


THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF THE MILITARY POLICE CORPS



MILITARY

POLICE



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Fall 2009

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
Chief, Military Police Corps Regiment, and Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School



Brigadier General David Phillips

The Military Police Corps Regiment continues with a high operational tempo, as a critical combat multiplier and force enabler with ongoing deployments of individual Soldiers and multibattalion brigades. The transformation and flexibility of the Regiment, along with the strategic vision of those military police leaders who looked out over the horizon in years past, set the conditions for our critical role in the current War on Terrorism. The performance of our Soldiers is nothing short of phenomenal.

The roles and responsibilities of the Regiment cross all phases of conflict and consequence management. Our most junior leaders carry the mantle for the Regiment when supporting maneuver forces. To set conditions for success—regardless of the command relationship—we are issuing a new doctrinally synchronized military police mission statement. This succinct statement encapsulates what we do as a combat enabler and provides our leaders with a foundation from which to build a dialog with maneuver commanders. It was developed through a combined effort of the U.S. Army Military Police School staff and Military Police Captains Career Courses 01-09 and 02-09. The final version, which was penned by Captain Megan Williams, was sent to the field for staffing and input. The military police mission statement is as follows:



The benefit of arming our junior leaders with a military police mission statement is significant because it echoes our current military police functions, establishes expertise in key areas that translate into assets for a brigade combat team commander, and maintains relevancy through continuing operations—deployment **and** garrison missions. The military police mission statement also opens opportunities for additional “green cycle” training by reemphasizing the “police” in “military police.” Law enforcement road duty is **not** a red cycle training distractor; it **is** green cycle critical, functional training. The “police” in “military police” is what keeps our Regiment relevant. Any unit can be trained in basic military police general skill sets as an “in lieu of” unit, but it takes years to train military police officers and noncommissioned officers with police, detainee, and stability operations functional expertise.

Of the Troops and For the Troops!

Regimental Command Sergeant Major



Command Sergeant Major Charles R. Kirkland

Hello, and Happy 68th Anniversary from the Home of the Regiment! I encourage everyone to reflect on the history of our Military Police Corps. Although a great deal has changed over the years, there are a couple of constants that prove to be the foundation of our success and relevance to the Army.

The first is our great men and women who make up our ranks; they are the finest professionals to serve in any uniform. I have the honor of traveling everywhere that our military police serve, and I get to hear the great things that you do. The conversations that I have with senior leaders across the Army are very complimentary. Conversations always start with how proud they are of your performance and what we can do to provide them with more of you to enhance their missions. I thank you for representing our Regiment as you do. Please keep those who are serving in harm's way at the top of your prayer list, and extend a hand to the families keeping the home fires burning. Your sacrifices are noted and greatly appreciated.



The second is our capacity to provide law and order as a professional military police force. Let's not lose sight of what truly makes us relevant to the Army. Our law enforcement skills make us unique. Our experiences hone our abilities to think through critical situations, make and communicate decisions on the ground, build trust within communities, understand and enforce standards . . . I could ramble on and on. All of this produces mature, capable Soldiers and leaders who have the mental capacity to effectively operate on the streets of Fort Wherever—from Bagdad to Kabul. Any of us who have been in the Regiment for a while have seen the proverbial pendulum swing back and forth in this area before. Over the past eight years, the pendulum has received its momentum from the effects of our operational tempo. Our focus has justifiably been on winning in combat, and our attention has been placed primarily on combat operations. This has caused an inadvertent skills deficit in our junior NCOs and company grade officers. The lack of experience will continue to degrade our abilities as a professional police force since this population represents our pool of primary trainers and our future. There are a couple of things to think about.

First, your Regiment continues to evolve by "right sizing" the force (military police and Department of the Army civilian police [DACP]), standardizing the size of our battalion formations, implementing training readiness authority, and linking brigades to battalions—to name a couple of the "large rocks," so to speak. To close the training gap, we have increased the number of hours of law and order taught in professional military classes, from one-station unit training through officer and NCO education and functional courses. We have realigned additional skill identifiers within our modified tables of organization and equipment and tables of distribution and equipment, and we plan to imbed law and order additional skill identifiers within all platoon level formations. All of these initiatives—and more—will lay the foundation and bridge the gaps; but they are not the end-all solution. The solution is you.

The total military police family, working together on our installations and abroad, is what will pull all of this together. It's all about relationships and good or bad "personalities." The senior military police leaders from organizations (Directorate of Emergency Services; division provost marshal; separate battalions and brigades; U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command [USACIDC], commonly referred to as "CID") must cross-talk and realize that the mission we perform for the Army is bigger than their slice. Everyone needs to work together to resolve challenges (training and experience opportunities) at the installation and unit levels. Resist the urge to look up for the answers. We can push the "big rocks" at this level, but true individual and leader development takes place inside your grid square. Be innovative; and figure out how to get your Soldiers, NCOs, and officers (in leadership positions) on the road and into provost marshal offices. Gain the experience necessary to hone the critical skills that keep us relevant.

Our DACP men and woman are a critical part of the team; without them, we would not have been able to sustain our installation force protection during this high-operational-tempo period. Large populations of our DACP are former military police. What I ask of our DACP is that you don't forget where you came from! Use your experience and the continuity to assist in the development of your military police counterparts. For our military police, accept that the DACP are members of the team. Work together to protect our communities. Share knowledge so that we all get smarter. And watch each others' backs. We can only get better as a professional organization if these things happen.

(Continued on page 5)

Regimental Chief Warrant Officer



Chief Warrant Officer Five T. L. Williams

In this issue, I will address one of the many questions that I am often asked—Why is the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) (commonly referred to as “CID”) a “stovepipe” organization? In other words, why does the CID commander report directly to the Chief of Staff of the Army? Well, it all started in Germany and it ended with a former stripper testifying before a Senate subcommittee during the Vietnam Era.

This is the “Year of the NCO.” I have great respect for NCOs. I have been trained by some of the best of them throughout my career. They have helped me become a better Soldier and a better person. In fact, before becoming a warrant officer, I was a staff sergeant; and I have not forgotten my roots—nor would I want to. Therefore, my purpose in writing about this incident is not to point out the shortcomings of NCOs or the Regiment, but rather to relate our history. The acknowledgement of this dark history helps us to appreciate where we came from and where we are going. Growing up in a family of teachers, I was always instructed that “understanding your history keeps you from repeating it.” The fact that incidents such as the one described here have not been repeated is a testament to those NCOs who recognized and corrected our shortcomings and set Regimental and Army standards accordingly. In this way, knowing the history of our Regiment has made us stronger.

In 1966, General Harold Johnson, Chief of Staff of the Army, selected Command Sergeant Major William O. Wooldridge to be the first Sergeant Major of the Army. The new job was chartered “to look after the interests of” the Army’s 1.25 million Soldiers. Wooldridge was appointed to this prestigious job to improve morale.

While Command Sergeant Major Wooldridge was stationed in Germany, he worked with several senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who skimmed \$350,000 per year from the slot machine profits at the clubs of the 24th Infantry Division in the area of Augsburg-Mannheim, Germany. This was just the start. The so-called “Khaki Mafia” operation moved to Fort Benning, Georgia, and then to Vietnam. After Command Sergeant Major Wooldridge completed his tenure as the Sergeant Major of the Army, he requested to be stationed in Vietnam, where he was the Command Sergeant Major of the Military Assistance Command. He meticulously selected the NCOs who were put in charge of the clubs. The clubs purchased merchandise through MareDEM, Ltd. (a corporation developed by Wooldridge).

While the Vietnam War was raging on and Soldiers were dying by the thousands, the club systems were thriving. The NCO proprietors were making money at the Soldiers’ expense. Nonappropriated funds were spent on such things as entertainment, snacks, and furniture; and kickbacks and graft were part of it all.

Miss June Skewes, an Australian-born entertainer who was better-known by her professional name of June Collins, had spent many years in Korea and Vietnam. To make money, she started off as a stripper and then later became a booking agent for bands. She testified to a Senate subcommittee that she could book a band for \$150—with \$100 going to the band, \$25 going to her, and \$25 going as a “kickback” to the sergeant in charge of the club. Some club managers even requested sexual favors, which Miss Skewes did not supply. She became extremely upset with the corruption and eventually reported what she knew to CID. Miss Skewes later coauthored the book, *The Khaki Mafia*, with Robin Moore (author of *The Green Berets* and *The French Connection*).¹

During this time, CID offices reported to the provost marshals at each installation; the provost marshals, in turn, reported up their chains of command. When the Khaki Mafia operation moved from Europe to Fort Benning, CID in



“We can learn from history how past generations thought and acted, how they responded to the demands of their time, and how they solved their problems. We can learn by analogy, not by example, for our circumstances will always be different than theirs were. The main thing history can teach us is that human actions have consequences and that certain choices, once made, cannot be undone. They foreclose the possibility of making other choices; and thus, they determine future events.”

—Gerda Lerner

(Continued on page 5)

(Regimental Command Sergeant Major, continued from page 3)

In closing, I would like to say thank you once again for all you do each and every day in the service of your country, the Army, and this great Regiment. On the eve of our 68th anniversary, reflect on our history and recognize what makes us unique and relevant. Stay focused on the mission, and find balance in training. Provide our Soldiers with the skills to fight and survive on the battlefield and with the law enforcement skills necessary to protect our communities, and train indigenous police forces while deployed. Here at the Home of the Regiment, we will continue to work hard to improve all that we do in support of our Soldiers, Families, and mission. Stay safe, and don't forget to enjoy yourselves!

Of the Troops and For the Troops! NCOs Lead the Way!

(Regimental Chief Warrant Officer, continued from page 4)

the United States was ineffective, primarily because access to the reports from the earlier Augsburg probe was banned by Major General Carl C. Turner, the Provost Marshal General of the Army. Turner initially told the Senate subcommittee that General Johnson had ordered him to hinder the investigations, but he later testified that it was his own decision. The investigations were closed, but were later reopened. The Central District of California eventually handed down a 21-count indictment.

Major General Turner, who later served as the Justice Department's chief U.S. marshal during the Nixon Administration, suppressed an investigation of Command Sergeant Major Woolridge. A witness testified that a report linking Woolridge to financial irregularities related to service clubs was recreated to exclude his name. In addition, Major General Turner was also accused of selling firearms. As a result of the subcommittee probe, Turner was fired as the chief U.S. marshal, convicted for income tax evasion and fraud, and sentenced to a prison term. The basis for his conviction was not necessarily his role in the Khaki Mafia, but rather his acquisition (under false pretenses of Army training and display in an Army gun museum) of 397 firearms from the Chicago and Kansas City police departments. He sold several of the weapons for personal profit; some were recovered during a raid of a weapons cache.

The allegations against Command Sergeant Major Woolridge included the protection by influential generals, concealment of vital records, and control of military personnel assignments to important service clubs. Command Sergeant Major Woolridge invoked his 5th Amendment rights throughout the hearings. He and three other NCOs were convicted, but none received prison sentences. Instead, they were placed on probation, with the proviso that they perform charity work without salary and sign virtually all of their assets over to the government. The federal judge stated that he wanted the defendants to be "penniless." The Army revoked the Distinguished Service Medals that were previously awarded to Command Sergeant Major Woolridge and Major General Turner.

In 1971, the Senate subcommittee published a 300-page report which indicated that the senior Army military police officer had created barriers on several occasions. According to the report, when sufficient evidence was obtained, senior officers took action that prevented CID from doing its work. As a result, on 17 September 1971, CID was established as a major Army command and an independent investigative agency designed to be free of command influence at all levels. All CID special agents now take an oath to "... at all times seek diligently to discover the truth, deterred neither by fear nor prejudice ..."

Endnote:

¹Robin Moore with June Collins, *The Khaki Mafia*, Crown Publishers, New York, 1971.

Of the Troops and For the Troops! Warrior CID!

A Letter to the Troops

9 April 2009

To All of Our Troops,

Today marks the six-year anniversary of the fall of Saddam Hussein—his fleeing and the Iraqi people pulling his statue down with their bare hands. You or one of your many brethren has been here helping the Iraqi people and Iraq. It has been six years of sufferance and six years away from your homes and families. I would like to thank each man and woman that has served in the country of my birth.

I do not want a single Soldier to doubt what they have done in Iraq because of the news—American or from any country. Too many times, the news doesn't reflect the truth of our accomplishment. The news seems to use political wants instead of facts in their stories. It is a fact that we have profoundly helped Iraq and its people. It is a fact that because of your sacrifices, Iraq has a chance at true democracy.

I was born in Iraq and lived here with my family until after my college. I saw firsthand how Saddam Hussein destroyed this great country and fractured its people. In 1993, I moved to the United States, where I worked with the mayor of Louisville, Kentucky, on the international affairs committee and served as a Louisville Public Library speaker on Iraqi and Middle Eastern culture. In February 2006, I returned to Iraq to work as a bilingual-bicultural advisor with the U.S. Department of Defense at Camp Bucca.

Iraq is a country with a history of higher learning reaching back to the Middle Ages. Baghdad was a place that European scholars traveled to learn. In the 1950s and 1960s, 82 percent of Iraqis finished high school and advanced to some form of higher education. After the damage from Saddam Hussein and his regime, 12 percent of Iraqis managed to enter high school in 2003. Today, high school attendance has jumped to 36 percent. In the time the United States has been here, it has increased more than 300 percent.

The Iraq of today now sees teachers well-paid and a focus on the importance of education it had in the past. When we came to this country, the teachers and professors made \$3 to \$5 dollars a month; today's teachers are one of the highest paid professions in Iraq, making well over \$500 to \$700 a month. Before the fall of Saddam Hussein, the children in Iraq were taught mostly how great Saddam Hussein was and were taught propaganda; now Iraqis are learning about math, literature, Arabic language, and real history with a renewed pride in their country.

Because of your dedication and efforts, women's issues and rights can be discussed by Iraqi women. Women have a say in their parliament. Iraqi women have a say in their government. Until we toppled Saddam Hussein, there was one lone "yes" woman in his bogus government. Now, there are many women elected into Iraq's government with a provision pending to have 25 percent of the parliament women. Iraq today may not reflect the women's rights of America, but it is beginning to reflect the women's rights before Saddam's regime.

In today's Iraq, the families' and each person's standard of living has increased substantially—less unemployment, greater job opportunities, a higher quality of life, and opportunities to travel. Until the fall of Saddam Hussein, the average Iraqi couldn't even get a passport until they were 75 years of age or they just wanted to travel to Mecca. Now, I watch as my brothers travel to places and see sights I never thought they would have the opportunity to see. Imagine how different Iraq will be by just having the

experiences of seeing how the rest of the world lives and governs itself. None of this would be possible if it weren't for each of our Soldier's service.

Iraq has a new sense of religious freedom. Until the fall of Saddam Hussein, no Shi'i Islam could celebrate or openly practice their religion. While Muqtada al-Sadr speaks against the truth, until the fall of Saddam Hussein, neither he nor his family could speak of something as simple as Ashura (a religious Islamic festival). Though he uses his speech to hurt instead of help, the Iraqi people are beginning to see right through men who are using religion as a vehicle for power instead of a vehicle for faith.

Just in reading Iraq's newspapers and television channels, we see that we have given them the inalienable right of free speech. Before we came to help the Iraqi people, there were only two television channels, which were state-controlled. There were no satellites allowed in any home. The people of Iraq had no right of free speech and assembly. The simple fact that they can hold a protest and voice their opinion is proof above all else that we have made a massive difference in the life of each Iraqi.

While Iraq is still growing and will face many challenges ahead, each of you can be proud of the foundation and hope we've given Iraq to find itself. While I am sure that mistakes have been made, I am also sure that the heart of every decision was to help Iraq and its people. While I am sure that there are some Iraqis who hate Americans, I am sure that the majority of Iraqis thank us each day for the hope we have given them. While we have not pleased every country in the world by helping Iraq reach freedom, I know that each Soldier serves his or her country because America has always been the beacon of hope for all who are suffering injustice and tyranny. Americans have always come to the aid of those who need us because that is what it means to be American.

I wanted to thank each of you for what you have given, for the lives you have touched, and for the sacrifices you have made. As you go about your day, please don't watch the news and be disheartened. Whether our news in America calls this the "not good war," each of you know that everything you and your comrades have given was for the good of thousands. As you see the scenes of protestors in Iraq, realize that their right to protest is just another sign of our victory to free Iraq. If you are browsing a Web site of Iraqi newspapers, realize that their freedom of speech is only because of the never-ending determination of our Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

I hope that each of you know in your heart that there are far more Iraqis who are thankful than those who are resentful. Tomorrow, I hope you hear the appreciation as much as you hear the protests. As an Iraqi by birth, I thank you. As an American by choice, I am proud of you. And as a human, I feel in awe of your sacrifices for this good and noble cause.

Respectfully,
Salah Al-hindawy

Mr. Al-hindawy was born in Iraq in 1966. He graduated from the University of Baghdad with a major in Arabic language. He came to the United States in July 1993 and currently works as a U.S. Department of Defense bilingual-bicultural advisor at Camp Bucca, Iraq.

The Maneuver Enhancement Brigade

By Colonel Charles A. Williams and Mr. Joe Crider

“The Army is in the midst of a transformation process to move it to modularity—by adopting the six war-fighting functions and creating new and special organizations. One of those new and special organizations is the MEB [maneuver enhancement brigade]... designed as a C2 [command and control] headquarters with a robust multifunctional brigade staff that is optimized to conduct [maneuver support] operations. Maneuver support operations integrate the complementary and reinforcing capabilities of key protection, movement and maneuver, and sustainment functions, tasks, and systems to enhance freedom of action.”

—Field Manual (FM) 3-90.31

This article is intended to provide a basic understanding of the capabilities and doctrine of the MEB and its role in the modular Army. It offers a basic description of its unique capabilities, relevance to the current force,¹ and importance to the U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center (MANSCEN).

The roots of the MEB can be traced to the Army’s transformation initiatives, where modularity was identified as one of the primary goals. The goal in developing modular units was to serve the specific needs of combatant commanders by providing tailored forces² to support full spectrum operations. The Army’s leaders envisioned modularity as a bridge linking current capability requirements with those anticipated for the future. This strategy culminated in the Army’s decision to limit its brigade force structure to the following five distinct types:

- Infantry brigade combat teams.
- Heavy brigade combat teams.
- Stryker brigade combat teams.
- Functional brigades.
- Multifunctional brigades.

The MEB is the only one of five multifunctional brigades designed to manage terrain—a capability it shares with the brigade combat teams (BCTs).

With no antecedents, the MEB represents a unique—and at times somewhat misunderstood—organization. It is a dynamic, multifunctional organization predicated entirely on tailored forces that are task-organized for a specific objective. In many ways, it is an organization like no other, offering a tremendous variety of functional and technical depth coupled with significant lethality. The MEB delivers critical complementary and reinforcing capabilities in a flexible and scalable manner essential to conducting full spectrum operations. Included in these capabilities is the capacity to deliver any combination of lethal and nonlethal effects.

The critical missions or key tasks of MEBs include maneuver support, consequence management, stability, and


support area operations. A common thread among each of these missions is the obvious capability requirements of the MANSCEN proponents—chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN); engineer; and military police.

MEB Headquarters

Of particular significance to MANSCEN proponents and stakeholders is the robust MEB headquarters design. Currently numbering nearly 200 Soldiers, noncommissioned officers, warrant officers, and commissioned officers, the MEB headquarters is among the largest in the Army’s brigade inventory. Most of these coded authorizations specifically require CBRN, engineer, and military police personnel. To further extend MEB utility, force developers included authorizations for several other functions—such as fire support coordination and air space management—that lend the unique planning and execution capabilities necessary to support an area of operations (AO). The robust planning and C2 capabilities organic to the MEB headquarters serve as its primary attributes, making it ideal for complex missions requiring a flexible response and scalable effects along the spectrum of conflict. For example, the MEB may conduct missions that range from supporting host nation police or civil engineering to supporting a division conducting a deliberate river crossing. The relevance and potential of the MEB continues to evolve, particularly in the realm of support to civil operations as evidenced recently in the requirement for the MEB to provide support to a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) consequence management response force.

