

THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF THE MILITARY POLICE CORPS

MILITARY POLICE

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Chief, Military Police Corps Regiment, and Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School

Brigadier General David D. Phillips

Military police who entered into service during the Cold War are becoming less prevalent among our ranks. Our Regiment now consists primarily of Soldiers who joined the Army following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on our country.

The skills of this new generation of military police have been honed through a decade of deployments, war, and high operational tempo. Their training has been experiential compared to that of the post-Vietnam Cold War military police who completed training under replicated combat conditions at Grafenwoehr, Hohenfels, and Vilseck, Germany, and at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. These new, emerging military police leaders have faced the enemy in combat and understand the current operating environment. They are using creativity to challenge the status quo and to shape the future of the Regiment.

Most of the articles in this issue of *Military Police* were written by military police who were not in the Army on 9/11, but who are now leading the fight. Most were written by young noncommissioned officers or company grade officers with battle-proven skills—not by senior military police leaders with decades of experience. While these young Soldiers view highly technical automation as a "matter of fact," they know nothing of grease pencils or communication electronics operations instructions. They are bombarded with an unprecedented volume of data, and they must sift through this data to separate information that is relevant to their mission from that which is extraneous. Shockingly, they do not become overloaded; rather, they multitask.

I believe that the military police of previous generations, who faced other enemies under differing conditions, can feel confident that our Regiment is in good hands. This new, technologically adept generation of military police is keeping the Regiment relevant and on target. The articles in this issue of our professional bulletin will prove my point.

Assist, Protect, Defend!

Regimental Command Sergeant Major

Command Sergeant Major Charles R. Kirkland

Building the Military Police Professional: Enlisted Personnel Management in Your Grid Square

Have you ever viewed yourself as an architect? Have you ever sat back and thought: In a perfect world, the perfect enlisted leader would have done this . . . attended that . . . successfully held these positions . . . ? As senior leaders, we understand and value the clarity of hindsight. Because we are products of our upbringing, our personal career path tends to serve as the baseline for our well-intended guidance. But is it enough?

When talking to junior NCOs, I like to draw an analogy using high-definition television (HDTV) and ultra-high frequency (UHF) television, with HDTV representing senior leaders and UHF television representing junior NCOs. Some of you old-timers know what I am talking about; however, when I mention "UHF," the younger Soldiers often look at me like I am speaking in code. The point of the analogy, though, is that it is the detail that we see through our experience that gives us clarity. And it is this clarity that allows us to professionally guide those coming up behind us, ensuring that they have successful careers and that our units have qualified military police who are capable of leading at the highest levels of our Regiment and our Army. I realize that, so far, this sounds like pontification—but let me delve a little deeper.

. . . it is the detail that we see through our experience that gives us clarity. And it is this clarity that allows us to professionally guide those coming up behind us . . . .

The personnel management landscape has changed significantly. With decentralization, we no longer hold the exclusive key to the placement of a large population of our subordinates. And the U.S. Army Human Resources Command (Military Police Branch), which manages personnel assignments, places a priority on the aggregate, rather than on the professional development of individuals. This situation, coupled with various personnel accounts on an installation, creates an uphill battle for the senior enlisted leader who is interested in making sure that the right person is placed in the right position for mission success and professional development. A single assignment can derail a Soldier's professional development, and no one is better equipped to determine the needs of an enlisted Soldier than a sergeant major or command sergeant major who "grew up" in the same career management field. However, over time, this responsibility has been handed over to personnel specialists, who require the input of military police leaders to fight their way into the process. With the current structure and enlisted management processes in place, our sphere of influence is limited to our organization at our specific geographic location. Until our direction is corrected, there will be long-term negative impacts on readiness and professional development. In spite of all of this, when a Soldier lands in your grid square, you have a mission.

The Human Resources Command fills a requisition by assigning a particular Soldier to a specific installation; however, when an enlisted Soldier arrives at an installation, receiving leaders evaluate the situation and assign the individual to a specific position based on mission requirements. This can have a significant positive or negative effect on professional growth and development through operational experience, which is the key building block of professional military police—a building block that represents a combined effort among the Military Police Branch, Human Resources Command; the receiving organization's senior leadership (military police or not); and the individual. Personal attention from all three of these entities is necessary to ensure that the mission requirements of the organization and the professional needs of the individual are met. The mission, of course, takes priority; and a conscious effort is required to simultaneously meet the needs of the unit and the professional development needs of the individual. We are all familiar with the sharp, squared-away, "go to" NCO working in our operations section or provost marshal office who was passed over for promotion by the previous two consecutive boards. On the surface, this doesn't make any sense. But in evaluating the NCO's record, it is apparent that the minimum requirements in key leadership positions have not been met. Although the NCO may have previously served as a squad leader, his or her expert PowerPoint skills may have been needed in company operations after only a few months. This may sound simplistic, but it happens; NCOs are slotted based on a single skill or additional skill identifier (ASI), they become comfortable specializing, and then they can't figure out why they struggle with mission accomplishment or why they cannot get promoted.

Unfortunately, they are not prepared for levels of higher responsibility. Don't allow specialized skills to cause a Soldier to get stuck in a rut or leaders to make lazy personnel management decisions.

But what about our current practice of personnel management by ASI? Does it still work? Does supply meet demand? Or is the operational demand so great that management by ASI degrades mission effectiveness and professional development? I will use the management of our canine (K9) program as an example of how the current system might work against the mission and the Soldier.

Due to the invaluable capabilities that K9 assets bring to the battlefield, Soldiers with an ASI of Z6 are in high demand. As a result, we have unassigned dogs and are continually scrambling to get Soldiers trained and teams certified and deployed. Since ASIs can be managed at 150 percent strength, this doesn't make sense to an outsider (or to an insider who doesn't understand the system). The common misconception is that Military Police Corps leaders must be guilty of "mismanagement," when in fact, the problem is actually overmanagement. In this strained system, mission demand is outstripping the supply, which is fed by a flawed personnel system. Leaders are being forced to move Z6-qualified Soldiers from the K9 program to fill key 31B leader development positions so that they can remain competitive with their peers. Many of our squad leader and platoon sergeant positions are currently filled by Z6-qualified Soldiers, operations sergeants, or first sergeants. And commanders must weigh other organizational mission requirements that may also result in the need for Z6-qualified Soldiers to provide support elsewhere. So, we train young Soldiers with minimal experience, send them downrange, and end up with large percentages of the authorized 150 percent ASI strength working outside the program in other key 31B positions. And because the ranks of K9 positions below kennel master are staff sergeant and below, it is not likely that these now-seasoned NCOs will ever go back to working with dogs. Instead, they will continue to advance, working their way up and out of the ranks included in the program. And the Z6 Soldiers will end up losing their K9 skill proficiency. This is a vicious cycle that must be challenged.

. . . what about our current practice of personnel management by ASI? Does it still work? Does supply meet demand? Or is the operational demand so great that management by ASI degrades mission effectiveness and professional development?

Would the Army and our Soldiers be better served by transforming the Z6 skill set into a military occupational specialty? After all, it is not possible to professionalize around an ASI; there is no professional track, no progressive or developmental career path, and no advanced training. In addition, the necessarily high rate of movement into and out of the career field is not conducive to the development of the Soldier's skill proficiency, growth, or competiveness in advancement against his or her peers. Fortunately, commanders are not mandated to place Z6-qualified Soldiers with dogs—or to assign a lengthy mandated time of service with a dog. Doing so would constrain commanders and place Soldiers at an even greater disadvantage for promotions. But as a military occupational specialty, there would be a logical, systematic career path that included the Noncommissioned Officer Education System and the advanced training necessary to professionalize the program and prepare for the mission at hand. There would be no need to move Soldiers in and out of the program; they would be requisitioned and employed specifically for the purpose of working with dogs—eliminating the "obligation" for commanders to "mismanage" this great asset. And Soldiers would compete with their peers for promotions within the military occupational specialty and professional career track. In addition, cohesive teams would be built and those teams would stay together—an essential element in our line of work.

The example of the K9 program was used to stimulate thought about how we manage the enlisted population throughout our Regiment. Our Army is changing, and we must ask ourselves if our personnel management and assignment practices are keeping pace. This aspect of career development deserves our attention to ensure that our Soldiers are getting the full benefit of operational experience.

The mission of building professional future leaders of our Regiment should be viewed as exactly that—a mission. There are challenges, but your personal involvement in effective counseling and your engagement of the Human Resources Command and, when necessary, adjacent commands, when making internal moves will profoundly impact the building of future leaders. Continue to challenge systems that affect our enlisted population.

As always, I ask that you keep our Soldiers who are currently deployed and in harm's way—and the family members that await their safe return—in your thoughts and prayers.

"Of the Troops and For the Troops"

Regimental Chief Warrant Officer

Chief Warrant Officer Five David Albaugh

31E Internment/Resettlement Specialists

In keeping with the 70th Military Police Corps Regiment anniversary theme, "Three Strands, One Profession," I would like to present the second of a three-part series honoring each military occupational specialty within our great Regiment. This article focuses on our 31E internment/resettlement specialists—those men and women who are tasked with securing some of the most heinous military criminals and a seemingly never-ending line of detainees on a continuous, 24-hour-per-day, 365-day-per-year basis.

Internment/resettlement specialists comprise a relatively small portion of our Military Police Corps. The 1,668 31E Soldiers represent only about 8 percent of the total Regular Army Military Police Corps Regiment. However, these professionals have a huge mission—and they perform it well.

On the numerous occasions in which I have observed 31E training here at Fort Leonard Wood, I have been impressed with the intensity, determination, synchronization, and professionalism that the Soldiers exhibit as they practice forced extractions of a prisoner from a cell. (There is actually an observation deck from which visitors may observe training firsthand.) And out on the job, internment/resettlement specialists must look into the eyes of thieves, child abusers, rapists, and murderers who were once a part of our Army and who now test the will of our Soldiers. It takes a dedicated professional to deal with these prisoners—and to live behind the same bars, walls, and wires with them for several hours each day.

31Es have a huge responsibility to the communities in which they live and work. Military communities that host correctional facilities have an undying trust in the ability of the internment/resettlement specialists to conduct zero-defect correctional work. Anything short of that is considered substandard and is not tolerated in any environment. Our 31Es welcome the challenge to keep prisoners behind bars and to keep our family members safe and secure.

Please take the opportunity to tour a U.S. Army correctional facility. It will open your eyes to a different world. And it will make you appreciate the dedication and sacrifice of our 31Es in ensuring that criminals are kept secure and in check.

I would like to thank the 31Es of the Regiment for their service, support, and sacrifice for our great Nation. It takes a special Soldier to live up to the responsibilities, focus, and resolve required of military police internment/resettlement specialists.

During this year's Regimental celebration, please take a moment to meet someone new, speak with a Soldier of another military police skill set, and embrace the three strands that make up our great Regiment.

Happy 70th Anniversary to our great Regiment, and Happy 40th Anniversary to the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command!

Do what has to be done.

Walking Through the Desert on a Sunday Morning:

An Account of the 2011 Bataan Memorial Death March

By Captain Christine Keating

The woods are lovely, dark, and deep,
But I have promises to keep,
And miles to go before I sleep,
And miles to go before I sleep.

—Robert Frost[1]

I imagine that it takes quite a bit to make an elite runner who is in fourth place at Mile 19 of a marathon stop dead in his tracks. But then again, an angry 200-pound pronghorn antelope qualifies as "quite a bit." At this year's Bataan Memorial Death March, where the course briefly overlaps itself along Miles 9 and 19, I watched in awe as an antelope—agitated by the huge crowd surging up the hill—sprang from the roadside brush and barreled directly into a runner who was already on the return trip. The boots that had been carrying the runner at a fast, steady cadence came to a screeching halt; hooves reared and turned back to the brush in a cloud of dust; neither man nor beast knew exactly what had just happened—not exactly what you would expect during your ordinary marathon.

But the Bataan Memorial Death March is no ordinary marathon, and these are no ordinary runners. They are not bantam, fleet-footed Kenyans. Rather, they are warriors—muscle-bound, boot-wearing Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen—marching to honor the memory of the 70,000 American and Filipino prisoners of war who conducted the original 60-mile forced march through the Philippine jungle at the hands of their Japanese captors in April 1942.

This is the 22d annual memorial march. The 26.2-mile course winds its way through the desert of White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, commanding more than 6,000 participants each year. There are separate categories for teams and individuals, civilians and military, and heavy (35-pound rucksack) and light (water only). However, few participants come here to run, and even fewer actually come to compete. Most come just to finish—and to honor those original prisoners of war.

We shiver in the predawn twilight as we await the opening ceremony. Bagpipes drone in the background. At 6:30 a.m., the microphone crackles to life and the crowd responds, gathering in a giant parking lot to hear the opening comments of the White Sands commanding general. We salute the flag as a country artist sings the national anthem. Then, we listen in solemn stillness as one of the surviving Bataan prisoners of war calls roll. When he gets to the names of those who can no longer answer, his voice is met with complete silence. "Taps" rings clear in the early morning air. If we didn't already know why we were marching, we do now.

Two jets from neighboring Holloman Air Force Base roar overhead, and a cannon signals the official start of the race. The five of us maneuver as a team—weaving in and out of holes in the crowd. We're in no hurry. We each have a time chip laced tightly to our boots, so our time won't begin until we cross the start line. The event closes at 8:00 p.m., giving us 13 hours to complete the course; we're hoping that we only need 7.

. . . few participants come here to run, and even fewer actually come to compete. Most come just to finish—and to honor those original prisoners of war.

We're not really sure if we've started yet. At the sound of the cannon, the crowd surged forward, but there is little indication of the actual race course. Thousands of marchers jostle good-naturedly toward what must be the start point. Then, with a race clock finally in sight, the crowd suddenly parts, drifting to the sides of the road. There, lining the road, sit original Bataan survivors, shaking the thousands of hands proffered them. These men (now old and few in number) neither chose nor wished to become icons—members of the Greatest Generation, battered by war and chance. Yet, they rose when called, survived the horrors of battle, and endured the subsequent agony of surrender and imprisonment. My teammates and I gently shake the hands of these accidental heroes, and then we step over the timing mat. The march has begun.

Our team consists of five Soldiers from the 110th Military Police Company "Hellraisers," Fort Carson, Colorado— a perfect microcosm of the modern Military Police Corps. First, there is a private first class—a Mexican-American citizen whose father carried him, at the age of 3, on his shoulders across the Rio Grande. He is now one of the best mechanics in the company, and he dreams of someday opening his own mechanic shop back home to support his wife and three sons. Next is a military police specialist and Colorado native who delights in "smoking" the rest of the team on high-altitude workouts. One of our noncommissioned officers (a sergeant who has successfully held the position of platoon sergeant for weeks) is a quiet, humble combat veteran. The noncommissioned officer in charge of the team is a Puerto Rican internment/resettlement specialist who loves his job, but misses home. At his recent reenlistment ceremony, his beautiful 5-year-old daughter insisted on raising her right hand and taking the oath along with him. Finally, there's me. As the company commander, I was thrilled to have the chance to lead a team of Soldiers through such a challenging and rewarding event.

The first mile flies by. We are surrounded on all sides by our fellow marchers; the crowd is still thick and slow. One gentleman walks along, deliberately ahead of us, wearing a sign on his back that says, "Made in the U.S.A., 1928." He's doing the half-marathon, or "honorary route," but his goal is to complete the full 26.2 miles next year—at the age of 84.

At Mile 4, we're 1 hour into the race. Despite the congested start and a desperate Mile 3 bathroom break, we're still on pace with 15-minute miles. Smiles and "high fives" all around. This isn't so bad after all!

By Mile 6, I'm starting to think that the previous assessment might have been a bit ambitious. One of our teammates is already starting to fall back, thinking too much about the impending hill and talking about stopping to change socks. Keeping the team together the whole way may turn out to be unrealistic. We will finish together, but we've each started to find our own pace for now.

Mile 7 brings the first full-blown aid point, with water, fruit, and medics. I don't want to stop, but we need to wait for everyone else to catch up. After an excruciating 20 minutes of sitting still, my hips angrily object when I prompt them to start moving again. I squeeze a packet of electrolyte goo down my throat and dig out my headphones 5 miles earlier than I had planned to plug in. The music helps get me going again, and I'm off.

At Mile 8, we hit pavement and my hips and knees are still protesting from their brief rest. I decide to break into a jog to loosen up; two of my teammates start running with me. This is our last chance to stretch out before hitting the long hill that covers Miles 9–13. It feels good to change up the routine a little. It also feels good to pass people.

There, lining the road, sit original Bataan survivors . . . These men (now old and few in number) neither chose nor wished to become icons—members of the Greatest Generation, battered by war and chance. Yet, they rose when called, survived the horrors of battle, and endured the subsequent agony of surrender and imprisonment.

At Mile 9, we are 2½ hours into the march. We meet the first runner on his way back, proudly sporting a National Guard singlet. We still have 17 miles to go, and our hope is bolstered by seeing runners already on their way back in. One by one, we cheer them on as they start trickling by. And then . . . the antelope incident. Absolutely surreal. We share incredulous looks and then laughingly cheer louder as the victim recovers, regains his rhythm, and breezes on down the hill.

At Mile 12, it's time to check our feet while we wait for the others to catch up. Army medics check on us and offer foot powder, bandages, ibuprofen, and more intense care for those who are beginning to realize that they're in over their heads. Our junior teammate discovers that his hydration pack has leaked all over his extra socks—his diabetic grandmother's compression socks. After ribbing him about the oh-so-stylish look, we offer up a dry pair of boot socks from our collective reserve and we're ready to hit the trail again. This is what a second wind feels like! The sun is shining, the breeze is blowing, and right now, we are part of something special. Life is good.

As the Mile 13 marker approaches, I am sick of electrolyte gel and my mind wanders longingly toward a cheeseburger. I tuck my head down, turn the music up, and try not to think about the nagging pain in my right knee. I'm hungry! And then, as I round the bend—God bless America! Someone is grilling hamburgers! I'm not hallucinating; there truly is a glorious cloud of charcoal smoke rising above the Mile 14 water point. I pull off the trail, praising every god I can think of for the improbable presence of this midrace oasis. And then reality hits: This manna from Heaven is not free. Someone is *selling* hamburgers. Who sells food along a race route? And who carries cash on a marathon? But then, I dully remember that I may have tucked a $20 bill in with my identification card, which is in the outer pocket of my hydration pack. Too much effort would be required to take off the pack, find the money, wait in line, pay, and then start back up again. Grudgingly, I turn back to the trail. It's time to run again. My knees will thank me, and the memory of the cheeseburger that could have been will more quickly fade into the distance.

As I pick up the pace, my thoughts start to weave in and out of focus. I no longer control the stream of instructions flowing through my mind. *Pass the lady in green.* Check. *Find where the helicopter is coming from.* Check. *Blackhawk, nap of the earth.* Cool! *Medevac.* Not cool. *Say a quick prayer for whoever's getting flown out.* Check. *Don't knock over the guy with one leg.* Check.

