MILITARY POLICE

THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF THE MILITARY POLICE CORPS



HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
This publication is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
PB 19-13-1, Spring 2013

USAMPS
573-XXX-XXXX/DSN 676-XXXX (563 prefix)
or 581-XXXX (596 prefix)

COMMANDANT
BG Mark Inch.....563-8019
<mark.inch@us.army.mil>

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
COL Patrick Willams..... 563-8019
<patrick.williams@us.army.mil>

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
Mr. Mark Farley..... 563-6221
<mark.l.farley@us.army.mil>

REGIMENTAL COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR
CSM John McNeirney..... 563-8018
<mcneirneyj@us.army.mil>

REGIMENTAL CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER
CW5 Leroy Shamburger.....563-8035
<leroy.shamburger@us.army.mil>

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT–USAR
COL Daniel Foulkrod..... 563-6223
<daniel.foulkrod@us.army.mil>

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT–ARNG
LTC Craig Chandler 563-4570
<craig.chandler@us.army.mil>

QUALITY ASSURANCE ELEMENT
Miss Cathy Bower 563-5892
<cathy.bower@us.army.mil>

14TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE
COL Kevin Vereen.....596-0968
<kevin.vereen@us.army.mil>

701ST MILITARY POLICE BATTALION
LTC Curtis Schroeder.....596-2377
<curtis.schroeder@us.army.mil>

787TH MILITARY POLICE BATTALION
LTC Richard Heidorn..... 596-0317
<richard.heidorn@us.army.mil>

795TH MILITARY POLICE BATTALION
LTC Kyle Bayless..... 596-2384
<kyle.bayless@us.army.mil>

USAMPS Directors

DIRECTOR OF TRAINING
COL Michael Thomas..... 563-8098
<michael.robert.thomas@us.army.mil>

DIRECTOR OF PLANS AND OPERATIONS
LTC Michael Henshaw.....563-8027
<michael.henshaw@us.army.mil>

G-37 PUBLICATIONS
Managing Editor, Diane E. Eidson **563-4137**
<diane.eidson@us.army.mil>
Editor, Diana K. Dean.....**563-5004**
<diana.k.dean@us.army.mil>
Graphic Designer, Dennis Schellingberger.....**563-5267**
<dennis.schellingberger@us.army.mil>
Editorial Assistant, Phyllis E. Grayson **563-7651**
<phyllis.grayson@us.army.mil>

This medium is approved for the official dissemination of material designed to keep individuals within the Army knowledgeable of current and emerging developments within their areas of expertise for the purpose of enhancing professional development.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

RAYMOND T. ODIERNO
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

JOYCE E. MORROW
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
1233801

Military Police, an official U.S. Army professional bulletin for the Military Police Corps Regiment, contains information about security and mobility support, police operations, and detention operations. The objectives of *Military Police* are to inform and motivate, increase knowledge, improve performance, and provide a forum for the exchange of ideas. The content does not necessarily reflect the official U.S. Army position and does not change or supersede any information in other U.S. Army publications. *Military Police* reserves the right to edit material. Articles may be reprinted if credit is given to *Military Police* and the author. All photographs are official U.S. Army photographs unless otherwise credited.

Articles to be considered for publication are due 15 November and 15 May. Send submissions by e-mail to <usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.mdotmppb@mail.mil>, or send an electronic copy in Microsoft® Word on a compact disk and a double-spaced copy of the manuscript to *Military Police* Professional Bulletin, 14010 MSCoE Loop, Building 3201, Suite 2661, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8702. Due to limited space per issue, we normally do not print articles that have been published elsewhere.

Military Police (ISSN 0895-4208) is published semi-annually at the U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Third-class postage is paid at Fort Leonard Wood and additional mailing offices.

CORRESPONDENCE: Correspondence should be addressed to *Military Police* Professional Bulletin, 14010 MSCoE Loop, Building 3201, Suite 2661, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8702 or to <usarmy.leonardwood .mscoe.mbx.mdotmppb@mail.mil>. Please provide a telephone number and complete return address.

PERSONAL SUBSCRIPTIONS are available through the U.S. Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 979050, St. Louis, MO 63197-9000. An order form is available at <http://www.wood.army.mil/mpbulletin/pdfs/subscription .pdf>.

UNIT SUBSCRIPTIONS are available by e-mailing <usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.mdotmppb@mail.mil>. Please include the complete mailing address (including unit name, street address, and building number) and the number of copies per issue.

POSTMASTER: Send unit address changes to *Military Police,* 14010 MSCoE Loop, Building 3201, Suite 2661, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8702.

THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF THE MILITARY POLICE CORPS

MILITARY POLICE

Spring 2013 | Headquarters, Department of the Army | PB 19-13-1

2 **Chief, Military Police Corps Regiment, and Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School**

4 **Regimental Command Sergeant Major**

5 **Regimental Chief Warrant Officer**

6 **Letter to the Editor: Thoughts on "Military Police Posture"**

7 **Move That Military Police Battalion *Now*: The Role of the 504th Military Police Battalion in OIF I**
By Colonel Thomas H. Tatum

12 **Hostage/Crisis Negotiations: First Responders Should Initiate Contact**
By Chief Warrant Officer Three Alejandro Aucestovar

14 **Beyond Culture: Advising in Afghanistan**
By Colonel Ed Lowe

16 **Shohna ba Shohna: 549th Military Police Company Partnership Operations in Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan**
By Captain Donald "Skip" Riddle

20 **19th Military Police Battalion—Lineage and Honors**

21 **Unity of Effort and the ILE Interagency Fellowship Program**
By Major Scott R. Blanchard and Ms. Eliza Edgar

24 **The 94th Military Police Battalion Explores the Regional Alignment Concept With 2ID in Korea**
By Major Kevin Pelley and Major Chris Rivers

26 **The 2d Cavalry Regiment (SBCT) Military Police Platoon**
By Captain Joshua K. Frye

28 **CALEA Accreditation and Army Law Enforcement: Is It a Fit?**
By Captain Bryan P. Jonas

30 **The Need to Integrate Cross-Cultural Competencies and Ethical Considerations Into Military Police Training**
By Dr. Boshra N. EL-Guindy

34 **Military Police and CID Operations in Korea, 1945–1949**
By Master Sergeant Patrick V. Garland (Retired)

36 **Book Review: *Warrior Police: Rolling With America's Military Police in the World's Trouble Spots***
By Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Peters (Retired)

37 **Lessons Learned From Austere Challenge 2012**
By First Lieutenant Jessica Letarte

39 **A Place to Honor History**
By Mr. Jim Rogers

40 **Doctrine Update**

42 **Brigade/Battalion Commands**

44 ***Military Police* Writer's Guide**

45 **Subscribe to *Military Police***

Chief, Military Police Corps Regiment, and Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School

Brigadier General Mark S. Inch

Forging Military Police From 2013 to 2020

In September 2012, senior leaders of the Military Police Corps Regiment gathered to address the strategic way ahead. The conference centered on the introduction of the *Military Police Force 2020 Strategic Plan* (*STRATPLAN*)[1]—a document resulting from a cooperative effort among senior military police leaders from the U.S. Army Office of the Provost Marshal General; the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS); the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly referred to as *CID*); the U.S. Army Corrections Command; the Defense Forensics and Biometrics Agency, U.S. Department of Defense (DOD); and the field. The *STRATPLAN*—which was signed under the authority of Major General David E. Quantock, U.S. Army Provost Marshal General—signals the need to "fundamentally change how we do business."[2] It sets the stage for a clear understanding of the strategic environment and provides a framework to be used to forge the future. But unless the leaders of our major military police force organizations use and operationalize the *STRATPLAN*, it will be nothing more than a coffee-table decoration.

The *STRATPLAN* presents a clear military police force mission statement: "Provide professional policing, investigations, corrections, and security [and mobility] support across the full range of military operations in order to enable protection and promote the rule of law."[3] And the vision statement indicates that we intend to be "recognized as policing, investigations, and corrections professionals who enable the Army's decisive action in unified land operations . . ."[4] In addition, the *STRATPLAN* outlines four core competencies—soldiering, policing, investigations, and corrections. This means that the five doctrinal military police battlefield functions will need to be adjusted to the three complementary disciplines of security and mobility support, police operations, and detention operations. The Military Police Regimental Strategy (commonly referred to as the *box top*) is a visual tool that communicates how the military police force develops and provides critical capabilities to the Joint Force in support of our national objectives. (See figure.) In the featured article of this issue of *Military Police* ("Move That Military Police Battalion Forward *Now*: The Role of the 504th Military Police Battalion in OIF I," page 7), Colonel Thomas H. Tatum, Provost Marshal, U.S. Army Forces Command, demonstrates evidence of the immediate Joint Force demand for these critical capabilities during Phase III operations.

There are six goals of the *Military Police Force 2020 STRATPLAN*. These goals—and the way in which major military police force organizations use the *STRATPLAN* to plan, organize, and forge the future—are critical. The *STRATPLAN* goals are[5] —

- **Goal 1.** Enhance professional standards across the military police.
- **Goal 2.** Assess and implement a preventive policing strategy to protect the force at home and abroad.
- **Goal 3.** Assure partner interoperability.
- **Goal 4.** Develop adaptive military police leaders.
- **Goal 5.** Maximize versatility of military police capabilities.
- **Goal 6.** Implement knowledge management practices and technologies to assure that knowledge is identified, captured, and shared.

USAMPS personnel performed a cross-walk between the USAMPS Campaign Plan and the *Military Police Force 2020 STRATPLAN*. We identified and reviewed those goals and objectives that are best addressed within the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) domains. For example, Goal 1, Objective 1.3 of the USAMPS Campaign Plan (Analyze and implement accreditation) corresponds to Goal 1 of the *Military Police Force 2010 STRATPLAN*. And I am pleased to announce that, on 17 January 2013, USAMPS achieved a 3-year reaccreditation from the Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation, which had previously accredited the U.S. Army Civilian Police Academy, the Special Victims Unit Investigations Course, and the USAMPS Staff and Faculty Certification Course. All items were found to be complete and in full compliance. The American Correctional Association has also accredited the Military Occupational Specialty 31E Advanced Individual Training Course. And in May 2013, USAMPS will undergo a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command accreditation audit.



Legend:

A2–antiaccess	HADR–humanitarian assistance disaster relief	MP–military police
AD–area denial	HD–homeland defense	ops–operations
COIN–counterinsurgency	HN–host nation	TA–traffic accident
CT–counterterrorism	IW–irregular warfare	WMD–weapon of mass destruction
DSCA–defense support of civil authorities	MAPRO–mass atrocity prevention and response options	

Military Police Regimental Strategy

An equal USAMPS level of effort is focused on Goal 1, Objective 1.4 (Analyze and implement certifications and credentials). On 5 February 2013, the qualified trainees of Company E, 787th Military Police Battalion, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, embarked on a pilot program in which they will complete a modified, one-station unit training program of instruction and then take the Missouri Peace Officer licensing exam to potentially receive Missouri Peace Officer Standards and Training licensing. The collaboration with our civilian law enforcement partners—in particular, the Missouri Peace Officer Standards and Training Program—will provide the foundational learning necessary for us to develop a Department of the Army (DA)/DOD/ peace officer standards and training model. This, in turn, will help establish a program that institutionalizes the implementation of certifications and credentials for military police Soldiers and DA civilian police. As stated in the *Military Police Force 2020 STRATPLAN*, our intent is to "further enhance the professionalism of all our military police through a military police credentialing program that is consistent with accepted national industry standards."[6]

The description of our efforts in the areas of accreditation and credentialing are offered to elicit professional dialogue from, and to identify other initiatives of, all major military police force organizations and units in the field. The Fall 2013 issue of *Military Police* will specifically address actions needed to implement the *Military Police Force 2020 STRATPLAN*. Tell us what you are doing to implement the *STRATPLAN*. But whatever you do, do not leave the *STRATPLAN* on your coffee table. Do not let this opportunity to forge the future pass you by.

Endnotes:

[1]*Military Police Force 2020 Strategic Plan*, U.S. Army Office of the Provost Marshal General, 2012, <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/38004170>, accessed on 31 January 2013.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Ibid.

