One of those hurdles was to train and deploy two detachments to replace those already in the combat zone. Typical CID detachments are geographically separated from the battalion headquarters and are often dispersed throughout a given area of responsibility. This alone can result in command and control challenges when organizing, resourcing, and conducting training. When the 1001st Military Police Battalion (CID) was ordered to receive and assemble 2 independent, multicomponent units composed of soldiers from 15 parent units from all over the globe, these challenges increased dramatically.

To accomplish the mission, the CID turned to the 6th Military Police Group. The mission began with an order from the 6th Military Police Group to the 1001st Military Police Battalion (CID) to provide an Active Army detachment headquarters—the 48th Military Police Detachment (CID) from Fort Carson, Colorado—and a nucleus of eight soldiers. To round out that detachment, additional agents and support soldiers were needed from Fort Sill, Oklahoma; Fort Leavenworth and Fort Riley, Kansas; Fort Leonard

Wood, Missouri; and Fort Carson. The battalion was also tasked to receive and integrate 12 additional soldiers from Hawaii; Korea; Fort Huachuca, Arizona; and Fort Lewis, Washington, and to coordinate with the Army Reserves for the arrival of the 380th Military Police Detachment (CID). The additional Army Reserve soldiers needed to round out the 380th Military Police Detachment (CID) were just as widely dispersed, with individuals coming from two Regional Readiness Commands and four subordinate units.

Several staffs, including those of the Fifth Army, the US Army CIDC, and others, coordinated to assemble and build these two units. Assembly of the two units at Fort Riley occurred after some home station training on individual tasks such as Warrior Task Training, driver training, combat lifesaver training, and individual weapons qualification. In late November 2004, all 40 soldiers descended on Fort Riley to prepare in earnest for Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Training at Fort Riley for deploying Army Reserve units is routinely handled through the 648th Area Support Group and the 3d Brigade, 75th Training Support Division. Tapping into the existing force projection abilities of these organizations and of the Fort Riley community, the 1001st Military Police Battalion (CID) supervised the training of Active Army and Reserve Component soldiers, focusing on CID-specific training for theater operations. The battalion also coordinated the transport of unit equipment and personnel while working around the Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays for the deploying soldiers, instructors, and staff. The training was compressed into 25 days between those holidays, with continuous training and deployment preparation to meet theater requirements. By design, all of the soldiers got a week of holiday leave in anticipation of an early January deployment.

Training highlights included interservice training conducted by members of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations from Wichita, Kansas, and San Antonio, Texas; CID mission-essential task list training; weapons qualification; base defense operations; military operations on urbanized terrain; convoy operations; and a unit live-fire exercise. Both detachments were validated for deployment by their respective headquarters while training on all of Central Command's required tasks for units, soldiers, and leaders.

The commander of the 1001st Military Police Battalion (CID) said of the effort of the deploying soldiers, trainers, and battalion staff, "In a nutshell, we took 40 individuals from almost as many units, brought them together for certification and deployment, and launched them as two cohesive, trained, and combat-ready (multicomponent) CID detachments in less than 30 days. What these soldiers and the battalion accomplished in that time is nothing short of remarkable."

The executive officer of the 380th Military Police Detachment, a Vietnam veteran and retired police officer, said there was a big difference in the training he got at Fort Riley compared to the training he got before going to Vietnam. "Back then, I got out of advanced individual training and had my orders cut immediately for Vietnam. The training that we are going through now directly relates to the situations we may find ourselves in (in) Iraq."

The two units successfully certified and deployed in early January. They will provide general criminal investigative support throughout Kuwait and Iraq, operating in some of the toughest environments in the theater. They will be responsible for all types of criminal investigations, from drug offenses to personal security operations to responding to terrorist attacks like the one that took the lives of 13 soldiers in Mosul, Iraq, in December 2004. CID soldiers continue to work side by side with the rest of the Army and the Military Police Corps, sharing the same risks daily. What began as 40 individual Active Army and Army Reserve CID soldiers from numerous locations around the world evolved into two cohesive CID detachments capable of "doing what has to be done" in the Iraqi theater of operations.

Major Sankey enlisted in the Military Police Corps in 1987 and has performed such duties as patrolman, desk clerk, company commander, and provost marshal. He currently serves as the executive officer of the 1001st Military Police Battalion (CID) at Fort Riley, Kansas.

New Jersey Army National Guard Soldiers Earn Right to Proudly Wear Brassard

By Captain David A. Beveridge

The soldiers of C Company, 759th Military Police Battalion, are a diverse group of men. Back in the United States, they are organic to the 3d Battalion, 112th Field Artillery Regiment, or the 5th Squadron, 117th Cavalry Regiment, both from the New Jersey Army National Guard. Among their youngest soldiers are 19-year-old college students, and among their oldest soldiers is a 57-year-old Vietnam veteran. As civilians, some earn their living as schoolteachers, police officers, engineers, small-business owners, and factory workers. As soldiers, they are cannoneers, forward observers, tankers, and scouts.

For their deployment last year to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, however, they did not serve as artillery or cavalry soldiers, but as "in lieu of" (ILO) military police. With their professionalism and dedication to duty in Iraq, these soldiers earned the right to proudly wear the military police brassard. They also earned a reputation as some of the hardest fighters in the history of the Military Police Corps, according to the commander of the 89th Military Police Brigade. With 4 soldiers killed in action and 29 wounded, C Company has suffered more casualties than any military police company since C Company, 716th Military Police Battalion, which took more than 40 casualties while defending Saigon during the 1968 North Vietnamese Tet Offensive.