Organization

The central purpose of the MEB is to provide tailored support to the modular division and corps (supported force) to meet the wide-ranging requirements of full spectrum operations. The MEB maintains a robust headquarters design composed of multiple coordinating and special staff cells. Included in the headquarters is a broad range of functional expertise that enables the commander to optimize his capabilities and tailor his response.



MEB staff organization

This organization provides the MEB with unique capabilities such as the—

- **Fire support element cell.** This cell provides indirect fire coordination (tube, rocket, or rotary-wing); enables the commander to extend protection throughout the support AO; and enables the mitigation of a host of threats, including support to a tactical combat force (TCF) (when assigned) for a Level III threat.
- **Liaison officer (LNO) cell.** With permanently assigned LNO personnel, this cell coordinates and establishes liaison vertically with senior and subordinate commands and horizontally with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational or other agencies located in its AO.
- **Area operations cell.** This cell provides the commander with added flexibility on planning and coordinating activities related to terrain management without distracting the operations and training cell or civil-affairs cell from their primary focus.
- **Airspace management cell.** This cell coordinates air operations during support area operations or when the MEB is assigned an AO.

The "01C Initiative" is an approved special-reporting code that designates seven key positions within the MEB—commander, deputy brigade commander, executive officer, training officer, operations officer, headquarters company commander, and LNO team chief—to be filled by CBRN, engineer, or military police officers. The rationale for this initiative extends from the understanding that most of the MEB capabilities involve maneuver support. Limiting these billets to CBRN, engineer, and military police officers is a way to ensure technical and functional expertise within the seven most critical command and senior staff positions.

Beyond the headquarters nucleus, the MEB is a task-organized unit that is tailored to meet a specific mission requirement. To ensure flexibility, the designers of the MEB structure limited its organic composition to a headquarters, headquarters company, network support company, and brigade support battalion. Though dependent on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civilian considerations (METT-TC), a typical MEB task organization would likely include CBRN, engineer, military police, and explosive ordnance disposal assets. Also based on METT-TC, it could include air defense artillery, civil affairs, and a TCF.³

Doctrine

The major tenets of FM 3-90.31 include the following:

- **Maneuver support operations.** These operations integrate the complementary and reinforcing capabilities of key protection; movement and maneuver; and sustainment functions, tasks, and systems to enhance freedom of action. For example, these key tasks may include area security, mobility, and internment and resettlement operations. Maneuver support operations occur throughout the operations process of planning, preparing, executing, and assessing. The MEB conducts maneuver support operations and integrates and synchronizes them across all Army warfighting functions in support of offensive and defensive operations and in the conduct or support of stability operations or civil support operations.⁴
- **Combined arms operations.** The MEB is a combined-arms organization that is task-organized based on mission requirements. The MEB is primarily designed to support divisions in conducting full spectrum operations. It can also support operations at echelons above division (EAD), including corps, theater, Army, joint, and multinational C2 structures. Still further, it is ideally suited to respond to state and federal agencies in conducting civil support operations in the continental United States. The MEB has limited offensive and defensive capabilities in leveraging its TCF (when assigned) to mitigate threats within its AO.⁵
- **Support area operations.** The MEB conducts support operations within the echelon support area to assist the supported headquarters in retaining freedom of action within the areas not assigned to maneuver units. When conducting support area operations, the MEB is in the defense, regardless of the form of maneuver or the major operation of the higher echelon. Support area operations need to—
 - Prevent or minimize interference with C2 and support operations.
 - Provide unimpeded movement of friendly forces.
 - Provide protection.
 - Find, fix, and destroy enemy forces or defeat threats.
 - Provide area damage control.⁶
- **Terrain management (conducted in the support area).** Tailored capabilities enable the MEB to assume many of the missions formerly performed by an assortment of organizations in the division and corps rear, such as rear area operations and base and base cluster security. Usually assigned its own AO to perform most of its missions, the MEB can also perform missions outside its AO.

What the MEB Is

- The MEB is designed as a unique, multifunctional, C2 headquarters to perform maneuver support, consequence management, stability operations, and support area operations for the supported force—normally the division.
- The MEB is a bridge across the capability gap between the more capable functional brigades and the limited functional units such as CBRN, engineer, and military police of the BCTs. This headquarters provides greater functional staff capability than BCTs, but usually with less than a functional brigade. The key difference between the MEB and the functional brigades is the breadth and depth of the MEB multifunctional staff. The MEB provides complementary and reinforcing capabilities. The MEB staff bridges the planning capabilities between a BCT and the functional brigades.
- The MEB is an “economy of force” provider that allows BCTs and maneuver units to focus on combat operations. It directly supports and synchronizes operations across all six Army warfighting functions. For example, economy-of-force missions might involve support to counterinsurgency or other “terrain owner” missions. The MEB serves a vital economy-of-force role by freeing the BCT to concentrate on its priorities when adequately sourced with maneuver formations and other capabilities such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; fires; information operations; and medical operations.
- The MEB is similar to a BCT, but without the maneuver capability, providing C2 for an assigned AO—unlike other support or functional brigades. Unique staff cells such as area operations, fires, air space, and LNO assets provide the MEB with a level of expertise in area-of-responsibility and terrain management that is uncommon in a functional brigade.
- The MEB is capable of supporting divisions and EAD.
- The MEB can conduct combat operations at the maneuver battalion level when task-organized with a TCF or other maneuver forces.

Normally, the MEB AO is the same as the supported echelon’s support area. Within its AO, the MEB can perform a host of missions, though it is better suited to perform one or two missions simultaneously than several at the same time. Some of the missions assigned to an MEB within its AO include movement control; recovery; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and stability operations. The MEB defends the assets within its AO, including bases and base clusters. Outside of its AO, the MEB can

What the MEB Is Not

- The MEB is not a maneuver brigade, but is normally assigned an AO with control of terrain. The main maneuver is defensive, with very limited offensive maneuvers when its reserve (response force or TCF) is employed to counter or spoil the threat. When the situation requires, the MEB executes limited offensive and defensive operations, using response forces or TCF against Level II and III threats.
- The MEB is not composed mainly of organic assets, but rather a tailored set of units.
- The MEB is not typically as maneuverable as a brigade. It is designed to be assigned an AO and C2, with higher headquarters assigned tactical control for the security of tenant units.
- The MEB is not designed to conduct screen, guard, or cover operations, which are usually assigned to BCTs.
- The MEB is not a replacement for functional brigades, especially at EAD.
- The MEB is not a replacement for functional brigades for missions such as counter CBRNE weapons and threats across the entire operational area; major complex CBRNE or weapons of mass destruction—elimination operations; major focused combat or general engineering operations; brigade level internment/resettlement operations; major integrated military police operations (each involving three or more battalions); or missions requiring increased functional capabilities and staff support or exceeding the C2 focus of the MEB.
- The MEB is not replaceable by a CBRN, engineer, or military police brigade to perform other functional missions within its own AO or at other selected locations within the division AO.
- The MEB is not a replacement for unit self-defense responsibilities.

provide military police, explosive ordnance disposal, or CBRN support to the supported commander.⁷

- *Movement corridors.* One of the ways that the MEB performs protection missions is by establishing movement corridors to protect the movement of personnel and vehicles. The MEB provides route security and reconnaissance and defends lines of communication. (The figure on page 29 offers an overview of MEB mission capabilities, depicting core capability mission-essential tasks and the supporting task groups.)
- *Interdependencies.* The MEB, like all other modular brigade structures, relies on others for some of its support. When needed, the MEB must leverage fire, medical, aviation, and intelligence

support from adjacent functional or multifunctional brigades. As the likely landowner of the support area, the MEB provides support throughout the division area of responsibility and to the other modular support brigades residing within the support area as part of its support area operations mission.

MEB Limitations

The MEB is not a maneuver organization. Although it harnesses sufficient C2 and battle staff personnel to employ a TCF in a limited role (when assigned), it does not seize terrain and it does not seek out a Level III threat. It is important that MEB commanders and staffs clearly articulate the differences between the MEB, the other modular support brigades, the functional brigades, and the BCTs.

The Way Ahead

The future of the MEB appears very positive. Its capabilities are relevant and indispensable to combatant commanders conducting full spectrum operations. The MEB receives frequent accolades from an expanding chorus of general officers. Just recently, General William S. Wallace, then the commanding general of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and Major General Walter Wojdakowski, Chief of Infantry and commander of the Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning, Georgia, strongly supported the need for more MEBs. Their belief is that the current and future operational environments—increasingly asymmetrical and complex—require more MEBs. In sharing their experiences from the major combat operation phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, they remarked that an MEB or two could have played a key role during the march to Baghdad. Their assessment was that the MEB is uniquely configured to C2 all the maneuver support capabilities required to support Army operations. During the early phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom, all critical maneuver support functions now resident in MEBs were managed in composite fashion. Most frequently, functional or maneuver brigades would assume these functions as an additional mission. Performing these vital missions was necessary in ensuring that the lines of communication remained open and that the rear area remained secure. Typically, units performed maneuver support operations and support area operations missions as a secondary effort, diverting their focus from their primary mission—the march to Baghdad.

The unique design of the MEB ensures its place in the Army's force structure to provide maneuver support to divisions and corps for years to come. A central concept of the modular force is for each of the modular support brigades to provide seamless support to the supported commander. For the MEB, the tailored design ensures that it can provide all essential maneuver support functions to the supported commander. While the MEB is only one part of a division force package, it is required to ensure seamless support to the division across the spectrum of conflict. There are

to the division across the spectrum of conflict. There are twenty-three MEBs planned for the total force—four in the Active Army, three in the U.S. Army Reserve, and sixteen in the Army National Guard. We began to activate MEBs in 2006 and will continue to activate them through 2012. So far, fourteen MEBs have been activated and several have already deployed.

The MANSCEN challenge now is to develop a culture of leaders who can visualize, describe, and direct the many capabilities resident in the MEB to support a transforming Army.

Endnotes:

¹“Our Army at War: Relevant and Ready,” *Soldiers Magazine*, January 2004.

²Field Manual Interim (FMI) 3-0.1, *The Modular Force*, 28 January 2008.

³FM 3-90.31, *Maneuver Enhancement Brigade Operations*, 26 February 2009.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid.

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18th Military Police Brigade Leads the Way for D-Day Ceremonies

By Specialist Adrienne Killingsworth

When it came time to honor the Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen who fought and gave their lives during the D-Day invasion of Normandy, France, sixty-five years ago, thousands flocked to the shores of Utah Beach and Omaha Beach to pay homage to the bravery and sacrifices of these heroes. To honor them in the manner they deserve, the 18th Military Police Brigade was tasked to plan, coordinate, and conduct all U.S. support to the Normandy ceremonies commemorating the 65th anniversary of D-Day. Weeks of careful planning and coordination ensured that the veterans of D-Day knew their acts of heroism had not been forgotten.

As the “Task Force Normandy” commander, Colonel Thomas P. Evans (commander of the 18th Military Police Brigade) oversaw the command and control of the ceremonies, which began on 3 June. And more than 600 Soldiers from the 18th Military Police Brigade and historical D-Day units participated in the ceremonies. Maintaining such a large number of Soldiers and coordinating with other military branches and foreign officials required a high level of dedication and attention to detail.

An essential aspect of the mission was coordination with French officials (including town mayors, cemetery managers, and the gendarmerie) from the brigade headquarters in Germany. In addition, the President’s attendance at D-Day ceremonies made coordination with

the White House Press Corps and the U.S. Secret Service necessary.

Soldiers of the 18th provided force protection and were directly involved in the ceremonies. They conducted salute battery and color guard support and stood in formation at the ceremonies.

Despite the logistical difficulties of planning and conducting such a large operation, the opportunity to bring U.S. Army Europe units together with historic units like the 82d Airborne Division, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), and 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment and to be involved in such a historical event was a prestigious honor for the brigade. The Soldiers of the 18th Military Police Brigade were proud to pay tribute to the veterans who came before them.

The teamwork and partnerships of Task Force Normandy mirror the cooperation and alliances that have made so many hundreds of military missions a success—including one very important one sixty-five years ago on the beaches of Normandy.

Specialist Killingsworth is a public affairs specialist with the 18th Military Police Brigade, Mannheim, Germany. She holds a bachelor’s degree in English literature from California State University–Northridge.



2009—The Year of the NCO

A Model NCO

By Sergeant First Class Tommy Davis

When I think of a Soldier who embodies the ethos and values of today's Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Corps, Staff Sergeant John Wade Russell's name comes to mind. I have been Staff Sergeant Russell's platoon sergeant for more than two years and have served with him for nearly four years and through two combat deployments. During that time, Staff Sergeant Russell has evolved from an extremely capable, competent team leader to the epitome of a modern-day professional squad leader who is capable of independently planning and executing any mission.

Staff Sergeant Russell became a squad leader in January 2007. He was deployed to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and twice to Iraq during three of the last five years. However, just a short thirteen months after his last deployment, Staff Sergeant Russell committed to train and lead eleven other Soldiers for fifteen more months in Afghanistan. On a daily basis, Staff Sergeant Russell sought to train his Soldiers in any way that he could to ensure that they would be capable of deploying and surviving under the most arduous and trying of circumstances. He searched for unique methods to accomplish the tasks set before him, often creating his own methods based on research he conducted on tactics, techniques, and procedures used in Afghanistan. As a platoon level master driver for the M1117 Armored Security Vehicle, Staff Sergeant Russell developed his own training program. And, based on his experience as an Armored Security Vehicle team leader in Iraq, he facilitated the training of eighteen Soldiers while conducting combat operations in Regional Command East, Afghanistan.

Staff Sergeant Russell leads from the front and by example in all that he does. He coordinated with medical officers at his combat outpost to teach college level courses to squad members when they were not on combat missions, allowing the Soldiers to excel and improve themselves. He established and fostered a climate of excellence by competing in and winning two military police battalion NCO boards. His Soldiers strove to follow his example; one of his squad Soldiers was recognized as the Soldier of the Quarter for the company, one of his squad NCOs was recognized as the NCO of the Quarter for the company, and one of his team leaders won the battalion level NCO of the Quarter competition. And as a result of their superior performance in support of a calvary task force, Staff Sergeant Russell's entire squad was awarded combat spurs.

On several separate occasions during Operation Enduring Freedom, Staff Sergeant Russell's squad was tested by enemy forces; each time, the squad prevailed. Every member of Staff Sergeant Russell's squad was awarded the Combat Action Badge for their actions during firefights with a determined enemy. Two specific incidents best highlight the determination, skill, and confidence that Staff Sergeant Russell instilled in his Soldiers through countless hours of drills, rehearsals, and training. The first incident occurred in October 2008, when Staff Sergeant Russell voluntarily led his squad to relieve a cavalry platoon that had been ambushed by a numerically superior enemy force. Staff Sergeant Russell's Soldiers decisively broke the enemy attack and evacuated wounded Soldiers and damaged vehicles. Just one month later, while training Afghan police, Staff Sergeant Russell's Soldiers assisted in defending their combat outpost, taking control of defensive positions and Afghan army personnel while receiving direct fire and multiple rocket-propelled grenade strikes from enemy forces. During this series of engagements, the medic assigned to Staff Sergeant Russell's squad earned the Combat Medic Badge for his treatment of wounded base personnel while under constant enemy fire.

Simply put, Staff Sergeant Russell is an example of the finest the NCO Corps has to offer.

Sergeant First Class Davis is the platoon sergeant, 3d Platoon, 527th Military Police Company. He is working toward an associate's degree in general studies from Central Texas College, Killeen, Texas.





2009—The Year of the NCO

The Military Police NCO

By Command Sergeant Major David M. Bruner

As the command sergeant major of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), I spend much of my time in airports, traveling to visit Soldiers who are in training. I am always honored when American civilians approach me while I am in uniform to tell me how highly they regard the Army and to ask me questions. When I explain that this is the “Year of the NCO,” the most common response is a two-part question: “What is an NCO?” and “Why are they so important?”

The heart and soul—indeed the fighting spirit—of any competent, effective military is the noncommissioned officer (NCO). By design and implementation, NCOs are our asymmetric advantage in present and future wars. Regardless of the garrison or battlefield situation, NCOs adapt, overcome, and prevail. The NCOs of the Military Police Corps provide examples of this truth every day; thus, they fill me with pride.

Because they belong to one of the most deployed branches in the Army, military police warriors are constantly in the fight. Evidence of their fighting skills and heroism can be found in NCOs like Staff Sergeant Timothy Nein, who earned the Distinguished Service Cross, and Sergeant Leigh Ann Hester, who became the first female to earn a Silver Star since World War II. These two military police were serving as citizen Soldiers in the Kentucky National Guard when their convoy was ambushed near Salman Pak, Iraq. Their brave counterattack through a fortified trench line was certainly reflective of their personal professionalism and bravery, but it was also reflective of the Military Police Corps. Their swift and adaptable reaction was like that of the Military Police Corps in every American conflict since its official inception in 1941. Like all military police, they were sworn to kill the enemy while saving American lives.

The same heroic spirit that was displayed by Staff Sergeant Nein and Sergeant Hester is present in every NCO in the Military Police Corps. Military police conduct patrols through city streets and mountain passes, guard detainees, train local security forces, and perform anything and everything in between. The law enforcement skills honed by military police NCOs who are protecting our Soldiers in garrison contribute to their adaptability on the battlefield. Part of what makes the Military Police Corps so successful on the battlefield is the professionalism, knowledge, critical thinking, and leadership ability developed while patrolling in garrison.

Military police have a hard job to do, and they do it well. Within sixty days following a deployment, most military police sergeants are carrying 9-millimeter pistols again and protecting their communities; this is amazing in itself. But, the fact that they do this while enjoying time with their families, training new Soldiers, and attending professional schools and phases of the NCO Education System is humbling. We ask so much of our military police—and they deliver. As an Army and as a Nation, we owe our Military Police Corps warriors a huge debt.

Assist. Protect. Defend. This motto touches every NCO in the Military Police Corps as surely as the NCO Creed touches every sergeant in the Army. Our NCOs deserve the very best the Army can provide. TRADOC recognizes this, and it is one of the reasons that the NCO Education System is undergoing changes. We are pushing complex leadership training down to lower ranks.



Staff Sergeant Nein and Sergeant Hester

The mind is one of the most important tools for NCOs and adaptable leaders. Just as daily physical training is necessary to stay in physical shape, the mind must also be exercised regularly. Soldiers now have the opportunity to sharpen their proficiency, expand their character, and earn a college degree through the College of the American Soldier.¹ This system helps produce the ideal NCO—an adaptable leader of rock-solid integrity who will make the right decisions in the hard moments, just as Staff Sergeant Nein and Sergeant Hester did in their own moments of truth.

Endnote:

¹The College of the American Soldier is a new, TRADOC-developed, Army program designed to maximize the potential college credit granted for military training and education to NCOs who complete courses through select colleges. Associate's and bachelor's degrees can be earned through the program.

Command Sergeant Major Bruner is the command sergeant major of TRADOC.

91st Military Police Battalion: *Enhanced PIO in the Baghdad Operational Environment*

By First Lieutenant Robin L. Buster

The mission of the 91st Military Police Battalion, which is deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, is to train and mentor Iraqi police in East Baghdad through the use of police transition teams (PTTs). The battalion's passive human intelligence collection efforts and the implementation of police intelligence operations (PIO) have significantly contributed to the sharing of information and intelligence with maneuver and support units and Iraqi security force leaders throughout East Baghdad.

To provide effective and successful support for an operational deployment, the military police battalion intelligence staff officer (S2) must understand the purpose and importance of the integration of police and criminal intelligence (CRIMINT) into the larger intelligence process. The 91st Military Police Battalion, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Michael R. Thomas, quickly realized and now fully understands their role and contributions to the fight and applies their knowledge and skills with full force. One of the most unique and significant roles of the battalion S2 involves the collection, analysis, and dissemination of police intelligence and CRIMINT to other coalition intelligence elements throughout Baghdad.