Regimental Command Sergeant Major

Command Sergeant Major John F. McNeirney

Technical Competence

All Soldiers must become technically competent and remain so. Our NCO Creed states, "I will strive to remain technically and tactically proficient." And our Soldier's Creed states, "I am an expert, and I am a professional." Part of being an "expert" is being technically competent. Many technical skills are required of members of the Army profession. Technical competence requires that Soldiers be knowledgeable about Army substance abuse and prevention polices. It requires that we be knowledgeable about Army sponsorship programs. And it requires that we understand the Army regulation governing uniforms.[1] NCOs must be proficient in the use of the Army writing style. We must be able to compose persuasive awards and promotion recommendations for our Soldiers. Officers must be able to write comprehensive, easily understandable orders, standing operating procedures, and organizational policies. All leaders must be able to write effective counseling statements that can be used to develop their subordinates. The ability to craft substantiated bullets in support of evaluations is not only necessary, but it is also expected. These are examples of general military technical expertise.

In addition to general military technical knowledge, it is vital that military police Soldiers remain knowledgeable and technically competent in the skills that are unique to the law enforcement and corrections professions. Military police Soldiers must know military police doctrine and must understand how the Military Police Corps supports the Army and the Joint Force. As military police, we must completely understand the laws and regulations that we are charged with enforcing. We must possess the skills necessary to identify criminal activity indicators and the ability to document information for use by investigators and commanders. We must be experts in the collection, identification, and preservation of evidence. We must know how and when to employ unique police equipment such as radar or laser detecting and ranging (LADAR) equipment to maintain order and discipline on installations. Corrections professionals must have the skills necessary to safely maintain custody and control of military prisoners. Together, we must be able to proficiently conduct criminal investigations and provide "legally sufficient" casework to commanders and staff judge advocates for action.

Even as we move into an era of fiscal uncertainty and unpredictable budgets, I challenge you to take advantage of every possible opportunity to develop your professional policing skills. There are many courses available online and through local colleges—some at no cost. I encourage you to read and understand the military police doctrine and to engage your peers in professional discussions about military police knowledge and skills. I ask that you review the *Manual for Courts-Martial, United States*[2] and become familiar with the elements of various offenses and rules of evidence. The U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) will begin injecting more police skill training into all levels of professional military education. Our goal is for all military police Soldiers to become highly proficient in the unique military police technical skills in addition to the general military technical skills.

Remember, it is our ability to apply military police technical knowledge in a tactical environment that allows the Military Police Corps to add value to the Army and the joint force.

Endnotes:

[1]Army Regulation (AR) 670-1, *Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia*, 3 February 2005.

[2]*Manual for Courts-Martial, United States* (2012 Edition), U.S. Department of Defense, <http://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/pdf/mcm.pdf>, accessed on 26 February 2013.

Assist, Protect, Defend!

Regimental Chief Warrant Officer

Chief Warrant Officer Five Leroy Shamburger

Warrant Officers Can No Longer Afford to Be Mere Technical Experts

Warrant officers have a long tradition of supervising systems and equipment operations that are vital to the success of the Army and of providing sound advice to senior leaders. And warrant officers are still recognized as technical experts in their chosen specialties today. According to a relatively recent warrant officer study chartered by the Chief of Staff of the Army and conducted by the Army Training and Leader Development Panel, "Through progressive levels of expertise in assignments, training, and education, the [warrant officer] administers, manages, maintains, operates, and integrates Army systems and equipment across the full range of Army operations. [Warrant officers] are innovative integrators of emerging technologies, dynamic teachers, confident warfighters, and developers of specialized teams of Soldiers."[1]

While it is great that senior Army leaders recognized warrant officers as technical experts, the warrant officer study failed to address the leadership role of warrant officers in the Army or the impact that warrant officers have in working on strategic assignments outside of their technical specialties. In today's Army, warrant officers who are recognized only as technical experts are not considered relevant and ready; the same will be true in Army 2020.

The Army's expectation of the warrant officer has expanded throughout the past 10 years, as evidenced by the assignment of warrant officers to strategic positions as advisors to some of the Army's most senior leaders. For example, warrant officers have served as advisors to the Secretary of the Army; the Chief of Staff of the Army; the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army; the G-3/5/7 staff officer, Department of the Army, Military Operations; the Strategic Initiative Group staff officer, Army Human Resources Command; and branches and regiments. At the operational level, warrant officers of some branches are embedded in the command teams of their organizations and are assigned detachment/company level commands. To fulfill these expanded roles, warrant officers need to embrace the Army's changing perception—yet remain technical experts in their specialty areas.

The Army is currently conducting a study of the Warrant Officer Education System to determine whether it meets the needs of Army 2020 and to ensure that warrant officers are properly postured for expanded assignments. The final report is slated to be published in March 2013. I expect the results to indicate a need for the Warrant Officer Education System to more closely mirror the Officer Education System. According to Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet (Pam) 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, the goal of the Officer Education System is "to produce a broad-based corps of leaders who possess the necessary values, attributes, and skills to perform their duties in service to the Nation. These leaders must know how the Army runs and demonstrate confidence, integrity, critical judgment, and responsibility while operating in an environment of complexity, ambiguity, and rapid change. To build effective teams capable of supporting joint and multinational operations in this environment, they must be adaptable, creative, and bold amid continuous organizational and technological change."[2] On the other hand, the goal of the Warrant Officer Education System is to produce officers who are "highly specialized experts, trainers, and leaders; fully competent in technical, tactical, and leadership skills; creative problem solvers able to function in highly complex and dynamic environments; [and] proficient operators, maintainers, administrators, and managers of Army equipment, support activities, and technical systems." There are distinct differences in the training currently provided by the two education systems.

Considering the list of strategic positions recently held by warrant officers and the upcoming force structure changes, the Army will soon reach (if it hasn't already) a decision point regarding the employment of warrant officers. If warrant officers are to be properly prepared for what I expect to be their expanded leadership roles at the strategic and operational levels, they will need advanced training regarding how the Army operates; broadened assignments; and exposure to joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational training. In fact, warrant officer leadership training and professional development issues are currently under discussion at the four-star level. I envision that, in the near future, warrant officers who are selected to attend the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (which is designed to develop field grade officers who are capable of operating at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of the military) will be placed on a glide path to strategic and operational assignments. In order to build a bench of warrant officers who are prepared to meet the requirements of Army 2020, the number of authorizations for warrant officers to attend the Command and General Staff College must be increased—or the quality of training offered at the Command and General Staff College must be integrated into the Warrant Officer Staff Course and the Warrant Officer Senior Staff Course.

We are becoming a smaller force; and if we don't step outside of our comfort zone, see the bigger picture, and embrace the fact that all officers (commissioned, warrant, and noncommissioned) must shoulder additional responsibilities in Army 2020, the entire Army will suffer. The warrant officers of today are filling more prominent roles as leaders, staff officers, and advisors in strategic- and operational-level organizations. Warrant officers who fail to take advantage of broadening assignments and increased opportunities for professional military education will be left behind as mere technical experts. They will also miss an opportunity to help make warrant officers more relevant to Army senior leaders.

Endnotes:

[1]*The Army Training and Leader Development Panel ATLDP Phase III—Warrant Officer Study, Final Report*, 18 July 2002.

[2]DA Pam 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, 1 February 2010.

Letter to the Editor:

Thoughts on "Military Police Posture"

By Lieutenant Colonel Florentino Santana

As a military police officer with many years of civilian law enforcement experience, I was glad to see one of our military police leaders argue that military police should be allowed to carry their weapons in what the Army calls "red" status (with a round in the chamber) while on duty. In his article entitled "Military Police Weapons Posture" (*Military Police,* Spring 2012), Regimental Chief Warrant Officer David Albaugh does a great job of explaining how military police on duty at our installations are subject to the same catastrophic risk as any other police officer in any city across the United States.

In his article, Regimental Chief Warrant Officer Albaugh references a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) study which shows that the action/reaction lag times among suspects and law enforcement officers render the first few seconds of a gunfight critical to survival. I argue that the first few seconds of a gunfight are all that there are.

One of my former firearms instructors at the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department, Nashville, Tennessee, presented the results of a police study which indicated that most police gunfights occur within 3 to 6 feet of the suspect, last for 3 to 5 seconds, and result in the firing of four or five rounds. And due to action/reaction lag times, most officers do not fire before the third round. The individual who delivers the first accurate round will be the one who survives the 3- to 5-second gunfight.

Regimental Chief Warrant Officer Albaugh is right—military police weapons training must change. To survive the typical law enforcement gunfight, the officer must not only have a ready weapon, but also a draw stroke that allows him or her to present the weapon and deliver accurate rounds. Furthermore, to use time and distance as advantages, the officer must employ tactics that keep him or her inside the suspect's decision cycle.

Some ingrained training and ammunition management mind-sets must also change. In the world of civilian law enforcement, it is a bad thing when your weapon goes "red." It means that something has happened to keep your weapon from functioning properly and that you must take immediate action—such as clearing a malfunction or reloading the weapon—to return it to "green" status and get back in the fight.

Finally, ammunition allocations must also be changed from once-a-year, qualification-focused events where Soldiers follow a preset course with preloaded magazines to multiple, live-fire training events that are conducted outside the realm of qualification courses and include timed, from-the-holster drills performed from multiple positions and distances. This would force Soldiers to manage their own ammunition and the condition of their weapons.

Lieutenant Colonel Santana is the Provost Marshal, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, Texas. From January 1993 to July 2005, he served as a civilian police officer with the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department, where he held the positions of field training officer, detective, and special weapons and tactics (SWAT) team police marksman. He holds a bachelor's degree in political science and economics from the University of Connecticut; a master's degree in public service from Cumberland University, Lebanon, Tennessee; and a master of military arts and science degree from the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Move That Military Police Battalion *Now*:

The Role of the 504th Military Police Battalion in OIF I

By Colonel Thomas H. Tatum

As the Army and the Military Police Corps Regiment focus on creating the right force for 2020, the thinking once again returns to what is required to be successful and to provide value added in all operational phases, particularly during Phase III decisive combat operations. There is clear recognition and agreement within the Army concerning the value of military police—especially during Phase IV stability operations in the areas of detainee operations, police training and advising, and rule of law support. But there seems to be less discussion and recognition of the military police role in support of decisive combat operations of the future.

The Army customarily takes a hard look at the last war that was fought to gain lessons learned for the future employment of forces. There are countless examples of lessons learned concerning the employment of military police in support of decisive operations during World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the invasion of Panama, and Desert Storm. Unfortunately, I do not believe that history has adequately captured the role of military police in support of combat operations during the early days, weeks, and months of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Leading up to the invasion of Iraq, U.S. Central Command and Army Central Command/Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) planners recognized the need for military police forces. They initially identified three military police brigades to support initial OIF operations, and they actually deployed those three brigade headquarters in advance of the 20 March 2003 invasion. Military police played a key role in supporting early OIF I operations, despite the fact that many of their capabilities were delayed due to changing situations and conditions.

This article describes the efforts and experiences of a military police unit that participated in the early days of OIF—the 504th Military Police Battalion, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington. The intent is to provide ideas and insights that might be considered for future military police participation in Phase III operations. The article also provides historical support of the current U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) concept of security and mobility support as a critical military police discipline used to enable combat power in decisive operations. There were many other military police units on the ground during the early OIF fight; however, it would be impossible for this article to adequately cover the many great contributions of the hundreds of warrior police who participated in OIF I. A more holistic and comprehensive review of the total OIF I military police effort is in order.

Most of the planning and preparation for OIF was conducted during the summer and fall of 2002. One of the key Central Command assumptions was that the Iraqi military would not resist; consequently, large-scale surrenders and capitulations were expected. Based on this expectation, CFLCC identified the need for a robust military police capability to handle hundreds of thousands of enemy prisoners of war. As combat forces moved north, it was also expected that military police would be needed to support stability operations in areas under coalition control before Phase IV operations commenced. Central Command and CFLCC clearly predicted a large-scale military police footprint for Phase IV operations. Three military police brigades were ultimately identified for the support of Phase III and Phase IV operations. However, unlike the situation with Operation Desert Storm, there was little time and capacity available for a large buildup of forces. To bring combat units into the theater more quickly, CFLCC assumed some risk and moved military police units toward the end of the force flow. Consequently, when the war started, there were significantly fewer military police units in-theater than had been originally planned.