On 5 January 2004, B Battery, 3d Battalion, 112th Field Artillery Regiment, was mobilized for deployment in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. (When the battery arrived in Iraq and was organized under the 89th Military Police Brigade, it was operationally redesignated as C Company. All ILO military police units under the 89th Military Police Brigade were named in this manner.) C Company soldiers came from 13 New Jersey Army National Guard units. From 7 January to 21 February, C Company underwent military police training at Fort Dix, New Jersey. Soldiers trained on all military police weapons systems and military police tasks. Though this provided C Company soldiers with a general overview of military police missions, the most important aspects of the training at Fort Dix were the motivation and esprit de corps that developed in the unit. Despite the snow, below-freezing temperatures, and 18- to 20-hour training days, the soldiers had "never-ending energy," said one noncommissioned officer.

After training at Fort Dix, C Company landed in Kuwait, and by 7 March, it had moved to Camp Cuervo in Baghdad, Iraq. There the company received training from the unit it was replacing. C Company soldiers learned important real-world lessons during this training.

From 15 April to 15 May, one C Company platoon was operationally assigned to the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force in Fallujah. The platoon's mission was to patrol the main supply route between Fallujah and Baghdad, escort supply convoys, and provide security for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams searching for and disarming improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in the area. The platoon's patrols and security escorts kept critical supplies flowing to Marines fighting in Fallujah. On one grueling occasion, the platoon escorted an EOD team for 27 continuous hours.

In April, C Company soldiers began providing site security at Iraqi police stations in eastern Baghdad and Sadr City, a sprawling slum on the northeastern edge of Baghdad. In June, they also began training and equipping Iraqi police at these stations. Though not trained for these specific missions, C Company soldiers used skills from their diverse professional backgrounds to achieve success, said the company first sergeant, who is a police officer in civilian life.

Other soldiers who worked in civilian law enforcement and medical and engineering positions also provided valuable insights that contributed to mission success.

From mid-May to early June, C Company became engaged in fierce combat operations against the Mahdi army of Muqtada al-Sadr in Sadr City. Soldiers told harrowing stories of patrols through densely crowded slums where gutters overflowed with raw sewage and streets were littered with trash, burning tires, destroyed vehicles, and the carcasses of animals slaughtered at roadside butcher shops. Barefoot children would first wave and smile at the soldiers then begin throwing rocks, bricks, and even Molotov cocktails. When US soldiers arrived at Iraqi police stations, insurgents frequently attacked with small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, and mortars within 10 or 15 minutes. On Mother's Day 2004, six C Company soldiers defended an Iraqi police station for approximately two hours against more than 100 Mahdi army insurgents, killing 19, according to media accounts.

Over two days—4 and 5 June 2004—four C Company soldiers were killed in two IED ambushes on the outskirts of Sadr City. The deaths of Staff Sergeant Frank Carvill, Staff Sergeant Humberto Timoteo, Specialist Ryan Doltz, and Specialist Christopher Duffy dealt a devastating blow to the entire unit.

"It was horrible," said Duffy and Carvill's platoon leader. "We mourned…but we understood that we had to continue to do our mission. Nobody said we should give up." Squads began missions by holding hands and praying together. When they returned, entire platoons would pour out of the barracks to greet them with hugs and pats on the back and to help them remove their weapons and gear.

C Company currently supports the 1st Cavalry Division's 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT). Division leaders have been impressed with C Company, and many were shocked to find out that the unit was a National Guard ILO company. With the 1st BCT, C Company soldiers continued to train and rebuild the Iraqi police force. They recruited and screened more than 1,000 new police cadets; provided millions of dollars in weapons, ammunition, and uniforms to police officers; and continued to provide security at police stations. They also worked closely with the local civilian population by providing food and care packages, as well as medics to treat sick or injured men, women, and children at the police stations.

A C Company team leader provides critical site security at an Iraqi police station in Sadr City.

With might, muscle, compassion, and courage, C Company soldiers have made a lasting mark in the military history of the Field Artillery and Military Police Corps. Their battles in Sadr City and Baghdad will be remembered along with battles fought by other 3d Battalion, 112th Field Artillery Regiment soldiers at Trenton, New Jersey; Antietam, Maryland; and Saint Lo, France and with battles fought by military police in Vietnam, Panama, and Iraq. Their contributions to the Iraqi people during Operation Iraqi Freedom have won many hearts and minds in the fight to create a peaceful, prosperous, and democratic Iraq. C Company soldiers have earned the recognition and praise they have received from the leaders of many US Army organizations.

Captain Beveridge is commander of C Company, 759th Military Police Battalion. He has been a member of the New Jersey Army National Guard for 11 years; he is an environmental consultant in civilian life. Upon redeployment, he plans to enroll in law school to specialize in environmental law.

New Kennel Facility Opens at Fort Knox

By Sergeant First Class Chiloi O'Brien

Ask and you shall receive. That saying worked well for the military working dog (MWD) section at Fort Knox, Kentucky. After more than 16 years of operating out of a dilapidated modular kennel initially used by the veterinary clinic, the section now operates out of a state-of-the-art kennel complex completed in August 2004. The 16-run kennel is located within a four-acre fenced area with two separate training areas. An additional outside area has a covered training area for inclement weather and bleachers for command and staff viewing of proficiency training and demonstrations by the dogs and handlers.

The new facility

When not training, the dogs live in spacious indoor-outdoor runs that feature radiant floor heat during cold weather, plus forced heat and air conditioning. Also, the kennel administrative building has a veterinary office with an exam table and light; all the equipment needed to conduct minor surgical procedures; and a professional bathing station that can stand up to copious amounts of dirt, grime, and fur. The noncommissioned officer (NCO) in charge of the Veterinary Treatment Facility (VTF) said he is pleased with the ability to treat the dogs on-site at the new kennel. It eliminates the worry of cross-contamination with diseases from privately owned dogs.