The battalion executes their primary mission through the use of PTTs. To effectively support the intelligence cycle and commander's situational understanding, PIO efforts are conducted according to the doctrinal steps of plan, prepare, collect, process, and produce.¹

Plan

The first step in carrying out PIO is to develop a plan to be incorporated into daily PTT operations. This phase begins long before the unit is deployed to the theater. Back at the home station in Fort Drum, New York, the 91st Military Police Battalion trained and prepared for PIO in the deployed environment. During this first step, information requirements were identified, the commander's intent was recognized and understood, and PIO priorities were set. The many responsibilities of the battalion S2/PIO cell included gathering and analyzing intelligence, determining the severity of a crime, conducting crime trend analyses, developing indicators of and warnings for criminal and threat activity, identifying crime-conducive conditions, and assessing the dimensions of the environment as outlined by the POLICE model.² Police intelligence was incorporated into the initial military decisionmaking

process, and intelligence briefings were presented to the battalion commander so that he would have an understanding of the operational environment (OE) that he would later inherit. The battalion's plan for conducting PIO resulted in support, contribution, and enhancement to the commander's situational understanding and common operating picture.

Prepare

Once a plan for conducting PIO is developed, the battalion S2 prepares for its execution. When the 91st Military Police Battalion actually assumed responsibility for training and mentoring Iraqi police in East Baghdad, the battalion S2 began to integrate the PIO plans into the overall mission, ensuring that units at the lowest levels (PTTs) understood the intent and significance of their input. A "bottom up" approach to the collection of information and intelligence was accomplished by ensuring that each subordinate company in the battalion was trained on writing thorough patrol debrief reports, reporting actionable intelligence in a timely manner, and exercising the "Every Soldier a Sensor" concept. PTTs, in turn, were provided with the background information and intelligence necessary to focus their collection efforts and reporting requirements. Armed with directives, passive collection plans, and an understanding of the commander's intent, battalion staff and PTT squads were prepared to conduct PIO.

Collect

Police information is collected to gain an enhanced understanding of the environment, contribute to intelligence efforts, and assist in measuring Iraqi police capabilities. Most passive data collection performed by the 91st Military Police Battalion takes place during daily PTT engagements with Iraqi police, Iraqi police leaders, and local nationals. Topics discussed vary from the possible resurgence of security threats to the feelings of

local neighborhood citizens regarding the winners of the 2009 provincial elections. The ability of the PTTs to engage the Iraqis in such a wide range of topics allows the PTTs to gain a great deal of insight into many aspects of the OE; social, political, and threat information is continuously passed from the PTTs to the S2 for analysis. One of the most important aspects of information obtained by the PTTs is crime data. This data, which is gathered on a weekly basis, is captured in simple, digitized tracking form and forwarded to the S2 for incorporation into CRIMINT products such as crime hotspot overlays and crime trend analyses. These CRIMINT products not only depict crime-conducive conditions in certain areas; they also provide an assessment of the ability of the Iraqi police to track and report crime to their higher elements. In addition to the crime data, PTTs also regularly collect biometric data.

The relationship between PTTs and Iraqi police also facilitates the sharing of exploitable evidence. All detainees who are brought into an Iraqi police facility are searched for illegal contraband, including any exploitable items. If exploitable items are found, Iraqi police temporarily release them to PTTs, who then submit them to the S2 for analysis and exploitation. Through this process, it is often revealed that “everyday criminals” are connected to larger insurgent activity. If it were not for this PIO function, important information and connections might otherwise remain undiscovered.

Process

A continuous stream of information flows from company PTTs to the battalion S2 for analysis, dissemination, and assessment. At the battalion level, the raw data is analyzed, evaluated for validity, fused with other intelligence information, and used as input into predictive analysis tools. New information is compared to previous patterns of threats and crimes. This continuous assessment makes it rather easy to identify any shifts in trends. Determining the reasons for the shifts, however, is more challenging. This involves the continuous assessment of **all** aspects of the environment (social, political, threat) and often requires that the battalion S2 research recent and historical coalition force (CF) operations that may have impacted actual or perceived Iraqi police capabilities, threat reporting, or crime and enemy trends.

Conclusions that are drawn from the analysis of events occurring in the

OE are shared with Iraqi police. This enables Iraqi police leaders to focus their efforts and enhance security. In addition, Iraqi police have been trained to conduct their own crime trend analyses. Battalion findings are also shared with lateral and higher CF units to fill information gaps. The unique function of the S2 in integrating police intelligence analysis results into the larger intelligence cycle greatly contributes to the situational understanding of all dimensions of the OE.

Produce

The final step in ensuring that police information and intelligence is not “stovepiped” within military police channels requires that the S2 generate and disseminate PIO products. Depending on the nature of the information, PIO products generated by the 91st Military Police Battalion range from PTT patrol debrief rollups (highlighting CRIMINT, atmospheric, threat reporting, and Iraqi police capability assessments) to targeting packages developed to assist Iraqi police in investigating corruption within their ranks. The PTT patrol debrief rollup—a culmination of all PIO information gathered by the




Figure 1. Police information and CRIMINT products included in the intelligence process

company on a daily basis—facilitates information sharing with many other CF units. The information and intelligence contained in PTT patrol debrief rollups often addresses requests for information pertaining to Iraqi police capabilities, police corruption, and enemy intelligence. Other significant items generated by the S2 and integrated into Iraqi police and CF intelligence pools include CRIMINT products such as crime trend analysis briefs, crime trackers, crime indicators and warnings, and descriptions (profiles) of common victims and locations.

The S2 submits evidence or biometrics obtained from a crime scene for processing and shares exploitation results with Iraqi police and CF intelligence elements. On a nearly monthly basis, S2-generated CRIMINT and intelligence products are shared with vetted Iraqi police leaders to enhance their understanding of the OE and encourage Iraqi police to share intelligence with other Iraqi security force and CF elements. In addition, brigade combat team S2s rely on battalion PIO products to ensure that they have a complete view of the enemy operating picture in the shared environment. But, while these products are very beneficial to Iraqi police and other units, they are most valuable to the battalion commander, who

uses them to assess the current environment and make decisions regarding how and where to place forces to best accomplish the mission.

Summary

PIO is an integral function and responsibility of the 91st Military Police Battalion S2. The ability to collect and analyze the information provided by PTTs and ultimately produce relevant police intelligence and CRIMINT products is essential to the success of the battalion in supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. Enhanced PIO in the Baghdad OE represents a unique and important military police-specific contribution to the intelligence cycle and enables leaders across the battlefield to envision and understand the criminal dimension of the environment.

Endnotes:

¹Field Manual [FM] 2-0, *Intelligence*, 17 May 2004.

²FM 3-19.50, *Police Intelligence Operations*, 21 July 2006.

The POLICE model is a tool used to assess the criminal dimension and its influence on effects-based operations. The term “POLICE” is an acronym representing police and prison structures, organized crime, legal systems, investigations, crime-conducive conditions, and enforcement mechanisms and gaps.

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MILITARY POLICE Writer's Guide

MILITARY POLICE is a professional-development bulletin designed to provide a forum for exchanging information and ideas within the Army law enforcement and investigation community. We include articles by and about officers, enlisted Soldiers, warrant officers, Department of the Army civilian employees, and others. Writers may discuss training, current operations and exercises, doctrine, equipment, history, personal viewpoints, or other areas of general interest to military police. Articles may share good ideas or explore better ways of doing things.

Articles should be concise, straightforward, and in the active voice. If they contain attributable information or quotations not referenced in the text, provide appropriate endnotes. Text length should not exceed 2,000 words (about eight double-spaced pages). Shorter after-action-type articles and reviews of books on military police topics are also welcome.

Include photos (with captions) and/or line diagrams that illustrate information in the article. Please do not include illustrations or photos in the text; instead, send each of them as a separate file. Do not embed photos in PowerPoint® or Microsoft® Word. If illustrations are in PowerPoint, avoid excessive use of color and shading. Save digital images at a resolution no lower than 200 dpi. Images copied from a Web site must be accompanied by copyright permission.

Provide a short paragraph that summarizes the content of the article. Also include a short biography, including your full name, rank, current unit, and job title; a list of your past assignments, experience, and education; your mailing address; a fax number; and a commercial daytime telephone number.

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91st Military Police Battalion, Operation Iraqi Freedom: *The “Pendulum Effect”*

By Major Daniel A. J. Erker

The current environment in Iraq is one of counterinsurgency; that is, it is an environment in which military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions are taken by a government to defeat an insurgency.¹ Military operations—especially counterinsurgency operations—are fraught with uncertainty and unpredictability.

Iraqi security forces are steadily working toward establishing and maintaining the position of a functioning society within a secure environment. The problem is that there is a disparity between the current state or conditions and the desired state or conditions.² The battle between those who desire stability and those who desire to demonstrate instability is complex. The police are making significant progress in maintaining an environment that fosters a sense of safety and security.

The mission of the 91st Military Police Battalion “Guardians” is to conduct counterinsurgency operations by partnering with Iraqi police and coalition forces at the directorate, district, and station levels to develop Iraqi police competencies and operating systems that enable self-reliance and the rule of law, deter insurgent activity, and achieve a long-term, stable, secure environment which promotes a sovereign Iraq. This article relates the experiences and challenges faced by the 91st in executing its mission in the dynamic environment of Iraq—an environment with continuously fluctuating levels of criminal activity and rapidly adaptive and continuously barbaric insurgency. Within this very dynamic environment, there are shifts between conventional and counterinsurgency military police operations and significant changes in operational tempo, police tactics and techniques, police transition team (PTT) mission conduct, and security perceptions.

The first challenge faced by the 91st was the fluctuation of the operational tempo in the insurgent environment. There are two entities at work in this environment. On one side is the Iraqi government, which is trying to establish itself by improving the variables of the operational environment—political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT). On the other side are the insurgents, who are intent on forcing a long, drawn-out, bloody struggle. The result is a battle that can be characterized by the “pendulum effect.” As progress in stability is

made, the pendulum swings toward the Iraqi government. However, a rise in insurgency causes the pendulum to slow and change direction, accelerating toward a balance or equilibrium point (the bottom of the pendulum swing) before proceeding in the opposite direction—toward the insurgents. Once the pendulum begins to swing toward the insurgents, tactics and techniques are adjusted to slow the pendulum movement and reverse its direction so that it accelerates toward equilibrium and beyond once again.

Another challenge is the difficulty in maintaining a balanced growth. During periods of growth, progress generally occurs in one or two areas of PMESII-PT. But, the rapid change in operational tempo that results from progress in one area inadvertently stresses or otherwise affects the tempo and progress in other PMESII-PT areas. For example, the Iraqis made progress in the political area when they executed provincial elections in January 2009. However, that political progress required that Iraqi police provide the level of security necessary to ensure a successful election. The operational tempo was accelerated, and the Iraqi police responded positively. Thus, progress in the political area forced progress in the security area. Less than one month after the elections, the Iraqis also enjoyed progress in the social area with the celebration of Arba’een.³ The large pendulum swings associated with this progress had positive effects, but they also placed stress on the developing Iraqi police. The fact that surges in any one area of PMESII-PT generated efforts in other areas of PMESII-PT resulted in a “pulling effect” on those areas that lagged behind. The 91st Military Police Battalion was concerned that these surges would eventually cripple the police.

The success of the PTT mission was analyzed through constant oversight by military police Soldiers and after-action reviews of surge events. It was determined that the techniques which were being employed to facilitate the self-learning, self-building, and self-sustaining of the Iraqi police were not working. The 91st had slid into an observer/

controller method of conducting PTT; and although this technique is effective with developed units, it was not producing Iraqi police who could function successfully without assistance. Therefore, the battalion changed techniques. In terms of the pendulum comparison, the 91st had reached an apex with its PTT method—a result of the shift from expanding the Iraqi police to developing them. In addition, there was a time constraint applied against the mission that also required a shift in PTT methodology. The battalion, therefore, shifted toward a model which involved the Iraqi police identifying their best officers and noncommissioned officers and sending them to an instructor trainer course and an advanced police continuing education course.

As the 91st Military Police Battalion coached and mentored Iraqi police leaders in the systems and processes designed to facilitate a self-sustaining Iraqi police force, they were also eliminating their own jobs. After helping the Iraqi police develop a police essential training list based on force protection and the seven policing competencies, the battalion focused its training efforts on developing the Iraqi police leadership. The police essential training list, along with the introduction of monthly police training academies, provided Iraqi police leaders with the processes and systems necessary to maintain capacity. The progress made by the Iraqi police during the months of March, April, and May (coupled with the upcoming deployment of coalition forces) served as the impetus for a pending change in future battalion missions.

Operational tempos in the counterinsurgency environment will continue to fluctuate. The 91st Military Police Battalion commander recognizes that the future mission

of the battalion could swing back to conventional military police operations. An analysis of the changing operational environment, along with a defined time constraint, indicated that military police must be flexible and prepared to conduct mobility, maneuver support, and area security operations as the reduction of U.S. forces begins. Uncertainty about what the future will bring requires that military police remain flexible and capable of shifting back and forth between performing PTT missions and conducting mobility and maneuver support or area security operations—depending on which way the pendulum swings.

The 91st Military Police Battalion continues to prepare for and adapt to pending shifts in missions and fluctuations in operational tempo by analyzing potential missions with the intent to identify future Iraqi surge events and mission shifts. The uncertainty and unpredictability presented by counterinsurgency will continue to create a challenge. Understanding the dynamics of the problem will help the 91st Military Police Battalion and future military police battalions understand the importance of incorporating flexibility into all mission planning and execution.

Endnotes:

¹Field Manual [FM] 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, 15 December 2006.

²FM 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Production*, 20 January 2005.

³Arba'een is a Shi'a Muslim religious observation.

Major Erker is the operations and training officer (S3) for the 91st Military Police Battalion. He holds a bachelor's degree in aero technology from Bowling Green State University, Ohio, and is working toward a master's degree in homeland security from American Military University.



143d Military Police Detachment in Iraq

By Specialist Cory Welch

Law and Order at Victory Base Complex

As the sun begins to set at Victory Base Complex (VBC), Baghdad, Iraq, the sound of helicopters taking off can be heard in the background. The night shift from the 143d Military Police Detachment (a unit from the Montana National Guard) prepares to provide a law and order presence at the several bases that make up the VBC. The shift supervisor calls the members of his patrol units to attention. He assigns area responsibilities and patrol vehicles, and a quick prepatrol training class begins. Members of the previous shift make their way to the provost marshal's office to finish paperwork, turn in equipment, and hand over vehicles to their replacements; the law and order mission of the 143d is a 24/7 operation.

Although VBC is primarily a U.S. military installation, other national military members, foreign contractors, local nationals (Iraqi citizens), and third-country nationals (citizens of any other nation) also work there. In addition to the large military presence, thousands of nonmilitary personnel provide support services for the troops; they, too, live and work at VBC. The mission of the 143d, which has jurisdiction over the VBC population of several thousand, includes traffic enforcement and accident investigation, criminal investigation, area protection, and other duties common to a municipal police department. Patrols are tasked with specific responsibilities that range from walk-throughs of common areas to the coordination of mayor cell elements¹ and random antiterrorist measures.

The members of the night shift prepare their vehicles and move to their patrol areas. The patrol supervisor keeps in touch with the various elements, roving through each area to check on personnel as they perform traffic stops and respond to vehicle accidents and various types of criminal activities.

The military police keep very busy. Some of the challenges they face include light discipline, the scarcity of cell phones (since most local and third-country nationals are not allowed to have cell phones on VBC), and the variety of languages spoken by the people of VBC. The job of the 143d Military Police can be daunting.

To enforce standards, military police must exceed those standards. Military police have a great deal of power



in enforcing laws and regulations. But that power must be balanced with the responsibility to do the job right, document incidents in depth, and maintain transparency of actions. As with any police work, the paperwork is constant and never-ending. Reports documenting each call and incident must be thorough and complete. Several pages of documentation can be generated, even with the simplest of incidents.

As the night shift winds down, the sun begins to rise over Baghdad. Members of the night shift patrols return to the provost marshal's office to finish paperwork, turn in equipment, and hand over vehicles to their replacements. The sound of helicopters taking off can still be heard in the background as the day shift prepares to continue providing a law and order presence. Another day at VBC is about to begin.

Endnote:

¹Mayor cell elements are individual camp leadership units that act as a mayor's office, serving in public works and safety leadership roles.

143d Military Police Detachment Provides Security and Escort Operations for Presidential Visit

On 7 April 2009, President Barack Obama made an unannounced visit to VBC. While hundreds of Soldiers attended a ceremony held in Al Faw Palace, the 143d Military Police Detachment provided an open traffic route for the presidential motorcade and denied all other vehicles access to the palace area.

Security is a top priority wherever the President of the United States travels, and Iraq is no exception. Until President Obama's visit was publicly announced, few people had any knowledge of it. But by the time word had spread, leaders of the 143d were in the final phases of briefing their Soldiers about their responsibilities.

With time constraints to meet, action plans to brief, and a large area to cover, the 143d responded quickly and executed their tasks professionally. Although the Soldiers of the 143d were but a small part of the more than 1,200 personnel who worked to ensure that the presidential visit was safe and smooth, they provided a clear route and served as an escort to quickly move the presidential motorcade

from Baghdad International Airport to the Al Faw Palace. And President Obama was not the only dignitary to use the route secured by the 143d Military Police; Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, General Ray Odierno, and other Iraqi distinguished visitors were also in attendance and traveled the same route.

Despite the challenges of seamlessly integrating several “moving parts” with other Soldiers who had their own missions, the 143d Military Police successfully established traffic control points and provided a safe, expedient route for travel. The 143d also served as the police escort for the visit, leading the presidential motorcade through the streets of Baghdad to the Al Faw Palace, where President Obama addressed Soldiers who were fortunate enough to make it inside before the palace

reached capacity. Very few problems surfaced; and when they did, the 143d reacted to the changing elements and made the necessary adjustments.

Although most of 143d Military Police Soldiers missed the rare opportunity to see the Commander in Chief while in Iraq, they gained a sense of pride in knowing that they played a vital role in forming one of several rings of security surrounding the Al Faw Palace and in quickly and safely transporting the President of the United States through Baghdad.

Specialist Welch is the unit public affairs representative, 143d Military Police Detachment (Law and Order). He holds a bachelor's degree in business from Montana State University and is a graduate of the Montana Law Enforcement Academy Police Officer Basic Course.



Airborne! (Again)

*By Captain Thomas Cieslak and
Private First Class Garrett Hernandez*

A paratrooper who was injured in Iraq has taken the final step in his recovery—a step out of a military aircraft into the skies above Key West, Florida.

On 23 June 2009, Sergeant Daniel Powers, 118th Military Police Company (Airborne), 503d Military Police Battalion (Airborne), 16th Military Police Brigade (Airborne), completed his first parachute jump from a military aircraft since he was stabbed in the head with a nine-inch knife while serving in Iraq. Sergeant Powers and twenty-nine other paratroopers descended from an Air Force C-130 Hercules aircraft into the ocean near Fleming Key. The jump was Powers' 44th and his first from an aircraft tailgate into water.

Sergeant Powers, who was serving his second tour of duty as a squad leader in Iraq, was investigating the site of an explosion when an Iraqi teenager approached him from behind and plunged a knife into his head. Sergeant Powers was evacuated from the scene and transported to Iraqi doctors, who extracted the knife and saved his life. He was later transported to the United States, where he underwent multiple surgeries.

Throughout his recovery, Powers was determined to return and lead Soldiers as a military policeman and paratrooper. “I had to get back and back into the fight” said Powers in a recent interview with Ms. Michelle Tan of the *Army Times*. “Back to work and back into the fight because it’s not over yet.”

Powers prepared for the jump by completing refresher parachute jump training and water training. When it came time for the jump, Colonel John Garrity, commander of the 16th Military Police Brigade, led Powers out of the aircraft. Powers' parachute deployed smoothly, and his jump was a success.

In reference to the paratroopers who were once in his squad, Powers said, “They’ll always be my guys no matter where they are. I still hear from some of them who have gotten out, which is always nice. The 118th—they’re all my guys too, so I can’t wait to get back with them.”

Captain Cieslak is the public affairs officer for the 16th Military Police Brigade, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He holds a bachelor's degree in political science from Gannon University, Erie, Pennsylvania

Private First Class Hernandez is a public affairs specialist with the 16th Military Police Brigade. He is a graduate of the Defense Information School.