The 504th Military Police Battalion was originally aligned under the 18th Military Police Brigade for deployment; but in January 2003, the battalion was informed that it would be assigned to the 220th Military Police Brigade as part of the 377th Theater Support Command. By February, an invasion of Iraq was clearly looming, but it was evident that military police forces would be delayed. With the help of the 220th Military Police Brigade, the 504th Military Police Battalion advance party traveled by routine rotator flight, arriving in Kuwait on 20 March 2003—just as ground operations were kicking off and Iraqi ballistic missiles were being fired into Kuwait. As a result of the missile attacks, the Kuwait airport was closed

before we landed. Because the airport was deserted, we were required to exit the plane, off-load the baggage and equipment, and find our way to Camp Arifjan on our own.

Once we reached Camp Arifjan, our small team immediately began operations to coordinate for and receive assigned follow-on military police units. On about 23 March, as coalition forces were rapidly moving through Iraq, a severe sandstorm, increased enemy activity along the main supply routes (MSRs), and the backlog of critical supply convoys in the staging areas at the Kuwait-Iraq border crossing placed operations at risk. The CFLCC commander initiated an operational pause to secure the lines of communication (LOCs), resupply the maneuver forces, and set the proper conditions before isolating and entering Baghdad. When the arrival of the 504th Military Police Battalion advance party was announced during an evening battle update brief to the CFLCC commander, he grabbed the microphone and said something like, "Move that military police battalion forward ***now***, and get the LOC opened back up."

> ***". . . he grabbed the microphone and said something like, 'Move that military police battalion forward* now, *and get the LOC opened back up.'"***

With staff and equipment augmentation provided by the 220th Military Police Brigade, the 504th moved to the border to establish operations. The battalion took mission command of L Troop, 3d Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment; the 302d Military Police Company; and 2d Platoon, 410th Military Police Company, which had been performing security force duties in Kuwait and Qatar. The small military police battalion task force rapidly moved to secure CSC Navistar and the crossing points and to organize the convoys. The 504th worked with individual convoy commanders, movement control units, CFLCC staff entities, and nearby British forces to prioritize, stage, and secure all coalition convoys passing through CSC Navistar and to ensure that the most combat-essential supplies were quickly moved forward. With the number of vehicles exceeding the holding-area capacity of CSC Navistar by the hundreds, several additional large staging areas needed to be established.

On 4 April, the 300th Military Police Company arrived at CSC Navistar, where it joined the effort to protect critical Class III and Class V supply convoys along the extended

CSC Scania in Iraq in April 2003

Due to the obvious critical need for military police to support combat operations, the 504th Military Police Battalion advance party received a 25 March CFLCC order to immediately move forward to occupy Convoy Support Center (CSC) Navistar along the Kuwait-Iraq border. Our battalion mission consisted of—

- Securing convoy staging areas and crossing points.
- Coordinating and directing essential troop movement and combat resources across the border into Iraq via MSR Tampa.
- Establishing security along MSR Tampa through the Iraqi border town of Safwan.

supply lines so that I Marine Expeditionary Force and V Corps forces could remain on the offensive path toward capturing Baghdad. On 8 April, the remainder of the 504th headquarters detachment arrived and began integrating into ongoing operations. At the same time, CFLCC directed that the 377th Theater Support Command secure MSR Tampa as a theater route to Tallil Airbase, An Nasiriyah, Iraq. In support of this directive, the area of responsibility for the 504th was extended to Tallil Airbase, 125 miles north of CSC Navistar. The 504th was responsible for establishing a security corridor along MSR Tampa from the Kuwait-Iraq border to Tallil Airbase. The battalion immediately began coordinating with the 18th Military Police Brigade (in support of V Corps) and



504th Military Police Battalion OIF I area of operations

the 709th Military Police Battalion, which were located at Tallil Airbase, to snap in behind them as they focused on the mounting security operations and the enemy prisoner of war mission north to Baghdad.

One of the first 504th efforts to improve the security of units along MSR Tampa involved the installation of the "Sheriff 911" emergency frequency. The battalion established a theater-recognized communication system from the Kuwait-Iraq border, along MSR Tampa, to Tallil Airbase using a series of communication relay points. The military police communication sites not only provided an emergency frequency that was available to all coalition forces traveling along the MSR, but it also provided a capability for the military police battalion to conduct mission command operations. Furthermore, the communication sites enhanced the ability to provide a response force along the MSR and to provide security for key terrain. This communication system became the primary means of providing convoy assistance and medevac support for the duration of the war.

As the 377th Theater Support Command assumed responsibility for the security of MSR Tampa from Kuwait to Baghdad and for forward movement support of the 1st Armored and 4th Infantry Divisions, the 220th Military Police Brigade directed the 504th to expand operations north of Tallil Airbase to Baghdad. On 11 April, elements of the 504th moved 225 miles north of CSC Navistar to Shumali, Iraq, establishing a new CSC (Scania) at an abandoned gas station/rest stop adjacent to the MSR. Intense coordination and effort were required to ensure that the CSC Scania operation was secure and efficient for moving crucial units and supplies forward in support of the offensive on Tikrit. However, once CSC Scania was established, it served as a secure location where critical convoys and units could stop, rest, refuel, and stage before moving on to final destinations.

After operations at CSC Scania had been established, Company D, 1st Battalion, 152d Infantry Regiment, arrived to assume the security force mission. With the arrival of the 933d Military Police Company, the 504th assumed responsibility for convoy and route security along MSR Tampa from Tallil Airbase to CSC Scania, 50 miles south of Baghdad. In mid-April, the 170th Military Police Company arrived and moved to Baghdad to provide security for the newly established Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (later renamed the Coalition Provisional Authority [CPA]). By mid-May 2003, with the arrival of the 105th Military Police Company and the 333d Military Police Company, the battalion area of operations eventually expanded to Baghdad. The battalion conducted convoy security (focusing on logistical convoys, including contracted sustainment convoys and

CSC Scania in Iraq in December 2003

humanitarian assistance convoys for the Iraqi people), secured key terrain, and provided security along the route. In addition to maintaining a coalition presence to deter or prevent enemy activity, the battalion conducted MSR combat patrols, which targeted enemy ambushes, snipers, and improvised explosive devices at high-threat "hot spots" along the route. In addition, the 504th expanded the communication relay points along MSR Tampa, creating a communications capability for movement along the entire 275-mile route from the Kuwait-Iraq border to Baghdad. The 504th handled air and ground medical response operations involving enemy contacts and traffic accidents, saving the lives of many coalition personnel and local nationals.

Maneuver forces and logistical convoys continued to pour into Iraq even after the President announced the end of major combat operations on 1 May 2003. One of the top priorities was to get forces into critical areas of Iraq to stop the looting and to reestablish security. This was followed by another priority of establishing life support and sustainment for the growing number of coalition forces. In late May, convoys and military police patrols began coming under attack along the MSR—mostly in areas just south of Baghdad. In an effort to protect the convoys and provide a secure MSR for troop movements, the 504th established a small, forward operating base (FOB) at the key intersection of MSR Tampa and Alternate Supply Route Jackson, south of Baghdad. This lonely outpost, named in honor of First Lieutenant James Robert Kalsu (a Buffalo Bills defensive lineman who was killed in Vietnam on 21 July 1970), played a key role in the protection and sustainment of coalition forces for the remainder of the war. FOB Kalsu became a critical platform for the launch of response forces to counter the seemingly endless attacks against coalition forces. It also became a target of frequent nighttime attacks. By establishing CSC Scania and FOB Kalsu to launch security operations and to maintain the communication network along the MSR, the 504th successfully secured the coalition's logistical lifeline into Baghdad and beyond.

In addition to security operations, the units of the 504th executed multiple combat operations in conjunction with I Marine Expeditionary Force, special forces, and Polish forces. The battalion completed more than 30 platoon, company, and battalion level raids and cordon and search operations against insurgent locations and conducted hundreds of hasty and deliberate vehicle checkpoints, which led to the detention or elimination of more than 200 suspected criminals and insurgents. The battalion placed special emphasis on the protection of Iraqi infrastructure within and adjacent to MSR Tampa, including bridges, oil pipelines, power lines, power substations, and water distribution centers.

From May through early August 2003, the Soldiers of the 504th provided relief operations for I Marine Expeditionary Force to secure the only bridge crossing along MSR Tampa at the Euphrates River to the north of An Nasiriyah. In addition, from June through September 2003, the battalion provided security in support of engineering efforts to improve a 60-mile, dangerous, unpaved stretch of the MSR. The 504th also helped develop and cultivate civil-military relationships within the Iraqi towns and villages located along the MSR. And it participated in restoration and reconstruction projects for several schools, medical clinics, police stations, water-pumping facilities, and irrigation systems and assisted in establishing local markets to help revive the economy.

As the senior commander at CSC Scania, the commander of the 504th Military Police Battalion was directed to coordinate the construction of a multimillion dollar, secure, enduring, fully functioning base and convoy support center capable of supporting heavy convoy flow while simultaneously providing life support for the Soldiers living there. With the full support of the 377th Theater Support Command, the battalion led the way in planning, designing, and constructing the new facility and making improvements to existing on-site structures. The construction began in August and was completed in November 2003.



Left: Medevac operation along MSR Tampa

Right: The 504th Military Police Battalion commander providing a mission brief to an incoming unit

In September 2003, the 504th Military Police Battalion began to involve the Iraqis in highway security and enforcement by establishing the Iraqi Highway Patrol in Babil Province. Working with the regional Coalition Provisional Authority, the battalion received funding for the construction of three 24-hour highway patrol stations along MSR Tampa. This was part of a program designed to build, develop, and improve the fledgling highway patrol system, which eventually grew into an Iraqi law enforcement program.

During OIF I, the 504th Military Police Battalion conducted more than 4,000 combat patrols on nearly 300 miles of the MSR. The dedicated "Dragon Fighters" secured nearly 9,000 convoys and ensured the safe passage of more than 25,000 convoys moving troops and resources across the vital, but dangerous, MSR. Operations included more than 70 enemy contacts, and the battalion captured more than 200 insurgents and enemy prisoners and confiscated more than 1,200 weapons. The 504th also apprehended hundreds of Iraqis who were caught damaging or destroying critical Iraqi infrastructure. In addition, the battalion developed and improved the fledgling Iraqi highway patrol program and protected coalition forces by ensuring the safe detonation of countless improvised explosive devices.

At the height of the operation, the 220th Military Police Brigade committed three full military police battalions to MSR, convoy, and area security missions in Iraq. In January 2004, the 16th Military Police Brigade arrived in Iraq and replaced the 220th and 800th Military Police Brigades, assuming security and detention operations missions for OIF II. In March 2004, the 95th Military Police Battalion replaced the 504th. Over time, with unique military police capabilities in high demand, other forces took over the MSR, convoy, and area security missions to free critical military police units to focus strictly on detention operations and Iraqi police training, advisory, and assistance efforts in follow-on OIF rotations.

As the Military Police Corps Regiment focuses its attention on assessing and evaluating its core disciplines and competencies, the need for military police leaders and forces to be very flexible and adaptive in operating along the full range of military operations within a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment can be anticipated. The Army is rapidly preparing brigade combat teams for decisive-action, combat training center rotations and regionally aligning forces to meet future requirements. The Military Police Corps must be ready to support and participate. As we look to the future, the story of the 504th Military Police Battalion may serve as one example for thought and discussion regarding how future military police units can potentially execute an array of capabilities through several operational phases—not only providing critical police and detention operations, but also supporting and securing the actual movement and maneuver of forces on the battlefield.

Dedication: This article is dedicated to the brave men and women who served with the 504th Military Police Battalion Dragon Fighters in the early days of the historical OIF I conflict.