The kennel project began in earnest in October 2003 with the clearing of an area outside the hub of the installation's main activities. Construction began with the erection of the covered training area, followed by placing concrete for the 4,500-square-foot facility.

Dog bathing station

The kennel includes unique gadgets that would have been unheard of 10 years ago, such as two-way swinging doors that keep bad weather and disease-carrying pests out of the dog runs. Each run also has capped drains in the interior and exterior areas and a translucent panel between the interior and exterior sections, allowing ambient light inside.

It is not only the VTF personnel who like the new facility. One recent graduate of the Military Working Dog Handlers Course at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, said her MWD, Ben, also enjoyed it. "Ben thinks it's awesome."

The MWD handlers have benefited from the new kennel as well. One obvious benefit is having a more comfortable place to work. However, the new kennel may have energized the handlers and their dogs to step up their performance to a new level. In a span of nine months, two NCOs deployed to Bahgdad, Iraq. For their superior effort, both received the Joint Service Commendation Medal. After his return from Iraq, one of the NCOs entered the 16th Annual Tucson (Arizona) Area Police K9 Trials and took first place out of 65 competitors in the building search event. His first-place win in that category helped his Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) K9 team take third place in the top agency category. The new facilities have helped bring the Fort Knox kennels to the forefront of TRADOC's K9 program.

Sergeant First Class O'Brien serves as the kennel master at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and is assigned to the 34th Military Police Detachment.

Logistics Security

By First Sergeant Kathy Johnson

During August and September 2004, members of the 5th Military Police Battalion, Criminal Investigation Division (CID), headquartered in Kaiserslautern, Germany, conducted extensive logistics security operations at the ports of Antwerp, Belgium, and Bremerhaven, Germany, in support of the Operation Iraqi Freedom redeployment to the US Army, Europe (USAREUR). These logistics security inspections were identified by the highest levels in USAREUR as vitally important to the smooth transition and reintegration of forces returning from Iraq for the units to return to combat readiness as quickly as possible.

More than 25 special agents and military police investigators participated in the operation under the direction and supervision of a special agent from the Baumholder, Germany, CID office. The agents and investigators were organized into teams of three to five persons who inspected railcars, vehicles, containers, and ships at both ports around the clock for almost two months. The operation also required extensive coordination with the Military Intelligence Corps, and the working relationship that developed between the two agencies set a new benchmark for cooperation and assistance. The teams also coordinated regularly with the Belgian and German police, with all involved agencies learning new respect and appreciation for the others.

One major problem identified during the operation was the illegal shipment of war trophies, which included items like weapons, furniture, artwork, and even explosives. During one memorable event at Antwerp, CID special agents identified a vehicle containing unexploded ordnance, resulting in a call for explosive ordnance disposal specialists. Besides identifying war trophies, the teams also concentrated on identifying and rectifying other issues, such as unsecured sensitive information, unsecured sensitive items and equipment, and the shipment of illegal contraband, such as drugs.

At Antwerp, the teams inspected more than 3,900 pieces of equipment, to include trucks, tanks, railcars, and barge containers, resulting in the initiation of 21 CID reports. Similar operations at Bremerhaven resulted in the inspection of more than 1,670 pieces of equipment and the initiation of nine CID reports. The teams discovered, however, that while there were some systemic problems with security and smuggling, overall the bulk of the shipped equipment was safely and securely returned to USAREUR.

Once again, the CID proved itself to be a vital asset in the Global War on Terrorism and demonstrated yet again that it is the agency that is always ready to do what has to be done.

First Sergeant Johnson serves with the 5th Military Police Battalion, Kaiserslautern, Germany. She joined the Army as a military police soldier in 1985 and became a CID special agent in 1997. She holds a master's degree in administration from Central Michigan University.

So You Want to Be a Military Police Investigator

By Sergeant First Class Bruce Large

Do you think you might want to be a military police investigator (MPI)? Your unit is looking for an outstanding military police soldier who wants to become an MPI. You are interested, but you are not sure if you meet the requirements to go to the MPI Course or what an MPI really does. An investigator can be assigned to a garrison environment or to a combat zone, but no matter where the assignment is, the job of an MPI is a demanding one. It is not a 9-to-5 weekday job but a 24-hour, 7-day-a-week career. It takes a special person to be an MPI.

The US Army Military Police School (USAMPS) follows the selection and certification guidelines of Army Regulation 190-30, *Military Police Investigations*, which states, "all personnel nominated will meet the prerequisites." Nominees must—

- Have the primary military occupational specialty of 31B (military police).
- Be a US citizen (native-born or naturalized).
- Be in pay grade E3 to E7.
- Have a Government Test (GT) or Service Test (ST) score of 100 or higher.
- Have at least of one year of military service remaining as indicated by expiration of term of service.
- Have a secret clearance based on a favorable National Agency Check with Local Agency and Credit Check (NACLC).
- Have one year of experience with military police or with civilian law enforcement.
- Be a high school graduate or have received a General Education Development equivalent.
- Not have been previously dismissed or reassigned from MPI for misconduct or inefficiency.
- Be free from any records (military or civilian) reflecting offenses other than minor violations, multiple or repeated arrests and/or apprehensions, a substantial record of juvenile misconduct, financial irresponsibility, and other conduct or behavior not in the best interest of Army law enforcement.