The guy with one leg is the fourth amputee that I've passed today. This impressive class of marchers—the Wounded Warriors—has forced me to reevaluate my priorities. I'm grateful that my feet hurt, that my knees ache, and that my arms are starting to chafe at the shoulder seams of my uniform. All of this signifies that both of my legs and both of my arms are present for duty, intact, and responsive. I have had the honor of deploying, and I have had the good luck of coming home whole. These men weren't so lucky. Some of them are marching on one leg. Some of them have only one arm. Before the race began, I even saw a double-leg amputee, prosthetics strapped on, hiking poles in hand, warming up and getting ready to go. I never saw him again, which probably means that he stayed in front of me the whole way. When I thanked one of these incredible warriors for marching with us, he surprised me with a quick smile. "It's my honor! And besides," he grinned, "at least I only have one foot that's hurting right now. It could always be worse!"

There are nearly 6,400 participants in today's march. Many are members of the military; many others are civilians marching in honor of a deceased service member. The words "In memory of . . ." are frequently seen on T-shirts or on flyers pinned to rucksacks. Teams of service members represent every branch of the military; guidons stream in the constant wind. There are Reserve Officer Training Corps cadets, Boy Scout troops, and high school sports teams. There are a remarkable number of couples who are walking hand in hand, as though on a regular Sunday morning stroll. And at least one of the marchers—93-year-old Ben Skardon—is an original Bataan Death March survivor. There is little need for an internal pep talk; all the inspiration that I need is walking right alongside me.

Mile 15 ticks by, and then Mile 16. I'm still hungry, and now I'm starting to get tired. Conflicting poems begin to battle in my head. Clement C. Moore's "visions of sugarplums" dance enticingly.[2] *What on earth is a sugarplum?* If it's anything like a chocolate peanut butter cup, I would kill for one right now. On the other hand, Robert Frost is admonishing me from beyond the grave, reminding me that I still have "miles to go before I sleep"—10.2 miles, to be exact.

I swear those miles are getting longer. My teammates and I have agreed to stop and link up every 6 miles, so my next opportunity to rest is still 2 miles away. I don't know if I'm looking forward to the stop—or dreading it. The respite will be more than welcome, but starting again will be even harder than it was the last time. The trail begins to wind, and suddenly I know where I am. I'm almost back to the point where the route loops back on itself—where the unfortunate runner got up close and personal with an enraged antelope hours earlier. Although there is still a long road ahead, it is comforting to know that I'm almost on familiar turf. Maybe there will be oranges and bananas

This impressive class of marchers—the Wounded Warriors—has forced me to reevaluate my priorities. I'm grateful that my feet hurt, that my knees ache, and that my arms are starting to chafe at the shoulder seams of my uniform. All of this signifies that both of my legs and both of my arms are present for duty, intact, and responsive. I have had the honor of deploying, and I have had the good luck of coming home whole. These men weren't so lucky.

where we meet back up with the road. Maybe I can run on the downhill stretch. Maybe—just maybe—I'll actually finish this thing.

When Mile Marker 18 shows up, I pull to a stop and join our lightest and fastest teammate, who has already been casually pacing the roadside for several minutes. A formidable number of cacti line the trail, initially preventing me from sitting down. I finally find a bare patch and semicollapse onto the dirt. I'm sitting mere feet in front of the mile marker and have, thus, unwittingly become the subject of dozens of photographs as my fellow marchers document their progress along the route. "Here's me at Mile 18!" their blogs will proudly proclaim. "And that's some dusty Soldier who was too tired to move. Don't ask me who she is."

Twenty minutes later, our team is reassembled and we head back out together. I try to rein in the pace, but I now appreciate something that a friend told me following a Marine Corps marathon years ago. At that time, he recalled that he had wanted to walk at about Mile 17 but physically couldn't, since by then, his body was so ingrained with the rhythm of running. I find it difficult to go any slower; my hips and knees are now precisely calibrated to a certain stride and pace. The slightest deviation results in a screaming protest from my midback to my toes. I put the headphones back in and lean downhill. They'll catch up.

At the bottom of the hill, the White Sands Missile Range can be seen glittering in the distance. The road is lined with local police officers and firefighters who are directing traffic and supporting the marchers. There is now an unmistakable air of hope; although we still have 6 miles to go, we can see our objective growing closer. One of our teammates decides to high-five every police officer we pass; some are friendlier than others.

We continue to follow the road toward the post, but quickly discover that there's a trick. Instead of heading straight in, the course turns to the right and enters what is known as the Sand Pit—a dishearteningly accurate name. The Sand Pit consists of a 2-mile stretch of ankle-deep sand that shifts and slides with every step. By now we are at Mile 21; and for the first time, I think, *This sucks!* We've been marching for nearly 7 hours, and my legs feel like lead. I can't keep my rhythm without solid footing. *Don't hit the wall now,* I think. *We're too close to the finish!* For the first time all day, I slip into last place on our team. Now, I'm angry too. *Left, right, left, right.* I stare at the sand passing slowly between my feet. *Left, right, left, right.* The trail begins to curve. *This too shall pass.* Sure enough, the trail begins to ascend, and the sand gives way to harder-packed dirt. My feet actually stay where I put them. I shake my head and my legs, clearing out the sludge of the last 2 miles. I must catch up to my teammates. I shuffle along, regaining third place among my teammates.

We are now completely out of the sand and quickly approaching the main cantonment. The team is strung out again, so we pause at Mile 24 to reconsolidate. Marchers with angry, blistered feet are sitting on cots lining the road, boots off, attended to by medics who are attempting to patch them enough to make the last leg of the march. I can't fathom taking my boots off right now. They would never go back on. But the volunteers here are serving cookies! This is the first time all day that I've had sustenance that requires chewing. I guess they save the best for last.

Our team will stay together for the rest of the race now—no matter what. I try to put things in perspective, reminding the team that the remaining distance is no longer than an ordinary Army physical fitness test. Somehow, that knowledge doesn't make the last 2 miles any easier. The agave and yucca that had lined the route are

. . . at least one of the marchers—93-year-old Ben Skardon—is an original Bataan Death March survivor. There is little need for an internal pep talk; all the inspiration that I need is walking right alongside me.

slowly being replaced by long grasses; we are only feet away from the backyards of on-post housing. A chest-high stone wall separates us from easy chairs, ice-cold drinks, and air conditioning. But the stone wall might as well be the Great Wall. There's no going over it; there's no quitting now. After an impossibly long time, the small brown sign signifying Mile 25 comes into view.

If we're going to break 8 hours, we have 18 minutes remaining. At the beginning of the march, a mile easily fell away in 13 or 14 minutes. But now, we're going to have to push the last mile. Spectators line the route, helping to boost our spirits. A handful of grade school children sit on the wall, cheering and declaring that we are "way cooler" than they are. An older man, clearly a marcher who has already finished, saunters by holding a beer and hollering that there are cold ones at the finish line. My empty, dehydrated stomach roils at the thought. *No thanks!* I think. *But good for you, Buddy.*

The 8-hour milestone looms large, prompting us to move faster. Some of us are jogging, some are speed walking; but the whole team is moving together—faster than we have since Mile 6. Now there are 11 minutes left, and still no sign of Mile 26. Seven minutes left. We begin to hear the cheering. Five minutes. We round the last curve, and the finish line bursts into view. The whole team is running now. Bystanders shout our team number in encouragement as we fly by. "Go 101!" "Way to finish, 101!" We have less than a hundred meters to go. We're going to make it!

The Hellraisers cross the finish line together at 7 hours, 57 minutes. We place seventh of twenty teams in the military coed light division—not bad for our first time. There are blisters, swollen joints, and sunburns; but more importantly, there are camaraderie, honor, and gratitude. We sought out a challenge as a company, as a team, and as individuals; and we met that challenge head-on. We've been there, done that, and gotten the T-shirt. Literally.

Back at the hotel later that night, a few of us limp our way down to the lobby. Clad in sweats and flip-flops, we appear to be a far cry from the hardened Soldiers who pushed through 26.2 miles of sand, hills, and pain earlier in the day. But a few hours removed from the march, nursing glasses of ice water, we are now able to sit and reflect on the importance of what we accomplished. We were part of the largest crowd in Bataan Memorial Death March history—a crowd that came together from 5 nations, all 50 states, and all branches of the military to commemorate the courage and sacrifice of the "Battling Bastards of Bataan," as they called themselves. As Americans, we honored their commitment to our freedom. As Soldiers, we sought in some small way to share their struggle and their spirit.

Each of us made a promise, implicit in the oath we took when we raised our right hands, to remember and honor those who took that same oath before us. More than any memorial constructed of brick and brass and more than any headstone carefully adorned with pebbles, the physical effort of marching keeps the sacrifice of our predecessors alive and relevant. With each step, we more vividly remembered those who came before us, their dusty ghosts falling into step alongside us. Bataan was everything a memorial marathon should be—long, challenging, painful, and inspiring.

Will we be back? Oh yes—for we have promises to keep and miles to go before we sleep. Miles to go before we sleep.

Endnotes:

[1]Robert Frost, "Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening," *New Hampshire*, 1922.

[2]Clement C. Moore, "A Visit From St. Nicholas" (later known as "The Night Before Christmas"), 1822.

Captain Keating is the commander of the 110th Military Police Company. She holds a bachelor's degree in international and strategic history from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York.

There are blisters, swollen joints, and sunburns; but more importantly, there are camaraderie, honor, and gratitude. We sought out a challenge as a company, as a team, and as individuals; and we met that challenge head-on. We've been there, done that, and gotten the T-shirt. Literally.

Certain Uncertainty: Preparing for an Unwanted Mission

By Captain Christopher Evans and Captain Lauryn Riley

When man-made or natural disasters overwhelm local, state, and federal response efforts, the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF)—a Title 10[1] task force comprised of active duty Soldiers, Marines, and Airmen—can be called upon to provide lifesaving assistance to civilian authorities within 96 hours of notification. The 93d Military Police Battalion, Fort Bliss, Texas, has been poised to conduct consequence management operations as part of the CCMRF (pronounced "see-smurf") since 1 October 2010. During a recent 93d Military Police Battalion officer professional development session, Brigadier General David Phillips (chief of the Military Police Corps Regiment and commandant of the U.S. Army Military Police School) reminded officers that "It's not if, but when" the CCMRF will be activated. As with any contingency response organization, the CCMRF faces its own unique set of challenges, which include logistics, mission command, and integration into civilian response efforts. This article contains a discussion of the challenges that are unique to CCMRF; successful tactics, techniques, and procedures used by the 93d; and the future of the mission.

At its core, CCMRF is about "Americans helping Americans" when civil support and National Guard forces have been overwhelmed. Military police leaders and Soldiers within the CCMRF serve as general-purpose forces in the affected area, supporting civilian response mitigation efforts and assisting fellow Americans. Because the CCMRF is assigned unique mission sets and can only be activated in response to catastrophic disasters, leadership, critical thinking, and flexibility are required at the ground level. The CCRMF mission is one that is tailor-made for military police due to the Corps emphasis on leadership, responsibility (which begins at the junior level), and experience in responding to high-stress situations.

The 93d Military Police Battalion serves as the headquarters for Task Force 93—a force comprised of three military police companies and a chemical company with an additional Biological Integrated Detection System platoon. In the "ready" phase of CCMRF operations, Task Force 93 headquarters exercises mission command over subordinate elements with training readiness authority only. More problematic is that the official training readiness authority relationship is not established until mission assumption at the start of the fiscal year, while planning and coordination for training is required months before that. Additionally, the training readiness authority relationship inherently constrains the ability of an ad-hoc task force headquarters to conduct mission command, putting the task force in the precarious position of waiting in line behind the organic chain of command. For individual companies tasked with CCMRF operations, this can exacerbate the problem of simultaneously meeting the intent of battalion, brigade, and installation commanders who have the authority to "task" rather than "ask."

Task Force 93 recently completed Operation Vibrant Response—the Joint Task Force–Civil Support fiscal year 2011 validation exercise. The execution of this large-scale, joint exercise—which included participants from three brigade-size task forces under Joint Task Force–Civil Support—afforded Task Force 93 the opportunity to train as a task force and execute realistic missions. The operation also introduced the element of logistics into the CCMRF mission—an element that had not previously been fully integrated. The daunting task of deploying multiple geographically separate units with the ultimate goal of a phased flow of troops and equipment to the base support installation is an immense challenge that is only complicated by the fact that units under the CCMRF are unable to accurately anticipate mission requirements, since mission assignments are made at the discretion of the incident commander.

Because there is no established mission-essential equipment list for the CCMRF, one of the major issues encountered by the logisticians was the acquisition of non-modified table of organization and equipment items. Task Force 93 considered potential mission sets and acquired the following items as the basis of an equipment package to support the CCMRF mission: triple containers; Base-X® tent systems; environmental control units; commercial chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) apparel, and civilian-compatible automations. All acquired equipment was essential to

the battalion's ability to deploy within 96 hours and self-sustain for up to 30 days.

The 93d Military Police Battalion began conducting mission analysis and holding meetings with key personnel in the Fort Bliss transportation office (G-4) and mission support element (G-3) months before mission assumption. The three organizations worked together on an array of logistic and operational tasks—one of which was outlining requirements for a CCMRF-specific deployment sequence and identifying possible friction points within that sequence. To test those friction points, the 93d conducted a September 2010 emergency deployment readiness drill involving the integration of the plan developers and executors. Synchronization between the planners and the unit movement officer was critical. The emergency deployment readiness drill experience was used to help refine the installation deployment plan; it also brought tangibility to a mission that sometimes seems unlikely to materialize.

Unless authorized by the Secretary of Defense, Title 10 forces do not carry weapons. And military personnel are further constrained by the Posse Comitatus Act,[2] which prohibits federal troops from actively enforcing the law on American soil. So the question is: How is a young Soldier to deal with a mob of confused, desperate, and possibly violent civilians without the ability to exercise the full spectrum of force? Furthermore, how is a military police Soldier to deal with such a crowd without the authority to enforce law and order? The key is to form partnerships with local and federal civilian law enforcement personnel and to provide assistance while they enforce the law. Leaders at all levels of the military should emphasize that the purpose of the CCMRF is to "care for the people"—not to promote the rule of law.

Understanding the constraints placed on defense support to civil authorities operations is the first step toward effectively executing missions. And based not only on their training in law enforcement and the escalation of force, but also on their experience with working in small elements (where interpersonal communication skills and independent decisionmaking abilities are imperative), military police Soldiers are well equipped to deal with such situations. These skills carry over into the CCMRF mission set, where operations are independent of platoon—or even squad—leadership. This flexibility allows commanders at all levels to provide support to civil authorities without the fear of depleted effectiveness.

Task Force 93 military police units provide the bulk of the manpower used to support local law enforcement and civil agencies during CCMRF operations; accordingly, they are viewed as the main effort of task force operations and Joint Task Force–Civil Support. The primary defense support to civil authorities mission of military police units is to conduct community wellness checks, which involve working with local law enforcement agencies to sweep the affected area for survivors and to provide basic medical support, supplies, and accurate information from the incident command post.

Soldiers conduct mass caualty decontamination.

Soldiers carry an injured civilian to an ambulance during wellness check operations.

A Soldier searches for survivors in the rubble before the unit begins route clearance operations.

At the end of this fiscal year, the CCMRF will transition to the Defense CBRNE Response Force. The Defense CBRNE Response Force will maintain the same mission and intent as its predecessor, but will be distinctly

different. Rather than being made up of three distinct organizations with responsibility for different submissions within task force operations, the Defense CBRNE Response Force will be comprised of three independent, multifunctional CBRNE response task forces, with each of the O-5 level commands having the same capabilities as their sister task forces. For military police, this means that companies will not necessarily serve under a military police higher headquarters or among other military police companies. Instead, one military police company will be assigned to each O-5 command and will perform missions as the only general-purpose force within that task force command. The Defense CBRNE Response Force will provide support to civil authorities within the initial hours or days following a catastrophic incident. Whether this new structure will create a more effective response force remains to be seen. However, military police will certainly be involved in assisting, protecting, and defending the people of the United States when the time comes.

Endnotes:

[1]"Title 10" refers to U.S. Code (USC), Title 10, *Armed Forces*.

[2]The Posse Comitatus Act (USC, Title 18, *Crimes and Criminal Procedure*, §1385), which was passed in 1878, was developed in response to the U.S. Army occupation of former Confederate States during the Reconstruction Era.

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Captain Riley is the officer in charge, Operations, 93d Military Police Battalion. She holds a bachelor's degree in comparative politics from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York.

There's a New Sheriff in Town:

The "Fighting Deuce" Takes Over for the "Punishers"

By Private Alyxandra McChesney

On 2 February 2011, the "Punishers" of the 512th Military Police Company, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, introduced their U.S. forces replacements—the "Fighting Deuce" Soldiers of the 272d Military Police Company, Fort Polk, Louisiana—to the police chiefs of Kirkuk, Iraq. Then the Punishers said their goodbyes.

During their 12-month deployment to Kirkuk, the 512th built a new law enforcement program called the Kirkuk Provincial Organized Crime Unit (KPOC-U). "KPOC-U is a program we came up with to advise and assist the investigating officers of Kirkuk to enhance their capabilities to collect evidence to help the Iraqi police in convicting criminals," said Sergeant First Class Robert Cannon, platoon sergeant, 512th Military Police Company.

Before creating the new unit, U.S. Army military police, civilian police advisers, a criminal investigator from each of the eight Kirkuk districts, and two criminal investigators from the Kirkuk Anticrime Unit attended a 30-day, Iraqi-led class intended to help U.S. forces understand Iraqi police procedures conducted during criminal investigations. Class topics included Iraqi law, crime scene security and integrity, forensic evidence identification, and DNA collection.

KPOC-U was created by combining a wide range of preexisting Kirkuk police force resources. Personnel and assets were consolidated under one command to fight an increasingly organized criminal enterprise within the province.

On 15 June 2010—just two days after class graduation—the new KPOC-U began operation and undertook their first mission. Much of the unit's experience was derived from on-the-job-training.

Upon receipt of a crime report, Soldiers of the 512th Military Police Company accompanied Iraqi police units to the scene of the crime, where they advised, assisted, and mentored their Iraqi counterparts in building the prosecution's case by collecting evidence and taking fingerprints. Establishing the KPOC-U enabled Kirkuk police teams to find and collect evidence, capture suspects, and convict criminals under the Iraqi rule of law.

According to Sergeant First Class Cannon, the crime rate in the city of Kirkuk has been successfully reduced through the KPOC-U program. "When we first started the program, we were going out on two missions or crime scenes a day to collect criminal evidence. Now we go on very few crime scene missions—only a few per week," he said. "I believe our mission here is complete on our end," he added. "It feels great to hand over the task to another unit to finish what we started."

A platoon sergeant with the 272d Military Police Company observed a marked improvement in security since his first tours in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. "We are excited to be here, and we want to continue with the KPOC-U program," he said, "But most of all, we want to keep the relationship [that the] 512th has built."

Private McChesney is a print journalist with the Public Affairs Office, 1st Advise and Assist Task Force, 1st Infantry Division, U.S. Division–North, Contingency Operating Site Warrior, Iraq.

Counterinsurgency Within Internment Facilities: Safeguarding Soldiers and Detainees

By Captain Andrew B. Stipp

The 108th Military Police Company (Airborne) (Air Assault), Fort Bragg, North Carolina, recently concluded one of the toughest missions within the spectrum of military police operations—detainee operations (DETOPS). Furthermore, the mission was carried out while the unit was deployed to Camp Cropper, Iraq, from April 2010 to March 2011. There are two key components to the DETOPS mission in a deployed environment—mental challenge and strategic-level visibility.