References:

Gregory Fontenot et al., *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom*, Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2004.

Thomas H. Tatum, personal journals, 18 March 2003–21 March 2004.

Thomas H. Tatum, "Recommendation for the Meritorious Unit Citation for the 504th MP Battalion, Operation Iraqi Freedom," CSC Scania, 8 March 2004.

John Voorhees and Adria Toth, "The Long Road to Baghdad . . . The 504th Military Police Battalion Secures the Iraqi Freedom," CSC Scania, 8 March 2004.

Colonel Tatum is the Provost Marshal, U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He formerly served as the commander of The 504th Military Police Battalion. He holds a bachelor's degree in criminal justice and master's degrees in leader development from the U.S. Military Academy–West Point, New York, and in strategic studies from the Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama.

Hostage/Crisis Negotiations:

First Responders Should Initiate Contact

By Chief Warrant Officer Three Alejandro Aucestovar

Hostage/crisis situations are highly sensitive, highly dangerous situations that occur from time to time in today's world. Many installation commanders have experienced a hostage/crisis situation at least once during their command; and at some installations, these situations may take place several times a year.

The response to a hostage/crisis situation involves a myriad of agencies and organizations—such as the installation directorate of emergency services, the garrison command, special-reaction teams (SRTs), explosive ordnance disposal personnel, the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) (commonly referred to as *CID*), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other equally interested entities—coming together and working as a single unit to successfully resolve the situation. These agencies generally establish a mission command cell that is capable of coordinating and controlling the entire operation, establishing procedures, implementing courses of action, anticipating hazards and pitfalls, and executing the mission. Hostage negotiations play a vital role in the successful resolution of situations that are a primary function of CID, but those negotiations are often handicapped by a lack of contact with the subject/suspect.

"If the first responder maintains communications with the suspect, critical information can be more quickly retrieved and provided to the incident commander. The first responder may be able to observe the number, make, and model of the weapons possessed; the number, gender, and description of hostages taken; the nature of injuries that have occurred; and the demeanor and body language of the hostage taker. This information serves as vital input to the incident commander's decisionmaking process regarding the establishment of security and the deployment of assets."

During a hostage/crisis situation, the garrison commander, who also serves as the incident commander, must exercise mission command of the entire operation. The commander's decisionmaking ability is greatly improved when police, investigators, negotiators, and other involved parties can provide current and accurate information. However, in most hostage/crisis situations, valuable information—such as the number and types of weapons possessed, the number of hostages taken, the nature of injuries that have occurred, and an explanation for the motive—is extremely difficult to obtain until negotiations between the hostage negotiation cell and the hostage taker are well underway.

Simultaneously working closely with the command cell and other cells, hostage negotiators must be able to lead an extremely emotional suspect to a state in which the suspect can begin to rationalize about the situation at hand. This is not an easy task. All hostage negotiators, including CID negotiators, are trained to establish a rapport with the suspect before engaging the suspect in a line of questioning designed to elicit specific information. However, depending on the nature of the initial contact, establishing this rapport can often be very difficult. For example, when delivering a hostage phone during the early stages of a hostage situation, SRT members are masked, armored, and fully armed. In addition, the hostage phone is often thrown to a barricaded suspect through an open window. Thus, the suspect may perceive the phone delivery as a hostile act, increasing the suspect's irrational, emotional behavior and making it more difficult for the hostage negotiator to control communications and establish a rapport.

One way to minimize the perception of hostility during hostage phone delivery is for a first responder to initiate communications with the suspect. For example, a military police officer responding to a domestic violence situation could begin communicating with the parties involved and then—if one of the parties brandishes a weapon, takes hostages, and assumes an offensive posture—the military police officer, after finding cover, could continue to communicate with the suspect. By maintaining communications, the military police officer is better able to transfer the communications to the hostage negotiators, provide critical information to the incident commander, and decrease the danger to the SRT when it delivers the hostage phone.

In most situations, the hostage negotiator must make contact with the suspect through the use of a bullhorn; a vehicle-mounted, public-address system; or a hostage phone after the hostage phone has been thrown to the suspect through an open window. Any of these forms of initial contact tend to heighten the suspect's state of emotional instability, placing the negotiator at a disadvantage. The heightened emotional instability caused by these ill-advised methods of initial contact may prompt the suspect to kill hostages or take his or her own life before the hostage negotiator has a chance to open the lines of communication. If the first responder maintains communications with the suspect, it is possible to avoid—or at least decrease the chance of—the suspect reaching a heightened state of emotional instability. Hostage negotiators are then more likely to gain the trust of, and achieve a rapport with, the suspect. Once a rapport has been established, the negotiator can take control. This improves the chance of ending the situation according to the incident commander's intent.

If the first responder maintains communications with the suspect, critical information can be more quickly retrieved and provided to the incident commander. The first responder may be able to observe the number, make, and model of the weapons possessed; the number, gender, and description of hostages taken; the nature of injuries that have occurred; and the demeanor and body language of the hostage taker. This information serves as vital input to the incident commander's decisionmaking process regarding the establishment of security and the deployment of assets. And the incident commander needs this information immediately. The more information and the faster it is provided, the better the incident commander can execute the mission.

The successful transfer of communications from the initial responder to the hostage negotiator enables a smooth delivery of the hostage phone to the suspect. The hostage negotiator has the opportunity to explain the purpose of the hostage phone to the suspect and to ensure that the suspect does not become frightened when the SRT delivers the phone. If the hostage negotiator can convey the point that the delivery is meant for the suspect's safety, rather than for violence, the suspect is more likely to be receptive and less likely to engage the SRT. The transfer of communications from the first responder to the hostage negotiator also allows the command cell and the SRT to assess the situation and to plan the delivery of the phone, the release of hostages, and the medical treatment of injuries.

Unfortunately, most first responders fail to maintain initial communications with the suspect because they are not confident that they are sufficiently trained or that they have the experience necessary to effectively handle the situation. Although this may be somewhat true, there are several additional training courses available. The FBI, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, and many civilian agencies across the country have developed courses designed to teach first responders to maintain communications with hostage takers. First responder courses are not designed to train officers to resolve situations on their own, but they teach officers to calm the suspect for a short period of time until the hostage negotiator arrives and establishes the hostage negotiation cell and communications can be seamlessly transferred. Garrison and provost marshal commanders greatly benefit by sending first responders to these courses—even if those officers are never called upon to use the training. The FBI and CID currently offer a Negotiation Concepts for Commanders Course, which provides incident commanders, unit commanders, and provost marshals with the same resources and capabilities of the hostage negotiators. Together, the first responder courses and the Negotiation Concepts for Commanders Course provide incident commanders with valuable knowledge about bringing hostage/crisis incidents to a successful resolution.

"First responder courses are not designed to train officers to resolve situations on their own, but they teach officers to calm the suspect for a short period of time until the hostage negotiator arrives and establishes the hostage negotiation cell and communications can be seamlessly transferred."

A growing number of civilian police agencies have taken steps to train and certify first responders. Police agencies that have sent officers to this training have done so to augment existing hostage negotiation teams or to compensate for a lack of trained negotiators within their agencies. Although scientific studies to determine the effectiveness of these courses at these police agencies have not been conducted, police chiefs from some of the agencies (Dallas Police Department, New York City Police Department, San Francisco Police Department) have observed advantages of the training and have already expressed their approval.

Installation provost marshals will certainly face a hostage/crisis situation during their tenure and should, therefore, concentrate on the most effective way to handle the situation. It is time for installation provost marshals to take a hard look at their first responders. They should assess their training and skills and seriously consider sending them to first responder training so that they may more effectively complete their mission. Obtaining training slots and requirements for first responder courses is as simple as contacting a local FBI hostage/crisis negotiation liaison through the local CID office.

Chief Warrant Officer Three Aucestovar is an assistant special agent in charge assigned to the 76th Military Police Detachment (CID), 11th Military Police Battalion (CID), Fort Bliss, Texas. He holds a master's degree in criminal justice administration from the University of Louisville, Louisville, Kentucky.

Beyond Culture: Advising in Afghanistan

By Colonel Ed Lowe

The traffic was particularly heavy in Kabul, Afghanistan, that morning, and the drive (which normally takes 15–20 minutes) from Camp Eggers to the headquarters of the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) was especially challenging. Cars weaved in and out of traffic without regard for normal street protocols—or at least any street protocols that we recognized. And among the cars, a donkey pulling a cart meandered its way down the street, further delaying traffic movement. Naturally, we were particularly rushed that morning. I knew that Major General Gul Zamarai, the ANCOP commander, was scheduled to depart early to visit one of his units—and I needed to relay information to him before his departure. After making our way through the headquarters checkpoints, our two-vehicle convoy parked and I rushed upstairs to Major General Zamarai's office. As I reached his office, still wearing my armored gear, he looked at me rather quizzically and asked, "Why do you have your gear on?" But it wasn't really so much of a question as it was a statement. It was clear that Major General Zamarai was conveying a message: If I were to serve as an advisor in his headquarters, I would need to trust my own personal security to his men. I needed to demonstrate that I felt just as safe and secure at the ANCOP headquarters or on battlefield circulation visits as I did sitting in the dining facility at Camp Eggers. This incident occurred early in my deployment, and I never forgot the lesson.

"It was clear that Major General Zamarai was conveying a message: If I were to serve as an advisor in his headquarters, I would need to trust my own personal security to his men."

When I left the U.S. Army War College in June 2011, I was assigned to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission–Afghanistan (NTM-A), where I was to serve as a senior advisor to the ANCOP commander. Having completed a tour as a company commander in Haiti and earlier tours in Afghanistan and Iraq, I felt that I was qualified and prepared for the mission at hand. The smattering of cultural training that I had received throughout my career further boosted my confidence.

In late July 2011, I assumed my position with the small NTM-A ANCOP advisory team—which consisted of a few American officers and noncommissioned officers; a contingent of Canadian naval officers; and a French gendarme colonel, who was Major General Zamarai's personal advisor. I quickly realized that my preconceived cultural expectations would need to change. I became aware that my year in Afghanistan would encompass more than my mere position as an advisor to an Afghan two-star general and his staff. My cultural experience would go beyond simple recognition, acknowledgement, and understanding.

Major General Zamarai was an incredible leader. He fought against the Soviets during their invasion of Afghanistan and was wounded an amazing 11 times. I once saw him salute and noticed that it seemed rather difficult for him to do so. When I asked him about it, he explained that his right arm had been nearly severed by a rocket-propelled grenade. It was so badly damaged that surgeons were forced to remove about 8 inches of it. He had also lost most of his teeth when he sustained machine gun fire through his jaw. In spite of his numerous injuries, Major General Zamarai remained the true backbone and inspirational leader of the ANCOP. He cared about his soldiers, and he was genuinely interested in ensuring that they were trained and equipped for their mission as a regionally based, nationally deployable force.

With the lesson that I had learned from Major General

Zamarai fresh in my mind, I prepared for my first battlefield circulation visit. Major General Zamarai wanted to visit some of his units to the north near Mazar-E-Shariff, so with one armored vehicle and about 10 pickup trucks, our group set off on the 9-hour ground movement. Major General Zamarai was the only passenger in the armored vehicle. For most of the trip, I sat alongside a linguist in one of the pickup trucks—our gear stowed in the cab of the truck. Even with my 9-millimeter pistol tucked away in my uniform, I was somewhat anxious. Some of the Afghans appeared to be curious about whether I would don my armored gear for the trip, but with Major General Zamarai's comment deeply ingrained in my mind, I knew that I could not. I had only a scarf that had been provided by an Afghan for the trip.

About 5 or 6 hours into the trip, our group came upon an American roadblock. Major General Zamarai seemed frustrated, and he looked to me to do something. I got out of my vehicle and approached the roadblock. The Soldiers who were operating the roadblock were armed "to the teeth" and fully decked out in body gear, and they were stunned to see an American colonel approach them in only his uniform. After some discussion, our group was soon on its way.