Iraqi Police Transition: Bridging the Gap



By Captain Nate Brookshire

In 2007, the 716th Military Police Battalion “Peacekeepers” from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, deployed on a police transition team (PTT) mission in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 07-09. The 716th relieved the 92d Military Police Battalion, who concluded their grueling fifteen-month deployment during the peak of the “awakening” and “surge” operations. The wealth of combat experience that the 716th gained through a previous OIF deployment and as a headquarters for Task Force 716 in Afghanistan set the stage for a successful OIF 07-09 rotation.

The 92d Military Police Battalion had successfully sustained police forces from Baghdad, Iraq, to the Syrian border; and the Iraqi police had supported their overarching goal of transitioning primacy to the Iraqi government. Trained and eager, the Peacekeeper Battalion did not wish to falter. The 716th set out to sustain the progress made by the 92d and to further it by transitioning the Iraqi police from a force that supported a kinetic fight to one that performed stability operations. Such a transition created many challenges, but the 716th remained creative, proactive, and flexible in addressing the myriad of issues. As a result of the battalion’s diligence, more than 12,000 shurta (police) were recruited and trained and Iraqi police have taken over as the primary security force in eight Baghdad “muhallas” (neighborhoods) and expanded security functions and responsibilities by integrating the Sons of Iraq¹ into their organizations.

This article presents lessons learned, highlights best practices, and describes one military police battalion’s preparation, methodology, and execution for transitioning Iraqi police to a legitimate organization.

Predeployment

There were many problems associated with the predeployment of the Peacekeepers, but those problems helped the battalion develop the analytical and critical thinking skills that were needed. In addition to preparing the headquarters and headquarters detachment (HHD) for deployment, the staff was consumed with reconstituting units that had just redeployed from OIF and Operation Enduring Freedom. And they were busy planning and preparing for the deployment of sister companies—the 194th and 561st—to OIF 07-09 as well. The 716th assisted these units until the day they boarded the plane. The staff delicately managed predeployment requirements and individual preparations with other required, work-related tasks—a job that was quite difficult at times.

As a tenant unit of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), the 716th was directly impacted by structural changes that resulted from the adaptation of the Army force generation model within the division. Consequently, battalion access to ranges and training facilities was somewhat limited, so the 716th was required to readjust training plans and objectives to work within the constraints of available areas.

Fortunately, the 101st Sustainment Brigade assumed training readiness oversight (TRO) of the Peacekeeper Battalion months in advance of the deployment. Once that oversight was established, access to resources and training facilities improved. The limited resources of the battalion were supplemented by the brigade through the approval for off-post training at the Wendell H. Ford Regional Training Center, Greenville, Kentucky, and the Fort Knox, Kentucky, military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT) site. After several months of planning and resourcing, HHD conducted a field training exercise that consisted of a 126-mile ground movement from Fort Campbell to Fort Knox. Once the Soldiers arrived at Fort Knox, they used the state-of-the-art MOUT site, renowned for recreating the contemporary operating environment of Iraq. This facility provided role players; training scenarios based on recent intelligence; and instruction on current tactics, techniques, and procedures used to address issues and problems that Soldiers would be facing during the upcoming deployment. Many of the lessons learned during this event proved valuable during the deployment.

For the staff, the culminating event that prepared them for deployment was a mission readiness exercise held at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. A week of nonstop scenarios and interaction with the 18th Military Police Brigade (the battalion’s higher headquarters for most of its deployment) allowed key staff members to work through situations together, finalizing—and sometimes

establishing—battalion standards that were implemented and used throughout the deployment.

Although riddled with constraints and competing demands, the 716th Military Police Battalion successfully validated training in preparation for the deployment while maintaining command and control of the companies that would remain at Fort Campbell. The time spent and lessons learned during predeployment assisted with a smooth deployment.

Deployment

During their fifteen-month deployment, the Peacekeeper Battalion successfully transitioned and provided oversight to nine companies, conducted two changes of command, and assisted in all matters related to the movement of three companies from one area of operation to another. Impressively, throughout all of this, more than 3,000 awards were processed; numerous promotions occurred; and over \$115 million worth of equipment was procured. Although this list of accomplishments is not all-inclusive, it illustrates the degree of logistical and administrative support that the battalion provided throughout the deployment.

In addition to the vast number of logistical and administrative tasks, the main effort of the battalion was to carry out the Multinational Division–Baghdad (MND-B) PTT mission. This required a great deal of time and effort by many. The 716th Military Police Battalion partnered with two directorates, nine districts, and thirty-seven police stations. Five PTTs were organically formed from the battalion headquarters to partner with directorate and, in some instances, district level stations. These five teams were developed and headed by the battalion commander, three staff officers, and the HHD commander. Their engagements were critical in shaping the actions and directions taken by the Iraqi police as a whole. In addition, the other eight company commanders assumed duties as district chiefs and maneuvered six to nine PTTs within their companies on a daily basis. The

PTTs provided oversight and assistance to more than 15,000 Iraqi police. The time and effort of the PTTs resulted in the development, expansion, and legitimacy of the Iraqi police force.

Postsurge

As the surge drew down and the implementation of the security agreement and preparation for the provincial election approached, the battalion found itself at the center of focus for operations. The transition from the Iraqi army to the Iraqi police was at the forefront of the agenda. The term “max partnership” was coined to describe the ideal transitional process. The battalion was charged with assisting Iraqi police in taking the lead in securing



Soldiers of HHD, 716th Military Police Battalion, conduct reflexive fire drills during predeployment training.



Soldiers of HHD, 716th Military Police Battalion, conduct medical evacuation training at Fort Campbell, Kentucky.

neighborhoods, checkpoints, and several named areas of interest. Through a complex and tedious recruiting, selection, and hiring process, more than 10,000 Iraqis were brought aboard as Sons of Iraq to support the growing demand for Iraqi police. In addition, two new emergency response unit battalions were established and fourteen new Iraqi police stations were opened. These actions provided evidence that the Iraqi police were a critical element for the community and government and that “max partnership” was truly occurring.

Although the “max partnership” process appeared to be successful, it was necessary to measure the actual success or failure of the process and the readiness of the Iraqi police to operate independently. The method of measurement was the Police Monthly Station Report. This report was used to brief senior leaders on the operational readiness assessment (ORA) of each station on a monthly basis. The ORA was a tangible way to evaluate and convey to key leaders information about the progress (or lack thereof) made within the Iraqi police organization.

In addition to the Police Monthly Station Report and ORA ratings, the Peacekeeper Battalion developed another subjective tool to provide a real-time snapshot of station capabilities. This tool, known as the “check ride” template, visually depicts how the current significant activities, the five Iraqi police competencies (apprehend, process, investigate, adjudicate, and incarcerate), and the five core systems (administration, logistics, maintenance, force protection, and training) affect the progress of a station and the transition of primacy from coalition forces to Iraqi police. As significant activities decrease and the competency and proficiency of the Iraqi police core systems grow, the time required for on-station partnering with coalition forces decreases. The check ride template makes use of a sliding scale that takes situational factors into account and provides commanders with a running estimate of Iraqi police capabilities.

Security Agreement

On 1 January 2009, the security agreement took effect, placing Iraqi forces in the lead for security operations. No longer authorized to perform combat patrols independently of their Iraqi police counterparts, the PTTs quickly incorporated Iraqi police into their daily tasks to an even greater degree. Max partnership reached its peak and began to decline as the Iraqi police took on more and more daily responsibilities. The Iraqi police are now securing checkpoints and critical sites (such as election polling sites) and conducting daily patrols, ensuring that the security of the populace is the top priority. As a result, the local populace has gained trust in the ability of the Iraqi police to perform their duties as a legitimate organization.

Conclusion

The improved security environment, increased Iraqi security force proficiency, enactment of the security agreement, and successful provincial elections have established the conditions necessary for the Iraqi government to protect the population and execute the Iraqi rule of law. Our Iraqi partners are in the process of transforming into a legitimate force, and they are making daily gains in the trust and cooperation of the populace. The actions of the Peacekeeper Battalion over the past fifteen months were an integral part of that success. The 93d Military Police Battalion, Fort Bliss, Texas—under the watch of the 8th Military Police Brigade—now continues the fight.

Endnote

¹Formerly known as Concerned Local Citizens, the Sons of Iraq is a grassroots security force made up primarily of armed Sunnis who augment coalition and Iraqi security forces by helping to maintain order and collect intelligence in their local neighborhoods.

Captain Brookshire is the assistant operations and training officer (S3), 716th Military Police Battalion, Fort Campbell, Kentucky. He holds a bachelor's degree in psychology from the University of Maryland.

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HONOR BOUND

By Command Sergeant Major Jeffrey Plemmons

“Honor Bound to Defend Freedom” is the motto of the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guard personnel who perform the detention operation mission of Joint Task Force (JTF) Guantanamo, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Their primary concern is the safe, humane, lawful care and custody of enemy combatants. In this case, the enemy combatants are terrorist radicals (including al-Qaida) who believe that it is their duty to carry out jihad, or holy war, against the “tyrants.” Descriptions of al-Qaida tactics and procedures can be found in the “Manchester Document,” an al-Qaida training manual discovered by police from Manchester, England, during a search of an al-Qaida home in 2000. According to the manual, the al-Qaida call for a confrontation that “knows the dialogue of bullets; ideals of assassination, bombing, and destruction; and diplomacy of the cannon and machine gun.”

The United States has established a humane and secure facility for the detention of captured enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay. Domestic and international visitors have noted that the conditions at Guantanamo Bay meet or exceed those of prisons elsewhere. Following a March 2006 inspection by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, a Belgian police official said, “At the level of detention facilities, it is a model prison, where people are better treated than in Belgian prisons.” Comments like this are a testament to the discipline and professionalism which our young men and women in uniform display while carrying out their everyday duties.

The first detainees arrived at Guantanamo Bay in early 2002. And after seven years of captivity, most are still committed to the cause. Joint Detention Group staff members are subjected to intimidation, threats, and assault on a daily basis. Guantanamo Bay detainees play the same games as any other inmates, with one major difference—they have a real hatred for Americans, and they actively look for opportunities to hurt or kill staff members.

The Guantanamo Bay operation is not easy, and any mistake or error in judgment can potentially result in international criticism. Under these difficult conditions, Service members operate a professional detention center, demonstrating considerable respect for the physical and mental welfare of the detainees. Despite the difficulty of the mission, our Service members are committed to keeping dangerous terrorists from planning, financing, and executing further attacks against the United States. In short, they live up to the JTF motto.

Notwithstanding the humane conditions, the U.S. administration has acknowledged that the continued operation of Guantanamo Bay remains a source of controversy. Of course, some of these criticisms would persist no matter where the detainees were housed, but some pertain specifically to the past operation of the facility at Guantanamo Bay. Regardless of your personal feelings about Guantanamo Bay, you can sleep well at night knowing that the Service members of JTF Guantanamo are “Honor Bound to Defend Freedom” and committed to protecting U.S. citizens around the world.

Command Sergeant Major Jeffrey Plemmons is the senior enlisted advisor to the Commander, Army Corrections Command, Arlington, Virginia. He served as the senior enlisted advisor to the Commander, Joint Detention Group, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in 2006 and 2007.

Camp 5: Breaking the Stereotype

By Second Lieutenant Joshua K. Frye

Images of the detention facilities at U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, dominate the news media. Old photographs and videos of Camp X-Ray, including images of guards wearing outdated battle dress uniforms and escorting orange-clad detainees between wooden huts, frequently resurface. Reality, though, is very different. By mid-April 2002, operations at Camp X-ray had ceased and detainees were immediately dispersed to other facilities located behind the wire.

By September 2003, Kellogg, Brown, and Root, Inc., and Hensel-Phelps International had begun construction on new, state-of-the-art detention facilities. Camp 5, which was the first of these facilities, was completed in April 2004. The \$17.5-million complex was an excellent example of the military tradition in which Soldiers continually work to “improve the foxhole;” in May 2004—just two years after all detainees had been moved from Camp X-Ray—Camp 5 was occupied.

Camp 5 was designed based on a high-security U.S. penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana, with some adaptations for the unique mission of housing detainees at Guantanamo Bay. The facility was designed for reduced manpower requirements and detainee movement. It meets all standards and U.S. building codes and boasts the latest in amenities and security, including digital access and utility management, full climate control, handicap accommodations, medical facilities, and recreation areas. Each of the four 2-story wings includes numerous 12- by 8-foot cells. Each cell is camera-capable; includes a bunk, toilet, sink, mirror, and breakaway hooks; and receives natural light through a window with an outside view. Camp 5 is primarily manned by U.S. Army military police internment/resettlement specialists.

As detainee operations have progressed, Camp 5 has been continuously enhanced and upgraded inside and out. Suggestions from the guard force have been implemented over time. The realization that one recreation yard would be inadequate when compliant detainees began to receive four hours of recreation per day prompted the construction of two additional recreation yards. Bulletin boards were erected so that camp rules and newsletters could be posted. Exercise equipment such as treadmills, elliptical machines, and soccer balls were provided. Movie rooms were also added, and compliant detainees are allowed uninterrupted

time to watch a movie or read newspapers for two hours per week. And detainees are now afforded the opportunity for communal meals in the recreation yards every Monday and Friday, allowing for social time and group prayer. Most recently, a classroom was constructed to accommodate detainee instruction on a variety of topics.

Other modifications have been made to ensure force protection. Many of the detainees housed at Camp 5 are noncompliant. Assaults with various bodily fluids are very common. Guards are required to wear personal protective equipment to counteract these assaults. In the past, the staff wore ballistic eyewear. However, as threats of these assaults increased, splash face shields and gloves became mandatory for guards who interact with detainees. Another modification that has been made to ensure force protection is that meal tray slots remain secure except during prayers in which the *moo adhan* (prayer caller) and *imam* (prayer leader) must address the tier. And special meal tray boxes may be used to pass food and other items into the cells of detainees who have a history of assaults.

Notwithstanding these changes, continuing images of Camp X-Ray in the media perpetuate negative perceptions of detainee treatment. These outdated images do not promote a broader public understanding of the current mission of Joint Task Force Guantanamo (comprised of representatives of all Department of Defense [DOD] services, the U.S. Coast Guard, and other organizations)—namely to conduct “safe, humane, legal, and transparent care and custody of detainees.” And they do not promote a broader public understanding of the Joint Detention Group, which is a part of Joint Task Force Guantanamo that consists primarily of U.S. Army and Navy personnel who are directly responsible for operating the facilities at Guantanamo Bay. It is within this operational environment that Soldiers must perform their challenging mission. Two of the keys to successful mission performance are discipline and impartiality.

Second Lieutenant Frye is a platoon leader assigned to the 193d Military Police Company, 525th Military Police Battalion, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Platoon leaders serve as assistant officers in charge of Camp 5. Second Lieutenant Frye holds a bachelor's degree in criminal justice with a minor in military science from East Tennessee State University.

90th Military Police Detachment (CID)



Lineage and Honors

Constituted 7 July 1952 in the Regular Army as the 90th Military Police Criminal Investigation Detachment (CID).

Activated 1 August 1952 at Fort McClellan, Alabama.

Reorganized and redesignated 19 April 1954 as the 90th Military Police Detachment.

Inactivated 24 March 1965 at Fort McClellan, Alabama.

Activated 16 June 1965 at Fort Riley, Kansas.

Inactivated 28 March 1973 in Vietnam.

Activated 16 April 1994 at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

Campaign Participation Credit

Vietnam

Defense; Counteroffensive; Counteroffensive, Phase II; Counteroffensive, Phase III; Tet Counteroffensive; Counteroffensive, Phase IV; Counteroffensive, Phase V; Counteroffensive, Phase VI; Tet 69/Counteroffensive; Summer–Fall 1969; Winter–Spring 1970; Sanctuary Counteroffensive; Counteroffensive, Phase VII; Consolidation I; Consolidation II; Cease-Fire

Decorations

Presidential Unit Citation (Army)—Streamer embroidered SAIGON-TET OFFENSIVE

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army)—Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1966

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army)—Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1968

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army)—Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1968–1969

Navy Unit Commendation—Streamer embroidered SAIGON

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm—Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1965–1968

DOCTRINE UPDATE

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center Directorate of Training Doctrine Development Division			
Publication Number	Title	Date	Description
Current Publications			
FM 3-19.1	Military Police Operations	22 Mar 01 C1 31 Jan 02	A keystone manual that is the foundation for all military police doctrine. This manual communicates (to all levels of leadership and staff) how the military police provide a flexible and scalable force capable of full-spectrum operations. Status: Under revision (to be published FY 10).
FM 3-19.4	Military Police Leaders' Handbook	4 Mar 02 C1 2 Aug 02	A manual that addresses military police maneuver and mobility support, area security, internment/resettlement (I/R), law and order, and police intelligence operations across the full spectrum of Army operations. It primarily focuses on the principles of platoon operations and the tactics, techniques, and procedures necessary. Status: Current.
FM 3-19.6	Armored Security Vehicle	24 May 06	A manual that provides military police forces with the tactics, techniques, and procedures and related information necessary for the employment of the armored security vehicle. Status: Current.
FM 19-10 (FM 3-19.10)	Military Police Law and Order Operations	30 Sep 87	A manual that addresses each element of the military police law and order mission, including law enforcement, investigation, U.S. military prisoner confinement, and counterterrorism operations. Status: Projected for revision FY 09/10.
FM 3-19.11	Military Police Special-Reaction Teams	13 May 05	A manual that serves as a guide for commanders, staffs, and trainers who are responsible for training and deploying military police special-reaction teams. Status: Current.
FM 3-19.12	Protective Services	11 Aug 04	A manual that addresses tactics, techniques, and procedures for special agents of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command and military police assigned to protective services duties. Status: Current.
FM 3-19.13	Law Enforcement Investigations	10 Jan 05	A manual that serves as a guide for military police, investigators, and U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command special agents operating in tactical and garrison environments. Status: Current.
FM 3-19.15	Civil Disturbance Operations	18 Apr 05	A manual that addresses continental U.S. and outside the continental U.S. civil disturbance operations and domestic unrest, including the military role in providing assistance to civil authorities. Status: Current.
FM 3-19.17	Military Working Dogs	6 Jul 05 C1 22 Sep 05	A manual that addresses the current capabilities of the Military Police Working Dog Program and the potential for future capabilities. Status: Under revision (to be published FY 10).

DOCTRINE UPDATE

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center Directorate of Training Doctrine Development Division			
Publication Number	Title	Date	Description
Current Publications (continued)			
FM 19-25	Military Police Traffic Operations	30 Sep 77	A manual that addresses traffic operations in garrison and combat environments. Status: To be incorporated into FM 3-19.10 in FY 10.
FM 3-19.30	Physical Security	8 Jan 01	A manual that establishes guidance for all personnel responsible for physical security. This manual is the basic reference for training security personnel and is intended to be a one-stop physical security source. Status: Under revision FY 09.
FM 3-19.40	Internment/Resettlement Operations	4 Sep 07 C1 17 Dec 07	A manual that addresses I/R operations across the entire spectrum of conflict. It serves as the key integrating manual for I/R operations and depicts the doctrinal foundation, principles, and processes that military police employ when dealing with I/R populations (detainees, U.S. military prisoners, and dislocated civilians). Status: Under revision FY 09.
FM 3-19.50	Police Intelligence Operations	21 Jul 06	A manual that addresses police intelligence operations which support, enhance, and contribute to situational understanding, homeland defense, and protection of the force by integrating police engagement, police information, and police investigations to support law and order operations and the intelligence process. Status: Under revision FY 09.
FM 3-90.31	Maneuver Enhancement Brigade Operations	26 Feb 09	A manual that provides operational guidance for commanders and trainers at all echelons. It facilitates operations and employment considerations of the maneuver enhancement brigade as it organizes, prepares for, and conducts full-spectrum operations.
Note: Current military police publications can be accessed and downloaded in electronic format from the Reimer Digital Library at http://www.adtdl.army.mil/ or from the U.S. Army Military Police School Web site at http://www.wood.army.mil/usamps/ . Comments or questions about military police doctrine can be e-mailed to leon.mdottddmpdoc@conus.army.mil .			
Emerging Publications			
FM 3-07.2	Antiterrorism Operations	Jul 10 (estimate)	A manual that will establish the Army's guidance on how to integrate and synchronize antiterrorism across the full spectrum of conflict and into the full range of military operations. This manual will show how antiterrorism operations nest under full-spectrum operations, the protection warfighting function, and the composite risk management process.
FM 3-10	Protection	FY 09	A manual that will follow joint doctrine and introduce the protection warfighting function and its purpose of preserving the force, personnel (combatant and noncombatant), physical assets, and information.