Unit commanders may have other requirements as part of the selection process. Applicants who have met all prerequisites will attend the eight-week MPI Course taught by USAMPS at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. The school trains MPIs for the US armed forces, the Department of Defense, and allied nations. Candidates receive expert instruction in—

- Criminal law.
- Family advocacy.
- Crime scene processing.
- Testimonial evidence.
- Investigations of crimes against persons and property.
- Physical evidence.
- Drug investigations.
- Investigative reports.
- Special investigative techniques.
- Protective services.
- Computer and economic crimes.

There are written exams, hands-on tests, and practical exercises that candidates must complete and pass to graduate the course. The candidates must also meet the height and weight requirements of Army Regulation 600-9, *The Army Weight Control Program*, and pass the Army Physical Fitness Test while attending the course. While attending the course, students are assigned to C Company, 701st Military Police Battalion, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473. Upon completion of the course, graduates receive the additional skill identifier "V5" and can go to work at their home stations as MPIs.

For information concerning travel or issues not covered here, contact—

C Company, 701st Military Police Battalion at (573) 596-0131, ext 37908, 37913, 37915, or 35721; or at DSN 676-7908, -7913, -7915, or -5721; or e-mail <*ATSJMPBT@wood.army.mil*>; or e-mail the MPI Course manager at <*ATSJMPTI@wood.army.mil*>.

Sergeant First Class Large is course manager, instructor, and writer for the MPI Course at USAMPS.

194th Military Police Company

Lineage and Honors

Constituted 10 June 1943 in the Army of the United States as the 194th Military Police Company.

Activated 26 June 1943 in North Africa.
Inactivated 29 November 1945 at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana.

Allotted 19 May 1967 to the Regular Army and activated in Vietnam.
Inactivated 28 June 1972 in Vietnam.

Activated 21 October 1977 in Germany.

Campaign Participation Credit

Vietnam

Counteroffensive, Phase II	Summer–Fall 1969
Counteroffensive, Phase III	Winter–Spring 1970
Tet Counteroffensive	Sanctuary Counteroffensive
Counteroffensive, Phase IV	Counteroffensive, Phase VII
Counteroffensive, Phase V	Consolidation I
Counteroffensive, Phase VI	Consolidation II
Tet 69/Counteroffensive	Cease–Fire

Decorations

Meritorious Unit Commendation (streamer embroidered) Vietnam 1967-1969.

History Wanted

By Jim Rogers

Museums generally deal with the collection, maintenance, and public exhibit of physical objects, and the US Army Military Police Corps Regimental Museum at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, is no different. The museum is part of the US Army Center of Military History, headquartered at Fort McNair in Washington, DC. According to the fiscal year 2005 Army Historical Program, at the beginning of 2004 there were 57 Active Army museums nationwide. There are also two Active Army museums in Germany and one in Korea.

The US Army Military Police Museum has more than 3,000 items in its collection, representing most of the history of the Military Police Corps. However, there are gaps in the collection. While some single items may fill the museum's requirements for some historical periods, other time periods or operations lack any significant representation at all. This article will provide a general overview of the museum's artifact objectives, plus a listing of some specific items being sought to fill historical gaps.

The museum's main mission is to focus on the American military police soldier and military police branch history. Not all artifacts are publicly exhibited; the majority are kept in proper conservation storage to ensure their preservation for study and research by future generations of military police soldiers. Museum staff members carefully select appropriate artifacts from the collections for public exhibit to "interpret" aspects of the military police branch history. Fragile artifacts (usually paper, cloth, or leather) may be publicly exhibited for only limited times because of light levels and environmental conditions.

Generally, the museum seeks standard-issue gear, equipment, and uniforms from identifiable military police soldiers who were on various deployments, perhaps in association with a significant example of one of the Army values. There is no preference for items used by enlisted soldiers or officers. Gear, equipment, and uniforms showing normal wear and tear from actual use by a military police soldier on deployment provide a tremendous amount of intrinsic value or "provenance," which is a documented association with a specific person or event. New "out-of-the-box" items that were never worn or used have little value as museum artifacts. Specialized equipment related to a unit or organizational mission is also recommended for the museum. Photographs or videos of military police soldiers on deployment would also be highly desirable. The museum does not need a great number of items, preferring to have a few pieces with a high degree of historical significance.

As museum staff members have reviewed the museum's current holdings and identified what is necessary for properly representative exhibits and soldier education, specific needs have come to light. These include but are not limited to the following:

- Military police-marked helmets and helmet liners from World War II.
- Unit-marked military police helmet liners from Vietnam.
- Unit-specific military police brassards from Vietnam.
- Equipment and uniforms associated with the Criminal Investigation Division.
- Specialized women's military police uniforms and equipment, especially the 1976 green pantsuit issued Armywide in November 1977.

Also sought are US Army military police uniforms and equipment with specific history from the following operations:

- Urgent Fury, Grenada (1983).
- Just Cause, Panama (1989-90).
- Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Southwest Asia (1990-91).

- Eastern Exit and Restore Hope, Somalia (1991-92).
- Uphold Democracy, Haiti (1994-95).
- Joint Endeavor and Joint Guardian, the Balkans (1995-96).

Collecting artifacts from current operations is now underway with units and individuals on or recently returned from deployments. I trust that this article has proved enlightening to the military police community about a major function of the museum and will spark ideas and recollections to help the museum obtain items it requires to properly reflect the history of the military police.

References:

US Army Center of Military History, Army Historical Program, Fiscal Year 2005, 6 December 2004.

US Army Center of Military History, Army Regulation 870-20, *Army Museums, Historical Artifacts, and Art*, 11 January 1999.