The Soldiers and leaders of the 108th did not originally plan or train for a DETOPS mission. However, a series of significant changes (including the retention of positive control over high-value detainees in April 2010, a reduction of forces from May to July 2010, and the onset of Operation New Dawn on 1 September 2010) resulted in their assumption of the mission, which—to briefly summarize—was to provide care, custody, and control to high-value detainees while maintaining dignity and respect for human rights.

Many 108th Soldiers were veterans of a 15-month tour to Baghdad that took place during the 2007–2008 surge. These Soldiers recounted a tough year in which they endured numerous attacks and the tragic loss of Soldiers to enemy fire. And during my own most recent deployment to Iraq (March 2008–March 2009), my younger brother was injured by a suicide, vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack in Mosul. The detainee population held at Camp Cropper represented the root of al-Qaida in Iraq. One government agency described the detainees as "global jihadists"—terrorists capable of planning, resourcing, and conducting attacks around the world. It was certainly possible—if not probable—that one or more of these detainees had coordinated attacks against the veterans of the 108th. It was just as probable that one or more of them was directly involved in coordinating the suicide, vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack that crippled my brother. The DETOPS mission was a mentally challenging experience that required strict adherence to the Army values to execute tasks professionally.

The 108th faced a particularly challenging situation when four Iraqi detainees escaped from the Camp Cropper Theater Internment Facility (TIF) on 8 September 2010—just a week after the United States had transferred authority of the prison to Iraqi officials. The attention that was brought on by the aftermath of the well-coordinated, well-rehearsed escape effort prompted procedural changes (including additional detainee restraints and a reduction in recreation time to the 2-hour minimum required by the Geneva Conventions), facilitated an increase in available Soldiers, and resulted in more than $4 million in physical-security upgrades. Thus, the ability of the 108th to execute the DETOPS mission improved. However, while the increases in manpower and improvements in physical security were a tremendous help, they did not eliminate the relentless DETOPS challenges inherent in the requirement to provide care, custody, and control to [former] terrorists. From 9 September to 15 October 2010, tensions within the TIF were high; and on 16 October 2010, a disturbance broke out. Although the disruption was quelled within an hour and no Soldiers or detainees were injured, leaders reevaluated the situation. It became clear that, while physical security upgrades and security procedure improvements were taking place, the growing tension between detainees and the guard force needed to be alleviated; otherwise, detainees and Soldiers might be injured or killed. The leaders decided to implement a counterinsurgency (COIN) initiative inside the TIF. The intent of the initiative was to regain general detainee compliance, ultimately reducing the threat of harm against the Soldiers who made up the guard force and the detainees for whom they were responsible.

COIN doctrine is addressed primarily in Field Manual (FM) 3-24 and FM 3-24.2. Although COIN is not a new military concept, the training and preparation of Soldiers with regard to COIN doctrine is a challenge due to the following critical tenets:

- "The military forces that successfully defeat insurgencies are usually those able to overcome their institutional inclination to wage conventional war against insurgents."[1] Although the Army does an exceptional job of training Soldiers to engage and destroy U.S. enemies in close combat, this is not the primary means of defeating an insurgency.
- "Long-term success in COIN depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the government's rule."[2]
- "An operation that kills five insurgents is counterproductive if collateral damage leads to the recruitment

of fifty more insurgents."[3] Because antagonistic methods of force can often be counterproductive, the use of appropriate levels of force is important in promoting COIN strategy. In the case of the Camp Cropper TIF, the postescape tension was driven by an action/reaction paradigm: The insurgents acted, and the guard force reacted—and vice versa. The 108th needed to proactively work toward attaining a generally docile climate.

These three broad tenets were used to shape efforts to regain compliance from detainees of the Camp Cropper TIF. Under the leadership of the 105th Military Police Battalion (Internment/Resettlement) and the U.S. Forces–Iraq Provost Marshal General, a plan for an incentive-based approach to reducing disciplinary infractions was developed. The plan allowed for certain sections of the detainee population (the "chiefs" or select detainees who represented the internal leadership) to receive additional quality-of-life privileges if there were no disciplinary infractions during a specified period of time. In this way, detainee chiefs were engaged and empowered to "control" their section of the population. Members of other detainee population sections witnessed the endowment of privileges and subsequently become more compliant in an attempt to earn the same privileges. This approach closely followed the precepts described in FM 3-24.

The plan seemed simple enough; but juxtaposed with the mental challenges of DETOPS and the recent escape, it was initially a jagged pill for Soldiers of all ranks to swallow. After all, why should these terrorists receive anything but the bare necessities? However, through discussions with leaders and key advisors, it became clear that—by meeting the intent of the COIN initiative—compliance would be regained and Soldiers would be protected—which, in turn, also meant that detainees would be protected.

The success of the initiative depended on the following fundamentals:

- **Leadership.** Leadership was vital in ensuring that Soldiers understood why detainees received privileges. Engaged leaders and senior noncommissioned officers were needed to teach, coach, and mentor Soldiers and junior noncommissioned officers about the importance of COIN and how it reduces the threat of harm.
- **Synchronization.** Synchronization was crucial in enabling key battalion staff sections and civilian advisors to stay in tune with the guard force. Weekly meetings were scheduled between the battalion intelligence staff officer (S-2), COIN advisors, and TIF leaders to discuss COIN observations and objectives. The success of the initiative was due to a team effort, with all members focused on achieving the basic intent.
- **Communication.** Communication, which was the key to leadership influence, was important not only for synchronization meetings, but also to the dynamic between the guard force and detainee chiefs. Soldiers of the guard force needed to respectfully address the chiefs who, in turn, served as the overall voice of their sections. Because the chiefs were empowered with this responsibility, they were held accountable for the actions of their sections.

The COIN initiative was successful in many ways. Detainees noticed a change in the way they were addressed by the Soldiers of the guard force—with basic human respect, rather than an antagonistic tone. They also began to take notice of the "incentives for compliance" plan. Detainees from one section observed detainees from another section receiving additional privileges and began asking questions of the COIN advisors. Because the COIN advisors were in synchronization with the overall plan, they candidly informed the detainees that they, too, could receive additional privileges if they demonstrated improved compliance with guard force rules. After a few weeks, most of the population began to conform and multiple sections earned extra privileges by improving compliance, as demonstrated by a decrease in disciplinary infractions.

Guard force Soldiers who interacted directly with the detainees began reporting positive encounters with the chiefs. Although there was no exchange of "well wishes," interactions between the two groups evolved into simple, basic, and generally respectful communications. In September 2010, detainees were submitting only 2 or 3 positive guard force reports per month, while the average number of negative reports was 13. However, by mid-November 2010, the average number of positive reports from the detainees had increased to 4 or 5 and the average number of negative reports remained at 2 or 3. The general pattern of more positive reports than negative was maintained through mid-January 2011. Leaders were stunned at the success that was achieved; the level of compliance was unprecedented.

COIN is a complicated, esoteric doctrine of warfare with a focus on building host nation legitimacy and enabling countries to solve their own problems. The importance of COIN in DETOPS cannot be overstated, which is why the topic has now been incorporated into FM 3-39.40. The extrapolation of the tenets to the Camp Cropper TIF situation resulted in a level of compliance that could not have been realistically predicted. The success of the COIN initiative was further fueled by strong leadership, synchronization, and constant communication. The advancements and compliance realized through the COIN initiative led to the desired end state—the protection of Soldiers and, ultimately, the protection of detainees.

The Soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers of the 108th Military Police Company demonstrated utmost professionalism in making the COIN initiative a success while conducting DETOPS at the Camp

Cropper TIF. The "fight" that they endured did not provide a framework for acts and awards of uncommon valor; rather, it was a mental game—requiring maturity, self-control, and professionalism—played on a strategic level. The 108th did the job right by providing care, custody, and control with dignity and respect to some of the United States' most militant enemies. Any tour with such a conclusion is a good one.

Endnotes:

[1]FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, 15 December 2006, p. ix.

[2]Ibid, p. 1-1.

[3]Ibid, p. 1-25.

References:

FM 3-24.2, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, 21 April 2009.

FM 3-39.40, *Internment and Resettlement Operations*, 12 February 2010.

Captain Stipp is the commander of the 108th Military Police Company. He holds a bachelor's degree in psychology from Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana, and a master's degree in business and organizational security from Webster University, St. Louis, Missouri.

Fort Leavenworth Corrections Unit Named Best in Army

By Ms. Rebecca Steed

A military police company that deployed to Iraq to operate a detention facility has been named the best military police unit in the Army. Among its top achievements, the Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 705th Military Police Battalion, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, trained more than 2,200 Iraqi correctional officers, cut violence within the detention facility by 300 percent, and thwarted a dozen vehicle-borne improvised explosive device bombings through detection.

HHC, 705th Military Police Battalion, received the Brigadier General J.P. Holland Award on 25 April 2011. The award is named after a former (1953–1955) U.S. Army Europe provost marshal who, after his retirement in 1969, sponsored the award to promote esprit de corps and professionalism in military police units throughout the Regular Army. Brigadier General Colleen L. McGuire, Provost Marshal General of the Army and commander of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, presented the award.

According to the Army Corrections Command, unit achievements that played a key role in the selection for the award included—

- HHC, 705th Military Police Battalion, superbly performed their primary function of providing mission command for the Theater Internment Facility and Reconciliation Center at Camp Taji and, subsequently, the Theater Internment Facility at Camp Cropper. The unit was instrumental in training more than 2,200 Iraqi correctional officers and coordinating and executing the transfer of the Camp Taji Theater Internment Facility and Reconciliation Center and the Camp Cropper Theater Internment Facility to the government of Iraq—both pivotal actions in the restoration of Iraq's corrections system.
- The HHC deployed independently of its subordinate companies, but performed a strategically important and challenging mission exceedingly well. During a U.S. Army Central detainee operations inspection of the Taji Theater Internment Facility and Reconciliation Center, the unit received a 100 percent pass rate and was lauded for their counterinsurgency program, which yielded a 300 percent reduction in facility violence.
- The Intelligence Section, HHC, 705th Military Police Battalion, received four impact Army Achievement Medals and one impact Army Commendation Medal for accurately identifying U.S. Forces–Iraq targets who were visiting the Taji Theater Internment Facility and Reconciliation Center and for subsequently discovering twelve vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices.

For the second year in a row, HHC, 705th Military Police Battalion, also received the Brigadier General Thomas F. Barr Award, which recognizes the best military police company within the Army Corrections Command. In addition, General Raymond Odierno, the U.S. Forces–Iraq commander, awarded the Meritorious Unit Commendation award to the unit for their actions during Operation Iraqi Freedom (2009–2010).

Ms. Steed is the media relations coordinator, Public Affairs Office, Fort Leavenworth. She previously served as a military journalist in the U.S. Army.

300th Military Police Company
(Wardawgs)

Lineage and Honors

Constituted 26 August 1942 in the Army of the United States as the 300th Military Police Company and activated at Fort Myer, Virginia.

Inactivated 30 November 1948 at Fort Myer, Virginia.

Allotted 26 October 1965 to the Regular Army.

Activated 10 December 1965 at Fort Benning, Georgia.

Inactivated 1 April 1972 in Vietnam.

Activated 21 October 1977 in Germany.

Campaign Participation Credit

Vietnam

Counteroffensive
Counteroffensive, Phase II
Counteroffensive, Phase III
Tet Counteroffensive
Counteroffensive, Phase IV
Counteroffensive, Phase V
Counteroffensive, Phase VI
Tet 1969/Counteroffensive
Summer–Fall 1969
Winter–Spring 1970
Sanctuary Counteroffensive
Counteroffensive, Phase VII
Consolidation I
Consolidation II
Cease-Fire

War on Terrorism

Campaigns to be determined

Decorations

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered AMERICAN THEATER
Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1966–1967
Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1967–1968
Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered IRAQ 2003–2004
Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered IRAQ 2006
Army Superior Unit Award, Streamer embroidered 1990–1991
Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1971

Emerging Drugs: Building Awareness Within Formations

By Captain Erinn Singman-Kaine

Increased incidents of drug use throughout our Army installations cause concern for the welfare of our Soldiers and families. Specific drugs of interest include Salvia divinorum (or simply Salvia), Spice, a cocaine-like substance sold as Bath Salts and, most recently, Devil Tracks:

- Salvia, an herb, is currently listed as a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) "drug of concern."
- Spice, a synthetic cannabinoid, was recently placed on the DEA temporary list of controlled substances.
- Bath Salts and Devil Tracks contain analogs of illegal substances.

Changes in psychosis among those who use these substances vary drastically from one person to another, making the prediction of individual effects virtually impossible. And the horror stories affiliated with the use of these substances continue to surface. To combat this growing issue, it is imperative that leaders disseminate information and build awareness within our formations and family readiness groups.

Horror Stories

While some control measures are in place, it is easy to purchase these drugs merely by walking into a downtown novelty store or searching online, where the drugs are advertised as seemingly common items. Although the potential legal repercussions can be frightening, they pale in comparison to other possible consequences such as these:

- After missing a formation for a significant training event, a noncommissioned officer at Fort Benning, Georgia, was found in his room. He did not feel well, and—according to his leaders—"did not seem like his usual self." He began vomiting and was admitted to the hospital for treatment. The cause of his illness was Spice.
- After developing schizophrenia-like symptoms, an 18-year-old woman from San Francisco, California, was admitted to the hospital. Her heightened levels of agitation caused her to bite off a ½-inch piece of her tongue. The status of her physical condition continued to plummet; due to necrosis, elements of her small intestine and colon were removed. After a long hospitalization, during which several treatments of antipsychotic drugs were administered, she was released. The cause of her severe reaction was Salvia.
- After taking a substance that they believed to be "legal," three paratroopers from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, were hospitalized in critical condition. The drug—given to them by another Soldier—mimicked the effects of Ecstasy, which can lead to muscle breakdown and kidney, liver, and cardiovascular failure. The cause of their reactions was Devil Tracks.
- After snorting a "legal" substance, a young man from Covington, Louisiana, suffered a brutal case of intermittent delirium. His father spent three days taking care of him. During that time, the son's visions become so intense that he tried to cut his throat, narrowly missing major arteries. On the third day, while the father slept, his son left the room and shot himself. The cause of the severe reaction was Bath Salts.

Drug Facts

Each of these drugs can be described by its own set of unique characteristics and side effects.

Salvia divinorum

Salvia is an herb that contains the active ingredient salvinorin A. Available as seeds, leaves, and liquid extract, Salvia can be smoked or ingested (in liquid form). The drug affects brain receptors, causing immediate visual distortions, hallucinations, and alterations in the perception of reality.

The use of Salvia is known to cause the following specific side effects:

- Recollection of past memories. For example, the user revisits places from childhood memory.
- Overlapping realities. For example, the user perceives being in several locations at once.
- Synesthesia, or the intertwining of sensations. For example, the user "hears" colors and "smells" sounds.

Spice

Spice—also known as *K2*, *Red Ball*, *Blowout*, and *Chill*—is a synthetic substance that produces effects similar to those of marijuana. Samples taken from various Spice packets have tested positive for the synthetic cannabinoids JWH-018 and JWH-073, which are drugs that were originally developed in the mid-1990s by Clemson University (South Carolina) researchers who were conducting laboratory experiments to determine the effects of the compounds on mice brains.

Symptoms of Spice use include—

- Anxiety.
- Increased heart rate.
- High blood pressure.
- Vomiting.
- Seizures.

Bath Salts

Marketed in specialty shops under such names as *Ivory Wave*, *Bliss*, *Blue Silk*, *Charge Plus*, *White Lightning*, *Cloud 9*, and *Energy 1*, Bath Salts—also known as *fake cocaine*—exists in a white powder form, which users usually snort, but may also smoke or ingest. The active ingredient is 3,4-methylenedioxypyrovalerone (MDPV), which affects the central nervous system.

Users of Bath Salts have reported feelings of alertness, heightened sensory awareness, empathy, and euphoria. However, the DEA has reported that, in higher doses, MDPV is known to cause—

- Sweating.
- Prolonged panic attacks.
- Vasoconstriction.
- High blood pressure.
- Excessively rapid heart rate.
- Psychosis (induced by sleep deprivation).

In Europe, where MDPV has been in circulation since 2007, health care officials report that users "lose touch with reality" and many are currently being treated in mental institutions.

Devil Tracks

Devil Tracks, which contains mephedrone (also called 4-methylmethcathinone), is chemically related to Ecstasy (or 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine [MDMA]). It is available online, where it is advertised as plant food; however, the cost is drastically different. Plant food typically sells for $10 for 5 pounds, whereas Devil Tracks sells for about $20 for 500 milligrams. While the sale of Devil Tracks is legal, individuals who are found to be under the influence of mephedrone can be arrested. In addition, Devil Tracks may be detected as MDMA through drug testing.

Federal Matters

On 24 November 2010, the DEA issued a notice of intent to temporarily include five synthetic cannabinoids (including components commonly found in Spice) in the federal Controlled Substances Act. The final order, which went into effect on 1 March 2011, specifies the imposition of all civil, criminal, and administrative penalties on anyone engaged in the possession, manufacture, or distribution of these substances.

Although the drugs contained in Bath Salts (MDPV) and Devil Tracks (mephedrone) are not currently scheduled under the Controlled Substances Act, they are analogs of Schedule I drugs. Consequently, cases involving MDPV or mephedrone may be prosecuted under the Federal Analog Act of the Controlled Substances Act.

Army Restrictions

The possession or use of any of these drugs constitutes a violation of Army Regulation (AR) 600-85, which states that substances used "for the purpose of inducing excitement, intoxication, or stupefaction of the central nervous system" are prohibited.[1] The possession or use of these drugs is also considered a crime under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

In addition, there are some installation-specific policies in place. For example, Fort Benning Policy Memorandum 600-85-1 prohibits the use of "controlled substance analogs," or "designed" drugs. The policy also specifies that the possession or use of these or similar substances is prohibited on federal government facilities and by Department of Defense personnel working under the authority of the commanding general, U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence. (***Note.*** There were 14 Soldiers from Fort Benning who were charged for the possession or use of Salvia or Spice during 2010.)

State Restrictions

Several states have banned these drugs. For example—

- The sale or possession of MDPV is currently banned in Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, and North Dakota.
- Salvia was restricted in 21 states and Spice in 13 states before these drugs were placed on the federal temporary list of controlled substances.

The Way Ahead

Drug control measures are under development at state and federal levels; however, the road to gaining control of these substances is a long one.

The five synthetic cannabinoids that were added to the temporary list of controlled substances are scheduled to remain there for one year. This will serve to protect the populace while the DEA effectively researches the drugs to determine whether a permanent ban is warranted.

(Continued on page 41)

Lessons Learned From Company Level DCRF Operations

By Captain Henry Cartagena

On 1 October 2010, the 563d Military Police Company, Fort Drum, New York, assumed a directed response force mission in support of Joint Task Force–Civil Support (U.S. Army North). This means that the unit must be capable of deploying by air, rail, or ground movement within 96 hours of any alert of a national crisis arising from a catastrophic; man-made; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) event in the United States.