The advising mission requires a unique mind-set. I could have easily worn my armored gear for the entire trip, but what kind of message would that have sent to the ANCOP personnel? Would they have inferred that I did not trust them? I think so. The statement that Major General Zamarai made to me during the early days of my deployment helped me realize that I needed to reach beyond the basic culture of language and norms. Yet in many ways, that statement was Major General Zamarai's way of letting me know that my protection and my security also rested on his shoulders. The soldiers of his protective security detail watched my back, knowing that their honor, their integrity, and their reputations were on the line. To them, my safety was just as important as that of any other rank-and-file member of the ANCOP—maybe more so.

A few months into my deployment, I learned that the deputy commanding general of ANCOP (who had lost his wife to an automobile accident months earlier) was planning to get remarried in Kabul. The advisors were eager to present him with an appropriate wedding gift; so with the big day quickly approaching, I asked Major General Zamarai what type of gift would be suitable. Without hesitation, he replied, "Coming to the wedding would be the greatest gift!" Thus, after obtaining the necessary permission from NTM-A leaders, we began making preparations to attend the ceremony, which included being fitted for traditional Afghan wedding attire. On the day of the celebration, armed with our 9-millimeter pistols, we joined the convoy to the wedding hall. The hall, which was elaborately decorated, was filled with dozens of family members and other guests; and our presence drew some attention. However, our attendance meant the world to the groom. And the ANCOP officers were also pleased that we were there. We had moved beyond sharing small bits of language while drinking tea in the mornings. We had taken extra steps to connect in a much more personable way. In addition to sharing in Afghan losses on the battlefield, we were now sharing in Afghan joy and happiness as well. Our simple gesture of recognition meant so much to the ANCOP leaders.

Army and joint publications and research institutes recognize the important effect of cultural understanding on military operations. A lack of awareness or respect for the culture of a host nation could clearly have far-reaching, possibly even deadly, consequences. Conversely, cultural awareness, understanding, and respect could positively impact current and future tactical and strategic operations. The importance of developing cross-cultural competencies—including general cultural knowledge, skills, and attributes—is stressed in Field Manual (FM) 3-24.2, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*.[1] Furthermore, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations*, describes an understanding of culture and customs as a force-multiplying capability that can save lives and prove essential to mission success.[2] From an institutional perspective, the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences has identified three metacompetencies that provide a solid basis for civil-military collaboration:[3]

- Adapt across organizations and cultures.
  - Understand the cultural context of situations.
  - Assess new cultural environments, and adjust appropriately.
  - Understand multiple perspectives.
- Build partnering relationships.
  - Understand capabilities of partners and systems.
  - Establish effective partnerships and teams.
  - Develop positive relationships.
  - Build common ground and a shared purpose.
  - Manage conflict.
  - Manage the flow of communication.
- Collaborate to solve problems.
  - Use integrative methods for planning and for solving problems.
  - Synchronize tactical actions, operational objectives, and strategic goals.
  - Apply available resources and expertise.

Through doctrinal and institutional confirmation, our leaders recognize the importance of cultural knowledge and they understand how cultural skills and attributes relate to mission success. And through years of conflict and deployments, our military police officers and noncommissioned officers also understand it.

However, improvements could be made in the cultural awareness of Americans, as illustrated during an incident in which I was riding with Major General Zamarai when our entire convoy was pushed to the side by four American mine-resistant, ambush-protected armored fighting vehicles moving at an incredible speed. Defiantly controlling the road,

(Continued on page 19)



SHOHNA BA SHOHNA:

549th Military Police Company Partnership Operations in Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan

By Captain Donald "Skip" Riddle

"Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them—not to win it for them."

—T.E. Lawrence[1]

The 549th Military Police Company previously deployed to Forward Operating Base Shinwar, Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan, becoming the battlespace owner responsible for conducting unified land operations and wide area security for five districts in eastern Nangarhar. The 549th Military Police Company partnered with and mentored 11 chiefs of police, 11 district governors and their line directors, the 4th Afghan Border Police (ABP) Battalion (Zone 1), and the 6th Afghan National Army (ANA) Battalion (4th Brigade, 201st Corps). Despite a robust team of U.S. State Department personnel and civilian professionals working toward transition, it became abundantly clear that—if the 549th Military Police Company (operating with reduced personnel) was to succeed in preparing the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) in Eastern Nangarhar for transition by 2013—it would need to rely on the Afghans to accomplish the mission. This required a significant change in how the 549th looked at itself and how it interacted with its Afghan partners.

Problem Set 1: Rule of Law Integration and Education

Rule of law is a concept that incorporates not only the physical application of Afghan constitutional law by Afghan police and government and judicial officials, but also the public understanding of the application of the law and its overall transparency. Transparency, which is a critical element with regard to public perception, involves a deliberate effort to ensure that the physical application of constitutional law closely (if not identically) matches the application presented through educational curricula. Transparency is often a driving factor in legitimacy and public support.

Integration of the Rule of Law

In speaking with members of the local communities within the Shinwar District, it became apparent that the villagers did not consider the ANSF to be the legitimate, transparent "action arm" of the government in executing its duties and responsibilities according to Afghan constitutional law. Truthfully, most villagers did not understand Afghan constitutional law—instead, relying heavily on "tribal law," which is often applied by *mullahs* (Muslim scholars who are educated in Islamic religious law) or tribal elders within the community. Tribal law appealed to the locals because it was convenient, it was transparent (applied within the community), it allowed for faster trials and decisions and—compared to the Afghan judicial system—it lacked corruption. To tip the scales of public perception in favor of Afghan constitutional law and legitimacy, the GIRoA needed to educate the Afghan population and the ANSF needed a platform from which to emphasize transparency in lieu of corruption.

Education of the Public

The Shinwar District prosecutor acknowledged that controversial topics, such as searches/seizures and women's rights, needed to be addressed since offenses related to these topics often became points of contention among the locals who relied heavily on *mullahs* for the application of tribal law. Working in conjunction with leaders of the 549th Military

Police Company and rule of law advisors, the prosecutor agreed to host several rule of law *shuras* (consultations) aimed at educating the public on Afghan constitutional law. Previous coordination with the district governor ensured maximum participation among the senior *maliks* (chieftains) and *shura* attendees and allowed the exclusion of coalition forces from the meeting. Meetings took place at the district center; and discussions were led by the prosecutor, who reinforced the notion that his power base was the legitimate extension of Afghan law. Hosting the *shura* at the district center further emphasized the role and authority of the GIRoA, as locals were obligated to attend the *shura* at the invitation of the district governor. The *shura* provided the GIRoA with the platform that it needed (without the presence of coalition forces) to broadcast its message that the GIRoA is in charge.

"Warrant-based targeting takes the decisionmaking authority from coalition forces and places it in the hands of the Afghan judicial system, and it highlights the transparancy of that system. It also places the responsibility in the hands of the AUP, the district prosecuter, and the GIRoA."

Execution of Deliberate, Warrant-Based Detentions

From unit arrival, company leaders worked closely with law enforcement professionals (who had partnered with the provincial National Directorate for Security) to gather enough information to warrant the detention of various locals associated with a Shinwar District improvised explosive device cell. However, without the approval of the district prosecutor, the local population was unlikely to perceive the operation as Afghan-led and -executed. In order for the district prosecutor, the district governor, and the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) to take responsibility for detentions and subsequent prosecutions, *they* were the ones who needed the information. Law enforcement professionals and leaders of the 549th Military Police Company worked together to create a draft intelligence summary (releasable to the GIRoA) for various local criminals. The 549th Military Police Company delivered the summary to the prosecutor and National Directorate for Security officials. Not only did the document contain relevant information that led to the issuance of a warrant, it also empowered the district prosecutor to make a decision, which meant that he assumed some level of responsibility for the subsequent detention. Following the prosecutor's issuance of the warrant to the chief of police, the prosecutor and the chief of police invited the district subgovernor to the police station to discuss the operation. The subgovernor's attendance and subsequent approval meant that the approval of the GIRoA had been secured. This was an important postoperation mitigation strategy that alleviated pressure on the AUP, which had previously been forced to defend itself against frustrated citizens following an operation in which the subgovernor remained uninvolved. A month after the arrival of the 549th Military Police Company, the AUP, in coordination with the Shinwar District prosecutor and subgovernor—and without coalition forces assistance—conducted a deliberate, unilateral detention of a suspected improvised explosive device facilitator and prominent local businessman during a late-night operation. Expecting to see various *maliks* protesting the detention at the district center the next day, leaders of the 549th Military Police Company arrived prepared to assist the district subgovernor in engaging the local populace and in mitigating negative information associated with the operation. However, upon their arrival, the 549th discovered that the district center was operating under normal conditions and that there was no crowd containing frustrated local elders or prominent leaders. The operation demonstrated the capabilities of the AUP, the district prosecutor, and the GIRoA; it also revealed that the locals understood and respected the Afghan legal process and the authority of the GIRoA.

Warrant-based targeting takes the decisionmaking authority from coalition forces and places it in the hands of the Afghan judicial system, and it highlights the transparency of that system. It also places the responsibility in the hands of the AUP, the district prosecutor, and the GIRoA. A deliberate education strategy, combined with the integration of the rule of law and warrant-based targeting, helped mitigate nearly all negative information associated with the successful capture of the improvised explosive device facilitator, helped enhance AUP capabilities, and helped highlight the transparency of the Afghan judicial process.

Problem Set 2: Combined and Unilateral Operations

Leaders of the 549th Military Police Company quickly identified a very capable Afghan police force from within the Shinwar and surrounding districts; however, the capability of the force was overshadowed by a lack of confidence. This lack of confidence initially hindered the ability of the Afghan police force to conduct law and order operations in areas where members of the force believed that criminal capabilities exceeded their own. To address this issue, company leaders—who were keenly aware that a balanced approach was necessary in order to avoid enhancing confidence among the Afghans while, in reality, coalition forces were conducting operations—discussed an in-depth approach to building confidence. A series of discussions between leaders of the 549th Military Police Company and local Afghan leaders and chiefs of police led to the development of a mutually agreeable concept.

Step 1: AUP Partnered Patrols

It is difficult to convince a small Afghan police force to execute its duties against insurgent forces that are equipped with heavy machine guns and various other weapon systems without support from coalition forces. Early on, the 549th Military Police Company and security force assistance team (SFAT)/security force assistance advisory team (SFAAT) advisors agreed to surge AUP-partnered patrols in areas that the chief of police had identified as "volatile." Mounted and

dismounted partnered patrols were conducted through these volatile areas on a nightly basis until eventually the familiarity, capability, and confidence of the AUP had improved to the point that it was able to lead the patrols. This facilitated the introduction of the Afghan-sustainable variables of the ABP and the ANA into the AUP patrols. Because most Afghan police tend to feel "enabled" in the presence of coalition forces (due to enhanced capability, force protection, and life support), partnered patrols can be used to immediately build confidence. However, if left unchecked, partnered patrols can also tend to create a sense of dependency. Therefore, it was important to proceed to step 2 as quickly as possible.

Step 2: Combined Patrols (Partnered, Then Quick-Reaction Force)

In conjunction with the SFATs/SFAATs, advisors emphasized the importance of coordinated efforts among ABP and ANA units. At first, this initiative met with resistance from ABP and ANA commanders, who were reluctant to commit forces to daily or "routine" security patrols—a commitment that could be expected to result in arguments regarding mission command, logistics support, and requirements for obtaining the approval of higher headquarters before mission execution. However, after a few weeks of heavy emphasis on the program, the commanders agreed to oblige their mentors by conducting one or two combined, unilateral patrols while coalition forces maintained a quick-reaction force (QRF). Weekly security *shuras*, hosted by the ABP and ANA commanders, directly facilitated communication and coordination among the senior commanders, which indirectly (without their realization) and slowly developed into a working relationship. Together, the commanders began to realize that coordination and cooperation resulted in increased situational awareness, an improved ability to project forces and logistics, and less enemy contact (since enemy forces rarely attacked when faced with overwhelming firepower).