Contact information:
US Army Military Police Corps Museum
Attn: ATSJ-SM
495 South Dakota Avenue (Building 1607)
Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8851

Commercial: (573) 596-0604,
DSN: 581-0604
E-mail: <*jim.rogers1@us.army.mil*>

Mr. Rogers is the director of the US Army Military Police Corps Museum at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He began his museum career as an exhibit designer with the Ohio Historical Society in 1977. He has been director of the Motorcycle Heritage Museum in central Ohio and was previously the director of the Fort Bliss Museum in El Paso, Texas.

Kennel Dedicated in Iraq

By Sergeant Ann Venturato

The memory of a fallen military policeman will live on in a new military working dog kennel and administrative facility dedicated 11 November 2004 at Logistics Support Area Anaconda, Balad, Iraq. Staff Sergeant Arthur S. Mastrapa, a resident of Apopka, Florida, was killed in action in a rocket attack at Balad on 16 June 2004. At the time of his death, Staff Sergeant Mastrapa was assigned to the 351st Military Police Company, US Army Reserve, Ocala, Florida. He was a US postal carrier in his civilian career. He joined the Army in 1992 and served on active duty in Alabama and Germany before reenlisting in the Army Reserves in June 2000. He was known for his dedication to duty, loyalty, courage, and selfless service. Staff Sergeant Mastrapa was posthumously awarded the Bronze Star Medal and Purple Heart. He is survived by his wife, Jennifer; his children, Marisa and Reece; his parents, Arthur and Nancy; a brother, Mark; and a sister, Kristy.

The facility that now bears his name will provide life support and administrative space for dogs and handlers alike.

Military police with German prisoners of war, 1918

By Dr. Ronald Craig

While there was a great demand for military police in Europe during World War I, the need increased after the Armistice of 11 November 1918. US military police became part of the occupation forces and remained in Europe until 1922.

The first military police units formed in the US Army were two companies with the 1st Infantry Division in May 1917, only one month after the US declaration of war against Germany. They were also the first US military police to arrive in France, in July 1917. By the end of that year, US military police had arrived with four more divisions and began training with the French armies. The divisional military police were placed under the train headquarters of the division and the commander of the trains also served as the provost marshal of the combat division. (A "train" was defined during World War I as a convoy of wagons or trucks, not actual railroad trains.) This situation existed until October 1918, when the commander of the divisional military police company became the provost marshal of the combat division.

On 20 July 1917, Lieutenant Colonel Hanson E. Ely, an infantry officer, became the first Provost Marshal General (PMG) of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) in France. He had only 12 soldiers when the PMG department was formed, but it had grown to include 152 officers and 31 enlisted men by October 1918. During the first year, US military police in France were mostly selected at random from infantry units. A regiment of dismounted cavalry—1,600 men—was even specifically selected for guard duty. With each unit directly under the control of local commanders, there was no central control of the military police during that period. Most received a brief training session (while some received no training at all) and were expected to perform a variety of military police duties, including traffic control, convoy escort, and law and order functions. Because of the lack of training, many of those men were inadequate for the job.

On 18 July 1918, General John J. Pershing, commander of the AEF, issued General Order No. 111. This order reduced from two to one the number of military police companies with each combat division and designated the Military Police Corps as an organization, indirectly under the command of the PMG. This arrangement was unsatisfactory to the PMG and

others at headquarters, and on 15 October 1918, General Order No. 180 made the military police a formal division of the PMG department.

On 5 September 1918, a training depot was established at Autun, in eastern France, to train officer and enlisted military police. On 27 September 1918, Brigadier General Harry H. Bandholtz was appointed PMG of the AEF and began organizing the Military Police Corps and promoting education. After selecting a British officer with years of military police experience as chief of instruction, 21 enlisted men were selected and put through 10 days of rigorous training to become the core of instructors. The school opened on 21 October 1918. The curriculum was brief, with each class lasting only two weeks, but the formal education greatly improved the quality of US military police in France. During its short existence (it closed in April 1919), 244 officers graduated, 22 more received commissions in the officer candidate program, and 3,297 enlisted soldiers graduated.

The training facility at Autun, France

Circulation was the first problem that the AEF and PMG were forced to deal with in France. Upon their arrival, the AEF command realized there would be a much greater demand for military police, primarily to control the circulation of personnel and vehicles. American soldiers tended to congregate in various locations, including the dock area as they arrived in France, transportation points of departure, leave areas, training areas, and all other places from the front lines back to the ports of entry. Thus, much of the military police resources were dedicated to controlling movement.

A department of criminal investigations was officially formed on 11 May 1918 but, as with the military police, there was no centralized control. It was not until 27 November 1918, after the fighting stopped, that General Order No. 217 finally established the department as a PMG division and placed control of it with that office.

General Order No. 71 of 10 December 1917 delegated the management of prisoners of war (POWs) to the PMG department. However, until June of the next year, American soldiers were required to surrender their POWs to the French military. In June 1918, the US Army began retaining the POWs it captured and started building enclosures to house them. The situation required the establishment of POW escort guard companies and labor units. The first escort guard company was formed on 1 June 1918; eventually a total of 122 such companies came into being. Meanwhile, the first POW labor company was organized on 26 July 1918 and was assigned to the POW enclosure at St. Nazaire. There were eventually 122 labor companies, whose personnel also processed the POWs.

American troops at a port in France, 1918

The Third Army, formed in August 1918, performed occupation duties in the American sector of Germany (in the area of Coblenz) after the Armistice. The Third Army, with two corps and five divisions (including their military police companies), crossed into Germany by the middle of December 1918. In April

1919, divisions began returning to the United States, but most military police soldiers from those divisions did not return home for deactivation. Many were reassigned to other units. The Third Army was deactivated in the spring of 1919, and the new organization became the Army of Occupation, under the command of Lieutenant General Hunter Liggett.