Soldiers and families of the 563d Military Police Company "Titans" participated in a critical mission designed to alleviate human suffering in the United States should a CBRNE event occur during unit support to defense chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives response force (DCRF) (formerly known as the CBRNE consequence management response force) operations. This required standing operating procedures, a constant state of unit readiness in fiscal year 2011, and well-rehearsed drills. The Titans recorded several lessons learned in maintaining constant readiness and training appropriately for this type of rapid response mission.

Transitioning From Counterinsurgency to the DCRF

The 563d Military Police Company redeployed from Operation Iraqi Freedom in February 2010, where they conducted police transition team operations. Soon thereafter, they were notified of the upcoming October DCRF mission. During the reintegration period, the unit reset and participated in the 91st Military Police Battalion's Military Police Certification Course. From April to August 2010, they also conducted law enforcement operations at Fort Drum. The reintegration process and participation in community law enforcement operations were critical in the transition of Soldiers from combat support operations to DCRF operations. Soldiers strengthened and refined their interpersonal communication skills while performing the law enforcement operations; this contributed to the mindset and attitude necessary to perform effective DCRF operations.

To ensure that higher headquarters is aware of possible limitations, units must maintain updated shortage annexes at all times. This is especially important when the unit is required to deploy within 96 hours. The 563d Military Police Company acquired packing, blocking, and bracing materials and the tools required to load equipment into containers before assuming the DCRF mission. The company quickly became the most well equipped and rapidly deployable unit on Fort Drum. It fielded, maintained, and trained with 99 percent of the authorized or "in lieu of" equipment.

The 563d created a "DCRF Family Readiness Guide," which was issued to the families and mailed to incoming personnel as part of the sponsorship program and the unit integration process. This guide, in conjunction with monthly family readiness group meetings, ensured that family members understood the importance and impact of the DCRF mission.

Although the law enforcement experience gained before mission assumption was a tremendous benefit to the unit, their ability to respond to a real-world incident could have been greatly improved through their participation in a certification exercise (conducted before the directed mission) that focused on a 96-hour, alert-to-deployment drill; wellness checks; and CBRNE defense and lifesaving techniques in a CBRNE environment. U.S. Army North resolved this issue for fiscal year 2012 by conducting the Operation Vibrant Response culminating training event before the beginning of the next DCRF rotation. Toward

Soldiers receive a Federal Emergency Management Agency incident situation brief during an Operation Vibrant Response training exercise.

the end of their directed year-long mission, the 563d Military Police Company provided observers-controllers for this exercise to ensure that lessons learned were passed along to incoming units.

Sustaining DCRF Unit Readiness

The 563d Military Police Company conducted monthly unit alerts and deployment readiness exercises every quarter throughout fiscal year 2011. This helped ensure that the staff of the 91st Military Police Battalion was prepared to see that the company received the necessary deployment support. It also helped ensure that assigned company tasks were assumed by other units upon alert. The 93d Military Police Battalion (Task Force 93) and the 4th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (Task Force Operations) ensured that regular guidance was issued to units supporting the DCRF mission throughout the United States.

In October 2010, the 563d Military Police Company participated in the 10th Sustainment Brigade's full spectrum operations culminating training event, which required that the entire unit (along with 40 vehicles) alert, marshal, and deploy more than 300 miles from Fort Drum to Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania. Elements of the unit assisted the New York State Police and Pennsylvania State Police in facilitating the movement of brigade forces en route to Fort Pickett, Virginia. While at Fort Indiantown Gap, the company participated in an antiterrorism and force protection exercise with the installation police force. This exercise demonstrated the effectiveness of Blue Force Tracker (a system that uses global positioning information to provide military commanders and forces with the locations of friendly and hostile military forces) in a defense support to civil authorities situation.

In March 2011, the 563d Military Police Company also supported Operation Vibrant Response 11.1, which was held at Camp Atterbury near Edinburgh, Indiana, and Muscatatuck Urban Training Center near Butlerville, Indiana. Before the exercise, the company conducted individual and collective training and certification up to squad level. The training, which was conducted in the challenging winter environment of Fort Drum, went very well; however, it could have been enhanced by increasing the number of role players who required assistance from the patrols conducting wellness checks. The platoons identified a need for the creation of wellness check kits for each team before mission execution. They determined that these kits should include a VS-17/GVX signal panel marker, paint markers, spray paint, tape, and medical supplies such as tourniquets.



Soldiers treat role players after a simulated nuclear detonation during Operation Vibrant Response.

The unit contracted for the line-haul support of equipment and aviation support for personnel movement to Indiana. Task Force 93 and advanced liaisons were on the scene before the unit arrived; they safely integrated the company into response operations within 24 hours. Once again, company Blue Force Tracker assets were critical for mission command in a scenario in which there was no use of civilian communication systems from Muscatatuck Urban Training Center to the company command post at the Jennings County Fairgrounds near North Vernon, Indiana. Brigadier General Harry E. Miller Jr., senior commander at Fort Drum, visited the company in Indiana and said, "Always bring everything your unit owns on any type of deployment." (The company brought and used M1117 armored security vehicles, which would be extremely useful in areas where infrastructure had been destroyed.)

The culminating mass casualty event tested all company capabilities and those of elements attached to the company, such as medical and transportation units. The operational experience gained in Iraq was clearly evident in the unit's methodical execution of the search-and-rescue mission. The combat lifesaving and interpersonal communication skills of each Soldier were fully tested in the high-stress environment of the mass casualty event. Based on their experience, the unit identified the need for a long-range acoustic device, incident commander's radio interface, nonlethal capabilities, and lifesaving equipment at the home station before deployment. The focus on Soldier and civilian safety was the key to unit success during the exercise. The ability to communicate in the constantly changing interagency operating environment—which is always a critical component of military police operations—was also vitally important.

The 563d Military Police Company also conducted a DCRF deployment readiness exercise at Fort Drum immediately following the death of Osama Bin Laden in May 2011. The unit had been conducting law enforcement operations at Fort Drum, but was immediately replaced by other military police Soldiers from sister companies. A few weeks later, the 563d provided additional security during U.S. Military Academy commencement events, which were attended by First Lady Michelle Obama and Vice President Joseph Biden. These activities continued to exercise the company's deployment readiness and

individual and collective skills that are essential to the successful execution of a DCRF mission.

Conclusion

The participation of the 563d Military Police Company in the DCRF mission enabled the unit to constantly exercise and refine its deployment readiness processes and procedures. Every command maintenance event, family readiness group meeting, training event, and alert conducted throughout the year contributed to the company's success at Fort Drum, Fort Indiantown Gap, Camp Atterbury, Muscatatuck Urban Training Center, and the U.S. Military Academy. In the event of an actual national disaster, there is no doubt that the 563d Military Police Company would alert, marshal, and deploy within 96 hours by ground, rail, ship, or air to the joint operating area and execute all DCRF tasks in an exceptional manner.

STRENGTH AND HONOR!

Captain Cartagena is the commander of the 563d Military Police Company. He holds a bachelor's degree in history from the State University of New York at Buffalo and a master's degree in business and organizational security management from Webster University.

MILITARY POLICE Writer's Guide



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Articles should be concise, straightforward, and in the active voice. If they contain attributable information or quotations not referenced in the text, provide appropriate endnotes. Text length should not exceed 2,000 words (about 8 double-spaced pages). Shorter, after-action-type articles and reviews of books on military police topics are also welcome.

Include photographs (with captions) and/or line diagrams that illustrate information in the article. Please do not insert illustrations or photos in the text; instead, send each of them as a separate file. Do not embed photographs in PowerPoint or Microsoft Word. If illustrations are in PowerPoint, avoid using excessive color and shading. Save digital images in a TIF or JPG format at a resolution no lower than 200 dpi. Images copied from a Web site must be accompanied by copyright permission.

Provide a short paragraph that summarizes the content of the article. Also include a short biography (full name, rank, current unit, job title, and education), your mailing address, a fax number, and a commercial daytime telephone number.

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Applying Lessons Learned From the British Royal Military Police to the Professionalization of U.S. Army Policing

By Major Mark A. Davis

The 3d Regiment, Royal Military Police, introduced the concept of a personal development week (PDW) to enable every soldier of the regiment to build upon his or her skills and personal depth through structured visits and work experiences with other agencies throughout the United Kingdom. By participating in activities that they would not normally have an opportunity to experience in their military careers, soldiers achieved a real sense of growth in maturity and character. This article describes the PDW concept and its applicability to our own military police training construct and provides insight into the value of the PDW concept from a British officer's perspective. It also illustrates the contributions of military police exchange officers in meeting the U.S. Army Europe commander's guidance for increasing interoperability amongst our forces.

As the name suggests, the PDW event was conducted primarily over the course of one week; however, personnel who were unable to participate during the designated week were allowed to take part at a later date. Very few restrictions were placed on the nature of the personal development; the overarching requirements were that individual development experiences must be—

- Relevant to future goals.
- Cost-neutral to the organization.
- Risk-assessed by high-level organizational leaders.

Participants were also required to develop an administrative instruction that detailed their selected development plan—which, in turn, helped build their writing skills.

Understanding that this was a very good opportunity to obtain additional policing experience or to work on transition requirements, regimental personnel took full advantage of their time during PDW. Personal development took on many guises across the regiment, ranging from working with police agencies to participating in apprenticeships with butchers.

In the spirit of learning from our British ally and adopting best practices to improve the performance of our military police men and women, the PDW concept should be examined for possible application to the U.S. military police training construct at the unit level. The PDW solution—while not mandated, institutionally formalized, or approved by any higher-level organization—could serve as a means of improving our core policing skills and overall understanding within the policing realm. Simple memorandums of agreement could allow our military police personnel to take part in week-long internships with the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) (commonly referred to as CID), U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, local investigators, or prison systems throughout the United States. Our personnel could be developed in ways that could not be measured. Additionally, a PDW type opportunity may prove helpful to those within our organizations who are seeking employment outside the military. While the loss of personnel to other organizations may be undesirable, we must realistically assume that all Soldiers will eventually choose their time and place of exit from the military. We should actively seek to support them by providing the best possible opportunities to succeed in the civilian sector.

As a means of demonstrating the relevance of the PDW program to our own organization, I would like to highlight my experience as a military police exchange officer in assisting a British Royal military police subaltern (lieutenant) with completing his PDW in early February 2011. In conjunction with various U.S. Army military police officers and noncommissioned officers throughout the Military District of Washington, Lieutenant Aaron Moore observed the scope of activities conducted by our military police—including activities conducted at the U.S. Capitol and the Pentagon. Thanks to his successful and fulfilling visit, Lieutenant Moore is now familiar with our personnel, units, and systems and understands the extent of the experience, capability, and professionalism of the U.S. Army Military Police Corps. The importance of this personal development event is revealed in "American Journey"—an article that Lieutenant Moore wrote to chronicle his experience (see article on page 24).

Since 2008, many formal steps have been taken at the institutional level to build our policing capability. However, the 3d Regiment, Royal Military Police PDW concept represents a significant step in closing the informal gap that exists in professionalizing the U.S. Army policing capability. The specific aim of the program, which is meant for implementation at battalion level and below, should be to build on the policing skills of our junior Soldiers and officers and to enhance our relationships with professional policing organizations.

In addition, Lieutenant Moore's visit to the United States illustrates one benefit of the Military Personnel Exchange Program. Exchange officers, who are located throughout the world, are increasing organizational capacity and interoperability through important exchanges

of personnel and information. Lieutenant Moore's visit should be viewed as an example that U.S. and Royal military police can follow to gain a better understanding of and achieve cohesive operations in the uncertain future ahead. A similar arrangement might be beneficial in Germany—where the cost associated with the exchange of personnel between U.S. Army Europe and 1st Regiment, Royal Military Police, units would be minimal.

I look forward to further developments in the close U.S.-British cooperation and hope that military police battalion and company commanders give critical thought to the PDW concept as we continue to build our military police capability.

At the time this article was written, Major Davis was a military police exchange officer stationed in the United Kingdom. He is currently an Intermediate-Level Education (ILE) student at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Major Davis holds a bachelor's degree in physical therapy from the University of Toledo/Medical College of Ohio.

American Journey

By Lieutenant Aaron Moore

Someone once said that "to travel" is "to expand one's horizon." I would fully agree with that notion and add that those words have never been more relevant than they are to me now. In the summer after the Military Police Officer's Course, I happened to meet the [3d Regiment, Royal Military Police operations officer/U.S. Army Military Police exchange officer, Major Mark Davis]. After several discussions, the subject of the forthcoming [3d Regiment] PDW came up. This was the [commanding officer's] idea that every soldier in the regiment would be able to take a week of leave in order to achieve something that was beneficial to the individual and could therefore be utilized by the collective. Thus, it was at this point that we first talked about the opportunity to visit a U.S. Army [military police] unit in Washington, D.C. Eventually, the journey was organized with the much-appreciated help from Major Davis, who was instrumental in setting up the visit. To that end, in early February 2011, I set off to join the 289th Military Police Company in Fort Myer, Virginia.

During my time with the 289th Military Police Company, I was able to be part of a plethora of experiences that gave me a good insight into how our American ally conducts itself in the world of military policing. The first thing that I was able to witness was a national wreath-laying ceremony at Arlington National Cemetery, where the leader of Lithuania was present. This was a good opportunity for me to see the U.S. Army conduct a ceremonial duty, as well as the force protection measures that needed to be put in place by the military police personnel. I was also able to pay my respects to British Major General Orde Charles Wingate, who is buried there.

During the week, I was also able to partake in some police work by conducting patrols of the Washington, D.C., area. This was especially interesting, as I was able to witness an arrest that was conducted by the [Federal Bureau of Investigation]. This opportunity gave me a good insight into how the U.S. Army carries out police work at a tactical level and to witness the cross-organizational cooperation that can and will occur in a complex and diverse location such as Washington, D.C. Following that, I went on a visit to the Pentagon, where I was briefed on U.S. Army military police operations in Afghanistan. It was excellent to see that they very much operate along the same lines as the British [Royal Military Police] for the majority of issues. Notwithstanding our embedding of close-support [Royal Military Police] within battle groups to achieve maximal success whilst on operations, the U.S. military police very much organize and train their CID and Protective Services along the same lines as we do. In turn, our cooperation while on deployments is quite successful because we are usually working on the same issues and challenges in parallel.

There was also a day of range work that took place in Virginia. This was particularly useful (and fun), as I got hands-on practical exposure to the M4 and put rounds downrange with impunity. There were also plenty of opportunities to get to know the guys that were in the company, with all of their insightful observations on how the British Army works!

Another thing that I was able to do whilst in Washington, D.C., was visit Capitol Hill—the seat of the U.S. government. This visit was conducted by Major Josh Campbell (U.S. military police), who is the military attaché to Senate majority leader, Senator Reid. It was incredibly interesting to see how the various interest groups of American politics interact and how very much the military is part of that, with its own interests that need to be brought forward in the political arena.

During my time in Washington, D.C., there was also plenty of time to conduct personal sightseeing around what is a very impressive and beautiful city. The U.S. Army—and especially the military police unit that supported me—proved to be very hospitable, to the point that it was quite humbling. They did not hesitate to do whatever they could to facilitate my travel and learning and were not shy in showing me a good time during my weekend there. Overall, it was truly insightful to observe and interact with our U.S. counterparts and, on a higher level, to learn how their democratic system interacts with the military domestically. To that end, I have to thank everyone who made this trip possible.

Note. This article was printed with the permission of the author.

Military Police Make Use of Land Warrior

By Captain Joshua K. Frye

While dismounted, imagine—

- *Knowing the locations of your squad members at all times without visually scanning or talking.*
- *Shooting around corners.*
- *Seeing mission photographs, digital overlays, and live unmanned aerial vehicle feeds almost simultaneously.*

The technology that allows for these capabilities is actually available and was recently used in combat by the 2d Stryker Cavalry Regiment (2 SCR) (or 2d Dragoon) Military Police Platoon, Vilseck, Germany. The Land Warrior system offers tomorrow's requested capabilities today.

The Land Warrior was designed for traditional combat arms use; it was not originally envisioned as a tool for combat support Soldiers and leaders. When recent versions of the system began hitting the battlefields of Iraq in 2006, the Infantry Branch (4th Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment) became most involved. Because the Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) radio comprised the centerpiece of the Land Warrior, the Army naturally chose to field it with Stryker brigades, which already had the digital infrastructure necessary.

In 2009, the 5th Brigade, 2d Infantry Division (5/2) Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) deployed to Afghanistan with the latest version of the Land Warrior (dubbed the "Strike"). Because the system was not a program of record, it was fielded only to the 5/2 SBCT and, subsequently, to the 2 SCR.

Although 2 SCR infantry, cavalry scouts, engineers, and some field artillery units received the Strike before they deployed to Afghanistan, members of the Military Police Platoon did not attend new-equipment training in Germany. Because the platoon, which had been reorganized into four squads, had originally planned to conduct detention operations, their focus was on preparing to support the four 2 SCR maneuver squadrons. After arriving in Afghanistan, the platoon dispersed to various locations in several provinces; however, it quickly became clear that the military police squads could best serve the SCR by performing host nation police training as part of a security forces advisory team.

During the consolidation of two military police squads at one of the provincial police headquarters, it was apparent that—to leverage all possible advantages—Military Police Platoon capabilities would need to be reevaluated with regard to conducting daily dismounted patrols in an urban setting. With the engineer troop engaged in route clearance operations, some Land Warrior ensembles were available for issue to military police—and the two 2 SCR squads were rapidly outfitted. New-equipment training (including a short practical exercise that was technically supported by Department of Defense contractors on a nearby forward operating base) was accomplished in just two days. Although the training was actually intended for team leaders and above, all squad members were trained and had the opportunity to use the system in a combat setting. During that time, two Soldiers became the first females to train, field, and operationally use the Land Warrior. In addition, the 2 SCR Military Police Platoon became the first military police unit to use the Land Warrior in combat.

Following the training, the military police put the Land Warrior to the test. The 9- to 11-pound ensemble—which is affixed to the back of the Soldier Plate Carrier System or inside the back of the improved outer tactical vest—features a digital compass, a Global Positioning System receiver, a helmet-mounted display, an enhanced Soldier control unit, two battery life options, and numerous subcomponents in the standard configuration. It is capable of processing up to secret level classified information. The digital compass and Global Positioning System receiver allow for the constant determination of the location and orientation of the Soldier. The helmet-mounted display, which is commonly affixed to the helmet and viewed with the nondominant eye, displays full-color digital data and a moving map. The enhanced Soldier control unit serves as the primary user interface to system functions. The true strength of the Land Warrior as a force multiplier was revealed with the use of the EPLRS radio network to transmit position, voice, and other data between ensembles and vehicles. Each Soldier was outfitted with full, over-the-ear, active hearing protection or in-ear microphones, allowing for seamless communication over the secure EPLRS network and auxiliary radios.

An urban setting is arguably one of the most complex operational environments faced by a unit. To "even the playing field," the Military Police Platoon made daily use of the Land Warrior. Digital maps and the latest imagery were available for frequent download from the Regimental Geospatial Cell. The imagery was extremely valuable while traveling through the densely populated city at all hours of the day and night.