Dedication

The following members of the Military Police Corps Regiment have been lost in the War on Terrorism since our last issue. We dedicate this issue to them.



First Lieutenant William E. Emmert
269th Military Police Company
117th Military Police Battalion
Tennessee Army National Guard
Murfreesboro, Tennessee

Specialist Roberto A. Hernandez
549th Military Police Company
385th Military Police Battalion
16th Military Police Brigade
Fort Stewart, Georgia



Sergeant Raul Moncada
563d Military Police Company
91st Military Police Battalion
10th Sustainment Brigade
10th Mountain Division
Fort Drum, New York

Specialist Gary L. Moore
978th Military Police Company
93d Military Police Battalion
Fort Bliss, Texas



Specialist Jonathan C. O'Neill
549th Military Police Company
385th Military Police Battalion
16th Military Police Brigade
Fort Stewart, Georgia

Sergeant Jeffrey A. Reed
411th Military Police Company
720th Military Police Battalion
89th Military Police Brigade
Fort Hood, Texas



Sergeant Daniel J. Thompson
715th Military Police Company
Florida Army National Guard
Melbourne, Florida

Honoring the Fallen

By Captain Thomas Cieslak and Private First Class Garrett Hernandez



Colonel Garrity and Command Sergeant Major Lambert unveil additions to the Fallen Soldier Memorial.

On 5 June 2009, military police and their guests gathered at the Fallen Soldier Memorial, located at the headquarters of the 16th Military Police Brigade (Airborne), Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to pay tribute to their fallen comrades. The memorial honors service members from all states and military components who have died while serving with the 16th Military Police Brigade.

The names of seven 16th Military Police Brigade Soldiers who died during the past year were read during the ceremony: Staff Sergeant Jonathan W. Dean, Staff Sergeant Stephen J. Goodman, Specialist Roberto S. Hernandez, Sergeant Raul Moncada, Sergeant Matthew R. Simmons, Sergeant First Class Raymond T. Weicher, and Sergeant David B. Williams. Colonel John Garrity, commander of the 16th Military Police Brigade, and Command Sergeant Major Brian Lambert, command sergeant major of the 16th Military Police Brigade, unveiled the memorial, revealing the additional names inscribed on the stone. They also laid a wreath at the base of the memorial. In addition, a bronze sculpture of boots, an upturned rifle, and a helmet was also dedicated. Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) from the brigade donated the money necessary for the additions to the memorial.

In honor of the Army's "Year of the NCO," Command Sergeant Major Lambert also spoke at the ceremony. "Take time to reflect why we are a free nation. It is because of Soldiers like the ones with their names inscribed on the memorial who made our country what it is today," he said. "Americans know the sacrifices that our military has made to keep our country free." He concluded the ceremony by saying, "We must never forget our fallen Soldiers. They have provided the freedoms we take for granted every day."

***Editor's Note:** The name of Specialist Jonathan C. O'Neill, who was killed on 17 June 2009, was also recently inscribed on the Fallen Soldier Memorial.*

Captain Cieslak is the public affairs officer for the 16th Military Police Brigade, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He holds a bachelor's degree in political science from Gannon University, Erie, Pennsylvania.

Private First Class Hernandez is a public affairs specialist with the 16th Military Police Brigade.

324th Military Police Battalion

Lineage and Honors

Constituted 31 May 1942 in the Army of the United States as the 801st Military Police Battalion.

Activated 4 June 1942 at Fort Ord, California.

Inactivated 31 May 1946 in the Philippine Islands.

Redesignated 11 June 1947 as the 324th Military Police Battalion and allotted to the Organized Reserves.

Activated 4 July 1947 at Seattle, Washington.

(Organized Reserves redesignated 25 March 1948 as the Organized Reserve Corps and 9 July 1952 as the Army Reserve.)

Battalion broken up 21 August–19 September 1948 and its elements reorganized and redesignated as follows:

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment reorganized and redesignated 21 August 1959 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company.

(Companies A and B inactivated 21 August 1959 at Seattle, Washington; disbanded 22 August 1959.)

(Company C inactivated 18 September 1959 at Tacoma, Washington; disbanded 19 September 1959.)

(Company D inactivated 18 September 1959 at Pasco, Washington; disbanded 19 September 1959.)

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, reorganized and redesignated 15 March 1963 as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment.

Changed location 10 January 1968 to Fort Lawton, Washington; 1 December 1972 to Seattle, Washington; and 16 July 1983 to Fort Lawton, Washington.


Inactivated 15 September 1990 at Fort Lawton, Washington.

Activated 1 September 1997 at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.

Changed location in 2000 to Chambersburg, Pennsylvania.

Ordered into active military service 10 February 2003 at Chambersburg, Pennsylvania; released from active military service 9 February 2004 and reverted to reserve status.

Ordered into active military service 23 June 2006 at Chambersburg, Pennsylvania; released from active military service 19 December 2007 and reverted to reserve status.



Campaign Participation Credit

World War II

New Guinea; Luzon

War on Terrorism

Campaigns to be determined

Decorations

Philippine Presidential Unit Citation—

Streamer embroidered 17 OCTOBER 1944 TO 4 JULY 1945

Learning to Let the Evidence Reveal the Truth:

The Body Farm Reveals More Than Just Bodies

By Major Ian J. Townsend

As you enter through the gate of the ten-foot-high, razor wire-topped, wooden fence into the sparsely wooded area, there are two things that hit you immediately—the sight of what seems to be randomly placed black plastic tarps littering the ground in the underbrush and the distinctive odor of death.

What is this place, and what happens here? This is the University of Tennessee Forensic Anthropology Center or—as it is more commonly referred to—the Body Farm. Simply stated, the Body Farm is “about how [forensic anthropologists and investigators] determine time of death, or whether a body was moved after death and where it might have been before it was moved, and who the dead person was, and how he or she died.”¹

The Body Farm was the site of recent professional development training for a dozen special agents and three leaders of the 1000th Military Police Battalion (CID),² Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and 3d Military Police Group (CID), Fort Gillem, Georgia. There, the officers and noncommissioned officers became better U.S. Army criminal investigators through instruction on taphonomy.

The four-hour class was conducted by two research center faculty members—Ms. Rebecca Wilson and Dr. Joanne Devlin. Their instruction began with a brief history of the Forensic Anthropology Center. The facility, which is part of the University of Tennessee Department of Anthropology, is the only one of its kind in the United States. It was officially opened by Dr. Bill Bass in 1981 and is now the premier human decomposition research facility in the country. There are currently about 170 bodies in various states of decomposition throughout the two-acre area of the Body Farm. Although additional information regarding the history of the facility is presented in Dr. Bass’ nonfiction book, *Death’s Acre*, one agent who attended the professional development training stated, “I’ve read two books written by Dr. Bass; and a complete appreciation for research efforts, along with the determination of his students, cannot be properly given until visiting the Body Farm.”

Ms. Wilson and Dr. Devlin covered many topics in the fast-paced, outdoor classroom instruction. Initial decomposition, insects, mold, death during various seasons, decomposition in an indoor versus outdoor

environment, and the disposition of blood were among the topics that were discussed, explained, and demonstrated.

Participants learned about the five stages of decomposition of animals—in this case humans—after they die. Stage 1, the initial decay or fresh decomposition stage, occurs from zero to seventy-two hours after death. Stage 2, the putrefaction (tissue liquefaction) or bloat stage, occurs about four to ten days after death. Because special agents usually arrive at a crime scene within the first forty-eight hours of a death, Stages 1 and 2 are generally the most important. However, bodies may be encountered in any stage of decomposition in an Army criminal investigation.

Agents observed and discussed bodies that were in various stages of decomposition, ranging from one that had just been placed in the Body Farm on the previous day to skeletons of bodies that had been there for more than twenty years. Comparisons were made between bodies that had been embalmed and those that had not. Agents discussed the fact that the bodies they are called upon to investigate are further along in the decomposition process than an embalmed body would be. This led to a discussion concerning what happens when a person dies and the body begins to decompose. Agents wanted to know what clues could be used to help determine the stage of decomposition upon their arrival at the scene.

Normally, the first insect to arrive at the scene of a recent death is the blowfly. Blowflies lay eggs primarily in the eyes, nose, and hair of a body within the first twenty-four hours following death. The eggs hatch, and maggots emerge by the second stage of the decomposition process. The maggots, in turn, increase the rate of decomposition as they further destroy the body through their actions. In addition to blowflies, ants also stimulate the decomposition of dead bodies. When ants feed on a body, the skin turns



yellow. To an untrained investigator, the result may look like abrasions. Therefore, it is important for agents to be capable of differentiating between decomposition caused by the actions of ants and abrasions that occurred prior to death.

Another easily recognized process that can provide clues about the stage of human decomposition is the formation of mold on the body. The instructors discussed the length of time necessary for the formation of molds and the order in which various molds generally form. They also showed many examples of mold that had formed on dead bodies.

Agents learned that investigations involving dead bodies require that the time of year be taken into account, since seasons affect the decomposition rates of remains. For example, the appearance of a body twenty-four hours after death in the summer is different than that of a body twenty-four hours after death in the winter. This professional development training took place in March, so the agents were able to observe the amount of putrefaction and bloat that had occurred during a week's time in the spring season by comparing a body that had been placed in the Body Farm the day prior to the instruction with one that had been placed there a week prior to the instruction. During the summer months, it is common for a dead body to quickly move to a full bloat. On the other hand, under cold and dry conditions, more mummification takes place and the skin and organs are preserved for longer periods of time. Additionally, a body that was in place during warm conditions and later subjected to sustained colder conditions (such as occurs when fall transitions to winter) can undergo saponification—the process by which body fat is converted to adipocere, a waxy-like substance. Ms. Wilson presented an example of saponification when, with her glove-covered hand, she pulled off layers of adipocere and reminded everyone that “We are what we eat.”

Agents also learned that bodies tend to move more quickly toward putrefaction and bloat in an outdoor environment and then decompose from there. In an indoor environment, such as a building or car, bodies move toward putrefaction and bloat more slowly and the subsequent decomposition is more gradual. This information is important, given that agents investigate indoor and outdoor deaths.

Ms. Wilson presented information about what happens to the blood in a body after death. Gravity initially causes the blood to pool in certain locations; and as the molecules

of blood break down, the skin in those locations begins to change color. Using several bodies as examples, Ms. Wilson showed the resultant multicolored, marbled effect of blood by-products on the skin. Although green is the most prominent color, blue, purple, black, and red also occur. Areas such as these are often mistakenly identified as locations of blunt-force trauma or bruises. Special agents should remember and consider this before jumping to conclusions on their next death investigation.

The professional development training at the Body Farm is one of the most interesting, informative, and professional training sessions available. Participants become better-equipped to perform investigations, and some even become interested in pursuing careers as CID forensic science officers. One agent said, “I believe [the training] was educational to help us understand the various stages of decomposition and how the environment, weather, and terrain affect the bodies. Most training concerning those factors is normally conducted with photographs. You don’t get as much of an understanding of the different effects from viewing photographs as you do from seeing the actual bodies.”

Donations are an important factor in keeping the Forensic Anthropology Center going. Retired law enforcement officers and educators are the primary sources of donations—probably due to their desire to give something back in the effort to educate younger generations of detectives and teachers. This is a testament to the great things that police do for society—both while they are working and after they have passed on from their life of service.

Additional information about the University of Tennessee Forensic Anthropology Center is available at <http://web.utk.edu/~fac/>.

Endnotes:

¹Patricia Cornwell, forward to *Death's Acre: Inside the Legendary Forensic Lab, the Body Farm, Where the Dead Do Tell Tales* (written by Dr. Bill Bass and Jon Jefferson), Penguin Group, New York, New York, 2003, p. xi.

²“CID” is an acronym commonly used to refer to the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC).

Major Townsend is the executive officer of the 1000th Military Police Battalion (CID), Fort Campbell, Kentucky. He holds a bachelor's degree in political science from Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas.



Military police Soldiers and noncommissioned officers make excellent CID agents. If the training described in this article or the opportunity to investigate felony crime in the U.S. Army interests you, you can get more information about becoming a special agent by visiting your local CID office or going to http://www.cid.army.mil/join_CID.html.

18th Military Police Brigade Learns Advanced Crime Scene Techniques

By Specialist Adrienne Killingsworth

Soldiers from the 18th Military Police Brigade, along with U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) (commonly referred to as “CID”) special agents from throughout Germany, participated in a one-week Advanced Crime Scene Investigative Techniques Course held 13–17 April in Grafenwoehr, Germany. The training, which was organized by the 202d Military Police Group (CID) and 1002d Military Police Battalion (CID), was a mixture of classroom instruction and practical exercises.

Because military police officers and CID agents work together at crime scenes, it is important for each of them to understand the role of the other. This course provided participants with an opportunity to enhance previous training, and it gave military police a chance to explore forensic aspects of crime scene investigations. The role of military police at a crime scene is typically that of an initial responder; their duties traditionally include securing the scene, providing aid to victims, and keeping nonessential personnel away from the scene. Through the Advanced Crime Scene Course, military police gained a better understanding of what takes place at a crime scene upon the arrival of CID personnel.

The course began with instruction in photography because, according to the instructor, so much of the training hinges on a strong understanding of photography in the investigative process. Basic camera techniques were reviewed, and students applied the training to photographing evidence and conducting surveillance photography. Students also received instruction on the principles of forensic photography, presentation of photographs in court, and process of photographing a crime scene.

Next, participants learned the specifics of analyzing blood evidence at a crime scene, including blood pattern analysis, blood evidence collection, and forensic entomology (the relationship between insects and physical human evidence). During practical exercises, students collected blood samples. They also collected forensic entomological “field” evidence at a mock crime scene. The purpose of this portion of the training was for Soldiers to gain an understanding of analysis—not to make them blood evidence experts.

Finally, KrimeSite™ Imager training provided students with the opportunity to use refracted ultraviolet light to locate fingerprints that were invisible to the naked eye. Multiple methods for the collection and identification of fingerprints at a crime scene were introduced in the practical exercises associated with the training.

According to brigade officials, familiarization with the functional areas covered in the Advanced Crime Scene Course increases the forensic awareness of military police as they approach a crime scene. This allows them to better protect and preserve items that CID agents may collect as evidence when they arrive.



18th Military Police Brigade students gather soil and insect samples from a mock crime scene during the Advanced Crime Scene Investigative Techniques Course.

Specialist Killingsworth is a public affairs specialist with the 18th Military Police Brigade, Mannheim, Germany. She holds a bachelor's degree in English literature from California State University–Northridge.



The World of a U.S. Army Special Agent

By Mr. Colby Hauser

There are many reasons to consider a career in the military, but for the professionals of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) (commonly referred to as "CID"), serving as a special agent is much more than a career decision—it is a way of life. "It needs to be a calling because you don't get to flip a switch off at the end of the day," said Special Agent David Eller, a CID chief warrant officer. "It's an opportunity to be a part of something significantly larger than oneself," he said.

The level of responsibility placed on CID agents is immense. Agents often work independently, with little to no supervision. And they may be assigned missions that have a significant impact on the local command—or even the Army at large. "You are often placed in a position that has much higher expectations. Whether it's protecting a dignitary at a foreign summit to working a murder case, you have to be on your 'A' game every day," Eller said. "The flash-to-bang time on failure is very, very short."

When it comes to the rewarding career of a special agent, CID investigators recommend that prospective applicants thoughtfully consider the decision. "It's a tough job—especially investigations," said Special Agent John Spann, a senior CID special agent. "If you are going to do it as a career, you have to be willing to change your lifestyle; but it's worth it," he said.

Due to the nature of the work, little information concerning ongoing CID investigations and techniques is released; therefore, outside encouragement and recognition for a job well done is often slow in coming or even nonexistent. "There are a lot of times where the success of a case is announced by its silence," Eller stated. However, it is commitment and dedication to the mission that set special agents apart. "Joe Public isn't going to come up and congratulate you every day," Spann said. "It's doing the right thing at the right time on your own. That's what it's all about."

CID investigates felony level crimes of interest to the Army worldwide. Special agents, who are federal law enforcement officials, are some of the most highly trained criminal investigators in law enforcement. CID agents have the opportunity to attend advanced training at some of the most prestigious law enforcement programs in the world, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) National Academy, Metropolitan Police Crime Academy at Scotland Yard, Department of Defense (DOD) Polygraph Institute, and Canadian Police Academy. "The advanced school and career opportunities are outstanding," said Special Agent Jennifer Bryan, chief of economic crime and logistics security with CID. "From the FBI Academy to Scotland Yard to the master's program in forensic science at [The] George Washington [University], the potential is always there to go somewhere to develop your career."

Unlike many other major law enforcement organizations, CID special agents do not always specialize in any singular discipline, so agents could find themselves conducting a murder investigation one week and an arson investigation the next. Eller said this jack-of-all-trades approach makes for a very well-rounded agent. Coupled with diverse assignments and advanced training opportunities, this allows agents to develop unique skill sets which are in very high demand in the civilian sector.

Professional career opportunities are just one reason special agents serving in the Army make the transition to CID. For some, it is the obvious next step in their military law enforcement career; for others, it is an opportunity they do not want to miss. "Moving to CID, for me, was just a natural progression within my military career," said CID Special Agent Harold Van Dusen. "I started out working on a [personnel security detail] as [a military policeman], and the transition seemed like a good opportunity."

Serving a global community of more than one million Soldiers, civilians, and family members, CID is always on the lookout for prospective agents and is seeking individuals who not only meet the basic requirements to become a special agent, but also possess certain characteristics that are demonstrated by most successful agents. "We need agents who'll take ownership of their investigations, but the most important thing we're looking for is integrity," Eller said. "When you commit yourself to this profession, the satisfaction often is internal."

U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command



“We’re looking for a person of character— somebody who is loyal, balanced, professional, and organized,” Spann said. He added that agents deal with many negative aspects of life, and with a worldwide mission and an extremely high operational tempo, the ability to balance one’s personal and professional lives is a must.

If you are interested in seeking a career as a CID special agent, contact your local CID office or go to <http://www.cid.army.mil> for additional information.

Mr. Hauser is the community relations officer for CID. He holds a bachelor’s degree in mass communications from the University of Oklahoma.

Recovery of Two Missing Soldiers

By Special Agent Martin Eaves

Last summer, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) (commonly referred to as “CID”) special agents were dispatched to execute the sensitive-site exploitation of an area adjacent to Iskandariyah, Iraq. Discarded U.S. Army uniforms and equipment had been discovered in the area, and it was believed that human remains might be present there. In addition, CID was conducting an ongoing investigation into the kidnapping of two U.S. Soldiers who were believed to have been taken by insurgents in the aftermath of an ambush that had taken place in May 2007.

Upon their arrival at the scene, CID elements were greeted by Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Newsome, commander of the 3-7 Infantry Battalion. Battalion personnel had discovered, secured, and protected the site.



Photographing evidence during the search

CID, human remains detection, and explosive military working dog teams and the 3-7 Infantry Battalion initiated a systematic search of the cordoned area. This resulted in the discovery of shallow graves and numerous other areas of interest containing suspected human remains. U.S. Army uniforms and equipment recovered from the area bore the insignia of the missing Soldiers’ unit. Name tapes belonging to one of the Soldiers were affixed to some of the evidence. The scene and surrounding search areas extended for nearly a kilometer.

Examinations by members of the Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, Washington, D.C., later confirmed the identities of the two Soldiers as Staff Sergeant Alex R. Jimenez and Private First Class Byron J. Fouty.

Special Agent Eaves is a forensic sciences officer and assistant operations officer with the 202d Military Police Group (CID), Kaiserslautern, Germany. He holds a bachelor’s degree in public administration with an emphasis in law enforcement from Upper Iowa University and a master’s degree in forensic science from The George Washington University, Washington, D.C.