The number of US military police peaked in March 1919, with 1,100 officers and 30,000 enlisted men. By this time, the Military Police Corps had thousands of experienced men, many of whom had received formal training at the Autun school. With the return of peace came pressure for more professionalism among the military police. Their appearance and the performance of their assigned duties greatly improved, and they were required to meet a higher standard than most troops. Another peacetime duty of the military police included the recovery of stolen government property. From January to March 1919, they recovered more than $220,000 worth of government property.

Most of the military police battalions and companies assigned to occupation duties were dispersed. A prime example was the 12th Military Police Battalion, composed of the 5th and 6th Military Police companies, with headquarters at Orne, France. The soldiers of the 5th Military Police Company were dispersed to 15 locations, and those of the 6th Military Police Company were scattered at 7 locations. The 124th Military Police Battalion in Marseille, France, included the 247th, 248th, 277th, and 283d Military Police companies and, by March 1919, the men of those companies were dispersed among 14 towns in southern France. By then there were 50 military police companies with combat units, 88 companies with the Services of Supply, 8 criminal investigation companies, and 122 POW escort guard companies. Detachments and units of military police were located in 476 towns and cities in France, England, Italy, Luxemburg, and Germany.

In Paris meanwhile, the 2d Provost Guard Company guarded American military prisoners at La Roquette Prison, with duties as prison guards, hospital guards, and other details. They would be among the last US military police to leave Europe in 1922, when they returned control of the prison to the French.

Dr. Craig is the US Army Military Police Corps historian. He is a Vietnam veteran who served for 14 years in the US Marine Corps. He taught a variety of Native American studies and American history courses at Montana's Fort Peck Community College and Rocky Mountain College. He was the director of the Native American Studies Department at Fort Peck from 1996 to 2000. Dr. Craig has numerous professional publications to his credit. He holds a bachelor's degree in sociology and a master's degree in history from the University of Montana at Missoula and a doctorate of philosophy in history from the University of New Mexico at Albuquerque.

Letters to the Editor

MILITARY POLICE welcomes letters from readers. If you have a comment concerning an article we have published or would like to express your point of view on another subject of interest to miltary police soldiers, let us hear from you. Your letter must include your complete address and a telephone number. All letters are subject to editing for reasons of space or clarity.

Our mailing and e-mail addresses are—

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705th Military Police Battalion

Lineage and Honors

Activated 21 July 1906 as the US Disciplinary Barracks (USDB) Guard Battalion, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (Made up of Headquarters and the 1st, 2d, and 3d Guard Companies).
Deactivated 1929.

Reactivated 1940 as the USDB Guard Battalion with the same configuration.

Redesignated 1968 as the USDB Military Police Battalion, USDB, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Redesignated 15 April 1991 as the 705th Military Police Battalion, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. (The US Department of Heraldry provided this numerical value although it appears that the 705th as a numbered unit was last associated with an antitank unit in World War II. There was no previous listing of a military police organization by this title.)

Awards

Army Superior Unit Award, 1st award, 18 October 1993, for operations in quelling a major inmate disturbance, 11 May 1992—22 May 1992.

Army Superior Unit Award, 2d award, 31 October 1996, for operations in quelling a major inmate disturbance, 2 March 1996—3 March 1996.

Shiloh Staff Ride

By Captain Emily E. Eagan

Raising the flag at Shiloh

While many Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, residents were asleep at midnight on 8 December 2004, the Military Police Captains Career Course Class 4-04 was just arriving at the parking lot of the Maneuver Support Center armed with overnight bags, pillows, and blankets. The class of 31 students and 3 instructors boarded a bus for a seven-hour ride to the Shiloh National Military Park at Shiloh, Tennessee. Shiloh was the first major battle in the Western theater of the Civil War. The trip was a huge success. The class had studied the strategic and tactical importance of the April 1862 battle and applied the two-day campaign's principles of war to today's conflicts.

The staff ride began by raising the American flag over the national cemetery in the morning mist. Led by a six-soldier color guard, the flag-raising honored the battle's 24,000 Federal and Confederate casualties. The second stop on the staff ride brought the group to the west bank of the Tennessee River at Pittsburg Landing. There, students presented an overview of the battle and the significance of the terrain. Many students said this was their favorite stop of the day. Later, the group visited eleven other significant spots on the 4,000-acre battlefield. Students, including international exchange officers, briefed a significant event at each stop throughout the day. After the six-hour staff ride, students concluded by focusing on the lessons learned from this battle 142 years ago.

After the tour, the class drove to Jackson, Tennessee, to spend the night before driving back to Fort Leonard Wood the following morning.

"Doing a staff ride really gives you an appreciation for history," said one student. "Right now we are in the business of making history in Iraq and Afghanistan. It's important to realize that decisions we make today are going to be read about and analyzed one day. And of course, there is the fact that even though times are so different, some things still are the same. For instance, the fighting spirit of the individual soldier."

Captain Eagan is a 2001 graduate of the US Military Academy at West Point and a 2005 graduate of the Military Police Captains Career Course. She is stationed at Fort Stewart, Georgia.

Submit an Article to *MILITARY POLICE*

MILITARY POLICE welcomes articles on all aspects of Army law enforcement and investigations. Writers may discuss training, current operations or exercises (within security guidelines), doctrine, equipment, history, personal viewpoints, or other areas of general interest to military police.

A complete guide for writers wishing to submit articles for publication is located on our Web site at <*http://www.wood.army.mil/mpbulletin/guide.htm*>.

Dedication

The following members of the Military Police Corps Regiment have been lost in the Global War on Terrorism since June 2003. We dedicate this issue to them.