Because they did not operate Stryker vehicles, the Military Police Platoon needed an existing EPLRS to transmit and receive data to and from the network. A robust city network was established by placing full-size EPLRS radios at two nearby forward operating bases and one at the provincial police headquarters where the military police were based. Newly fielded, mine-resistant, ambush-protected, all-terrain vehicles were also equipped with EPLRS radios. Dismounted Soldiers who were equipped with the Land Warrior were tracked via Blue Force Tracker and Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below. The network served to enhance the situational awareness of the squads, enabling their unprecedented access to information on the go. In addition, automated position reporting allowed senior leaders and personnel from adjacent units to remain fully aware of the real-time locations of military police.

The Military Police Platoon also fielded and tested a number of advanced capabilities that can be integrated with the Land Warrior. For example, the platoon used the Soldier intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance receiver prototype to view real-time, unmanned aerial vehicle feeds through the Land Warrior. They then provided feedback, which led to the eventual fielding and operational use of a second version. The platoon also used the daylight video sight. When mounted to a weapon, the daylight video sight allows Soldiers to look and fire around corners, take still photographs, and transmit the photographs to network members. Other camera solutions, including the "pole cam" and Dragon Egg™, were also used. With the pole cam (a wireless camera mounted to a telescoping graphite pole), deep wells and the tops of compound roofs can be visually inspected for weapons or explosives without endangering Soldiers. The Dragon Egg (a throwable wireless camera) has a low-light capability and is primarily used for static site security or viewing small, hard-to-access areas. Finally, the platoon also used the multifunction, agile, remote-control robot in dealing with numerous real-world improvised explosive devices and other dangerous situations.

The Land Warrior incorporates numerous exceptional planning and mission command tools. Planning software is used to create detailed overlays using the same

A Soldier adjusts his Land Warrior ensemble before heading out on a mission.

maps and imagery that are available on Land Warrior ensembles. These digital capabilities entirely replaced the three-dimensional sand tables and paper maps traditionally used for briefings by the 2 SCR Military Police Platoon. With the mission planner hooked to a large, liquid crystal display television, the entire platoon observed the manner in which the operation was to unfold; they then received identical mission overlays on their individual Land Warriors. During operations, the Land Warrior laptop allowed tactical operations centers to interact with equipped Soldiers on the battlefield and to provide mission command at unprecedented levels.

Over the course of the 2 SCR Military Police Platoon deployment, the Land Warrior was used in an urban setting, on convoys, during dismounted movements in rural areas, and in myriad other mission profiles. The advantages of the system were clear. The capabilities amplified the situational awareness and abilities of the Military Police Platoon. Furthermore, the Program Executive Office was very responsive and helpful in troubleshooting hardware and software issues and the Land Warrior team eagerly accepted all military police feedback and operational reports. This resulted in several high-level visits to observe the 2 SCR Military Police Platoon using the system.

Future versions of the Land Warrior (by different names) are currently under development and may be massively fielded. The 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division SBCT Military Police Platoon is slated to receive Land Warrior equipment and may bring these new capabilities to bear in the near future. By leveraging these and similar technologies, military police of today and tomorrow will continue to assist, protect, and defend from "the cutting edge."

Captain Frye is the executive officer of the Regimental Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 2 SCR. He was the 2 SCR Military Police Platoon leader from 2009 to 2011. Captain Frye holds a bachelor's degree in criminal justice with a minor in military science from East Tennessee State University.

519th Military Police Battalion

Lineage and Honors

Constituted 18 October 1927 in the Regular Army as the 15th Military Police Battalion (less Company A).

Redesignated 1 June 1940 as the 519th Military Police Battalion (less Company A).

(Company E, 524th Military Police Battalion [activated 21 July 1942], redesignated 14 April 1944 as Company A, 519th Military Police Battalion.)

Activated (less Company A) 20 April 1944 at Camp Chaffee, Arkansas.

Inactivated 25 March 1956 in Japan.

Activated 23 December 1966 at Fort Dix, New Jersey.

(Companies A, B, and C inactivated 1 November 1970 at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland.)

Campaign Participation Credit

World War II

Ryukyus

Korean War

United Nations Defensive
United Nations Offensive
Communist Chinese Forces Intervention
First United Nations Counteroffensive
Communist Chinese Forces Spring Offensive
United Nations Summer–Fall Offensive
Second Korean Winter
Korea, Summer–Fall 1952
Third Korean Winter
Korea, Summer 1953

Armed Forces Expeditions

Panama

Southwest Asia

Defense of Saudi Arabia
Liberation and Defense of Kuwait

War on Terrorism

Campaigns to be determined

Decorations

Valorous Unit Award, Streamer embroidered IRAQ 2003–2004
Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered KOREA 1950–1951
Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered KOREA 1952–1953
Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered SOUTHWEST ASIA 1990–1991
Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered IRAQ 2005–2006
Army Superior Unit Award, Streamer embroidered 1988
Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered KOREA 1950–1952

DOCTRINE UPDATE

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence Capabilities Development Integration Directorate Concepts, Organization, and Doctrine Development Division			
Publication Number	**Title**	**Date**	**Description**
Current Publications			
ATTP 3-39.20	Police Intelligence Operations	29 Jul 10	A manual that addresses police intelligence operations which support the operations process and protection activies by providing exceptional police information and intelligence to support, enhance, and contribute to situational understanding, force protection, the commander's protection program, and homeland security. **Status:** Current.
ATTP 3-39.32	Physical Security	3 Aug 10	A manual that establishes guidance for all personnel responsible for physical security. It is the basic reference for training security personnel and is intended to be used in conjunction with the Army Regulation (AR) 190 (Military Police) Series, Security Engineering Unified Facilities Criteria publications, Department of Defense directives, and other Department of the Army publications. **Status:** Current.
ATTP 3-39.34	Military Working Dogs	10 May 11	A manual that provides commanders, staffs, and military working dog (MWD) handlers with an understanding of MWD capabilities, employment considerations, sustainment requirements, and the integration of MWDs in support of full spectrum operations. **Status:** Current.
FM 3-19.4 (will be TC 3-39.30)	Military Police Leaders' Handbook	4 Mar 02 C1 2 Aug 02	A manual that addresses military police maneuver and mobility support, area security, internment/resettlement (I/R), law and order, and police intelligence operations across the full spectrum of Army operations. It primarily focuses on the principles of platoon operations and the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) necessary. **Status:** Under revision; to be published 2d quarter fiscal year (FY) 2012.
FM 3-19.11 (will be ATTP 3-39.11)	Military Police Special-Reaction Teams	13 May 05	A manual that serves as a guide for commanders, staffs, and trainers who are responsible for training and deploying military police special-reaction teams. **Status:** Current.
FM 3-19.12 (will be ATTP 3-39.31)	Protective Services	11 Aug 04	A manual that addresses TTP for special agents of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command and military police assigned to protective services duties. **Status:** Current.
FM 3-19.13 (will be ATTP 3-39.12)	Law Enforcement Investigations	10 Jan 05	A manual that serves as a guide for military police, investigators, and U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command special agents operating in tactical and garrison environments. **Status:** Under revision; to be published 4th quarter FY 13.
FM 3-19.15 (will be ATTP 3-39.33)	Civil Disturbance Operations	18 Apr 05	A manual that addresses continental U.S. and outside the continental U.S. civil disturbance operations and domestic unrest, including the military role in providing assistance to civil authorities. **Status:** Current.

DOCTRINE UPDATE

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence

Capabilities Development Integration Directorate
Concepts, Organization, and Doctrine Development Division

Publication Number	Title	Date	Description
Current Publications (continued)			
FM 3-37.2	Antiterrorism Operations	18 Feb 11	A manual that establishes Army guidance on integrating and synchronizing antiterrorism across the full spectrum of conflict and into the full range of military operations. It shows how antiterrorism operations nest under full spectrum operations, the protection warfighting function, and the composite risk management process. **Status:** Current.
FM 3-39	Military Police Operations	16 Feb 10	A keystone manual that describes military police support to Army forces conducting full spectrum operations within the framework of joint operations. It emphasizes the importance of simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations and contains a critical discussion of civil support operations. **Status:** Current.
FM 3-39.40	Internment and Resettlement Operations	12 Feb 10	A manual that describes the doctrinal foundation, principles, and processes that military police and other elements employ when dealing with internment and resettlement populations. **Status:** Current.
FM 3-90.31	Maneuver Enhancement Brigade Operations	26 Feb 09	A manual that provides operational guidance for commanders and trainers at all echelons. It facilitates operations and employment considerations of the maneuver enhancement brigade as it organizes, prepares for, and conducts full spectrum operations. **Status:** Current.
FM 19-10 (will be ATTP 3-39.10)	Military Police Law and Order Operations	30 Sep 87	A manual that addresses each element of the military police law and order mission, including law enforcement, investigation, U.S. military prisoner confinement, and counterterrorism operations. **Status:** Under revision; to be published 4th quarter FY 11.
FM 19-25 (will be ATTP 3-39.13)	Military Police Traffic Operations	30 Sep 77	A manual that addresses traffic operations in garrison and combat environments. **Status:** Current.
TM 3-39.31	Armored Security Vehicle	20 Aug 10	A manual that provides military police forces with the TTP and related information necessary for the employment of the armored security vehicle. **Status:** Current.

Note. Current military police publications can be accessed and downloaded in electronic format from the Reimer Digital Library at *<http://www.adtdl.army.mil/>* or from the U.S. Army Military Police School Web site at *<http://www.wood.army.mil/usamps/>*. Comments or questions about military police doctrine can be e-mailed to *<leon.cdidcoddmpdoc@conus.army.mil>*.

The Military Police Service School, Autun, France

By Master Sergeant Patrick V. Garland (Retired)

On 17 May 1918, General John J. Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Forces in France, issued a directive to the commanding general of the Services of Supply that a "Training Depot for both officers and Soldiers of the Provost Marshal Service be established." On 9 July, General Pershing—in support of that directive—included instructions in General Order No. 111. The instructions stated, "There shall be established a training depot for the military police corps at a suitable place where all of the personnel will be received and trained before being sent to the military police units. This training depot shall be directly under the supervision of the provost marshal general." And on 9 September, the Military Police Training Department opened at Caserne Changarnier, Autun, France.[1]

On 27 September 1918, Brigadier General Harry H. Bandholtz was appointed provost marshal of the American Expeditionary Forces in France. Using the constabulary experience that he had gained in the Philippines, Brigadier General Bandholtz set about developing the Military Police Corps into an effective organization. He made major contributions to the organization and operation of the Military Police Service School at Autun.

The first commandant of the school was Captain Thomas Cadwalader; he served in that capacity from 15 September to 1 November 1918. Captain Cadwalader was succeeded by Major Frederick J. Osterman, who commanded the school for only 7 days. On 8 November, Lieutenant Colonel John R. White assumed command of the school, but he remained in the position only until 19 November. On that date, Lieutenant Colonel Samuel McIntyre assumed command; he continued in that position until 20 January 1919. The last commandant of the Military Police Service School was Lieutenant Colonel Harvey Llewellyn Jones, who took command on 31 January 1919 and left when the school was closed in April of that year. Who were these men and where did they come from?

Captain Thomas Cadwallader

Thomas Cadwalader was born to John and Marie Cadwalader on 22 September 1880 in Jenkington, Pennsylvania. The family moved to Maryland, where young Thomas followed in his father's footsteps, training for a career in the legal profession. He enlisted in the Maryland National Guard; and by 1917, had risen to the rank of sergeant major in the 5th Maryland Regiment. Later that year, he attended Reserve Officer Training and was commissioned as a captain of cavalry. Cadwalader chose to resign from the National Guard and immediately joined the National Army, where he was commissioned as a second lieutenant of cavalry. He then transferred to the Field Artillery Branch and rose to the rank of captain. He was appointed commandant of the Military Police Service School on 15 September 1918, but his stay was short, as he was honorably discharged in January 1919. Following military service, Cadwalader practiced law in Maryland.[2] He and his wife Elizabeth had three children—one boy and two girls.

Major Frederick J. Osterman

Frederick J. Osterman was born on 22 July 1880 in Columbus, Ohio. He joined the Army and served two enlistments, rising to the rank of sergeant. On 25 January 1906, he was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the 11th U.S. Infantry. He later transferred to the Signal Corps. Eventually, he trained as a pilot in Mineola, New York, and at Kelly Field, San Antonio, Texas. In 1918, Osterman served as a lieutenant colonel with the Aviation Section of the American Expeditionary Forces. At the end of the war, he transferred to the 132d Military Police Battalion in Paris, France. Frederick was honorably discharged in January 1920. He and his wife Alice had two children—a boy and a girl. Frederick died on 5 April 1955 in California, and he is buried at Fort Rosecrans National Cemetery, Point Loma, California.[3]

Lieutenant Colonel John R. White

John R. White was born in 1879 in England. He enlisted in the Greek Foreign Legion in 1897, and he fought in the Greco-Turkish War.[4] He returned to England and then traveled to the United States. In 1899, White enlisted in the U.S. Army and, in 1901, was attached to the Philippine Constabulary as a lieutenant. He rose to the rank of colonel within 6 years—a rare accomplishment. In 1906, White was awarded the Medal of Valor (the highest award of the constabulary) for his extreme bravery while wounded in action. After 15 years in the constabulary, White left the Philippines[5] and rejoined

the U.S. Army as a lieutenant. After his brief stint at Autun, White was appointed provost marshal of Paris. After retirement, he went to work for the U.S. National Park Service.[6]

Lieutenant Colonel Samuel McIntyre

Samuel McIntyre was born on 17 June 1872 in the Chattanooga, Tennessee, area.[7] On 6 June 1891, at 19 years of age, the young plumber enlisted in the U.S. Army at Lexington, Kentucky. He was assigned to the 6th U.S. Infantry Regiment, where he served a 5-year enlistment—rising to the rank of sergeant. In 1898, McIntyre joined the 3d Tennessee Infantry and was commissioned as a captain of volunteers. In 1899, he was commissioned as a second lieutenant of the 37th U.S. Infantry and rose through the ranks.[8] In 1920, he transferred to the Finance Branch and was promoted to colonel. Samuel McIntyre died on 11 March 1929; he was laid to rest at the Chattanooga National Cemetery, Chattanooga, Tennessee, alongside his wife Agnes.

Lieutenant Colonel Harvey Llewellyn Jones

Harvey Llewellyn Jones was born on 27 November 1877 in Tuckerton, New Jersey. He and his family moved to Maryland, where he joined the Maryland Army National Guard and was assigned to the 4th Maryland Infantry Regiment. In 1917, the 4th Maryland Infantry Regiment was combined with other National Guard units to form the 29th Infantry Division "Blue and Gray" for service during World War I. During this transition, Jones supervised the training of enlisted Soldiers who were to be commissioned into the officer ranks.[9] In preparation for overseas duty, Jones was assigned as the division inspector general; he served in that capacity until the armistice.[10] Harvey Jones and his wife Sadie had two daughters. The family returned to New Jersey; and Jones, who had studied and practiced law before he joined the military, returned to that profession following his military service.

Due to the inexperience of American military police officers, Lieutenant Colonel Peter Foley of the British army military police was appointed as the chief of instructions at the Military Police Service School. He commanded a faculty of fourteen British military police officers. Second Lieutenant John C. Groome, son of the American Expeditionary Forces provost marshal who preceded Brigadier General Bandholtz, served as the adjutant.

Classes were offered for the following types of students:

- Military police officers.
- Officer Candidate School cadets.
- Student instructors.
- Enlisted military police.

Twenty-one enlisted men were selected for the first class; they subsequently became the first American instructors at the school.[11]

Officers and enlisted Soldiers basically received the same 4-week training, which included coursework in the areas of esprit de corps, crowd psychology, rules of evidence, charge sheet preparation, criminology, provost branches in allied armies, map reading and sketching, authority and power of the Military Police Corps, general duties, march discipline, duties during engagements, straggler control, traffic control, road rules, area policing duties in cities and ports, duties in billets and camps, control of civilians in forbidden zones, searches, duties during train movements, range practice with pistols, and prisoners of war.

By the spring of 1919, 263 military police officers, 101 Officer Candidate School cadets, and 4,557 enlisted Soldiers had graduated from the Military Police Service School at Autun. Formal Army Military Police Corps training was not reestablished until 23 years later.

Acknowledgement. Thanks to Colonel John Baber, the regimental secretary of the Royal Military Police of England, who painstakingly attempted to locate information on Lieutenant Colonel Foley and his staff. Unfortunately, many of the British records were destroyed during World War II bombing raids.

Endnotes:

[1]"The Great War," Part I, *History of the United States Army Military Police School (USAMPS)*, <*http://www.mpraonline.org/docs/USAMPS_History.pdf*>, accessed on 14 June 2011.

[2]*Maryland in the World War, 1917–1919: Military and Naval Service Records*, Maryland War Records Commission, Baltimore, 1933.

[3]*Official Roster of Ohio Soldiers, Sailors, and Marines in the World War, 1917–1918*, Volumes I-XXIII, F. J. Herr Printing Co., Columbus, 1926.

[4]John R. White Papers, unpublished personal biography, University of Oregon.

[5]John R. White, *Bullets and Bolos*, Century Company, New York, 1928.

[6]Harold H. Elarth, *The Story of the Philippine Constabulary*, Globe Printing, Los Angeles, 1949.

[7]*U.S. Census 1900 (Georgia)*, U.S. Census Bureau, 1900.

[8]*Official Army Register for 1916,* 1 December 1915.

[9]John A. Cutchins and George Scott Stewart Jr., *History of the Twenty-Ninth Division "Blue and Gray": 1917–1919*, MacCalla and Co., Philadelphia, 1921.

[10]*Maryland in the World War, 1917–1919: Military and Naval Service Records*, 1933.

[11]*Final Report of the Provost Marshal General to the Secretary of War on the Operations of the Selective Service System to July 15, 1919*, 1920.

Master Sergeant Garland retired from the U.S. Army in 1974. During his military career, he served in military police units and criminal investigation detachments and laboratories. At the time of his retirement, Master Sergeant Garland was serving as a ballistics evidence specialist at the European Laboratory. He remained in this career field until retiring from civilian law enforcement in 1995.

Female Engagement Initiative: Professionalizing the AUP

By Captain Megan R. Spangler

As the sun came up, rows of Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) saluted the rising Afghan flag at the 202d AUP headquarters, Kabul, Afghanistan. The formation consisted of a uniform sea of blue—with the exception of three conspicuous head scarves in the back row. These three members of the AUP were wearing modified uniforms. Despite receiving the same training and earning the same qualifications as their male counterparts, these women were not issued boots or weapons and they did not serve in the positions that they had been trained to fill.

The 202d AUP headquarters (locally known as "Shamshad" for the neighborhood in which it is located) is responsible for eight provinces in eastern Afghanistan. There are about 13,000 AUP personnel stationed throughout those 8 provinces; however, only 58 women are assigned as police officers. Although a few women successfully complete each police academy class, they are not typically assigned to police positions within the provinces. Instead, Afghan women (who are, on average, better educated and, therefore, better qualified for clerical positions than their male counterparts) are frequently relegated to secretarial or administrative positions—regardless of their police qualifications.

AUP positions are designated on the *tashkil* (Dari[1] for "organization"), which is similar to the U.S. Army table of organization and equipment, where personnel duty positions are assigned on the basis of rank and position. A few *tashkil* positions, such as investigators in the Human Rights and Gender Directorate, are specifically coded for women, but women are not officially restricted from serving in other slots. In reality, though, Shamshad women are often assigned to clerical jobs in the Headquarters Company or the Logistics, Recruiting, Counternarcotics, or Human Rights and Gender Directorates. Because AUP personnel are paid according to their positions rather than their ranks, the restriction of women to the lowest positions also results in the restriction of their paychecks.