The Battle of Isandlwana, shown in a contemporary illustration from the *Illustrated London News*

Never Such a Disaster:

An Analysis of the British Defeat at Isandlwana

By Captain Christine Keating

“Never has such a disaster happened to the English army.”

—Unknown British officer in a letter describing the battle of Isandlwana

On 22 January 1879, British colonial forces clashed with native Zulu warriors at the mountain of Isandlwana in Zululand. Though armed with far superior weaponry, the British were vastly outnumbered and could not overcome the Zulu enemy, dying almost to a man in valiant last stands along the sloping plains at the base of the mountain. However, the defeat was not a simple case of being outnumbered. Commanders on both sides made critical leadership decisions that contributed to the outcome. For the Zulu, these were good decisions; for the British, fatal ones. The resounding victory for the Zulu at the Battle of Isandlwana demonstrates how the proper employment of the military principles of mass and surprise can contribute to military success. The outcome of the battle also exhibits a failure of the British leadership to adhere to the principles of mass and unity of command.

In the late 19th century, Zululand (located along the east coast of present-day South Africa) was situated

between two British colonial territories—Natal to the south and Transvaal to the west-northwest. Following the discovery of diamonds in South Africa years earlier, the geographic location of Zululand made it a highly desirable prize for the British Empire.¹ Therefore, in December 1878, Sir Henry Bartle Frere, a powerful British colonial officer in Natal, issued an ultimatum to King Cetshwayo kaMpande, the Zulu king: Abolish the Zulu *amabutho* (conscription system) and accept a British imperial presence at the Zulu royal homestead—or face occupation by force.² The king refused; and on 11 January 1879, Lieutenant General Frederick Thesiger, Second Baron Chelmsford—commander of the British “Centre Column”—marched 4,500 troops across the Mzinyathi River, which divided Natal from Zululand.³ British aggression against Zulu sovereignty had begun.

After crossing into Zululand, Lord Chelmsford had his 2d Column, under the command of Brevet Colonel



Anthony Durnford, remain at the river crossing at Rorke's Drift, while Lord Chelmsford himself pressed inland with the rest of the Centre Column.⁴ He reached the mountain of Isandlwana on 20 January. There, he paused to set up camp, rest his men, and reconnoiter the surrounding area. Because Lord Chelmsford planned only a temporary stop at Isandlwana, he made no effort to fortify the camp or set up a laager with the wagons.⁵ However, he took steps toward gathering intelligence by sending mounted police, under the command of Major John Dartnell, to reconnoiter Hlazakazi Ridge and Mangeni Gorge to the south, where Chelmsford believed they would encounter the enemy.⁶ There, Major Dartnell's mounted troops spotted a band of several hundred Zulu warriors. He sent word back to camp about what he had discovered and requested reinforcements. Chelmsford, believing that the main body of the Zulu army had been located, personally set out with the reinforcements in the wee hours of the morning on 22 January.⁷ Even this anticipated encounter with the Zulu army was treated lightly; several nonessential staff officers who accompanied Lord Chelmsford had "just come out for a ride."⁸ Chelmsford left the camp under the charge of Lieutenant Colonel Henry Pulleine, one of his battalion commanders who had joined the unit only days before. He also sent orders to Brevet Colonel Durnford to bring his troops forward to Isandlwana.⁹ When the battle began, there were only about 1,700 British troops at Isandlwana, including a few hundred Natal Native Contingent soldiers—native Africans fighting for the British.

The roving band of warriors that Lord Chelmsford's scouts had seen was actually only a portion of King Cetshwayo's planned diversion; his main body was camped further east. The king had recognized the implied threat of Sir Bartle Frere's ultimatum and had begun mustering his citizen-soldiers. Under the Zulu system, there was no standing army; but each military-aged male was trained and belonged to a local militia group that could be called upon to fight.¹⁰ When British forces penetrated Zululand, King Cetshwayo's army, under the command of *inkhosi* (General) Ntshingwayo kaMphole (a seasoned battle veteran and longtime advisor to the king), stood ready



King Cetshwayo kaMphande

at 25,000 warriors.¹¹ Cetshwayo was clearly prepared to adhere to the principle of mass (defined in the current Field Manual [FM] 3-0 as the "[concentration of] the effects of combat power at the decisive place and time"),¹² reserving his entire force—minus scouts and skirmishers—to strike at once. Even after sending roving parties of a few thousand warriors (including the troops that Major Dartnell had located) to divert British attention, Cetshwayo was still able to dedicate more than 20,000 Zulu warriors to one fight, rather than split them up to pursue the various British elements. The result was that the Zulu overwhelmingly outnumbered the British (nearly 20 to 1) when the battle began.

The battle itself began earlier than King Cetshwayo and General Ntshingwayo had planned. For religious reasons, the Zulu attack was to take place on the morning



From left: Sir Henry Bartle Frere, Lord Chelmsford, Brevet Colonel Durnford, Major John Dartnell, and Lieutenant Colonel Henry Pulleine

of the 23d, following the new moon on the night of the 22d.¹³ However, upon reaching Isandlwana with the 2d Column on the morning of the 22d, Brevet Colonel Durnford sent some of his troops to perform a reconnaissance; one of the troops (Lieutenant Charles Raw) stumbled upon the sleeping Zulu camp while pursuing a small group of Zulu cattle herders.¹⁴ As it turned out, Chelmsford's initial scouts had not thoroughly reconnoitered the surrounding area and, thus, had no idea that the Zulu army was there. The waning moon had provided a deep cover of darkness for King Cetshwayo's remarkably disciplined army; during the nights preceding the battle, the Zulu warriors slept in complete darkness and silence, with no fires for cooking or warmth.¹⁵

The strict noise-and-light discipline enabled King Cetshwayo to use the element of surprise (defined in FM 3-0 as "[striking] the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared") against the British.¹⁶ Had it not been for Lieutenant Raw's accidental discovery, the British forces would likely have remained oblivious to the 20,000 warriors camped just a few miles away. Upon being discovered, the Zulu army again demonstrated a high level of discipline—the obvious result of rigorous training and the thorough dissemination of the battle plan. The surprised Zulu soldiers immediately swarmed the startled British scouts and began pursuit back toward Isandlwana, organizing their battle formations on the run.¹⁷ Zulu commanders rapidly regained control of the rushing, disarrayed army, forming their units into their signature "buffalo" formation in which forces divided into right and left "horns," with the bulk of the force comprising the "chest" in the center. Because the attack had not been anticipated, the British camp at Isandlwana was vulnerable and woefully unprepared for the sudden enveloping swarm of Zulu that descended upon it.

Although Lieutenant Raw sent runners back to warn Lieutenant Colonel Pulleine of the pending attack,¹⁸ there was little the defenders could do in the short time before the Zulu warriors were upon them. Chelmsford's decision to divide his forces, born of his gross underestimation of Zulu capabilities, had left the camp with arrantly insufficient manpower and artillery. This decision to split the British forces directly contradicts the enduring military principle of mass. Chelmsford clearly believed that a portion of his force could handle the Zulu threat—a belief formed partially by Major Dartnell's report that only a few hundred Zulu had been sighted and partially by the arrogant, but widely accepted, colonial wisdom of the day that the British could not be defeated by a native force. Incomplete intelligence, coupled with Chelmsford's faith in the apparent superiority of British weaponry and fighting capability, caused him to discount the value of mass—one of the most timeless military principles. Had the entire Centre Column been present at Isandlwana when the Zulu army attacked, the resultant increase in manpower and the rate of fire could probably have

stayed a complete rout at least and crushed the lesser-equipped Zulu force at most.

When he chose to leave Isandlwana, Lord Chelmsford also failed to ensure that the unity of command (defined in FM 3-0 as "unity of effort under one responsible commander") was preserved at the camp.¹⁹ He ordered Lieutenant Colonel Pulleine to remain at the camp and protect it with his battalion. He simultaneously issued vague orders to Brevet Colonel Durnford to "march to [Isandlwana] at once with all the force you have," without specifying the purpose for Durnford's presence at the camp.²⁰ As a result, Durnford arrived at Isandlwana unsure of whether he was expected to follow on after Chelmsford's main body in anticipation of battle or if he was to remain at the camp. Additionally, since Durnford outranked Pulleine, Durnford expected to take command upon his arrival. For his part, Pulleine was specifically instructed that the camp and its security were his responsibility; and he had no intention of relinquishing his command or supplementing Durnford's column with his troops.²¹ This confusion over who was truly in charge prevented either man from establishing command and control and inhibited efforts to establish security and a clear logistical support structure.

Having no unity of command had a direct negative effect on combat units once the fighting began. Lieutenant Colonel Pulleine's quartermasters were unprepared to support the increase in the number of troops resulting from the addition of Brevet Colonel Durnford's column. Because quartermasters were reluctant to distribute ammunition to soldiers outside their units, many crates of ammunition went unopened during the battle.²² Meanwhile, soldiers ran out of ammunition on the lines. The fighting was soon reduced to hand-to-hand combat, where the practiced Zulu warriors—with their short spears and clubs—had the advantage. The British "fought there till their ammunition was exhausted, and then [were] surrounded and slaughtered."²³ The technological superiority of the British Martini-Henry rifles was completely negated once fighting closed to spear and bayonet range.

The final outcome of the battle was devastating to the British. Of the original 1,700 troops, the few hundred Natal Native Contingent soldiers fled at the outset of the battle; among the British, only five officers and about fifty soldiers survived.²⁴ Lord Chelmsford's failure to mass his forces and ensure the unity of command through clear orders left the troops at Isandlwana with inadequate defenses. The result was "the most improbable military defeat in British colonial history."²⁵ King Cetshwayo successfully used the element of surprise and the overwhelming mass of his army to catch the British off guard and effectively neutralize their advantages. He exploited Chelmsford's decision to split the British force by attacking and destroying the lesser force left in the rear. Despite sustaining nearly 1,000 casualties of their own,²⁶ the Zulu had won an undeniable victory over a better-equipped aggressor.

The principles of mass, surprise, and unity of command illustrated at Isandlwana are as relevant in the current operating environment as they were during colonial wars in 1879. The enduring lessons of the Battle of Isandlwana can be easily transferred to the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. Commanders must always ensure that they have adequate forces to strike decisively whenever and wherever the mission dictates. They must never underestimate their opponents' capabilities or be lulled into a false sense of security by the assumption of technological superiority. And they must ensure that their orders are clear, precise, and enforced. A failure on any one of these points could lead to a situation that echoes the events of Isandlwana. In modern terms, a poor, ill-equipped guerrilla or insurgent force could easily overcome a stronger, professional, military force that disregards the principles of war.

The success of the Zulu quickly turned bitter. The defeat at Isandlwana only inflamed the British colonial fervor, raising massive, popular support for the war and inciting a deep passion for revenge on the Zulu. Only hours later, a similarly outnumbered, but better-prepared, British force at Rorke's Drift decimated the attacking Zulu.²⁷ Within months, King Cetshwayo's forces were ultimately defeated and Britain gained control over the entire southern cape of Africa.²⁸ However, during the Battle of Isandlwana itself, the two opposing commanders proved how the proper application of the principles of war—or callous disregard for those same principles—can lead to the most unlikely of victories. Whether in nineteenth-century Africa or on today's urban battlefields, a commander's respect for the principles of war can be an unparalleled combat multiplier on the road to victory.

Endnotes:

¹Ian Knight, *Isandlwana 1879: The Great Zulu Victory*, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, Great Britain, 2002, p. 10.

²Ibid, p. 11.

³Ibid, p. 35.

⁴Ibid, p. 31.

⁵Ibid, p. 37.

⁶Donald R. Morris, *The Washing of the Spears: A History of the Rise of the Zulu Nation*, Simon and Schuster, Inc., New York, 1965, p. 332.

⁷Ibid, p. 339.

⁸Charles L. Norris-Newman, *In Zululand With the British Throughout the War of 1879*, W. H. Allen and Company, London, 1880, p. 54.


⁹Morris, p. 337.

¹⁰Knight, p. 23.

¹¹Ibid, p. 13.

¹²FM 3-0, *Operations*, 27 February 2008.

¹³Knight, p. 51.



Monument to the fallen Zulu warriors at the battlefield. The mountain of Isandlwana is in the background.

¹⁴Robert B. Edgerton, *Like Lions They Fought: The Zulu War and the Last Black Empire in South Africa*, Free Press, New York, 1988, p. 83.

¹⁵Knight, p. 51.

¹⁶FM 3-0.

¹⁷Morris, p. 363.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹FM 3-0.

²⁰Morris, p. 338.

²¹Knight, p. 46.

²²Norris-Newman, p. 63.

²³Ibid, p. 61.

²⁴Knight, p. 86.

²⁵Edgerton, p. 1.

²⁶Knight, p. 86.

²⁷Edgerton, p. 96.

²⁸Morris, p. 596.

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Army Officer Accused of Prisoner Abuse

By Master Sergeant Patrick V. Garland (Retired)

This title sounds like the headline of a current event, but it was taken from newspaper accounts of nearly a hundred years ago. The New York Times covered the story of a general court-martial from December 1919 into early 1920. The trial took place at Castle Williams, Governor's Island, New York—the Atlantic Branch of the Disciplinary Barracks at the time.


The defendant, Captain Karl W. Detzer of the U.S. Army, had been the commander of the 308th Military Police Company (Criminal Investigation) stationed in LeMans—a port of embarkation in France. During his term, he and his men investigated criminal activities and, as a result, made many enemies. The charges against him stemmed from allegations by former prisoners and disgruntled military policemen that Captain Detzer had frequently used excessive force against prisoners under his control. Lieutenant Colonel W. L. Culberson, inspector general, recommended that Detzer be tried for abuse to prisoners in his custody. These were American Soldiers under suspicion of criminal offenses—not prisoners of war.

Captain Detzer was formally charged with twenty-eight counts of misconduct and was confined at Castle Williams for trial by general court-martial. Major William Kelly, Judge Advocate General's Corps, was the prosecutor; he was assisted by Captain John M. Weir. Surprisingly, William H. Allaire (former provost marshal general of

the American Expeditionary Forces) was a member of the court-martial board.

Captain Detzer was born on 4 September 1891 in Allen County, Indiana.¹ He was educated in Indiana and gained some notoriety as a newspaper investigative reporter/writer, in Fort Wayne. A veteran of Indiana National Guard service on the Mexican Border, he later completed officer's training at Fort Harrison and was commissioned as a captain. During World War I, he traveled to France with the 84th Division as an infantry company commander. After the armistice, he was assigned to duties with the newly formed Division of Criminal Investigation.

Le Mans was a transit point for tens of thousands of U.S. troops heading home after the end of the war. It was also a location where vast supplies of materiel were stored while awaiting shipment home. The combination of the transient status and often poorly guarded supplies led many astray. Thefts were common, and the stolen property was sold to persons dealing in the black market. To combat this, Captain Detzer and his small force were constantly



Castle Williams, Governor's Island, New York

responding to calls for assistance. They investigated assaults and murders of American Soldiers by renegade Americans or French criminals. Those apprehended were taken to the Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) (Le Mans headquarters) for interrogation. It was there that the alleged abuses took place.

The trial began on 10 December 1919. During the first days, several witnesses testified that they had been subjected to or that they had witnessed abuse by Captain Detzer or his subordinates. These witnesses included former prisoners, military policemen and, in several cases, inmates from the disciplinary barracks at Fort Leavenworth and Governor's Island. In fact, Captain Detzer himself had been confined at Governor's Island in close proximity to several of his former prisoners. The first witness, Samuel G. Roth of Chicago, stated that he was a desk sergeant for Captain Detzer in Le Mans from February to April 1919; and he testified that he had personally witnessed the captain strike two prisoners—one of whom was Private Fred M. Yates. Private Yates, an inmate at Leavenworth, testified two days later that he had indeed been "slapped about" by Captain Detzer while he was in custody. Captain Detzer recorded the incident in his book entitled *True Tales of the D.C.I.*,² relating that he and his first sergeant had stopped Yates and asked him to identify himself. Yates told Captain Detzer that he was a special railroad guard and that he had apprehended two men who had been acting suspiciously in the railroad yards. Yates asked for assistance with getting his two "prisoners" to the military police station. The first sergeant left with one of the prisoners in the sidecar of his motorcycle, leaving Captain Detzer alone with Yates and the remaining prisoner. Shortly thereafter, Yates pulled his pistol on the unarmed Detzer and made his escape. During his testimony, Yates verified that he had falsely impersonated a military policeman, but was steadfast in his story of being "slapped about" by Captain Detzer (and his first sergeant) following his arrest later that night.

During the investigation, one of Yates' companions claimed that Captain Detzer had forced him to swallow a lighted cigarette; but during the trial, he testified that he had been told to dispose of a lighted cigarette and had dropped it to the floor and crushed it with his boot. In almost every case, Lieutenant Thomas F. Heffernan, Captain Detzer's defense counsel, was able to get the prosecution witnesses to recant some, if not all, of their testimony.

It was discovered, through defense witnesses, that there was a plot to discredit Captain Detzer before he left France. One very important witness had been a judge advocate general lawyer who had defended some of the complainants against Captain Detzer in France. Former Captain Ralph E. Jones testified that some lawyers from the judge advocate general office in Le Mans were developing information to "get" Captain Detzer. Jones himself had been ordered to investigate Detzer's unit for instances of abuse, but he found no evidence of misconduct. A few

days later, Lieutenant Leo J. Rasche (formerly of the 308th Military Police Company) testified that, during his time with the unit, he had witnessed only one instance of a prisoner being struck, and that was by Sergeant Frank Hoyt, who was later fired by Captain Detzer. At the time of the trial, Hoyt was listed as a deserter, believed to be residing somewhere in France.

A total of 125 witnesses were called, many of whom appeared for the defense—including Colonel E. O. Saunders, Chief of the DCI in France. Captain Detzer testified in his own defense, claiming that when he assumed command of the company, abuse was common. He further stated that he had transferred the former commander, Lieutenant Leonard D. Mahan, and more than seventy enlisted men for inefficiency or abuse of prisoners. In addition, he related that friction had developed between the judge advocate's office (including the assistant prosecutor handling his case) and his own unit.³ Detzer was vigorously cross-examined by the prosecutor. As the prosecuting attorney, Major Kelly's conduct became so harsh that the court-martial board recessed. When they returned, Major Kelly was issued a reprimand that stated, "The court desires that the examination of the witness by the judge advocate be conducted in a calm manner consistent with the dignity of this court."⁴

On 6 February 1920, Lieutenant General Robert Lee Bullard (commander of the Department of the East) published an order which stated that Captain Detzer was found "not guilty" of all twenty-eight specifications filed against him and that he was to be restored to duty.

Captain Detzer continued to serve and, during World War II, was active in the China-Burma-India Theater. After retirement, he continued writing and worked as a *Reader's Digest* editor. He died in Branford, Connecticut, on 28 April 1987.⁵

Endnotes:

¹U.S. Census 1900 (Indiana), U.S. Census Bureau, 1900.

²Karl W. Detzer, *True Tales of the D.C.I.*, Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis, 1925, pp. 51–68. This book contains fictitious names.

³"Capt. Detzer Denies Cruelty at Le Mans," *The New York Times*, 1 January 1920.

⁴"Court Reprimands Detzer Prosecutor," *The New York Times*, 6 January 1920.

⁵Social Security Death Index, <<http://ssdi.rootsweb.ancestry.com/>>, accessed on 22 May 2009.

Master Sergeant Garland retired from the U.S. Army in 1974. During his military career, he served in military police units and criminal investigation detachments and laboratories. At the time of his retirement, Master Sergeant Garland was serving as a ballistics evidence specialist at the European Laboratory. He remained in this career field until retiring from civilian law enforcement in 1995.

Massacre at Schio

By Master Sergeant Patrick V. Garland (Retired)

As a young U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) (commonly referred to as “CID”) agent, I often wondered about the history of the organization and the men and women who laid the groundwork. I wanted to know why CID was considered by many to be a premier investigative organization, with a rate of solving crimes that was far superior to other agencies.