Sergeant Leonard W. Adams	105th Military Police Battalion North Carolina Army National Guard
Specialist Michael Andrade	115th Military Police Company Rhode Island Army National Guard
Specialist Todd M. Bates	135th Military Police Company Ohio Army National Guard
Sergeant Aubrey D. Bell	214th Military Police Company Alabama Army National Guard
Staff Sergeant Joseph P. Bellavia	194th Military Police Company Fort Campbell, Kentucky
Private First Class Rachel K. Bosveld	527th Military Police Company Giesen, Germany
Sergeant Travis L. Burkhardt	170th Military Police Company Fort Lewis, Washington
Private First Class Jesse R. Buryj	66th Military Police Company Fort Lewis, Washington
Sergeant Charles T. Caldwell	115th Military Police Company Rhode Island Army National Guard
Staff Sergeant Joseph Camara	115th Military Police Company Rhode Island Army National Guard
Staff Sergeant Frank T. Carvill	C Company 759th Military Police Battalion*
Staff Sergeant Darren J. Cunningham	545th Military Police Company Fort Hood, Texas
Specialist Danny R. Daniels II	630th Military Police Company Bamberg, Germany
Sergeant Ryan E. Doltz	C Company 759th Military Police Battalion*
Specialist Christopher M. Duffy	C Company 759th Military Police Battalion*
Private David Evans Jr.	977th Military Police Company Fort Riley, Kansas

Specialist Craig S. Frank	1775th Military Police Company Michigan Army National Guard
Staff Sergeant Bobby C. Franklin	210th Military Police Company North Carolina Army National Guard
Sergeant Landis W. Garrison	333d Military Police Company Illinois Army National Guard
Corporal Sean R. Grilley	194th Military Police Company Fort Campbell, Kentucky
Specialist David E. Hall	805th Military Police Company US Army Reserves
Private Jesse M. Halling	401st Military Police Company Fort Hood, Texas
Private First Class George D. Harrison	293d Military Police Company Fort Stewart, Georgia
Sergeant Keicia M. Hines	108th Military Police Company (Combat Support) Fort Bragg, North Carolina
Specialist Eric R. Hull	307th Military Police Company US Army Reserves
Specialist Jonathan R. Kephart	230th Military Police Company Kaiserslautern, Germany
Staff Sergeant Charles A. Kiser	330th Military Police Detachment US Army Reserves
Private First Class Cole W. Larsen	272d Military Police Company Mannheim, Germany
Staff Sergeant Stephen G. Martin	330th Military Police Detachment US Army Reserves
Sergeant Arthur S. Mastrapa	351st Military Police Company US Army Reserves
Sergeant Heath A. McMillin	105th Military Police Company New York Army National Guard
Specialist Michael G. Mihalakis	270th Military Police Company California Army National Guard
Staff Sergeant James D. Mowris	805th Military Police Company US Army Reserves
Sergeant Rodney A. Murray	351st Military Police Company US Army Reserves
Private Kenneth A. Nalley	501st Military Police Company Wiesbaden, Germany
Specialist Richard P. Orengo	755th Military Police Company Puerto Rico Army National Guard
Lieutenant Colonel Kim S. Orlando	716th Military Police Battalion Fort Campbell, Kentucky

Staff Sergeant David S. Perry	649th Military Police Company California Army National Guard
Staff Sergeant Brett J. Petriken	501st Military Police Company Wiesbaden, Germany
Sergeant Darrin K. Potter	223d Military Police Company Kentucky Army National Guard
First Lieutenant Timothy E. Price	127th Military Police Company Hanau, Germany
Sergeant Jaror C. Puello-Coronado	310th Military Police Battalion US Army Reserves
Specialist Eric U. Ramirez	670th Military Police Company California Army National Guard
Private First Class Brandon Ramsey	933d Military Police Company Illinois Army National Guard
Private First Class Joshua A. Ramsey	95th Military Police Battalion Mannheim, Germany
Staff Sergeant Aaron T. Reese	135th Military Police Company Ohio Army National Guard
Staff Sergeant Wentz J.H. Shanaberger III	21st Military Police Company Fort Bragg, North Carolina
Private First Class Charles M. Sims	549th Military Police Company Fort Stewart, Georgia
Specialist Narson B. Sullivan	411th Military Police Company Fort Hood, Texas
Specialist Christopher M. Taylor	1165th Military Police Company Alabama Army National Guard
Staff Sergeant Humberto F. Timoteo	C Company 759th Military Police Battalion*
Sergeant Nicholas A. Tomko	307th Military Police Company US Army Reserves
Private First Class Andrew L. Tuazon	293d Military Police Company Fort Stewart, Georgia
Specialist Thai Vue	127th Military Police Company Hanau, Germany
Specialist Brandon J. Wadman	Military Police Task Force-Afghanistan** Florida Army National Guard
Specialist Michael L. Williams	105th Military Police Company New York Army National Guard
Specialist Michelle M. Witmer	32d Military Police Company Wisconsin Army National Guard

* Redesignated from 3d Battalion, 112th Field Artillery Regiment, New Jersey Army National Guard