But the relationship was not always that simple. On multiple occasions, one of the commanders simply refused to work with the group due to emotional frustration, a disagreement, an order from higher headquarters, or the like. However, the 549th Military Police Company and the SFAT/SFAAT advisors remained committed to ensuring that every meeting, every *shura*, and every plan involved multiple Afghan agencies. Although the ABP and ANA may not have always wanted to work with their counterparts, they soon realized that—to maximize coalition force capabilities—they would need to do so. Eventually, the commanders began sitting closer to one another during the regular meetings. Discussions that had once consisted of arguments over minute details evolved into conversations about families and friends. Personal relationships began to develop, and combined coordination became much easier.

Step 3: QRFs

The ANSF wanted a dedicated coalition QRF, but the Americans wanted to help their Afghan partners only in the event that they needed assistance. To ensure progression toward independent Afghan combined and unilateral operations, the 549th Military Police Company and SFAT/SFAAT advisors opted for a hybrid approach that made use of the partnered patrol concept—but only with the QRF. The involved parties agreed that the overall QRF would consist of ANSF personnel and Soldiers of the 549th Military Police Company. Following a few successful trial runs, the coalition QRF and the ANSF QRF deployed together, but disengaged early. A few weeks later, the coalition QRF again deployed with the ANSF QRF, but served in a tactical oversight role just a terrain feature or two behind the ANSF QRF. The coalition QRF eventually staged itself at the district center or police station and, from there, continued to retrograde toward Forward Operating Base Shinwar. However, as the confidence of the Afghans grew, the ANSF QRF didn't seem to notice; they became more and more willing to venture farther away from the coalition QRF and the forward operating base.

Step 4: Battlespace Integration

Although the ANSF truly planned and led most operations, they did not—and could not—maintain ultimate responsibility as long as coalition forces continued to operate in separate operations centers, coordinating and using assets that are not typically at the disposal of the Afghans. Therefore, once the Shinwar District combined tactical operations center was established, Afghans became the battlespace owners and the coalition forces supplied personnel to manage coalition force assets. Moving 549th Military Police Company operations into the combined tactical operations center resulted not only in a physical change, but also a psychological one. The ABP and ANA commanders felt culturally comfortable taking charge in *their* controlled environment; they felt empowered. To validate the battlespace integration concept, the 549th Military Police Company and the SFATs/SFAATs needed a platform that would test not only the concept, but also the capability of their Afghan partner—and then came Toufan 29.

Culminating Event: Toufan 29

The Afghans received a cipher ordering them to conduct a combined operation in Lal Pur District to disrupt insurgent forces operating in various villages within the district (including Raqmadi, Suray, and Yaqobi) before the arrival of Ramadan. From the beginning, the 549th Military Police Company and the advisors agreed: Toufan 29 would be an Afghan operation—planned, coordinated, and executed by the ANA, ABP, and AUP according to the Afghan timeline and using Afghan assets. This presented an opportunity for the Afghans to simultaneously assume responsibility for all three lines of effort—with ANA, ABP, and AUP commanders and the Lal Pur District governor having a vested interest in the plan. Despite their irregular planning process and, at times, hasty decisionmaking, the Afghans managed (without coalition force support) to discuss, develop, and rehearse a plan that involved political and military objectives. The governor needed to demonstrate GIRoA influence and capability during visits to outlying villages, and the military wanted to conduct a show of force. What had started out on paper 3 weeks earlier as a coalition force-influenced plan involving clearing operations

and significant coalition force and advisor presence turned into an Afghan-led presence patrol with the district governor. The presence patrol was conducted with no coalition force presence or support, and the schedule followed a realistic Afghan timeline.

On the day of the Toufan 29 operation, the 549th Military Police Company and the advisors deliberately delayed their departure to ensure that they arrived at the end of the operation. And as they approached a large crowd that had gathered under a shack-like structure, they observed the district governor and the commanders speaking to seated Raqmadi residents, who were listening intently. With their own resources and without coalition force support, the Afghans had managed to travel to a remote village in a volatile district and leaders were interacting with village residents—actively listening to the concerns and challenges expressed by various elders of the community. Remaining out of sight and irrelevant, the 549th Military Police Company reflected on the previous 3 weeks of planning, advising, compromise, and frustration.

Although Toufan 29 did not constitute a major clearing operation (and seemed more like a combined presence patrol than anything else) and did not brief well on paper, the results indicated otherwise. The following day, Raqmadi residents traveled to the district center to speak with the governor; some stated that this was their first trip to the district center in more than 10 years. Confidence surged throughout the ranks of the ANSF. Nearly all Afghan junior leaders indicated that the lack of enemy contact was due to the insurgents "running away in fear."

Unbeknownst to the Afghan commanders, the 549th Military Police Company and the advisors had tirelessly worked behind the scenes to help ensure the success of the Afghans. Intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and close air support assets intensively scoured the objective area before and during the operation to confirm the absence of insurgents. These assets were also fully prepared to provide immediate and overwhelming firepower should the Afghans need it. These efforts allowed the ANSF commanders and district governor to develop strength and confidence, which showed as they walked and talked together and sat next to one another during *shuras*. AUP, ABP, and ANA personnel also worked *shohna ba shohna* (shoulder to shoulder), as if they were part of the same Afghan unit. The confidence gained by the Afghans was important because they needed to believe that they had "won"—and at the completion of the operation, they did. Subsequently, the 549th Military Police Company did too.

Endnote:

[1]T.E. Lawrence, "Twenty-Seven Articles," *Arab Bulletin*, 20 August 1917.

Captain Riddle is the commander, 549th Military Police Company, Fort Stewart, Georgia. He was stationed at Forward Operating Base Shinwar from January 2012 to January 2013. He holds a bachelor's degree in science from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York.

("Beyond Culture," continued from page 15)

the gunners pointed their fingers at us and brandished their weapons. Major General Zamarai looked at me in disbelief and said, "This is our country!" I could do nothing more than shake my head.

Cultural experiences and anecdotes from Afghanistan are not unique to NTM-A police advisors. Many fellow senior officers, civilian advisors, military contractors, and international partners also recognized the importance of cross-cultural competencies and understood that their missions and responsibilities went beyond simple cultural awareness and understanding. And quite frankly, they often went above and beyond anything that I did in terms of establishing a close-knit relationship with their Afghan partners. Through the development of such deep, personable relationships, they earned a tremendous amount of lifelong gratitude from their Afghan counterparts.

During the time I spent in Afghanistan, I was aware of and understood the cultural expectations; however, my daily interactions and engagements with my Afghan friends went beyond that. Through multiple deployments, our leaders continue to be reminded of the importance of the role of culture in every operation. Furthermore, the *Military Police Force 2020 Strategic Plan* recognizes the importance of developing adaptive military police leaders for the future.[4] Educated in multiple disciplines and hardened by complex experiences, military police leaders can help change the cultural mind-set. They can convey the message that mere awareness and understanding are not enough. We must move beyond that.

Endnotes:

[1]FM 3-24.2, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, 21 April 2009. According to FM 3-24.2, culture consists of various elements including history, language, geography, religion, communications, political science, military arts and sciences, sociology, cultural anthropology, economics, education, art, music and entertainment, literature, food and drink, psychology, law and criminal justice, and science and technology. In addressing a cultural issue or problem, questions must be considered within each element.

[2]JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, 11 August 2011.

[3]"Development of a Competency Model for Civil-Military Training," fact sheet, U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, February 2012.

[4]*Military Police Force 2020 Strategic Plan,* U.S. Army Office of the Provost Marshal General, 2012, <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/38004170>, accessed on 31 January 2013.

Colonel Lowe is a police reform/rule of law analyst with the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. He holds a bachelor's degree in political science with a minor in history from North Georgia College and State University, Dahlonega, Georgia, and graduate degrees in humanities–history from California State University, business and organizational security management from Webster University, and national strategic studies from the U.S. Army War College.

19th Military Police Battalion

Lineage and Honors

Constituted 12 August 1943 in the Army of the United States as the 19th Military Police Section, Criminal Investigation.

Activated 14 August 1943 at Fort Custer, Michigan.

Reorganized and redesignated 29 December 1944 as the 19th Military Police Criminal Investigation Detachment.

Inactivated 28 September 1945 at Camp Anza, California.

Activated 15 June 1947 in Japan.

Allotted 12 December 1950 to the Regular Army.

Reorganized and redesignated 1 April 1954 as the 19th Military Police Detachment.

Inactivated 31 July 1971 in Korea.

Activated 16 October 1994 in Korea.

Reorganized and redesignated 1 September 1996 as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 19th Military Police Battalion.

Campaign Participation Credit

World War II

European-African-Middle Eastern Theater, Streamer without inscription.

Korean War

United Nations Defensive

United Nations Offensive

Chinese Communist Forces Intervention

First United Nations Counteroffensive

Chinese Communist Forces Spring Offensive

United Nations Summer–Fall Offensive

Second Korean Winter

Korea, Summer–Fall 1952

Third Korean Winter

Korea, Summer 1953

War on Terrorism

Campaigns to be determined

Decorations

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered KOREA 1950–1951

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered KOREA 1951–1952

Note 1: Lineage and Honors for this unit are in the process of being updated. According to Mr. Thomas Popa, Force Structure and Unit History Branch, U.S. Army Center of Military History, the unit has been awarded campaign participation credit for CONSOLIDATION III for deployment February 2010–January 2011 and a Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army) for AFGHANISTAN 2010–2011. The unit is currently deployed.

Note 2: The mission of the 19th Military Police Battalion is to provide criminal investigative services to the U.S. Army within a Pacific Rim geographical area of responsibility, including the state of Hawaii and the countries of South Korea and Japan. On order, individuals or detachments are deployed in support of contingency operations.



Unity of Effort and the ILE Interagency Fellowship Program

By Major Scott R. Blanchard and Ms. Eliza Edgar

A unity of effort and action involving military and civilian law enforcement agencies improves the effectiveness of the U.S. government in achieving common local, state, and federal goals. Achieving shared interests and common goals in a synchronized, coordinated, and collaborative manner improves public safety, assists in achieving national security objectives, and reduces the overall cost of doing business.

In January 2012, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) published a national strategy document entitled "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," which contains presidential guidance and priorities as well as national strategic objectives for the U.S. armed forces.[1] In the preface, President Barack Obama indicates that the U.S. is "joining with allies and partners around the world to build their capacity to promote security, prosperity, and human dignity."[2] President Obama also reminds readers that the armed forces are not the only instrument of American power and that "meeting these challenges cannot be the work of our military alone."[3]

The most appropriate response to the President's remarks is unquestionably the unified action of all U.S. government departments and agencies in achieving shared national security objectives. At the strategic level, *unified action* refers to the synchronization, coordination, and collaboration of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power to achieve national strategic objectives. At the operational and tactical levels, *unified action* refers to a whole-of-government approach that seeks to leverage the capabilities and partnerships of the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational community toward arrival at common interests and achievement of common objectives. Ultimately, unified action leads to a unity of effort, which helps "build international and domestic support, conserve resources, and conduct coherent operations that more effectively and efficiently achieve common objectives."[4] A unified effort is more important than ever in a fiscally constrained environment, where budget cuts, shrinking resources, pay freezes, and personnel drawdowns do not translate to modified missions or objectives.[5]

A practical example of a DOD attempt to achieve a unity of effort involves the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Intermediate-Level Education (ILE) Interagency Fellowship Program. The purpose of this program, which is offered to U.S. Army majors and midlevel government leaders, is to develop a cadre of national security professionals through partnered exchanges between the U.S. Army and other government agencies. Fellows are placed in an 11- to 12-month operational assignment in a participating federal agency, where they immerse themselves in the culture of the agency. The fellows become familiar with the mission, responsibilities, and capabilities of the host agency; and they apply their knowledge and experiences in developing joint solutions to achieve shared national security objectives.

Officers of the U.S. Army Military Police Corps have participated in the ILE Interagency Fellowship Program for the past 4 years; fellows from the Military Police Corps have been placed with the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection. The fiscal year 2011–2012 ILE partnership with the USMS produced significant results for both agencies in two common areas of law enforcement—sex offender targeting and deserter operations. This article describes the successful participation of the Military Police Corps in the Interagency Fellowship Program and the value of the program in providing a means for achieving a unity of effort.