Despite assertions of their support, senior leaders of the 202d AUP seemed to merely tolerate the presence of the women. The ubiquitous stares of their male peers followed them around the compound as they performed their duties.

The 728th Military Police Battalion (which was partnered with the 202d AUP for a police mentorship mission) recognized these discrepancies and established the Female Engagement Initiative (FEI) to help professionalize the AUP. The 728th developed a strategy to increase the use of female police, and the battalion is now actively pursuing its execution.

The concept of women within the ranks of the AUP is not new. The senior-ranking female at Shamshad, the deputy gender officer, has served as a police officer for more than 20 years. She is married to another police officer and has five children, although most Shamshad women are young and unmarried. Speaking through an interpreter, she says, "These women come from two types of families—those that are open-minded and want their women to be successful and those that have economic problems and need the women to work. Lucky for us, most of our girls come from the first type." The deputy gender officer and another experienced Shamsad female serve as strong maternal role models for the younger women. While they are enthusiastic about the FEI, they emphasize the importance of commander support for project validation.

Since 2004, Afghanistan has been a fielding ground for female engagement teams developed primarily by the Marine Corps. Female engagement teams consist of specifically trained teams of volunteer Marines and Soldiers who—using their culture-intensive training—gain the trust of Afghan women and, subsequently, engage them in discussions about local security and domestic topics (hygiene, food sanitation) while coalition patrols simultaneously interact with villagers in an attempt to track down insurgents. Inspired by the female engagement team mission, the 728th Military Police Battalion sought to establish similar relationships with Afghan women—but in the professional setting of the AUP. The women of the 728th were overwhelmingly supportive of tackling this project in addition to completing their primary staff duties.

The mission of the FEI is straightforward—to professionalize female AUP and to expand the role of Afghan women in the area of domestic security. The key to successfully activating the mission was to engage the Shamshad leadership in a combined plan of execution.

The gender officer—a 21-year veteran of the AUP—was instrumental in gaining the support of the 202d. Although he had served as the gender officer of the 202d for 8 years, he had never participated in a combined gender plan with an outside agency. His interaction with Shamshad females currently consists of conducting biweekly classes to educate the women about their rights within Afghanistan. Although he addresses the issues of workplace rights and domestic violence, more can be done.

The Shamshad commander is vocal in his support of FEI mentor interaction with the women. The Afghan females generally lacked self-confidence, and the commander directed them to conduct daily physical training in the new gym at the AUP compound. For women who had never participated in any sort of physical training and had not been issued physical training uniforms like their male counterparts, this was a challenge. The FEI mentors stepped in and helped the gender officer use the complicated logistic system to secure physical training uniforms for the women. They then worked with the gender officer to reserve the gym and organize private workout sessions, which are conducted five times per week. The Afghan women hesitantly arrived as a group for the first session. Although they were interested, they were cautious—their timid participation punctuated by nervous laughter. Since then, the women have become enthusiastic and energetic. They stomp, clap, and jump during the hour-long aerobics workout sessions.

In addition to fitness instruction, the FEI mentors plan to improve the confidence and ability of female AUP by providing training in the areas of combatives, weapons, and policing—particularly personnel searches, since the women are required to search other females when they are assigned as gate guards. The AUP themselves requested additional classes in literacy, driving, computer training, and English. FEI plans also include the incorporation of workshops and guest lecturers to address women's issues. The team is eager to export this program to reach subordinate AUP provincial headquarters.

With a curriculum aimed at professionalizing the AUP, the 728th hopes to invigorate AUP women—making them more effective at policing and, in turn, better utilized within their organization. In addition, the 728th is working with the Afghan Ministry of the Interior mentors to increase female recruiting and to add slots to the next *tashkil* that are specifically coded for women. The goal is to strengthen current female assets so that AUP leaders recognize the operational necessity for females and begin to incorporate more women within their ranks.

Female Soldiers conduct aerobics classes and assist with physical training for female AUP.

Using this aggressive approach, the FEI team is optimistic. However, cultural and societal attitudes toward female AUP will not be completely changed by the FEI. At the end of the year, the female AUP may only have their foot in the door, but that is one step closer to a seat at the table.

Endnote:

[1]Dari is one of the two official languages of Afghanistan.

Captain Spangler served as the logistic officer for the 728th Military Police Battalion in Kabul, Afghanistan. She is now the commander of the 58th Military Police Company, which is deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. She holds a bachelor's degree in political science from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York, and a master's degree in business and organizational security management from Webster University.

Publication Information

Change 1 to FM 3-0, *Operations*
(Published 22 February 2011)

Change 1 to Field Manual (FM) 3-0 incorporates lessons learned from continuing operations and maturing discussions with regard to U.S. Army doctrine. Key changes include replacing "command and control" with "mission command" as an activity and warfighting function and replacing the five Army information tasks with "inform and influence" and "cyber/electromagnetic" activities. The manual also contains several other changes:

- Hybrid threats are addressed.
- Security force assistance is described under stability operations.
- Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives consequence management is an additional civil support task.
- Design is included in Chapter 7.

An electronic copy of FM 3-0, Change 1, is available at <*http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/FM3-0/index.asp*>.

FM 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders for Full Spectrum Operations*
(Published 23 February 2011)

The recently updated FM 7-0 is the U.S. Army's keystone doctrine for training units and developing leaders for full spectrum operations on a rotational cycle using the Army force generation process.

The electronic version of the new FM, which is less than one-third as lengthy as the 2008 version of the FM, is best viewed on the Army Training Network at <*https://atn.army.mil*>. The online FM contains links to documents, examples, videos, best practices, and other resources. Now, for the first time, FM 7-0—

- Incorporates leader development as part of unit training.
- Replaces core and directed mission-essential task lists with full spectrum operations mission-essential task lists.
- Focuses on a modular, brigadecentric force in the Army force generation process.
- Introduces the importance of full spectrum operations training against complex hybrid threats.
- Makes training management an intellectual, rather than lockstep, process.

For additional information and a more in-depth overview of changes to Army operational doctrine, visit the Combined Arms Center Web site at <*http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/index.asp*>.

The proponent for FM 3-0 and FM 7-0 is the Combined Arms Center.



709th Military Police Battalion Conducts 360-Degree, COP Live-Fire Training

By Ms. Stefanie Kastner

There is a bitter-cold silence amid the snow-covered trees and icy air of the Grafenwoehr Training Area, Grafenwoehr, Germany. Seemingly out of nowhere, that silence is broken by the sound of grenade launchers and M4 rifles fired by Soldiers who are training on a 360-degree, combat outpost (COP) live-fire training facility.

With the large number of ranges at the Grafenwoehr Training Area and the ability to adapt those ranges to meet the needs of various training units, the Joint Multinational Training Command provides the resources necessary for units to conduct one-stop quality training. In particular, the COP live-fire facility offers a training environment that allows units to incorporate all elements of their arsenals (weaponry, vehicles, communication equipment) into a pertinent training scenario with the appropriate digital interfaces to meet their needs. The Grafenwoehr Training Area COP live-fire facility is the first of its kind anywhere in the military.

"COP live fire differs from regular training in that it has a 360-degree [firing] capability. A unit can fire in any direction," said an officer with Grafenwoehr Training Area Range Operations. "We take advantage of this by surrounding the entire COP with targets. This allows leaders the opportunity to practice fire discipline, fire distribution, and defensive priorities of work—to name a few—and Soldiers to practice target acquisition and fire control."

With conditions and sounds simulating actual combat, Soldiers of the 709th Military Police Battalion, Hanau, Germany, conducted COP live-fire training using several combat scenarios that they might face during their upcoming deployment. One of the training scenarios was based on a real-life incident in which 300 members of the Taliban attacked International Security Assistance Force troops, killing 8 Americans and wounding 22.

During enactment of the scenarios, Soldiers performed tactical movements while team leaders relayed critical needs (more ammunition, additional firepower) to platoon leaders. According to a platoon leader with the 709th, "In this type of situation, the platoon leaders do not engage in combat—they coordinate the entire operation." One of the points emphasized during the exercise was the direct line of communication between Soldiers and platoon leaders.

The Soldiers who were positioned at all four corners of the training area perimeter in the guard towers were the most important aspect of the entire exercise. They ensured that individual team movements were restricted to assigned sectors and that the entire training area was covered.

Some team members were designated as Afghan National Police role players. This allowed Soldiers to practice foreign communication skills and learn to work with foreign nationals—just as they will be expected to do during deployment. "Having role players pose as the Afghan National Police helps the team get used to the idea of having a language barrier between themselves and some of the team members," said a platoon leader with the 709th. "It is like playing a basketball game with someone who has never played before—you have to communicate things to them in ways that they will understand."

By replicating the operational environment and offering tactical training opportunities to units, the Joint Multinational Training Command provides commanders and staffs with a world-class capability to conduct individual and crew live-fire qualification and company-team training exercises.

At the time this article was written, Ms. Kastner was a summer intern with the Public Affairs Office, 7th U.S. Army Joint Multinational Training Command, Grafenwoehr.

U.S. Soldiers playing the role of Afghan National Police during the live-fire exercise.

Off the Leash:
Military Working Dogs Search for Recertification

By Specialist Cody A. Thompson

Detecting bombs, locating narcotics, chasing "bad guys," and saving lives are "all in a day's work" for military working dogs and their handlers. Such demanding jobs require constant training—punctuated by annual certification courses, such as the one held at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 10–14 January 2011.

According to Sergeant First Class James Bockelmann, kennel master, 42d Military Police Detachment, 16th Military Police Brigade, Fort Bragg, "A new dog is like a private right off the street." All military working dogs begin their training at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, where they take a course that is "like their basic training and [advanced individual training]." Training continues upon assignment to a unit, and recertification is required on a yearly basis.

Teams from Fort Stewart, Georgia; Fort Hood, Texas; Fort Riley, Kansas; and Fort Bragg completed the annual certification course. The course included training on patrol, obedience, suspect retention and apprehension, and explosives and narcotics detection.

The course began with obedience and suspect apprehension training, which was held at the main office of the canine (K-9) unit. Then the teams traveled to a nearby skating rink, where the dogs were expected to use their keen sense of smell to locate an explosive training aid or narcotics aid. Their sense of smell was tested once again when they were required to locate narcotics inside a terminal at Pope Air Force Base and explosive training aids in the woods next to McKeller's Lodge.

"As a handler, you don't want to go where your dog hasn't been," said Sergeant Jeffery Smith, a patrol explosive detector dog handler with the 16th Military Police Brigade, Fort Bragg. Staff Sergeant William Taylor, a patrol narcotics detector dog handler with the 385th Military Police Battalion, Fort Stewart, added, "The most important part is that the dog maintains proficiency because [it is] a psychological deterrent. Someone would think twice about messing with 'the guy standing next to a big dog.' "

Regardless of how many times the military working dog teams complete annual certification training, they arrive trained and ready to go to work to search, find, and seize contraband that endangers the lives of everyone. The successful completion of certification training will benefit the military working dog teams in real-world situations.

Specialist Thompson is a public affairs specialist/photojournalist with the 40th Public Affairs Detachment, Fort Bragg. He is working toward a bachelor's degree in psychology from Troy University, Troy, Alabama.

MPTT Supports Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines

By Captain Kelly L. Elwood

For the past eight years, the United States has maintained a relatively subtle military presence on the "other" Operation Enduring Freedom front—that of the Republic of the Philippines. Since 2003, the U.S. military has been partnering with police, local government units, and armed forces throughout the archipelago to advise and assist the Philippines in combating terrorism.

For years, violent extremist organizations have frequently visited and sometimes inhabited Mindanao and the southern Philippine islands, creating a volatile atmosphere and causing safety and security concerns not only for the Philippines, but also for U.S. citizens. Because travel among the Philippine Islands—and to neighboring countries such as Malaysia—is uninhibited, the Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines has been advising and assisting the Republic of the Philippines from a location in Zamboanga City, Mindanao.

In May 2010, the 728th Military Police Battalion, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, deployed a team of twelve Soldiers in support of Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines and the Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines mission. Their primary job was to serve as a military police transition team (MPTT) responsible for conducting subject matter expert exchanges with the Philippine National Police (PNP). They also worked with the PNP Special Action Force (SAF) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines, thereby contributing to the greater mission of advising and assisting Philippine security forces across the spectrum.

Although the mission statement was clear, the limits of the transition team were undefined. Therefore, the 728th Military Police Battalion selected noncommissioned officers from maneuver, fires, and effects companies and law enforcement detachments to assemble a team with a wealth of Military Police Corps time and experience. Members of the team had been deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan and had performed law enforcement functions in garrison. They possessed knowledge and experience in provost marshal's office, company, and detachment operations.

The team was well prepared. Training included all aspects of military police, law enforcement, and convoy security operations. And noncommissioned officers who had recently redeployed with the 58th and 552d Military Police Companies provided up-to-date knowledge and experience with regard to MPTTs.

Once the MPTT arrived in country, the team partnered with the U.S. Department of Justice to conduct a follow-on program for the Basic Police Officer Course, which the PNP Directorate had established in Luzon. The MPTT proceeded to build on the basic course curriculum with the Field Officer Training Course. They also certified the PNP to carry the Armament Systems and Procedures, Incorporated (ASP) baton. But because the Department of Justice and military police predecessors already had courses in place, the MPTT focused on the basic, self-sustainable principles most sought by the PNP. The revamped course covered classroom topics such as human rights, ethics and morals, and principles of policing, as well as more hands-on courses such as unarmed self-defense, interviewing and interrogation, and sensitive-site exploitation. The physical aspects of the course (ASP baton certification, RedMan training) were those that were most favored by the PNP officers. The officers were particularly pleased with the drills and exercises that reinforced their knowledge of red zones and improved their timing for the escalation of force.

Despite the small size of the island, the PNP is a diverse police force. Some of the PNP officers were raised and educated in Luzon, while others had never left Mindanao. Some spoke Tagalog, while others spoke Tausug; however, all spoke enough English to work through the course. In addition, the MPTT searched for effective ways to overcome language barriers and create "common ground" from which to build cohesion among the police officers. Practical exercises kept the officers out of their seats and working together in teams, striving to mitigate cultural and language barriers while reiterating the importance of a unified police force. The officers were aware that the Philippine citizens lacked confidence in their abilities, and they understood that their improvement as individuals was as important as their improvement as a team.

During culminating exercises, officers were presented with crime scenes to investigate and document. They were required to walk into scenarios, interview victims and subjects, make command decisions, and disarm and apprehend subjects if necessary.

The MPTT also took the opportunity to get acquainted with the most visible security forces in the area—the PNP SAF and the Armed Forces of the Philippines Marines. Despite numerous attempts to improve security across the island, there was a lack of police and Marine presence and most politicians, nongovernment organizations, and local citizens remained apprehensive about traveling in the predominantly rural area. Therefore, the Armed Forces of the Philippines requested assistance from the MPTT, which subsequently conducted several physical security subject matter expert exchanges with the Marines. In addition, between Field Officer Training Courses, the MPTT and PNP SAF companies participated in exchanges on RedMan training and other topics such as unarmed self-defense and subject apprehension. Although the relationship between U.S. forces and the PNP SAF was already outstanding, further MPTT/PNP SAF interaction significantly increased the involvement of U.S. forces in the local community.

Members of the PNP SAF practice apprehending and handcuffing a subject.

ASP baton training with the RedMan suit

During the MPTT deployment, more than 40 PNP officers graduated from the Field Officer Training Course and subject matter expert exchanges were conducted with more than 100 Armed Forces of the Philippines Marines and 80 PNP SAFs.

While the first group of warfighters reached beyond the PNP, their success is only the beginning for military police training in the Philippines. Additional teams will continue to advise and assist the PNP in building their police force and strengthening their rapport and reputation with the Philippine citizens. For example, another team is currently expanding on the initial PNP mission, while also undertaking additional security missions in support of the Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines Headquarters. And the 728th Military Police Battalion is now preparing a new team (slated to depart later this year) that will continue to advise and assist with military police and security operations for rotations to come.

Captain Elwood is a student in the Engineer Captain's Career Course, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Upon graduation, she will be stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. She holds a bachelor's degree in psychology from the University of Missouri–Columbia and is currently pursuing a master's degree in public administration.

New Program Emphasizes Leading From the Front

By Captain Meghan Starr

An MPDO checks with other patrols by radio.

From the very beginning, Army leaders are instructed to lead from the front and to share in the hardships experienced by their Soldiers. For military police, this instruction applies not only in the field, but also while conducting law enforcement operations in a garrison environment. While their Soldiers work the road, Military Police Corps leaders work as military police duty officers (MPDOs). Successful MPDO programs offer leaders the opportunity to lead from the front and to hone law enforcement skills that are vital during deployment and in garrison. The 97th Military Police Battalion, Fort Riley, Kansas, is fully invested in a new MPDO program that does just that.

The new MPDO program at Fort Riley is different from the programs of the past. In the 1990s, MPDOs worked 12-hour shifts and played an integral role on patrol and at the Fort Riley confinement facility. They provided guidance to patrols, accounted for inmates, and met with the Geary County and Riley County Police Departments, which operate immediately off post. At the turn of the century, though, the confinement facility closed and things changed. The interaction between MPDOs and the off-post police departments increased. MPDOs routinely linked up with local law enforcement agencies, and they maintained a consistent presence in the most popular nearby night spots. This also marked the first time that MPDOs interacted with Department of the Army (DA) police officers. The MPDOs and DA police built a solid relationship, which allowed the two organizations to work together to mitigate many potential issues during the Fort Riley reorganization.

As the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment prepared to deploy in 2009, the MPDO program was phased out. Battalion leaders were busy focusing their attention on deployments and combat operations, and they had little opportunity to increase their exposure to law enforcement. But following the return of the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment to Fort Riley, the battalion began to refocus its efforts on law enforcement and the creation of a new MPDO program.

The implementation of the new program began in early 2011. MPDOs no longer leave post; rather, they patrol within the Fort Riley community. They also maintain a stronger supervisory role with regard to the patrols. Thus, they work more directly with the Soldiers, leading from the front while working the road. Leaders gain a better understanding of the environment in which their Soldiers operate and the daily issues they face.

As the Military Police Regiment refocuses its efforts on building and maintaining law enforcement skills, it is fitting that the battalion do the same. Officers and senior noncommissioned officers with law enforcement experience are greater assets in garrison and in combat. As military police deploy to train host nation police, leaders now have a better background and working knowledge of police operations in the United States. This allows company level leaders to provide better training and make more effective improvements in host nation police operations.

While most deployed units are in Iraq and Afghanistan, the training of host nation police is not unique to these areas. Acting as a liaison and training host nation police are requirements almost everywhere that military police are deployed.

The new 97th Military Police Battalion MPDO program allows company grade officers and senior noncommissioned officers to lead from the front while gaining essential law enforcement skills that will help at home and abroad. These leaders will be valuable assets not only to the Military Police Regiment, but to the Army and to the host nation police forces they train around the world.

Captain Starr is an assistant operations and training officer (S-3) with the 97th Military Police Battalion. She holds a bachelor's degree in American politics from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York.