** Originally assigned to 2d Battalion, 265th Air Defense Artillery

MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE LEVEL COMMANDS

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM	UNIT	LOCATION
Falkner Heard III	Tommie Hollins	8th MP Bde	Yongsan, Korea
Joseph A. Rapone II	Dale J. Paff	14th MP Bde	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
David E. Quantock	Jeffrey A. Butler	16th MP Bde	Ft Bragg, NC
James B. Brown	Joseph E.Shelley	18th MP Bde	Mannheim, GE
Richard W. Swengros	Brian K. Wiles	42d MP Bde	Ft Lewis, WA
David D. Phillips	Charles E. Guyette	89th MP Bde	Ft Hood, TX
Dennis H. Thompson	James M. McVeigh	3d MP Grp (CID)	Ft Gillem, GA
David M. Lemauk	Craig P. Brott	6th MP Grp (CID)	Ft Lewis, WA
David A. Smith	Paul W. McDonald	701st MP Grp (CID)	Ft Belvoir, VA
Jack R. McClanahan, Jr.	Leslie B. Koonce	202d MP Grp (CID)	Heidelberg, GE
James C. Abney		Garrison, Fort Leonard Wood	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
James W. Harrison	Jeffrey Plemmons	USDB	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Kevin T. LaMar	Michael D. Hayes	USAMP Bde, HI	Ft Shafter, HI
Jeffrey T. Christiansen		USA Spt Act I	Camp Red Cloud, Korea
Donna G. Boltz		Garrison, Fort Richardson	Ft Richardson, AK
Angela M. Manos		Garrison, Fort McPherson	Ft McPherson, GA
	Stanley L. Staton	CMDT, MANSCEN NCOA	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
	Jerry K. Bennett	NE Region IMA	Ft Monroe, VA
	Richard W. Schnitker	USA Security Force	Ft Detrick, MD

RESERVE COMPONENT MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE LEVEL COMMANDS

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM	UNIT	LOCATION
Adolph McQueen	Michael Shanner	11th MP Bde	Ashley, PA
Kevin R. McBride	John McDonough	*43d MP Bde	Warwick, RI
Rod Barham	Andres Roman	*49th MP Bde	Fairfield, CA
Nelson J. Cannon	Michael J. Foy	*177th MP Bde	Taylor, MI
Dennis P. Geoghan	Kurtis J. Timmer	220th MP Bde	Gaithersburg, MD
William Terpeluk	Armando Cruz	800th MP Bde (EPW)	Uniondale, NY
Robert Taylor	Brian Oliver	*46th MP CMD	Lansing, MI
James E. Payne	John R. VanNatta	300th MP CMD (EPW)	Inkster, MI
Dell Nunaley	Ronald F. Brown	1st Bde, 80th Div (IT)	Ft Meade, MD

MILITARY POLICE BATTALION LEVEL COMMANDS

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM/1SG	UNIT	LOCATION
Jeffrey S. Davies	Norwood L. Patterson	94th MP Bn	Yongsan, Korea
Randall E. Twitchell	Edgar W. Dahl	95th MP Bn	Mannheim, GE
Jerry D. Stevenson	Brian K. Lambert	503d MP Bn	Ft Bragg, NC
James F. Switzer	Floyd A. Thomas	504th MP Bn	Ft Lewis, WA
David P. Glaser	Mark D. Green	519th MP Bn	Ft Polk, LA
Robert K. Burk	Joseph R. Graves	525th I/R Bn	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
Oliver S. Saunders	Freddie L.T. Brock	701st MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Stephanie L. Beavers	Rodney T. Shoffner	704th MP Bn	Ft Lewis, WA
Rocko V. Stowers	Johnnie Jones	705th MP Bn	Ft Leavenworth, KS
John F. Garrity	Louis C. Barnes	709th MP Bn	Hanau, GE
Ashton L. Hayes	Matt J. Demmitt	716th MP Bn	Ft Campbell, KY
Robert M. Taradash	William A. Generali	720th MP Bn	Ft Hood, TX
Steven L. Crowe	Norman C. Hampton	728th MP Bn	Taegu, Korea
Byron A. Freeman	Geraldine M. Rimpley	759th MP Bn	Ft Carson, CO
Gretchen A. Cadwallader	April L. Staton	787th MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Dan McElroy	Bernard C. McPherson	793d MP Bn	Bamberg, GE
Alfred Carter	Donald R. Sutton	795th MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Anthony Zabek	Michael E. Meyer	924th MP Bn	Ft Riley, KS
Samuel P. Mansberger III	Charles R. Kirkland	LEC, 3d MP Bn (P)	Ft Stewart, GA
LaTonya D. Lynn	Harold G. Hokkanen	LEC, 10th MP Bn (P)	Ft Drum, NY
Scott A. Carr	John E. Coleman	LEC, 25th MP Bn (P)	Schofield Bks, HI
Charles A. Williams	Richard C. Morris	LEC, 342d MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Edward V. Baker	James K. Sullivan	LEC, Fort Knox	Ft Knox, KY
Thomas T. Koesters	Dorsey L. Newcomb	76th MP Bn (P)	Ft Bliss, TX
Amy F. Turlock	Kathleen A. Johnson	5th MP Bn (CID)	Kaiserslautern, GE
Lennie Upshaw	John Mazujian	10th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Bragg, NC
Robert Q. Ake	Kenneth Dowless	11th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Hood, TX
Valrica JA. Marshall-Quiones	Benjamin M. Kellam	19th MP Bn (CID)	Yongsan, Korea
Jeffery T. Harris	Thomas E. Brown	22d MP Bn (CID)	Ft Lewis, WA
Kenneth J. Kroupa	Timothy S.J. Fitzgerald	1000th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Campbell, KY
Mark C. Darden	Thomas J. Seaman	1002d MP Bn (CID)	Bamberg, GE
James W. Gray	Andre Proctor	CID District	Ft Riley, KS
Gary L. Milner	Richmond Ellis	86th CID District	Ft Benning, GA
Steven M. Lynch	David K. Schumann	3d RGN WA, District	Ft Myer, VA
Debra Broughton		254th Base Support	Schinnen, Netherlands
Shelby E. Bell		MDW Spt Bn	Ft Meade, MD

*National Guard Units

Current as of 31 March 2005


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