This case of the Massacre at Schio caught my attention because it is unique in our history. The crime in this case was not committed by or against members of the U.S. military, nor was it investigated by an “old hand.” Or—at least Special Agent John Valentino had no police experience prior to being drafted and did not pursue that career field after leaving the service. However, based on the thoroughness of his reports and the attention to detail in his interviews, Valentino proved to be a very capable investigator.

During World War II, Italy was aligned with Germany and was, therefore, an enemy of the Allies. However, many Italians did not support the Fascist regime of their leader, Benito Mussolini. During the latter years of World War II, there were two very different governments trying to rule Italy; pro-Allied partisan groups were actively damaging the war machines of their own country and those of Germany.

In the absence of an effective government, the Allied armies occupying Italy (namely, the British and American armies) were responsible for maintaining order. The country was filled with ex-soldiers of the previously dissolved Fascist army. However, within the Fifth U.S. Army zone of occupation in northern Italy, partisans were exceptionally active and had, in many cases, set up their own governments. At the end of the war in 1945, many of the Fascist supporters were arrested and imprisoned.

Every effort was made to restore government operations in Italy, but abuses occurred. There was sectarian violence between loyalist partisans and the Fascists, whom they felt were responsible for Italy’s dilemma. Military authorities were advised of militant activity in the mountainous areas of northern Italy. According to one memo, “It has been reported that a band of Fascists are living on Monte Enna and thereabouts. Reports have come in that they have stolen food, etc. from lonely farms in the vicinity.” The same memo indicated that “It has come to the knowledge of this office that the Office of Requisition (Italian) is alleged to have sold war materials.”¹ These materials made their way into the hands of rebellious groups. Frequent battles took

place between the partisans and their Fascist enemies, with brutality occurring on both sides.

During the evening hours of 6 July 1945, a band of masked gunmen forced their way into the Mandamentale Jail in Schio and murdered 54 inmates (including women) who were thought to be Fascists. The provost marshal of the Fifth U.S. Army Headquarters directed CID to investigate the incident. Captain Walter J. Haley, the chief CID agent of the Fifth U.S. Army Headquarters, assigned the case to Special Agents Theron A. “Jack” Snyder and John Valentino.²

Valentino was drafted into the Army in 1943; and because of his proficiency with the Italian language, was trained as an interrogator at the Intelligence School, Fort Ritchie, Maryland. However, by the time he arrived in Italy, the war was winding down and he was assigned as a CID agent in the Provost Marshal’s Office, Fifth U.S. Army Headquarters.

Special Agents Snyder and Valentino began their investigation on 12 July. They interviewed dozens of prisoners—some multiple times—to get to the truth. While Agent Snyder (who was dark-complected with black hair) looked like an Italian, it was the light-skinned, blond-haired Valentino who had been born in Italy and was fluent in the Italian language. This proved to be beneficial when unsuspecting prisoners who were not aware of Valentino’s background discussed matters in their native tongue while Valentino stood nearby.³ Several witnesses were actually sympathetic to the perpetrators, many of whom were performing police duties.

Hindered by a lack of cooperation from Italian authorities, the two agents went about their mission of interviewing witnesses, conducting raids to arrest suspects, and then interrogating them. The subjects of the investigation stated that they were following orders by killing the Fascists, who were detested.

Through the investigation, it was determined that the masked invaders had accosted the chief jailer; and after he was threatened with bodily harm, he surrendered the keys to the prison. Once inside, the armed intruders cut the telephone lines, brought in more men (for a total of 12), and began segregating the 85 Fascists from ordinary prisoners. The Fascists were placed in cells on the ground floor and in one cell on an upper level. The women and eight male prisoners were placed in the upper-level cell, with the men being ordered to stand in front.

After midnight on 7 July, the intruders lined the prisoners up at one end of the cells. Using a variety of firearms, including automatic weapons, the intruders gunned down the unarmed inmates. As if by some signal, the firing simultaneously started on both levels of the prison and lasted for several minutes. According to witnesses, in each case, five shooters knelt in a firing position and shot into the group of prisoners. In a couple of instances, single shots were heard when a wounded prisoner uttered a moaning sound. Shortly thereafter, the shooters left the prison. Surprisingly, several of the prisoners survived the attack and later testified against their assailants.

Prisoners who were not wounded exited the cells, which had been left unsecured by the assailants. They then released the guards and prison staff who had been locked away, and help was summoned. The scene was photographed, and the wounded were transported to hospitals. Of the 85 prisoners segregated by the attackers, 54 were killed and 8 were seriously wounded. Fifteen of those slain were women, ranging in age from 18 to 74 years.

During the 2-month investigation, 108 suspects were apprehended and interrogated. Of these, eight were charged with the shootings and seven were tried by military tribunal. Many others were identified but not apprehended; several of these fled to Yugoslavia.

During the trial, each of the defendants reiterated that they had been following orders when they attacked the prison or that they had no prior knowledge of what

was to happen. One related, "I went downstairs because I did not have the courage to shoot."⁴ After deliberations, three of the accused were sentenced to death, two received sentences of life imprisonment, and two were acquitted. The case was reviewed by Colonel John K. Weber, chief legal advisor to the chief civil affairs officer of the Allied Military Government for Occupied Territories, at which time the death sentences were commuted to life imprisonment. All other sentences were affirmed.

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone, chief commissioner of the Allied Commission for Italy, wrote to the Italian prime minister, stating, "I enclose herewith a copy of my opinion on the Schio Massacre case in which, for the reasons stated therein, I have commuted the three death sentences imposed to imprisonment for life. Because of the brutal and shocking nature of this crime, the Italian government is requested to grant no further general or individual amnesty to these prisoners."⁵

Special Agent Valentino was reassigned to Florence, Italy, after the investigation and trial. In November 1945, he was discharged from military service and sent home.⁶

Additional information about the Massacre at Schio can be found at <http://www.larchivio.org/xoom/schio.htm>.

Endnotes:

¹Weekly report, Allied Military Government (Schio), 18 July 1945.

²Report of Investigation 5A, CID Case 151, 30 August 1945.

³Personal communications with Mr. John Valentino, June 2009.

⁴Transcript of military tribunal, undated.

⁵Letter from Rear Admiral Stone to the president of the Council of Ministers, 21 December 1945.

⁶Personal communications with Mr. John Valentino, June 2009.

Master Sergeant Garland retired from the U.S. Army in 1974. During his military career, he served in military police units and criminal investigation detachments and laboratories. At the time of his retirement, Master Sergeant Garland was serving as a ballistics evidence specialist at the European Laboratory. He remained in this career field until retiring from civilian law enforcement in 1995.

42d Military Police Brigade Law Enforcement Liaison Program



By Captain Matthew S. West

The provost marshal at Fort Lewis, Washington, identified a need for a military police Law Enforcement Liaison Program (LELP) to assist police departments in local communities. There are two purposes for the program. First, under the mentorship of local police, military police assist the agencies with any Soldier-related issues that might be encountered. Second, military police leaders gain the opportunity to observe firsthand how civilian agencies are established and how they function. This experience assists them with their role on police transition teams—a critical mission while deployed.

In some cases, when a Soldier is involved in an incident requiring the attention of civilian law enforcement, it can take weeks for his or her chain of command to be notified. However, when a Soldier is detained in the Lakewood or Tacoma Police Departments, the chain of command now receives almost instant notification. An LELP representative in the police department calls the military police station. The desk sergeant at the military police station then calls the appropriate personnel in the Soldier's chain of command and notifies them of the detainment. If the Soldier is officially charged by the local agency, he or she is taken to the appropriate booking facility, the chain of command is notified, a journal entry is recorded, and no further action is taken by the LELP or military police. If the police officer believes that the Soldier has simply made a mistake or that the offense is negligible enough, the Soldier is not charged and he or she is turned over to the LELP. LELP personnel record a journal entry and notify the military police desk, which notifies appropriate personnel in the Soldier's chain of command. A patrol is dispatched to the Soldier's location, and the Soldier is transported back to the Fort Lewis military police station, where he or she is turned over to the chain of command. According to the Fort Lewis provost marshal, this program keeps commanders informed about what their Soldiers are getting involved with off the installation. It could even indicate what discipline problems exist and what serious issues are being faced by troubled Soldiers.

To get the LELP started, the Fort Lewis provost marshal met with police officers from the Lakewood and Tacoma Police Departments several times to discuss what needed to be done to make the program successful. After the initial meetings, two Soldiers went to the stations for four weeks. Their mission was to get the program up and running for the rest of the Soldiers who would participate. These two Soldiers met with personnel from every section in the stations, discussing the intent of the program and obtaining feedback on how officers from all agencies could help improve the program. These discussions ensured that every police officer understood the Soldier's role in the station.

Each police department has set aside a Soldier workstation consisting of a desk, computer (with limited internet access and limited connection to the departmental network) for reporting purposes, and a telephone. The liaisons have consolidated in-boxes that enable police officers to send messages to a single, generic e-mail account for each liaison so that the e-mail address does not need to be changed every time Soldiers rotate.

Local police departments have already realized some benefits of the program. One evening, a disorderly, drunken Soldier was brought into one of the stations. He yelled at police officers and failed to cooperate. But when the LELP representative confronted the Soldier and told him that his chain of command was being notified, the Soldier immediately calmed down and began to cooperate. According to Lieutenant Steve Mauer of the Lakewood Police Department, "The program is very beneficial to both the police department and the surrounding community." And Lieutenant Bart Hayes of the Tacoma Police Department stated that "[The LELP] gets the Soldier off the street and back to Fort Lewis quickly, resulting in minimal to no run-ins with that Soldier again."

The commander of the 504th Military Police Battalion recognized the training value of locating squad and platoon leaders at the police stations. From the outset of

Operation Iraqi Freedom, military police companies have been tasked with establishing Iraqi police stations and training Iraqi police. The experience gained by spending time in a civilian law enforcement agency provides LELP participants with a better understanding of how a police station is organized and how it operates. The battalion commander indicated that the program “helps provide insight into how civilian agencies are established and how they run day-to-day operations.” This is valuable insight to have before deployment.

The LELP ideally consists of a three- to four-week rotation. This gives Soldiers the time necessary to completely familiarize themselves with the station and their coworkers. They work in the station three days each week (0900 to 1700). That time is spent rotating through various sections within the station. The Soldiers also spend Friday and Saturday nights at the station, ready to take charge of any Soldier that police officers apprehend during those two busiest nights of the week. The constant switching from days to nights is very taxing, and it is the reason that the rotation should last no longer than four weeks. A sample schedule for a three-week rotation is outlined below. However, the schedule changes for each rotation due to the extreme unpredictability of the police officers’ jobs and the time that they have available to meet with the Soldiers.

Week One

During the first week of LELP rotation, Soldiers spend time with the police chief, the assistant chief, and internal affairs personnel. They learn about various responsibilities within the station, and they have the opportunity to see how leaders run the station and how they interact with the local community. Soldiers are also required to read the department’s manual of standards during the week.

Week Two

During the second week of rotation, Soldiers spend time with the administrative unit. They spend half a day with the lieutenant in charge of the unit and the rest of the week rotating through the three sections of the unit—the administrative support, property room/identification, and professional standards sections.

Week Three

Soldiers spend the third week of their rotation learning about the criminal investigations unit, which is comprised of special operations, special assault, persons crimes, and property crimes sections. They have the opportunity to see how the different sections receive and investigate cases.

Summary

Military relations with the local communities have improved significantly through the LELP. There are now military police Soldiers stationed in two of the busiest police departments in the area, ensuring excellent lines of communication between the local departments and the Fort Lewis provost marshal. Police officers and local citizens are often able to get military-related questions answered very quickly, eliminating the need to locate a point of contact at Fort Lewis. In addition, junior military police leaders receive quality police transition team training in preparation for upcoming deployments.

One of the goals of the 504th Military Police Battalion is for every platoon and squad leader to complete the LELP before deploying. All junior leaders should participate in the program. It will provide them with a better understanding of civilian policing, which will better enable them to establish civilian police stations while deployed.

Captain West is the training officer for the 504th Military Police Battalion, Fort Lewis, Washington. He holds a bachelor’s degree in administration of justice from George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia.

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Multifunctioning: The Beginnings of Task Force Phoenix

By Captain Emily Barrett and Captain Rebecca Doak

In October 2008, the 4th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (MEB) was activated at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, bringing the Army's newest initiative in modularity to the home of the Military Police, Engineer, and Chemical Corps.

As their most basic doctrinal functions, MEBs are designed as command and control headquarters with robust, multifunctional brigade staffs that are optimized to conduct maneuver support operations.¹ The 4th MEB is no exception. In principle, the 4th MEB organically consists of the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 193d Brigade Support Battalion, and 94th Signal Company. Any additional units required by the MEB are identified and assigned according to the current mission. The first task of the 4th MEB was to assume command and control of its organic units and provide training readiness authority over the 92d Military Police Battalion, 5th Engineer Battalion (Rear), and 94th Engineer Battalion (Rear), while simultaneously standing up and activating its headquarters.

The solution to the daunting command and control task of the 4th MEB was the creation of Task Force (TF) Phoenix—a microcosm of the MEB modularity concept. TF Phoenix consists of the 92d Military Police Battalion and its organic, subordinate military police companies (13th, 512th, 463d, and 988th Military Police Companies and Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment); 94th Engineer Battalion (Rear); 5th Engineer Battalion (Rear) (Provisional); 50th Multirole Bridge Company (MRBC); and the Army's only engineer canine company (provisional), consisting of three military working dog detachments. Since its inception, TF Phoenix has deployed the 50th MRBC and many engineer military working dog teams, Soldiers for Multinational Corps–Iraq protective services detail, and individual augmentees in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.

Almost overnight, TF Phoenix stretched its capabilities from preparing and deploying military police companies to understanding the unique requirements for the deployment of MRBCs and engineer dog handlers. The battalion staff sections had to understand and address engineer-specific equipment shortages, personnel needs, and training requirements; while subordinate engineer

units had to learn to communicate their needs to a higher headquarters that was not fluent in engineer parlance. In addition, the 92d Military Police Battalion staff learned to articulate battalion requirements and objectives, including those of their subordinate units, to the 4th MEB staff in a language that could be easily understood by all personnel.

In an effort to reduce language barriers and enhance leader understanding across the organization, the 4th MEB developed a “Branch 101” Program. Military police, engineer, chemical, and logistics representatives briefed 4th MEB officers, warrant officers, and senior noncommissioned officers on branch specifics (organization, functions, capabilities, MEB support). In addition, TF Phoenix implemented a two-pronged approach to closing the gap between units in its own organization through team building and professional development. This was achieved through officer physical training sessions and hands-on, branch orientation training on the unique combat missions and capabilities of the branches who primarily represented the 4th MEB. The training helped create a single, cohesive unit at the TF and brigade levels and improved communication between members of the various branches.

For the 4th MEB and TF Phoenix, the obstacles of managing multiple missions, speaking diverse doctrinal languages, and overcoming differences in training approaches were conquered through innovative leader professional development and a return to the Army basics.

Endnote:

¹Field Manual (FM) 3-90.31, *Maneuver Enhancement Brigade Operations*, 26 February 2009.

Captain Barrett is the operations officer for the 92d Military Police Battalion, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. She holds a bachelor's degree in sociology from the University of Arkansas at Fayetteville and is currently working toward a master's degree in business management.

Captain Doak is the special projects officer for the 92d Military Police Battalion. She holds a bachelor's degree in psychology from Georgia Southern University.

SPLAT!

18th Military Police Brigade Assaults Paintball Course

By Specialist Adrienne Killingsworth

Soldiers from Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 18th Military Police Brigade, Mannheim, Germany, recently practiced leadership skills and built unit cohesion at a unique venue—the Rod and Gun Club at Wiesbaden, Germany.

The 16 April outing was part of the Warrior Adventure Quest (WAQ)—a high-adventure, recreational program implemented by the Army to help redeployed Soldiers reach a “new normal” by better adapting to the garrison environment following a combat tour. Soldiers returning from a deployment may experience a loss in adrenaline levels that developed during combat. This can lead them to engage in risky behaviors when they return to garrison. The WAQ is designed to help prevent those behaviors by providing a safe outlet for redeployed troops.

The Soldiers of HHC, 18th Military Police Brigade, returned from their most recent combat deployment in December 2008, making them eligible to participate in the U.S. Army Garrison Mannheim WAQ program, which offers a number of high-adventure, high-adrenaline activities including rock climbing, mountain biking, paintball shooting, skiing, and snowboarding. The HHC Soldiers chose to participate in a paintball course, which provided them with the opportunity to use their agility, stamina, and quick thinking to take on personal and team challenges. They put their combat training skills to use in an attempt to win various competitions held at the indoor course.

Despite their bruises, the Soldiers seemed to enjoy the training. “It was great,” said Specialist Earnest Hamilton. “We got to release some stress. Everybody got to have fun together. We got a chance to have a good time with our coworkers. I would love to do it again.” It was a sentiment echoed by many Soldiers who participated in the event.



Soldiers prepare to breach a building as part of a paintball challenge.

Specialist Killingsworth is a public affairs specialist with the 18th Military Police Brigade, Mannheim, Germany. She holds a bachelor's degree in English literature from California State University–Northridge.

International Military Police Day in Kosovo

By Major Douglas L. Gifford

The Multinational Task Force–East (MNTF-E) Provost Marshal's Office hosted an International Military Police Day at Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo, on 16 January 2009. More than sixty military police from Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Morocco, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Switzerland, Sweden, Turkey, and the United States participated in the event, with representatives from every multinational task force in Kosovo in attendance. This was the first of several events planned to enhance relations and cooperation among coalition forces in Kosovo.

The highlight of International Military Police Day was a shooting competition using the Camp Bondsteel Small Arms Virtual Trainer. The competition consisted of the following events:

- Military Police Qualification Table.
- Pop-Up Military Police Qualification Table.
- Marathon.
- Quick Fire 1.
- Quick Fire 2.

The events were designed to test shooting speed and accuracy under multiple scenarios. Forty-eight participants competed in the events; the Soldier with the highest combined score for all events was declared the winner. First Sergeant Josefin Jarlheden of Sweden was the overall winner with 621 points, followed by Specialist Clayton Schoneboom of the United States with 620 points and Corporal

Adriano Currenti of Italy with 604 points. The highest possible score was 650 points.

In addition to the shooting competition, Soldiers also had the opportunity to participate in a military working dog (MWD) exhibition conducted by the MNTF-E MWD Section.

Throughout the day, attendees mingled freely with fellow military police from other countries. At noon, they gathered for a luncheon at the South Town Dining Facility. According to Sergeant First Class Jeff Wolfeher of the MNTF-E Provost Marshal's Office, "[The International Military Police Day] was a great chance to teach and learn from other nationalities."



Winners of the event (left to right): First Sergeant Josefin Jarlheden of Sweden, Specialist Clayton Schoneboom of the United States, and Corporal Adriano Currenti of Italy.

As for the shooting skills of the international military police, Wolfgeher said, "They scored very well shooting on a course they were not familiar with. For example, the Swedish [military police] and the Italian Carabinieri came in first and third place." Sergeant First Class Wolfgeher himself had the highest score on the military police pop-up qualification table.

The Kosovo Forces (KFOR) Provost Marshal, Lieutenant Colonel Arend te Velde of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, developed the concept of the International Military Police Day. "The military police in KFOR are trying to raise their professional standard. The goal they are trying to reach is an even more flexible organization which can support the commanders within KFOR in the best way possible. This event is an excellent way to build teamwork and cooperation within the military police throughout KFOR," said te Velde.

The lead planner for the event (Sergeant First Class William Schumaker of the MNTF-E Provost Marshal's Office) added, "Everyone enjoyed meeting people from other countries with similar skills and experiences. By the end of the day, people were exchanging patches and e-mail addresses."

With regard to how the International Military Police Day met his expectations, Lieutenant Colonel te Velde said, "The day showed that it was possible that people could get in contact with each other. They met and talked about their work and typical national assets. People also made agreements on how to inform or help each other when needed. These are precisely the elements that are needed in a good working organization, and this day was a perfect first step to achieve this." Te Velde also said that he hopes the International Military Police Day will become an annual event in Kosovo.




Military Police compete in a 9-millimeter shooting competition inside the Small Arms Virtual Trainer at Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo.



Lieutenant Colonel Arend te Velde, KFOR Provost Marshal, addresses military police personnel at International Military Police Day.