The 11th Annual Army Worldwide AT Conference

By Mr. Ronald C. Francis

The 11th Annual Army Worldwide Antiterrorism (AT) Conference was conducted 29 January–4 February 2011 at the Shades of Green Armed Forces Recreation Center resort in Orlando, Florida. The conference theme was "Integrating and Synchronizing Antiterrorism." The goal of this year's conference was to educate and professionally develop Army AT personnel, build synergy for AT strategic goals and initiatives, and involve AT officers in solving key issues impacting the program. Nearly 350 registrants participated in this year's conference.

Senior leaders who participated in the conference included—

- General Peter Chiarelli, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.
- Mr. Gary Reid, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism.
- Brigadier General Colleen McGuire, Provost Marshal General of the Army.
- Brigadier General Ernest Audino, Deputy Director; G-33, G-3/5/7, Headquarters, Department of the Army (DA).
- Brigadier General Peter Atkinson (Canadian Forces), Deputy Commanding General–Canada, III Corps and Fort Hood, Fort Hood, Texas.

The highlight of this year's conference was the participation of General Chiarelli, via teleconference from his office in the Pentagon. General Chiarelli's remarks focused on the theme of the conference and stressed the importance of close collaboration among all security programs within the Army's protection portfolio to gain efficiencies, reduce redundancies, and provide the Army community with a safe and secure environment by protecting against internal and external threats. He called upon all leaders to recognize indicators of high-risk behavior in members of their organizations and to intervene before those members could initiate acts of violence directed against the Army community.

Key conference presentations included remarks about—

- Fort Hood lessons learned, by Brigadier General Atkinson.
- A comprehensive briefing concerning high-risk behavior and violence within the Army, by Lieutenant Colonel Mark Jackson, Office of the Provost Marshal General.
- An excellent examination of the insider threat to the Army, by Colonel James Stuteville, Director, Counterintelligence, Human Intelligence, Security, and Disclosure Directorate; Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, G-2; Headquarters, DA.
- An overview of the way ahead for the Army Protection Program, by Mr. Jim Platt, Deputy Director, G-34, G-3/5/7; Headquarters, DA.

The conference also included outstanding presentations from a number of noted subject matter experts from other government agencies, federal and local law enforcement agencies, and academia on the topics of terrorists and violent insiders and the threats they pose to the Army. Presentations included—

- "Keep Raising the Bar: Improving Combating Terrorism," by Mr. Wade Ishimoto, special assistant to the Under Secretary of the Navy.
- "The Next Terrorist Attack: Swarm Attacks," by Mr. Brian Fairchild, the Intrepid Group, (and a retired Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] officer).
- "Radicalization and Psychology of Active Shooters," by Ms. Anne Speckhard, Ph.D., Georgetown University School of Medicine, Washington, D.C.
- "al-Qaida's New Leaders," by Mr. Jarrett Brachman, Ph.D., North Dakota State University.
- "The Terrorist," by Mr. John Schindler, Ph.D., U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.
- "Threat Management of the Lone Offender," by Special Agents Andre Simons and Mark Rossin, Behavioral Analysis Unit, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
- "Threat Management Units at American Universities," by Major Gene Deisinger, Ph.D., Police Department, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.
- "Suspicious-Activity Reporting," by Mr. Doug Larm, Seattle Police Department/Washington State Fusion Center, Seattle, Washington.

AT-related presentations included—

- An Office of the Secretary of Defense AT and force protection policy update, by Colonel Erik Rundquist,

Deputy Director, AT and Force Protection, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and America's Security Affairs.

- A U.S. Navy Force Protection Program review, by Commander Ron Oswald, Director for Force Protection, U.S. Navy.

Awards were presented for the best results during the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 Protection Assessment Team assessment, the best AT program manager, and the best fixed installation AT programs. Additionally, sixteen individuals from across the Army were recognized as 2011 AT Honor Roll award winners. Brigadier General McGuire and Brigadier General Audino presented the awards.

To facilitate the sharing of AT best practices throughout the Army AT community, four AT officers from installation and command levels described the details of the best practices recognized during Protection Assessment Team assessments or AT Branch, Office of the Provost Marshal General, Coordination and Assistance Program visits during 2010. This year's presentations included—

- "Automated Aircraft and Personnel Clearance System for Travel Within an Area of Responsibility," by Mr. Mike Hebblethwaite, U.S. Army Pacific.
- "iWATCH Initiative," by Mr. Tim Harmon, U.S. Army Garrison, Baden-Württemberg, Germany.
- "AT Measures in Contracting," by Mr. Keith Lundquist, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
- "Integrating AT into Planning Exercises," by Mr. Darryl Bowman, U.S. Army Africa.

A Mitigating Terrorist Threats panel, consisting of members from the U.S. Army Counterintelligence Center, provided an excellent overview of current intelligence trends and operations in each of the geographic combatant command areas of responsibility (Northern Command, Southern Command, Central Command, European Command, and Pacific Command). The panel presentation included extensive conference attendee participation and a question-and-answer session. Lieutenant Colonel Pat Cook, branch chief of the AT Operations and Intelligence Cell, served as the panel moderator.

Planning for next year's conference has already commenced. The conference has been tentatively scheduled for the same time frame (30 January–3 February 2012). The Shades of Green resort remains an excellent, cost-effective, and extremely popular venue and has been tentatively selected as the location for the 2012 conference.

Mr. Francis works in the AT Branch, Military Police Operations Division, Office of the Provost Marshal General. He is also a retired Military Police Corps lieutenant colonel. Mr. Francis holds a bachelor's degree in history from the University of Toledo, Toledo, Ohio.

("Emerging Drugs," continued from page 19)

In addition to the drug bans that are already in place in several states, similar bans are also proposed in other states. For example, in Georgia, the legislature is considering House Bill 199, which would ban MDPV, mephedrone, and several other drugs.

Final Advice

Aside from the ongoing issues regarding the legal restriction of these drugs, other synthetic substances and designer drugs are being developed daily. Maintaining the safety of our Soldiers and families, therefore, requires constant and continuous diligence.

If you encounter any item that even remotely resembles a designer drug—

- Do not touch the substance.
- Restrict access to the area.
- Contact military police.

Pay attention to online transactions and novelty store purchases made by children. Be on the lookout for suspicious substances that are disguised as common household items. Conduct health and welfare inspections. Awareness is the key to prevention, and prevention is the solution to protecting the lives and welfare of our Soldiers and families.

Endnote:

[1]AR 600-85, *The Army Substance Abuse Program*, 2 February 2009, p. 24.

References:

U.S. Code, Title 10, *Armed Forces*, Subtitle A, Part II, Chapter 47, "Uniform Code of Military Justice."

Fort Benning Policy Memorandum 600-85-1, *Prevention and Control of Narcotic Analogs*, 21 January 2010.

U.S. Code, Title 21, *Food and Drugs*, Chapter 13, "Drug Abuse Prevention and Control" (Controlled Substances Act).

Captain Singman-Kaine is the deputy provost marshal at Fort Benning. She holds a bachelor's degree in sociology from Mary Baldwin College, Staunton, Virginia, is a Distinguished Military Graduate of the Virginia Military Institute, and is a graduate of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Warfare School.

WHERE'S THE GOLD?

By Master Sergeant Patrick V. Garland (Retired)

I was recently contacted by Mrs. Dene Wilson, the daughter-in-law of Chief Warrant Officer Four William C. Wilson—a deceased U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) (commonly referred to as "CID") agent. Mrs. Wilson, who intends to donate papers and artifacts that once belonged to Chief Warrant Officer Four Wilson to the U.S. Army Military Police Museum, related some amazing stories that I would like to share.

William C. Wilson was born in Detroit, Michigan, on 17 September 1910 and was serving as a Michigan state trooper and military reservist when he was ordered to active duty in late 1943. He reported for duty on 10 January 1944[1] and received initial training at the Military Police School, Fort Custer, Michigan. He was then assigned to Company C, 508th Military Police Battalion, Fort Sam Houston, Texas. The unit deployed to Scotland and, from there, to the European Theater of Operations in 1944. By the time the German army formally surrendered on 1 May 1945, the 508th had established a headquarters in Munich, Germany. During the latter part of that year, Wilson (who was then a sergeant) was assigned as a military policeman with the 3d Military Government Regiment, which was also stationed in Munich. He was assigned to the 13th CID in early 1946, and he attended the Criminal Investigator's Course at the European Command Training Center.

In the meantime—as U.S. bombers pounded Berlin, Germany, and Russian armies encircled the city in 1945—Adolf Hitler and his loyal followers realized that they needed to move billions of dollars in gold and currency (including U.S. currency) to safer locations so that it could be used to finance a Fourth Reich. Consequently, the German treasures were removed from Berlin through various means. While some of these assets were taken to Spain, Switzerland, Italy, and Austria, most went to the Final Redoubt in the alpine region of Germany.

In April 1945, caches of gold and currency began to be recovered. The discovery of the first hoard (in the town of Merkers, located in Thuringia, Germany) was purely accidental. Two American military policemen from the 90th U.S. Division detained two female displaced persons for verification of their status. Once their status was recorded, the police were ordered to take the women home—since one of them was very obviously pregnant. Along the way, the group passed a mine and the military policemen asked the women about it. The women indicated that the Germans had buried gold there. The military policemen reported the conversation; a few days later, American Soldiers entered the mine, where they initially found 550 bags of German paper currency—amounting to more than one billion reichsmarks. Moving farther into the mine, the Soldiers encountered a brick wall, which they breached with explosives. And what they found next was mind-boggling: thousands of bags, arranged neatly in rows, containing gold bullion, gold coins, and paper currency. A total of 250 tons of gold was found in this one mine alone.

Later in April, the U.S. 10th Armored Division moved into Bavaria, Germany, capturing Bad Tölz, Berchtesgaden, and Garmisch. As the Americans settled into their occupational role, the German officers who were overseeing the hidden gold caches began to wonder how they were to continue safeguarding the treasure. Some apparently bribed U.S. Soldiers in "Let's Make a Deal" style scenarios in which they offered the Americans hundreds of thousands of U.S. dollars in exchange for passes to cross the border into Switzerland, where they deposited gold bullion into German accounts. One Nazi officer claimed that he delivered U.S. currency to American Soldiers, who then traded it for German currency. And a military police sergeant allegedly tried to mail $25,000 worth of U.S. $100 bills to his home.

While the 10th Armored Division was instrumental in recovering gold bullion, the unit historian denies that

Soldiers of the 13th CID Detachment, including William C. Wilson (second from right) and Robert B. Shaw (far right).

members were involved in any wrongdoing. According to Les Nichols—

> *While we occupied Garmisch in 1945, the theft of gold bullion was rampant, but the black market was just beginning to assert its ugly head. During 1946–1947, the black market rose to immense proportions. Now these are the specifics of the 10th Armored role with regard to Nazi gold. Among those key officers were Colonel Bill Eckles, Division G-2 (intelligence); Major William Geiler, 55th Engineer Battalion Commander; Major Roger Rawley, G-2; Major Ken McIntyre; Sergeant Al Singleton; and several others. It should be noted that no 10th Armored Division officers or troops were involved in stealing gold or currencies. The Tiger Division was in the center of all that occurred in the Garmisch area and is featured in* Nazi Gold [The Story of the World's Greatest Robbery and Its Aftermath] *with regard to the 728 gold bars unearthed by the 55th Engineers. There was an investigation of our division as to what happened to that gold, valued at the time to be 10 million dollars. However, because of a record-keeping problem, the case was cleared up and the 10th Armored was totally cleared of any wrongdoing.*[2]

However, by the time various caches arrived at the approved American depository in Frankfurt, inventories were often considerably reduced. General George S. Patton ordered CID to investigate.

The unit closest to Garmisch was the 13th CID, and the first agent assigned to the case was Agent Walter Snyder, who Wilson described as "one of the 13th CID's best agents—able, honest, and a good German speaker."[3] Wilson served as the liaison between Snyder's team of German police detectives, the Munich Police Headquarters, and other investigative agencies. American forces had no idea how much German gold had been buried, stolen, or otherwise dispensed (though various estimates now place the total value in the billions of dollars); therefore, the focus of the investigation was on the differences between the initial inventories at recovery and the amounts that were actually received at the authorized depository in Frankfurt. As the investigation progressed, agents from the 32d CID and the 481st CID joined the effort. By that time, Agent Snyder was no longer involved in the case.[4]

Agent Walter Snyder of the 13th CID Detachment

Much of the hidden gold was stolen by the Russian army and former Nazi officials. And based on the CID investigation, some U.S. military personnel were also considered prime suspects. However, no one was ever charged or tried for the theft or misappropriation of German gold.

In 1947, Wilson left Germany and reenlisted at Fort Kilmer, New Jersey. He returned to Munich the following year, where he was assigned to the 13th CID once again. During that tour, his friend and coworker (Agent Walter Snyder) and a German detective, were murdered by a German teenager. Agent Snyder's death was investigated by CID Agent Robert B. Shaw of the 13th—another friend of Wilson.

Following Wilson's two-year tour in Germany, he returned to the United States, where he served with the Military Police Detachment, 1301st Army Service Unit, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; 17th CID, Brooklyn, New York; and 331st CID, Fort Dix, New Jersey, until he was discharged again in December 1951 to be appointed as a CID warrant officer.

Wilson went on to serve with distinction as a warrant officer. He was assigned to the 331st CID, Fort Dix (1951–1952); 51st and 19th CID Detachments, Korea (1954); Criminal Investigator's Course (instructor), Military Police School, Fort Gordon, Georgia (1954–1958); 102d CID, Fort Shafter, Hawaii (1958–1961); Polygraph School (instructor), Fort Gordon (1964–1966); 523d CID, 7th Division CID, and 2d CID, Korea (1966–1967); and 3d Military Police Group (CID), Fort McPherson, Georgia (1967–1969).

During his career, Wilson attended Military Police School, CID School (twice), Polygraph School, the Criminal Investigator Supervisor's Course, the Polygraph Transition Course, and the Instructor Course. He also attended several short courses, including the Homicide Investigation and Narcotics Investigation Courses. Wilson's awards include the Meritorious Service Medal, Army Commendation Medal with two oak-leaf clusters, Good Conduct Medal (3d Award), American Campaign Medal, European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign Medal

with two service stars, World War II Victory Medal, Army of Occupation Medal, Armed Forces Reserve Medal, the United Nations Service Medal, and the Luxembourg Croix de Guerre.

After his retirement, Chief Warrant Officer Four Wilson collaborated with the authors of *Nazi Gold: The Story of the World's Greatest Robbery and Its Aftermath*, providing them with documents, photos, and recollections of events surrounding the story of the German gold. In addition, he worked with the Sheriff's Department in Douglas County, Georgia, for 9 years.

Chief Wilson died at the Atlanta Veterans Hospital, Atlanta, Georgia, on 12 April 2003 and was buried with full military honors at the Georgia National Cemetery in Canton on 26 April 2003.[5] His wife Clara died on 2 January 2004. They had one son William R. Wilson, who is now also deceased.

Acknowledgement: Special thanks to Mrs. Wilson for kindly sharing service records, photos, and tales of her late father-in-law.

Endnotes:

[1]Service records of William C. Wilson.

[2]Les Nichols, "Nazi Gold and the U.S. 10th Armored Division in Europe During WW II," *Tiger Tales,* November 2001.

[3]Ian Sayer and Douglas Botting, *Nazi Gold: The Story of the World's Greatest Robbery and Its Aftermath*, Congdon & Weed, Inc., New York, 1984, p. 194.

[4]Patrick V. Garland, "Anatomy of a Murder," *Military Police*, Spring 2010, pp. 37–39.

[5]Personal correspondence with Mrs. Dene Wilson.

Master Sergeant Garland retired from the U.S. Army in 1974. During his military career, he served in military police units and criminal investigation detachments and laboratories. At the time of his retirement, Master Sergeant Garland was serving as a ballistics evidence specialist at the European Laboratory. He remained in this career field until retiring from civilian law enforcement in 1995.

Military Policemen Become Rangers

By Specialist Garett Hernandez

Three members of the 21st Military Police Company, 503d Military Police Battalion (Airborne), 16th Military Police Brigade, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, have completed one of the Army's most physically and mentally challenging courses of instruction. Sergeant First Class Ricky Royals, Sergeant Marcus Emelio, and Sergeant Christopher McMurdy recently graduated from the U.S. Army Ranger School.

Sergeant First Class Royals, left, Sergeant Emelio, center, and Sergeant McMurdy, right, proudly display their Ranger tabs.

Ranger School, which is open to Soldiers of any Army career field, is a demanding, 3-phase, 61-day combat leadership course that tests the students' physical, mental, and tactical aptitudes.

According to Sergeant First Class Royals (an operations sergeant who coordinates training and allocates resources in preparation for deployment), "The hardest part was the sleep and food deprivation."

"You have to develop yourself as a new leader," said Sergeant McMurdy. "In Ranger School, you develop the confidence and leadership style to lead others through chaotic and dangerous situations."

In addition to the regular coursework, the three Ranger School graduates were also required to attend a Pre-Ranger Course. Following the successful completion of that course, they had about a week before the start of Ranger School. In recalling the challenges faced during the preparation phase, Sergeant Emelio (who works as an operations sergeant alongside Sergeant First Class Royals) stated, "I think it was harder than Ranger School."

Royals, Emelio, and McMurdy are now authorized to wear the Ranger tab on their uniforms—a testament to their preparation for meeting the challenges they will face throughout their military careers. Each has also pledged to mentor other Soldiers who wish to attend Ranger School. Their hope is to increase the number of military policemen who volunteer for and graduate from the school.

Specialist Hernandez is a public affairs specialist, Public Affairs Office, 16th Military Police Brigade. He is a graduate of the U.S. Defense Information School, Fort Meade, Maryland.

U.S. Army Military Police in Italy During World War II

By Mr. Thomas Christianson

The U.S. Army Military Police Corps was officially recognized as an active duty branch in September 1941, just a few short months before the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. World War II—the bloodiest and most bitter war of the 20th Century—required the "newborn" military police to support combat operations at many levels. By the end of the war, the Military Police Corps was comprised of more than 200,000 troops. Many of these military police served in the Italian area of operations from July 1943 until the end of the war in Europe in May 1945.

Army military police were tested in many ways during wartime operations in Italy. How did they do? According to noted war correspondent Ernie Pyle, ". . . from the MPs [military police] I saw, judging by their demeanor and their conduct, I believe that—next to rangers and paratroopers—they are really the pick of the Army."[1] This positive impression was not necessarily shared by all American Soldiers, though—especially those on leave in rear areas like Naples, which many considered to be the "Wild West" of Italy. Performing military and police duties was often a challenge that stretched military police to their limits.

The war in Italy was characterized by assault landings in Sicily, Salerno, and Anzio. Military police units were usually onboard assault craft that landed in the second wave of attacks; in some cases, military police were part of the first wave. The ability of the troops to move off the beach as quickly as possible was considered essential to the success of the invasions. Military police units were specifically tasked to facilitate this movement. When the landings were stymied by fierce resistance, military police found themselves fighting alongside the infantry until a beachhead could be established. As they moved forward, helping to clear the beaches, they established traffic control points while follow-on units disembarked and continued to attack. During this critical period, they were subjected to extensive bombardment from enemy artillery. Casualties were often so crippling that it was necessary to hastily train infantry Soldiers to temporarily perform military police duties.