The USMS is the federal law enforcement agency that protects the federal judicial process and ensures the enforcement of federal court mandates. The agency is operationally organized to conduct judicial security, fugitive operations, prisoner operations, prisoner transport, asset forfeiture, witness security, and tactical operations. There are about 3,950 USMS deputy U.S. marshals and criminal investigators located across 94 domestic federal court districts, seven regional fugitive task

forces, and four foreign field offices. In addition, the USMS is supported by an extremely capable network of professional analysts who specialize in criminal intelligence and electronic and air surveillance. The Military Police Corps and the USMS are undeniably the federal law enforcement agencies that are best suited to exploit the benefits of an interagency relationship.

Through interagency cooperation between the Military Police Corps and the USMS from fiscal year 2011 to 2012, operational targeting practices against military sex offenders were developed, felony deserters were apprehended, and Department of Defense Form (DD Form) 2791, *Notice of Release/ Acknowledgment of Convicted Sex Offender Registration Requirements*,[6] was strategically revised. In addition, Military Police Corps fellows and USMS personnel participated in an information-sharing project in which they located and determined the status of Army deserters. These efforts reduced the risk to the force, increased Army family readiness, and saved a substantial amount of money.

Sex Offender Targeting

The USMS serves as the lead federal law enforcement agency responsible for investigating violations of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (AWA).[7] Pursuant to the AWA, the USMS is responsible for the following distinct missions:

- Assisting state, local, tribal, and territorial authorities in the location and apprehension of noncompliant sex offenders.
- Investigating violations of Section 2250 (Failure to Register), Chapter 109B (Sex Offender and Crimes Against Children Registry), Title 18, *Crimes and Criminal Procedure*, U.S. Code (USC),[8] and other related offenses.
- Assisting in the identification and location of sex offenders who have been relocated as a result of a major disaster.

The primary objective of the USMS missions is to expand the ability to identify former Service members who are noncompliant, convicted sex offenders so that they can be arrested and prosecuted.

In cooperation with officers of the Military Police Corps, the USMS embarked upon the initiative of identifying and locating noncompliant sex offenders. Together, personnel from the two agencies identified former Service members who had committed sex-based offense(s) while on active duty and who, subsequent to their convictions (many of which had occurred before the passage and implementation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act), had failed to comply with lawful registration requirements.

Military Police Corps fellows and USMS criminal investigators working within the National Sex Offender Targeting Center (NSOTC) teamed up with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense to identify former Service members who were convicted sex offenders. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense subsequently ordered the corrections command of each of the military branches to submit corresponding DD Forms 2791 to NSOTC. In addition, military facility commanders provided written notices of the releases to the appropriate local law enforcement jurisdictions and to the chief law enforcement officers of the states. These additional notifications were intended to enhance the process by increasing communications between enforcement officials and by improving the ability of enforcement officials to identify noncompliant sex offenders for arrest and prosecution.

The Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG) and the USMS jointly developed operational and tactical targeting practices to assist the DOD and the Department of Justice in efforts to ensure registration compliance and to prosecute Section 2250(a), Chapter 109B, Title 18, USC, violators. The NSOTC has been working with the DOD and each Service branch to directly provide USMS investigators with legal documents that can be used for the prosecution of sex offender registry violators. The documents have proved vital in presenting AWA cases to U.S. attorneys for federal prosecution.

New DD Forms 2791 are generally transmitted from the branch correction commands to the NSOTC 2 weeks before the release of the offender. The NSOTC maintains electronic copies of the forms. Since March 2011, NSOTC has received more than 300 completed DD Forms 2791. Each of these cases was reviewed for proper registration and compliance; and if a sex offender was out of compliance, an investigation for possible AWA violations was initiated.

The Military Police Corps and the USMS also worked together to modify DD Form 2791 to reflect the current Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act requirements. The modification was intended to help offenders understand the importance of timely registration. The revised DD Form 2791, with DOD instructions, will soon be released.

Improvements in communications between the Military Police Corps and the USMS have led to at least three indictments against former Soldiers who were noncompliant sex offenders. Through these targeting efforts, many active duty Service members who were required to register for previous sex offense convictions were also identified.

Deserter Operations

Deserters and absentees are threats to the operational readiness of the command, and they represent a financial and political liability to the Army. Failure to address the issue of deserters and absentees through criminal or administrative procedures signifies indifference and implies tacit approval. Furthermore, over time, Soldiers who flee to avoid prosecution are actually less likely to be prosecuted for offenses because victims, witnesses, and commanders are reassigned. This creates additional indiscipline incentives within the ranks.[9]

Efforts to dramatically reduce the number of absentees through a multidisciplinary approach that includes enhanced interagency cooperation, apprehension and prosecution efforts, and in absentia discharges are expected to improve law enforcement effectiveness and military readiness. (See figure.)

The OPMG requested USMS analytical and operational assistance in locating and apprehending felony deserters.



Deserter targeting sequence

From an original target list of 52 wanted persons, the USMS identified 29 viable cases in which it could provide immediate assistance. Shortly thereafter, the USMS hosted a conference call between OPMG elements and the U.S. Army Deserter Information Point to discuss possible courses of action. During this meeting, USMS representatives agreed to partner in the endeavor, generate law enforcement tactical intelligence reports to be used by the USMS and the Army, and request the immediate assistance of each USMS district task force supervisor in locating and apprehending the deserters for subsequent prosecution and return to military control.

In November 2011, the OPMG and the USMS formed an ad hoc task force to locate the 29 previously identified deserters who were wanted for charges that included drug possession, fraud, larceny, burglary, aggravated assault, obstruction/evasion, and probation violation. The resources and capabilities of the USMS Criminal Intelligence Branch, the USMS NSOTC, and the U.S. Army Deserter Information Point were combined with those of 14 USMS district task forces and two regional fugitive task forces. In less than 4 months, the ad hoc task force captured 18 deserters and located several fugitives who required international extradition.

In addition, through a comprehensive search of numerous law enforcement databases, the Fugitive Targeting Unit of the USMS Criminal Intelligence Branch recently located and determined the status of all 2,500 personnel on the Army desertion list. These efforts reduced the number of listed deserters by 200 and saved the DOD more than $23,000 in administrative costs. Furthermore, the DOD and NSOTC are working together to update Army Regulation (AR) 190-9, *Absentee Deserter Apprehension Program and Surrender of Military Personnel to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies*.[10]

Through the fellowship, Military Police Corps fellows expanded the USMS knowledge about Army systems and targeting processes, improved USMS access to Army senior leaders, and provided valuable military law enforcement information for ongoing investigations. Tangible USMS results included the development of a comprehensive database containing critical information about former Soldiers convicted of sex offenses and the indictment of three former Soldiers for violations of the AWA. Military Police Corps fellows also provided the USMS with modern Army combatives and special victims unit investigations training opportunities. The unity of effort between these two organizations produced lasting results, ultimately setting the necessary conditions for future interagency success.

A unity of effort and a unity of action increase the effectiveness of the U.S. government. The achievement of common goals in a synchronized, coordinated, and collaborative manner improves the overall ability of independent departments and agencies to arrive at common interests and shared national security objectives. And interagency operations also result in an overall reduction in the cost of doing business.

The 21st century challenges to U.S. national security require a whole-of-government approach and a trained cadre of national security experts. The ILE Interagency Fellowship Program promotes interagency collaboration and supports the

(Continued on page 25)



The 94th Military Police Battalion Explores the Regional Alignment Concept With 2ID in Korea

WHEN IN NEED

By Major Kevin Pelley and Major Chris Rivers

In the early stages of any potential military conflict on the Korean Peninsula, the 94th Military Police Battalion will stand alone as the only military police force available to support U.S. Army operations. Competing demands could quickly overwhelm the battalion as tactical and operational commanders request military police to conduct base defense, response force, convoy security, detainee, and law enforcement operations. Leaning forward, the 94th Military Police Battalion seized an opportunity to train with the 2d Infantry Division (2ID) during its annual exercise, Warpath, in November 2012. The 94th Military Police Battalion used this exercise to test the concept of the regional alignment of forces and to narrow the battalion wartime mission.

The purpose of the 2ID Warpath exercise was to synchronize division, subordinate unit, and supporting organization planning, preparation, and exercise support efforts. The division, with the support of the 8th U.S. Army; the 17th and 26th Infantry Divisions, Republic of Korea Army; the 20th Support Command; the Korean Battle Simulation Center; Operations Group C, Mission Command Training Command; and the Battle Command Training Program, Republic of Korea Army, conducted a computer-assisted exercise in November 2012. The mission of 2ID during Warpath was to train the division and its subordinate units on mission-essential tasks and to improve theater operational readiness. The division commanding general intended to conduct Warpath as a combined exercise, with the division providing mission command of U.S. and Korean brigades. During Warpath, 2ID—

- Validated the division ability to conduct assigned missions.
- Demonstrated division preparedness to "fight tonight" and win on the Korean Peninsula.
- Developed enduring partnerships with reinforcing U.S. units and Republic of Korea allies.

No written order specifies a relationship between the 94th Military Police Battalion and the 2ID. The 8th Military Police Brigade served as the higher headquarters for the 94th Military Police Battalion before relocating to Hawaii in 2006. With the departure of the 8th Military Police Brigade, the 94th Military Police Battalion was attached to the 501st Sustainment Brigade, 19th Expeditionary Support Command, for day-to-day armistice operations. However, in the event of a resumption of hostilities in Korea, the 94th Military Police Battalion will detach from the 501st Brigade and support 8th U.S. Army wartime operations. The 94th Military Police Battalion is currently the only military police battalion that supports a three-star headquarters without a higher military police brigade headquarters and staff to support operations. But in an effort to move toward a formal alignment with 2ID, Lieutenant Colonel Todd E. Schroeder, commander of the 94th Military Police Battalion, requested to participate in the exercise. The offer was accepted, and the 94th Military Police Battalion was brought into the task organization of the division as a direct reporting unit. Initially, the battalion was not included in the planning or reporting process; however, division leaders quickly learned the value that the military police battalion provided and began incorporating it into its planning and briefing cycles.

Lieutenant Colonel Schroeder established three major training objectives for Warpath. The first objective was to exercise an operational control relationship with the division. This test required that the 94th Military Police Battalion conduct an analysis of the unit mission set, command relationships, and the use of military police forces. During the final planning phases of Warpath, the battalion received a full list of missions that addressed three military disciplines and greatly exceeded the available assets. Lieutenant Colonel Schroeder and his planners met with the 2ID provost marshal and representatives from the division plans section to establish a feasible mission set that balanced available assets with capabilities.

The initial mission task organization stripped the battalion of two of its four subordinate companies, giving operational control to the division combat and engineer brigades; two companies and the battalion headquarters remained in general support of division detention operations. Capture rates remained low during the exercise, and the 94th Military Police Battalion expanded its operations and accomplished its second training objective—selling military police capabilities to a division commander and his staff.

One major division task was to consolidate and escort priority convoys across the battlefield. The brigade commander who was tasked with this mission was unable to secure the convoys or critical sites with organic assets, so he incorporated the military police battalion into the mission planning process. This critical, division level mission garnered the personal attention of the 2ID commander, so Lieutenant Colonel Schroeder and his staff earned an unexpected opportunity to brief the division deputy commanding general for support on the proposed employment of military police in support of this

new mission and the limitations and restrictions of the battalion due to the forces supporting detention operations. The division subsequently reallocated forces for the internment mission, thereby freeing two military police companies to conduct critical convoy and site security operations.

The third training objective was to improve the ability of the battalion headquarters to conduct mission command. Although all theater exercises in Korea provide an excellent opportunity for the battalion to work on its mission-essential tasks of "conduct command post operations" and "conduct the operations process," the Warpath exercise was unique in that it incorporated the employment of military police assets below the battalion level. The simulation center provided the battalion tactical operations center with real-time data for combat engagements and combat losses. During Warpath, the 94th Military Police Battalion was required to nest operations with 2ID tactical standing operating procedures and the division planning, decisionmaking, and executing cycle.