Major Gifford is the Provost Marshal, 110th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade, Kansas City, Missouri. He holds a bachelor's degree in liberal arts with a concentration in history from the University of the State of New York.

TRADOC Conducts 4th Annual Force Protection Workshop



By Mr. James M. Kirkland

The Command Provost Marshal Directorate (CPMD), U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Training (G-3/5/7), conducted the annual TRADOC Force Protection (FP) Workshop, hosted by the TRADOC Deputy Commanding General (DCG), at the Shades of Green Armed Forces Recreation Center, Orlando, Florida. The theme of the workshop, “What Keeps Security Professionals Awake at Night—Preparing for a Safer Tomorrow,” was a means of looking back on the tragedy of 11 September 2001—specifically, the terrorist attack on the Pentagon. Chief W. Scott McKay, assistant chief of the Arlington County Fire Department, Arlington, Virginia, served as the keynote speaker, relating his experience as an on-site shift leader during the aftermath of the attack on the Pentagon. Chief McKay said, “Exchanging business cards at the scene is not the time to meet neighboring emergency responders.” His message was very clear: Developing plans, conducting training, and establishing local contacts before an incident occurs are essential to the success of an emergency response.

The workshop began with a video presented by General Peter W. Chiarelli, Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. He emphasized, “Though our Homeland has not been successfully attacked since 9/11, the very real threat exists today. Therefore, we must continue to remain aware and vigilant. We cannot allow complacency to benefit the enemy by providing an opportunity to attack our Homeland, facilities, or deployed forces.”

This was the fourth TRADOC FP workshop and the third workshop under the leadership of Colonel Keith C. Blowe, TRADOC Command Provost Marshal. Colonel Blowe, who recently retired with twenty-eight years of service to our Nation and the Military Police Corps, amplified the workshop theme by stressing the importance of training, education, and awareness across the entire

force to better assist commanders in the development of antiterrorism (AT) programs. Colonel Blowe introduced the TRADOC DCG, Lieutenant General David P. Valcourt, recognizing the added value of senior leader involvement in providing guidance and supporting the FP mission.

Lieutenant General Valcourt then addressed the audience of more than one hundred, telling them that their work in the FP business is important and encouraging them to do their jobs well and to take maximum advantage of the training opportunities available at the workshop. He also informed attendees that FP is important to him and that TRADOC commanders and school commandants would soon be providing updates on their FP status in a video teleconference forum every six months.

The three-day workshop targeted FP personnel at the brigade level and above, including those who support unit FP or AT programs (appointed AT, physical security, intelligence, and operations officers and operations noncommissioned officers). CPMD planners distinguished

Developing plans, conducting training, and establishing local contacts before an incident occurs are essential to the success of an emergency response.

this as a workshop rather than a conference, emphasizing the available training. The workshop goals included improving individual FP skills and unit AT programs. The TRADOC staff accomplished these goals through hands-on training in the risk management process—beginning with threat assessments, then moving to criticality and vulnerability assessments, and eventually to risk assessments. At that point, the process moves toward mitigation through improved procedures, new equipment, or the commander’s acceptance of known risks. Guidance and instruction were also provided for resource management, funding procedures for unit level AT officers were unraveled, and attendees were reminded that AT funding flows through the TRADOC G-3/5/7 CPMD down to the unit level. Understanding the procurement process can be a challenge. There is a specific military decision package, coded as “VTER” (Antiterrorism), that can

only be used to support and fund AT. “QPSM” (Physical Security Matters) is a similar military decision package which funds the physical security that supports AT. This funding is not part of the traditional unit funding and does not take away from TRADOC mission training dollars. This was evidenced by the fact that temporary duty costs for all workshop attendees were covered with AT funds—not unit training funds. In addition to AT training, AT funds may be used for mass notification systems, AT exercises, and other AT-specific requirements. Mr. Bill Moisan, chief of the FP Division, CPMD, encouraged TRADOC organizations to seek funding of AT and physical security requirements through the upcoming program operating management process and to contact CPMD for further assistance.

Representatives from the AT Branch, Office of the Provost Marshal General, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) G-3/5/7, and U.S. Army North (USARNORTH) presented briefings about their organizations and how they relate to TRADOC. Lieutenant Colonel Brian Numerick, chief of the AT Branch, discussed the first AT field manual, which is currently being developed. He also discussed the second iteration of the HQDA AT Strategic Plan, *Tempering the Weapon*, which focuses on areas needing improvement and mandates specific basic goals (including one that all units at battalion level and above will have a trained, AT Level II-appointed AT officer). The AT Strategic Plan also amplifies initiatives such as embedding AT documents in the Army Campaign Plan and encouraging active leader participation. Lieutenant Colonel Andy Schell, USARNORTH, described his organization’s mission to conduct homeland defense, civil support operations, and theater security cooperation activities to protect American people and their way of life. He further explained the mission in terms of FP, relating that USARNORTH executes a comprehensive, all-hazards, FP mission that provides an appropriate level of safety and security for all U.S. Army personnel, resources, infrastructure, information, and equipment from the full spectrum of threats within the USARNORTH FP operations area to ensure essential operational mission accomplishment.

Mr. Jon Moilanen, TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity, discussed threat information products that are available and links that can be used to obtain terrorist threat information tools. These tools include case studies that contain recommendations about how the cases can be used in training and professional education regarding suicide bombings and critical infrastructure attacks; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) and other catastrophic weapons such as low-yield, high-destruction explosives; kidnapping and terrorism; and the TRADOC hip pocket handbook, *A Soldier’s Primer to Terrorism TTP [Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures] in the Contemporary Operational Environment*.

Mr. Patrick Poole, who is an author, lecturer, investigative reporter, and intelligence analyst, presented

information on Islamic extremists and the domestic threat from Islamic radicalism. Mr. Poole provided details about the radicalization process, which begins with the manipulative preradicalization stage and progresses through disengagement from the host society, rejection and self-identification, indoctrination (acquisition of violent attitudes) and, ultimately, recruitment or jihadization.

The TRADOC staff also presented briefings on domestic terrorism and criminal threats, international terrorist threats, cyberthreats, and AT training opportunities and conducted an open-forum panel discussion to answer audience questions and clarify items discussed during the workshop. Major Mark O’Connor, lead project officer for the Joint Entry Control Point/Escalation of Force Project (JEEP), provided a briefing on the scope of JEEP. Objectives include developing procedures to improve the warfighter’s use of FP technologies at entry control points and the associated use of force responses. This newly formed JEEP team will soon produce handbooks and TTP that address the integration of technology. These efforts will maximize the FP of friendly troops and reduce the risk of coalition and civilian casualties.

In addition to TRADOC attendees, FP specialists from the U.S. Army Installation Management Command, U.S. Army Reserve, Army National Guard, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command were also in attendance. The workshop served as an excellent opportunity to network; share experiences and ideas; and meet others from the U.S. Army Recruiting Command, U.S. Army Cadet Command, U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command, U.S. Army Accessions Command, and TRADOC centers and schools.

Workshop attendees received an e-mail invitation to participate in an online survey designed to assess the quality of the workshop and associated training. Respondents registered high marks for the workshop, adding comments such as: “I am a newcomer to the AT/FP world, but I found this workshop to be very informative;” “Overall, it was a great opportunity to network and coordinate;” and “I had a great time learning about the various FP issues that go into AT/FP planning and resourcing.”

Although the fifth annual TRADOC FP Workshop has not yet been approved, there is great anticipation that this event will continue. All TRADOC FP personnel at brigade level and above can tentatively mark their calendars to attend the next TRADOC FP Workshop in Spring 2010 in the vicinity of Headquarters TRADOC, Fort Monroe, Virginia.

Mr. Kirkland is the TRADOC AT officer assigned to Headquarters TRADOC, G-3/5/7, CPMD, Fort Monroe, Virginia. Mr. Kirkland, a Certified Protection Professional, retired with thirty years of service in the U.S. Army. He last served as the command sergeant major of the 924th Military Police Battalion, Fort Riley, Kansas.

16th Military Police Brigade Leaders Tour Vicksburg



By First Lieutenant Heatherann S. Bozeman

“Listen up, paratroopers. I’ve been on nearly fifty-six jumps, and all of them have been on Fort Bragg,” said Sergeant Major William Griffin, the rear detachment sergeant major of the 503d Military Police Battalion. “This is a great opportunity, and I hope you realize it.”

So began the day for forty-three paratroopers of the 16th Military Police Brigade, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The brigade sent the paratroopers—seventeen of them jumpmasters—to jump from a C-130 Hercules aircraft into Mound, Louisiana. This was the start of a four-day excursion to tour the former battlefield at Vicksburg, Mississippi. The trip also offered the group a chance to learn about the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Engineer Research and Development Center at Vicksburg.

Most of the tour participants were noncommissioned officers (NCOs) from the brigade. Sergeant First Class Stephen J. Pallazo, a platoon sergeant with the 108th Military Police Company, attended. He saw the trip as a great chance for NCOs to bond with officers.

The group spent an entire day touring the facilities at the Engineer Research and Development Center. The day began with a look at the work of seismic specialists. Several U.S. Army Corps of Engineer personnel presented briefings on new technologies for sustainment tools such as HESCO® barriers and quickly assembled, portable barriers. The paratroopers were particularly impressed with the gamut of testing conducted on the products. The tour continued with a look at the archives maintained at the facility. Then, the paratroopers viewed a display showing how researchers are saving thousands of man-hours and actual dollars by using anime graphics to test products. Finally, a type of Earth-imaging software that will not be fully operational for another year or two was unveiled. It left quite an impression on the visitors from Fort Bragg.

Attendees spent the next day learning about the Battle of Vicksburg. The Vicksburg National Military Park commemorates the campaign, siege, and defense of Vicksburg. The paratroopers traveled the sixteen-mile tour road around the battlefield stopping frequently to learn about highlights on the battlefield, a restored Union gunboat, a national cemetery, and more than 1,330 monuments that mark the tour road.

During the Civil War, control of the vital Mississippi River was key to victory; the tour attendees learned that control of Vicksburg was also important. The surrender of Vicksburg on 4 July 1863, coupled with the fall of Port Hudson, Louisiana, split the South and left undisputed control of the Mississippi River with the North.

“I think what left the largest impression on me was that the coordination of efforts in a joint environment was decisive to control back then, just as it is today,” said First Lieutenant Nathan Dicks, operations and training officer (S3) of the 503d Military Police Battalion.

The last stop of the day was the U.S. Ship (USS) Cairo Gunboat and Museum. The USS Cairo is a massive, ironclad gunboat that spent one hundred years on the bottom of the Yazoo River before she was raised to the current location.

The tour guide bid a farewell of thanks to the paratroopers from Fort Bragg. “I’ve spent the day telling you about brave Soldiers of the past. I know I stand among the brave ones of the present, and I thank you for your service and for the freedom my family and I enjoy because of your service,” he said.

As the trip ended, Sergeant First Class Pallazo noted that it was great that the brigade sent officers and NCOs to walk the battlefield. Learning about such a historic event in U.S. history gave way to many leadership discussions among the diverse group assembled.

First Lieutenant Bozeman is the executive officer of the 108th Military Police Company (Airborne/Air Assault), Fort Bragg, North Carolina. She holds a bachelor's degree in humanities from Thomas Edison State College, New Jersey.



By Major Brian S. Locke

The 40th Military Police Battalion (Internment/Resettlement) [I/R]) was activated in a ceremony held at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, on 15 April 2009. In addition to the activation, the 40th also assumed command and control of the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S. Disciplinary Barracks (USDB), and the 256th, 291st, and 526th Military Police Companies—all of which had previously been assigned to the 705th Military Police Battalion (I/R).

The 40th Military Police Battalion has a long and proud history, beginning with its initial activation as the 40th Military Police Service Battalion in 1945. Since then, it has been inactivated and reactivated several times. The 40th has served overseas in China, Thailand, Japan, and Korea. The most recent inactivation was at Fort McClellan, Alabama, in June 1990. The battalion mission at Fort Leavenworth is to provide custody and control services and emergency response in support of the USDB and to deploy I/R units and individual Soldiers in support of contingency operations.

The USDB planned and prepared for the activation of the 40th for more than eighteen months. The original plan called for the 40th to be activated on 16 October 2009. However, a request for early activation was granted to enable the 705th Military Police Battalion to be relieved of its USDB support and prepare for its deployment.

Major Locke is the commander of the 40th Military Police Battalion. He holds a bachelor's degree in criminal justice from Middle Tennessee State University and a master's degree in counseling and development from Long Island University, New York. He is also a graduate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy.

MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE LEVEL AND ABOVE COMMANDS

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM	UNIT	LOCATION
Rodney L. Johnson	Leslie (Rusty) Koonce	HQ USACIDC	Ft Belvoir, VA
David E. Quantock	Jeffrey A. Butler	TF 134	Baghdad, Iraq
David D. Phillips	Charles Kirkland	USAMPS	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
	Mark L. Farley	EUCOM	Stuttgart, Germany
Byron A. Freeman	Norwood Patterson	8th MP Bde	Scofield Barracks, HI
Jerry D. Stevenson	Jeffrey A. Palmer	14th MP Bde	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
John F. Garrity	Brian K. Lambert	16th MP Bde	Ft Bragg, NC
Thomas P. Evans	Brenda K. Curman	18th MP Bde	Mannheim, Germany
David P. Glaser	Edgar W. Dahl	42d MP Bde	Ft Lewis, WA
John Huey	Michael E. Ashford	89th MP Bde	Ft Hood, TX
Jeffrey S. Davies	John F. Schoenrock	3d MP Gp (CID)	Ft Gillem, GA
Anthony Cruz	Timothy S. Fitzgerald	6th MP Gp (CID)	Ft Lewis, WA
Robert Q. Ake	Paul W. McDonald	701st MP Gp (CID)	Ft Belvoir, VA
Jeffery T. Harris	Drew Underwood	202d MP Gp (CID)	Heidelberg, Germany
James W. Gray	Jonathan O. Godwin	USDB	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Bruce Vargo	Gary J. Fowler	Joint Detention Group	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
Katherine N. Miller	Jeffrey N. Plemmons	Army Corrections Command	Ft Belvoir, VA
Deborah Broughton		Garrison, Ft McPherson	Ft McPherson, GA
Timothy A. Weathersbee		Garrison, Ft Leavenworth	Ft Leavenworth, KS

RESERVE COMPONENT MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE LEVEL AND ABOVE COMMANDS

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM	UNIT	LOCATION
Robert Kenyon	Thomas Legare	11th MP Bde	Ashley, PA
Kevin R. McBride	Joseph Diniz	*43d MP Bde	Warwick, RI
Donald Currier	Andres Roman	*49th MP Bde	Fairfield, CA
Michael Nevin	Richard Michael	*177th MP Bde	Taylor, MI
John E. Cornelius	Patrick Scanlon	800th MP Bde	Uniondale, NY
Mandi A. Murray	Daniel Lincoln	*46th MP CMD	Lansing, MI
Adolph McQueen	Brendan Toth	200th MP CMD	Ft Meade, MD
Robert Hipwell	Theodore Copeland	300th MP CMD	Inkster, MI

MILITARY POLICE BATTALION LEVEL COMMANDS

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM/1SG	UNIT	LOCATION
Erica Nelson	Donald Wallace	40th MP Bn (I/R)	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Michael R. Thomas	Douglas Koser	91st MP Bn	Ft Drum, NY
Dennis M. Zink	Angelia Flournoy	92d MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Thomas H. Byrd	Dawn J. Ripplemeyer	93d MP Bn	Ft Bliss, TX
Matthew J. Coulson	Ricky L. Haralson	94th MP Bn	Yongsan, Korea
Duane Miller	Russell Erickson	95th MP Bn	Mannheim, Germany
David L. Chase	Thomas S. Sivak	97th MP Bn	Ft Riley, KS
Michael C. Henshaw	William A. Fath	385th MP Bn	Ft Stewart, GA
William Black	Todd E. Sprading	503d MP Bn	Ft Bragg, NC
John G. Voorhees Jr.	Albert Nelson	504th MP Bn	Ft Lewis, WA
Steven L. Donaldson	John W. Hopper	508th MP Bn (I/R)	Ft Lewis, WA
Bradley Graul	John T.C. Williamson	519th MP Bn	Ft Polk, LA
Alexander Conyers	Donald W. Troxler	525th MP Bn (I/R)	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
James D. Wilson	Scott Toy	701st MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Daniel D. Deadrich	William F. Hutchings	705th MP Bn	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Robert N. Dillon	William B. Chambers	709th MP Bn	Hanau, Germany
Ignatius M. Dolata Jr.	Richard Woodring	716th MP Bn	Ft Campbell, KY
David J. Segalia Jr.	Peter Ladd	720th MP Bn	Ft Hood, TX
Ross Guieb	Gerald Stegemeier	728th MP Bn	Scofield Barracks, HI
Laurence C. Lobdell	Jonathan Narcisse	759th MP Bn	Ft Carson, CO
Timothy P. Fischer	Mark E. Porret	787th MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Michael Blahovec	Eric D. Hodges	793d MP Bn	Bamberg, Germany
Bryan E. Patridge	James Schultz	795th MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Michael C. Petty	Kevin C. Rogers	LEC, Ft Knox	Ft Knox, KY
Raymond Stuhn	James A. Stillman	5th MP Bn (CID)	Kaiserslautern, Germany
Kerrilyn A. Corrigan	John R. Mazujian	10th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Bragg, NC
Peter C. Lydon	Crystal L. Wallace	11th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Hood, TX
Robert McNeil Jr.	Gail Dippel	19th MP Bn (CID)	Wheeler Army Airfield, HI
Mark A. Jackson	Thomas Seaman	22d MP Bn (CID)	Ft Lewis, WA
Stephen Green	Peter Harrington	1000th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Campbell, KY
Ken Tauke	Christopher S. Heldt	1001st MP Bn (CID)	Ft Riley, KS
Sonya Friday	Tara R. Wheadon	1002d MP Bn (CID)	Bamberg, Germany
David Koonce	Henry James III	Benning CID Bn	Ft Benning, GA
Ronald T. Cuffee Sr.	Brian K. Garon	Washington CID Bn	Ft Myer, VA
Thomas Denzler	Michael W. Jones	Protective Services Bn	Ft Belvoir, VA

*National Guard Unit

Current as of 1 August 2009

For changes and updates, please e-mail <leon.usampspo@conus.army.mil>.

No one is more professional than I. I am a noncommissioned officer, a leader of Soldiers. As a noncommissioned officer, I realize that I am a member of a time-honored corps, which is known as "The Backbone of the Army." I am proud of the Corps of Noncommissioned Officers and will at all times conduct myself so as to bring credit upon the Corps, the military service, and my country regardless of the situation in which I find myself. I will not use my grade or position to attain pleasure, profit, or personal safety.

Competence is my watchword. My two basic responsibilities will always be uppermost in my mind—accomplishment of my mission and the welfare of my Soldiers. I will strive to remain tactically and technically proficient. I am aware of my role as a noncommissioned officer. I will fulfill my responsibilities inherent in that role. All Soldiers are entitled to outstanding leadership; I will provide that leadership. I know my Soldiers, and I will always place their needs above my own. I will communicate consistently with my Soldiers and never leave them uninformed. I will be fair and impartial when recommending both rewards and punishment.

Officers of my unit will have maximum time to accomplish their duties; they will not have to accomplish mine. I will earn their respect and confidence as well as that of my Soldiers. I will be loyal to those with whom I serve—seniors, peers, and subordinates alike. I will exercise initiative by taking appropriate action in the absence of orders. I will not compromise my integrity, nor my moral courage. I will not forget, nor will I allow my comrades to forget that we are professionals, Noncommissioned Officers, leaders!

No one is more professional than I. I am a noncommissioned officer, a leader of Soldiers. As a noncommissioned officer, I realize that I am a member of a time-honored corps, which is known as "The Backbone of the Army." I am proud of the Corps of Noncommissioned Officers and will at all times conduct myself so as to bring credit upon the Corps, the military service, and my country regardless of the situation in which I find myself. I will not use my grade or position to attain pleasure, profit, or personal safety.

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Army NCO—No One Is More Professional Than I...