According to one military police standing operating procedure, "The maintenance of traffic control cannot be overemphasized during the campaign."[2] To efficiently maintain traffic control, military police were tasked to confer with the division assistant chief of staff for operations and plans (G-3) and assistant chief of staff for logistics (G-4) and then "Reconnoiter along main traffic routes as far forward as the assault infantry battalions. An early reconnaissance is necessary in order that information be received and planning be accomplished . . . in the wake of fast-moving operations."[3] During reconnaissance, military police were to note blown-out roads and bridges, narrow defiles, and potential bottlenecks. Even the degree of slope for a road was mandatory information for the military police report. Military police were also required to estimate traffic flow rates. All of these activities were to be accomplished within a matter of hours, while plans were being developed to support the forward movement of assault units.

The operational plan contained details about how to handle road conditions, narrow defiles, and bottleneck bypasses. It also included annexes that outlined military police responsibilities in the areas of reconnaissance, sign posting, traffic checkpoints, and enforcement of traffic regulations.

Standing operating procedures were clear: There was no substitute for enforcement. Military police were required to enforce high standards in the interest of safety during U.S. troop movements and enforce efficiency during forward operations. However, the standing operating procedures also prescribed "selective enforcement" and contained statements indicating that each military policeman was responsible for "good judgment," which eventually became a hallmark of the branch. Due to artillery bombardment and roadblocks resulting from contact with the enemy, certain routes were temporary and units were often at the mercy of military police decisions. Military police often encountered convoys that were filled with Soldiers who were headed to the front, but who did not know their final destination, convoys moving along a route without any coordination or authorization, infantry troops stopping their convoys in the midst of an artillery bombardment, and other basic situations that jeopardized the U.S. Army mission.

In addition to traffic control duties, military police also established prisoner of war collection stations. This proved to be an especially monumental task in Sicily in July 1943 when Italian soldiers, weary of their unwanted alliance with Germany, gave up by the thousands. Italy formally surrendered just weeks after the Allied invasion of Sicily, so the problem with the large number of Italian prisoners destined to be sent to Africa for processing and internment was solved, as most were allowed to go home or await the liberation of their portion of Italy. However, the 122,000 Italians who were released and sent home were also an enormous problem that the military police had not anticipated. Some Italian soldiers joined Italian units and fought the Germans. But maintaining order and discipline and providing for immediate subsistence for the rest of the former Italian foes was a difficult task that required a diplomatic approach. Military police became surprisingly efficient in coordinating activities and making use of local police authorities—particularly the Italian *Carabinieri*—an Italian military police force of sorts that was anxious to rid itself of its fascist past. Fortunately, there were numerous military police of Italian heritage in the U.S. Army and communication proved to be easier than first expected.

The evacuation and incarceration of German prisoners of war who were in the front area also became a significant military police unit activity. Supply trucks returning from the front were used for prisoner transport to the rear. Military police served as escort guards and operated prisoner of war processing detachments. Temporary "holding cages" were established until transportation could be arranged for evacuations to Africa, Great Britain, or the United States, where the prisoners were interned until the end of the war. Divisional military police guard companies were in charge of prisoner of war movement to the corps provost marshal; however, the military police chain of command was ill-prepared to handle the thousands of prisoners of war. Large-scale surrenders sometimes resulted in a ratio of 1 to 2 military police to 500 prisoners. Numerous complaints were made about the manning shortages experienced by military police. It was often necessary to augment military police resources with infantry troops.

The II Corps provost marshal recognized the effort and frustration of military police units. He could only offer encouragement, stating that "More effort should be exerted toward resourcefulness and ingenuity in the use of available personnel and equipment."[4] He went on to say that "Frankly, the provost marshal and his agents have constantly got to be on the alert so as to keep the situation in hand and not assume the attitude 'it can't be done' or 'we haven't got the men or equipment.'"[5] He recognized that military police were trying to do the impossible, adding, "Our job is never-ending and successfully accomplished only by the use of common sense, patience, sweat, and labor."[6] In his October 1943 report, he asserted that the Army, Military Police Corps, and divisions needed to consider reorganizing the military police to meet the demands placed on them, meaning that manning increases from 80 military police per each 12,000-man division would be necessary.[7]



A military jeep passes a traffic control point in the northern Apennine Mountains.

A U.S. military police Soldier directs traffic in Naples.

During the invasion and occupation of Italy, military police were issued an official list of enforcements for selected offenses; however, the police were urged to use "good judgment" in enforcement. The list included such "offenses" as throwing candy, cigarettes, or food to children in the streets; looting; possessing souvenirs; wearing a mixed uniform; wearing no shirt or steel helmet

while driving; and shooting from vehicles traveling along roads. The latitude to use "good judgment" meant that military police could choose to ignore the enforcement of these rules and, depending upon the situation, often did.

Perhaps the most difficult mission of the military police in Italy was to organize the Italian police to carry out domestic police functions under the supervision of the Allied Military Government (AMG). This required the utmost skill and diplomacy. Military police, who were the forward element, were often at odds with the AMG regarding which of them had authority and what procedures should be followed. Military police traffic control, the enforcement of Army regulations and procedures, and local policing activities did not always match the AMG desires; and tensions between the two were inevitable. As John Hersey pointed out in *A Bell for Adano*—his Pulitzer Prize-winning account of the U.S. Army experience in Italy in 1944—the military police were required to coordinate their activities with the officers representing the AMG.[8] And once AMG representatives arrived, the military police worked for and through them.

Their most difficult job was to immediately ascertain which of the population were fascists and which were "normal citizens."

In an 11 July 1944 report, an AMG officer wrote the following comments about the military police with whom he had worked in Italy: "American MPs did a very poor job with Italian civilians. They apparently realized no limit to their authority, arresting Italian civilians on slight charges or no charges at all and keeping them in prison for as long as 2 months. They were hated worse than the Germans."[9] His obviously biased account continued, "The trouble lay with the training MPs received for their work and the poor quality of men assigned to AMG work. Virtually all of them were of limited service and intelligence."[10] He also complained about the selection of military police without any documentation: "The MPs assigned were of the type that had courts-martial on their record[s]—or should have."[11] In spite of the AMG officer's claims, military police were generally the highest-quality Soldiers of any branch in the United States based on background checks and intelligence testing. Their actions and procedures were carefully monitored and scrutinized throughout the war—particularly in areas in which they fell under AMG control. And although tension certainly existed between the agencies, the Italian people looked upon American military police with respect. Although the AMG officer's negative report was filed, it was apparently not acted upon.[12]

The city of Naples provided the greatest challenge for U.S. Army military police throughout the war. The constant theft of Army supplies, coupled with black marketeering, were constant and, at times, overwhelming problems for the military police. U.S Army trucks often left port laden with supplies—only to arrive at their destinations empty. As the trucks proceeded up the hills of Naples, young boys would climb aboard and off-load the supplies. Things got so out of hand that the Army enlisted a former U.S. Mafia member to run things more efficiently. Military police did not have the manpower necessary to solve the various problems of a city of more than a million citizens and hundreds of thousands of Allied soldiers. Prostitution and venereal disease were rampant; commanders lost more men to venereal disease than to enemy bullets. However, military police continued to try to maintain law and order in the "Wild West" of Naples, enlisting and training former Italian policemen who were not tainted by the fascist experience. The task was daunting, but they received the greatest compliment of all from Italian citizens who demonstrated their admiration for military police, who "protected them from the wildness of soldiers on leave and their own dirty and corrupt countrymen."[13]

Though certainly not appreciated by the AMG—or even other American Soldiers at times—military police in the Italian campaign gained a reputation for fairness, efficiency, and good judgment; and they were viewed as a much-needed force for all U.S. Army operations in Italy. They were continuously praised for their flexibility in performing the many different missions they were assigned, including traffic management, prisoner control, the guarding of key facilities, and the establishment of order in occupied areas. The fact that they always performed these duties under adverse conditions—and usually while understrength—highlights the professionalism that military police have brought to the U.S. Army since the birth of the branch in 1941.

Endnotes:

[1]Ernie Pyle, *Here is Your War: Story of GI Joe*, The World Publishing Co., Cleveland/New York, 1943.

[2]"Duties of the Provost Marshal and Military Police Sicilian/Italian Campaign," Office of the Provost Marshal, Headquarters, II Corps, 23 October 1943, p. 4.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Ibid, p. 11.

[5]Ibid, p. 12.

[6]Paul R. Whitaker, *Military Police Training Bulletin*, Provost Marshal General's School, Fort Custer, Michigan, October 1943, p. 14.

[7]Ibid, p. 15.

[8]John Hersey, *A Bell for Adano*, Random House, Inc., New York, 1944.

[9]Captain Francis Brooks, "Technical Intelligence," Allied Military Government, Naples, Italy, 11 July 1944, p. 1.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Ibid.

[12]Ibid, p. 2.

[13]Personal interview with Sergeant Raffaele Migiarese of the *Carabinieri*, Verona, Italy, 1978.

Mr. Christianson is the U.S. Army Military Police historian.

MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE LEVEL AND ABOVE COMMANDS

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM	UNIT	LOCATION
Colleen L. McGuire	Thomas J. Seaman	HQ USACIDC	Quantico, VA
David D. Phillips	Charles Kirkland	USAMPS	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Mark S. Inch	Jeffrey N. Plemmons	Army Corrections Cmd	Alexandria, VA
Mandi A. Murray	Daniel G. Lincoln	46th MP Cmd	Lansing, MI
Sanford Holman	Kurtis Timmer	200th MP Cmd	Ft Meade, MD
Latonya D. Lynn	Thomas Sivak	8th MP Bde	Scofield Barracks, HI
Robert Kenyon	Thomas Legare	11th MP Bde	Los Alamitos, CA
Kevin Vereen	Gerald Stegemeier	14th MP Bde	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Eric R. Belcher	Jonathan O. Godwin	15th MP Bde	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Chad B. McRee	Todd Spradling	16th MP Bde	Ft Bragg, NC
Brian Bisacre	Brenda K. Curfman	18th MP Bde	Sembach AB, Germany
Robert Taradash	Dawn Rippelmeyer	42d MP Bde	Ft Lewis, WA
Charles E. Petrarca Jr.	Robert A. Sturdahl	43d MP Bde	Warwick, RI
Donald J. Currier	Robert D. Liles	49th MP Bde	Fairfield, CA
Patrick Wiliams	Peter Ladd	89th MP Bde	Ft Hood, TX
Michael White	Dale V. Clamont	177th MP Bde	Taylor, MI
Patton Pickens	Dennis Thomas	290th MP Bde	Nashville, TN
Therese M. O'Brien	Theodore Copeland	300th MP Bde	Inkster, MI
John E. Cornelius	Andrew Lombardo	800th MP Bde	Uniondale, NY
Jan F. Apo	Andre Proctor	3d MP Gp (CID)	Hunter Army Airfield, GA
Robert K. Burk	Timothy S. Fitzgerald	6th MP Gp (CID)	Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA
Donna W. Martin	Dennis Higgins	202d MP Gp (CID)	Kleber Kaserne, Germany
Timothy J. Chmura	Crystal Wallace	701st MP Gp (CID)	Ft Belvoir, VA
Donnie L. Thomas	Mark E. Porrett	Joint Detention Gp	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

MILITARY POLICE BATTALION LEVEL COMMANDS

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM/1SG	UNIT	LOCATION
John D. Adams	Christopher S. Heldt	5th MP Bn (CID)	Kleber Kaserne, Germany
David E. Heath	Franklin L. Porter	10th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Bragg, NC
Arturo J. Horton	James Sanguins	11th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Hood, TX
Shannon Lucas	Charles Baker	19th MP HHD (CID)	Wheeler Army Airfield, HI
Nieve F. Knell	Clyde Wallace	22d MP Bn (CID)	Ft Lewis, WA
Michael T. Beierman	Jerry D. Clements	33d MP Bn	Bloomington, IL
Erica C. Nelson	Donald Wallace	40th MP Bn (I/R)	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Stanley R. O'Neal	Carrol J. Welch	51st MP Bn	Florence, SC
Carl Packer	Blaine Harvey	91st MP Bn	Ft Drum, NY
William J. Benner III	Angelia Flournoy	92d MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Vernon F. Lightner	Myron J. Lewis	93d MP Bn	Ft Bliss, TX
Noel C. Smart	Robert Mester	94th MP Bn	Yongsan, Korea
Joseph Decosta	Henry Stearns	95th MP Bn	Sembach, Germany
Edgar Perez	Edward Simpson	96th MP Bn (I/R)	San Diego, CA
Michael Mathews	Patrick Quirk	97th MP Bn	Ft Riley, KS
Arthur E. Zegers IV	Thomas Ciampolillo	102d MP Bn (I/R)	Auburn, NY
David A. Gagnon	Scott C. Smilinich	104th MP Bn	Kingston, NY
Warren R. Wintrode	Alpheus A. Haswell	105th MP Bn (I/R)	Asheville, NC
Clintis S. McCray	James A. Young	112th MP Bn	Canton, MS
Eric C. Brown	Aaron Henderson	115th MP Bn	Salisbury, MD
Byron Deel	Fowler L. Goodowens II	117th MP Bn	Athens, TN
Javier A. Reina	David R. Morgan	118th MP Bn	Warwick, RI
Luis A. Munizmartinez	Armando Estradamiranda	124th MP Bn	Hato Rey, PR
Monica Alpi	Rena Torresestrada	125th MP Bn	Ponce, PR
Calvin B. Jenkins	Ardis Harden	136th MP Bn	Tyler, TX
James P. McHugh	Lonnie R. Bryson	151st MP Bn	Dunbar, WV
Raymond Lagemann	John Watts	160th MP Bn (I/R)	Tallahassee, FL
Barry L. Collins	James C. Smith	168th MP Bn	Dyersburg, TN
Wallace Steinbrecher	Timothy Jones	170th MP Bn	Decatur, GA
Sharon A. Martin	Donald E. Hubbard	175th MP Bn	Columbia, MO
Clifford W. Carter	Michael J. Coltrell	185th MP Bn	Pittsburg, CA
Daniel W. Murphy	Boyd E. Dunbar	192d MP Bn (I/R)	Niantic, CT

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MILITARY POLICE BATTALION LEVEL COMMANDS (continued)

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM/1SG	UNIT	LOCATION
Laura Clellan	William D. Woods	193d MP Bn (I/R)	Denver, CO
Shontelle C. Adams	William R. Wright	198th MP Bn	Louisville, KY
Michael A. Izzo	Perry Hooper	203d MP Bn	Athens, AL
Aaron D. Stover	Jay W. Marsden	205th MP Bn	Poplar Bluff, MO
Scott W. Hiipakka	Terry D. Berdan	210th MP Bn	Taylor, MI
Patric B. Conaway	Brian P. Branley	211th MP Bn	Lexington, MA
Rick Ryczkowski	Randy E. Abeyta	226th MP Bn	Farmington, NM
James McGlaughn	Jimmy Patrick	231st MP Bn	Prattville, AL
John Baird	Princecilla Ridley	304th MP Bn (I/R)	Nashville, TN
Frank Kuczynski	Vacant	306th MP Bn	Uniondale, NY
Jacqueline Gordon	Augusto Tavernier	310th MP Bn (I/R)	Uniondale, NY
Richard Giles	Vacant	317th MP Bn	Tampa, FL
Jay Pulliam	Keith Magee	320th MP Bn (I/R)	Ashley, PA
Victor Jones	Louis Ditullio	324th MP Bn (I/R)	Fresno, CA
Dominic Wible	Peter Schimmel	327th MP Bn (I/R)	Arlington Heights, IL
David Heflin	Joseph Plezia	336th MP Bn	Pittsburgh, PA
Perkins M. Robinson	Pamela D. Neal	372d MP Bn	Washington, DC
William Mergner	Glenn Carnahan	384th MP Bn (I/R)	Fort Wayne, IN
Eugenia K. Guilmartin	William A. Fath	385th MP Bn	Ft Stewart, GA
Eric Engelmeier	Richard Wieder	391st MP Bn (I/R)	Columbus, OH
Sean Siebert	Allen Freeman	393d MP Bn (CID)	Bell, CA
Kenneth Valcourt	Timothy Eddy	400th MP Bn (I/R)	Fort Meade, MD
John E. Teegerstrom	Lawrence A. Hall	402d MP Bn (I/R)	Omaha, NE
Eric D. Nagy	Jonathan Williams	437th MP Bn	Columbus, OH
Terry M. Nihart	Billy Ray Counts	503d MP Bn	Ft Bragg, NC
Lamar Parsons	Albert Nelson	504th MP Bn	Ft Lewis, WA
Robert Davel	Christopher Muller	508th MP Bn (I/R)	Ft Lewis, WA
David Detz	William Jordan	519th MP Bn	Ft Polk, LA
Christopher V. Wynder	Daniel F. Borrero	525th MP Bn	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
Martin Pennock	Jess Patteson	530th MP Bn (I/R)	Omaha, NE
Darwin Hale	Norman Garnes	535th MP Bn (I/R)	Cary, NC
John Hafley	Burmiekay Keyt	607th MP Bn	Grand Prairie, TX
Thomas P. Lombardo	Michael Cosper	701st MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Dawn Hilton	Steven Raines	705th MP Bn (I/R)	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Roger P. Hedgepeth	Timothy J. Lamb	709th MP Bn	Grafenwoehr, Germany
David G. Thompson	Willard Smoot	716th MP Bn	Ft Campbell, KY
Eric D. Brunken	Jon Mathews	720th MP Bn	Ft Hood, TX
Victoria Hudson	Robert Eichler	724th MP Bn (I/R)	Fort Lauderdale, FL
Theresa L. Farrell	Scott Dooley	728th MP Bn	Schofield Barracks, HI
Sydney Wright	Craig Owens	733d CID Bn	Fort Gillem, GA
Stacy Garrity	Jason Wells	744th MP Bn (I/R)	Bethlehem, PA
Christopher Burns	Jonathan Narcisse	759th MP Bn	Ft Carson, CO
Simon Brown II	Dennis F. Covel	761st MP Bn	Juneau, AK
Christopher A. Rollins	Jesse S. Perry	773d MP Bn	Pineville, LA
Robert Henderson	Donald Quinlan	783d MP Bn (I/R)	Inkster, MI
Richard Atchison	Charlotte Randazzo	785th MP Bn (I/R)	Fraser, MI
Randall Thrash	Barry Oakes	787th MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Stephen E. Gabavics	Richard Epps	793d MP Bn	Ft Richardson, AK
Bryan O'Barr	James Schultz	795th MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Matthew D. Stubbs	Paul Ohland	850th MP Bn	Phoenix, AZ
Peter C. Reyman	Anthony Pasqualichio	1000th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Campbell, KY
Edward F. Fears	Christopher Hedlt	1001st MP Bn (CID)	Ft Riley, KS
Jason M. Stoddard	Robert L. Code	1002d MP Bn (CID)	Warner Barracks, Germany
Richard Felices	John O. White	Benning CID Bn	Ft Benning, GA
Andrew P. Sullivan	Marvin Marlow	Washington CID Bn	Ft Myer, VA
Barbi L. Aleandre	Janet Tanner-Booska	Protective Services Bn	Ft Belvior, VA

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