All Warpath training objectives were met with great success, and the positive impact of the 94th Military Police Battalion on the mission was discussed at the division after action review. The lead observer/controller highlighted how the execution of the military police battalion area security mission enabled 2ID the freedom to conduct combined maneuver operations. Also at the after action review, the division commander provided the 94th Military Police Battalion with mission priorities and the directive to continue its command relationship with 2ID.

According to Colonel John (Mack) Huey, former assistant commandant of the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), "Given sufficient force structure (consisting of a full military police battalion, including four military police companies, aligned to the division) . . . we can provide maneuver commanders with the full range of technical military police support necessary to enable them to conduct decisive action."[1] The alignment of the 94th Military Police Battalion with 2ID during Warpath provided proof that the 94th is perfectly positioned to act as a proof of principle for future Army structure, ensuring that the Military Police Regiment of 2020 is prepared to provide essential capabilities required by combatant commanders to fight and win our Nation's wars.

Endnote:

[1]John (Mack) Huey, "The First 180 Days in Support of the Division in Combat: Let's Get It Right!" *Military Police*, Fall 2012.

Major Pelley is the executive officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 94th Military Police Battalion. He holds a bachelor's degree in liberal arts from Excelsior College, Albany, New York, and a master's degree in business and organizational security management from Webster University.

Major Rivers is the operations officer (S-3), 94th Military Police Battalion. He holds a bachelor's degree in criminal justice from North Georgia College and State University and a master's degree in business and organizational security management from Webster University.

("Unity of Effort," continued from page 23)

ability of the U.S. government and its armed forces to succeed across the range of unified land operations and to prevail in war.

Acknowledgement: Special thanks to the team of experts at NSOTC, USMS, OPMG, and the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children for their phenomenal teamwork.

Endnotes:

[1]"Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," DOD, 5 January 2012.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*, 24 June 2011.

[5]Military Personnel (MILPER) Message 12-214, "Academic Year 2013–2014 Army Competitive Category (ACC) Intermediate-Level Education (ILE) Opportunities and Procedures for Applying to Foreign, Sister Service School, and ILE Interagency Fellowship Attendance," 10 July 2012.

[6]DD Form 2791, *Notice of Release/Acknowledgment of Convicted Sex Offender Registration Requirements*, 1 April 2003.

[7]Title 1, Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, Public Law 109-248, Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 27 July 2006.

[8]Section 2250 (Failure to Register), Chapter 109B (Sex Offender and Crimes Against Children Registry), Title 18, *Crimes and Criminal Procedure*, USC, current as of 3 January 2012.

[9]*Army 2020: Generating Health and Discipline in the Force Ahead of the Strategic Reset (the "Army Gold Book"),* Department of the Army, 19 January 2012, and Herman Williams and John Hargitt, OPMG.

[10]AR 190-9, *Absentee Deserter Apprehension Program and Surrender of Military Personnel to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies*, 18 January 2007.

Reference:

DD Form 553, *Deserter/Absentee Wanted by the Armed Forces,* May 2004.

Major Blanchard is the executive officer, 709th Military Police Battalion, Grafenwoehr, Germany. He was previously assigned as an ILE interagency fellow at NSOTC, USMS. He holds a bachelor's degree in environmental engineering from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York, and a master's degree in kinesiology from Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas.

Ms. Edgar is the resource coordinator, NSOTC. She holds a bachelor's degree in French from Davidson College, Davidson, North Carolina.

The 2d Cavalry Regiment (SBCT) Military Police Platoon

by Captain Joshua K. Frye

The setting: A cavalry regiment (brigade), six squadrons (battalions), 29 troops (companies), 4,200 Soldiers, and roughly twice that number of family members—all in a distant and ancient foreign country. And working in support of this organization, tasked to maintain good order and discipline: One military police platoon (42 Soldiers) that is controlled by a provost marshal (PM) cell (three Soldiers). This is an overall 100:1 ratio of general Soldiers to military police Soldiers. Since the establishment of the fledgling 2d Cavalry Regiment Military Police Platoon in Vilseck, Germany, in mid-2009, the Soldiers of the platoon have experienced much—from the gritty club scene of Nuremberg, Germany, to the open, rugged countryside of Afghanistan.

As in any brigade combat team, the PM cell serves as the repository of military police knowledge for the regiment, coordinating efforts across the gamut of military police functions. With the most recent modified table of organization and equipment change, a military occupational specialty 31A major no longer occupies the PM position; instead, it is a captain who leads the cell, which is rounded out with an operations sergeant and an internment/resettlement noncommissioned officer (both sergeants first class). The cell tracks statistics and action reports, advises the chief of staff and regimental commander, and helps guide and prepare military police within the regiment for garrison life as well as the rigors of war—with each of these tasks just as important as the others.

The PM must strike a delicate balance between serving as an active member of the regimental commander's special staff and, at the same time, functioning as a member of the military police community. A healthy relationship with the garrison directorate of emergency services and adjacent military police companies and battalions has proven vital. Working with garrison commanders (usually colonels) and garrison PMs (usually lieutenant colonels) while advocating the tenant unit "agenda" creates an interesting dynamic. Without special relationships and a direct liaison between agencies, it would have been impossible to attain the synergistic effects that have been achieved. And the regimental PM's direct interaction with state and federal host nation authorities (in this case, the German *Polizei* [host nation police]) is just as important. Perceiving the regiment in a holistic, community-wide manner—as opposed to being isolated from the garrison—has led to tangible improvements in the community perception of military police and a reduction in indiscipline, both with direct benefits to the Army.

The use of the regiment's organic military police assets remains a struggle. While the Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) modified table of organization and equipment indicates that the military police platoon is at the brigade level, commanders have chosen to modify the task organization in various ways. The platoon is often kept below brigade level in training and deployed environments. The platoon has been nestled under various maneuver commanders; and although these commanders provide valuable training to the platoon, their focus is on their own non-military police maneuver assets. The ability of the PM to influence and shape decisions regarding the placement of the military police platoon is greater at some times than at others, but should be carefully tracked and constantly reevaluated. Throughout these iterations, maintaining the distinctiveness of the military police platoon has remained a constant priority. Separate barracks and a separation from subordinate units allow the military police platoon to effectively function as a police force. Maneuver commanders who are in control of military police in garrison can be tempted to use the military police platoon to accomplish tasks outside of their mission set; therefore, it is important to prevent the platoon from becoming just another scout

platoon. The regimental commander directed that the platoon be shielded from this situation so that it might complete law enforcement tasks throughout the formation and in garrison.

The traditional use of military police in a tactical environment is seldom exercised in contemporary training and operating environments in garrison, resulting in the predeployment atrophy of doctrinal military police skills. The late-2012, decisive-action training environment exercise provided an excellent opportunity for the regiment to get back to these basics. The regiment deployed from the home station, across the German countryside, into a large maneuver rights area in numbers that had not been seen in Germany since the redeployment of forces to Germany (REFORGER) in the 1980s. Working with the host nation and multinational partners, and against a very competent opposing force, the regiment was challenged in a wide array of offensive, defensive, and complex doctrinal tasks. The military police platoon supported the regiment by providing tactical route signage (posting speed limit, restricted access, and route designation signs), area and route reconnaissance, area security, high-value site security, convoy escort, detention operations, and military working dog support. The decision to task-organize the entire military police platoon directly under the headquarters paid off, properly allowing the use and flexibility that was envisioned during the design of the SBCT. The broad spectrum of capabilities and numerous battle platforms of the 2d Cavalry Regiment Military Police Platoon have prepared it to handle problem sets and potential operations of future conflicts.

Law enforcement operations in Germany present unique challenges and rewards. A North Atlantic Treaty Organization status-of-forces agreement and a German supplementary agreement allow U.S. military police a very permissive legal framework within which to perform their on- and off-post duties. And the stage for day-to-day activity is set with the U.S. Army Europe and comprehensive Army in Europe regulations. The 2d Cavalry Regiment military police commonly work hand in hand with Soldiers from the 18th Military Police Brigade and the Installation Management Command. These intra-Army partnerships are crucial for mission success. International partnerships are also important; the military police platoon has formed a mutual partnership with the *Bundeswehr* (German federal armed forces) *Feldjäger* (military police), and the partnership extends beyond combined training. Frequent, combined, real-world patrols have bolstered an understanding and increased the legitimacy of military police on both sides. For example, *Feldjägers* patrolled the garrison Independence Day celebration and the Nuremberg *Volksfest* (public festival) and participated in combined traffic enforcement on and off post.

But the cooperation and interoperability of the military police platoon with the *Polizei* is even more frequent than their partnerships with the *Bundeswehr*. A highly effective program, which was established by the garrison directorate of emergency services and is fully supported by the 2d Cavalry Regiment PM, spans multiple host nation agencies. Several times each year, *Bundespolizei* (German federal police)—who are responsible for transportation security—train select U.S. military police on the procedures for operating on moving trains and in train stations and provide them with legal guidance. These military police then coordinate with the *Deutsche Bahn* (German national railway company) to ride and police trains that are traveling from the home station to Nuremburg each weekend evening. Once they arrive in Nuremberg, the military police take part in night-long patrols with the Nuremberg state *Polizei* in the metropolitan bar districts and hot spots. Afterward, patrols travel the train lines, keeping vigil over the large number of Soldiers who have been "out on the town." This broad, unprecedented program has successfully addressed concerns among the German population and the train authorities and has showcased the ability of an organic SBCT military police platoon to police its own. Incidents of indiscipline have significantly declined since the inception of the program, and the program has been recognized by local German governments and the highest levels of U.S. Army Europe.

Future deployments present uncertainty for the military police platoon and the PM cell. Furthermore, the transformation of the Army as a whole threatens the very presence of a military police platoon within an SBCT. Aside from these concerns, though, the changes that are continuously taking place throughout the world will prompt the regiment to ask, "Where do our military police fit in?" Answering this question will be up to future regimental commanders, PMs, and their staffs. Regardless of the outcome, military police will be ready to serve with distinction—enabling the longest continuously active regiment of the U.S. Army to fulfill its obligations when duty calls.

Captain Frye is the PM for the 2d Cavalry Regiment. He holds a bachelor's degree in criminal justice from East Tennessee State University.



CALEA Accreditation and Army Law Enforcement: Is It a Fit?

By Captain Bryan P. Jonas

In case you haven't heard, the Military Police Corps Regiment pendulum is swinging. After spending much of the past 11 years serving in combat support roles, we must again embrace our policing expertise and demonstrate our indispensability as frontline representatives in the fight against criminal activities and networks to senior mission commanders at home and abroad. We need to become, and to be recognized as, policing professionals within our scope of operation.

While recently attending the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Police Chief's Conference in Portsmouth, England, I was struck by the seriousness with which the British Royal Military Police take the policing aspect of their profession. Their attitude is such a departure from the one that I have experienced among our own military police. Granted, there are two very important caveats to my observation: (1) my experience in the U.S. Army Military Police Corps Regiment is limited to direct support to a brigade combat team, and (2) the British Army (and thus, the Royal Military Police) and the U.S. Army (and our Military Police Corps Regiment) are two very different organizations. However, it seems to me that Royal Military Police soldiers are recognized as, and are proud of, their role as law enforcement professionals.

As Brigadier General Mark Inch, the 46th commandant of the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), is fond of saying, "You don't get to call yourself a professional." Practitioners can only be considered professionals when an outside organization recognizes that they abide by and uphold a set of standards. For example, doctors are certified by the American Board of Medical Specialties, lawyers are recognized by their state bar associations, and police officers are certified by state peace officer standards and training agencies. The Military Police Corps Regiment has recognized the need for military police to be certified to some common standard, which boosts their credibility when dealing with senior mission commanders and local law enforcement personnel and improves their employment opportunities when they leave the Army. The next logical step involves examining the standards that we set for our provost marshal's offices at installations across the Army. Many civilian law enforcement agencies abide by the standards set forth by the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA®)—but are the CALEA standards right for us?

What is CALEA?

At the International Association of Chiefs of Police Conference held in San Diego, California, 29 September–3 October 2012, I attended a CALEA presentation. The chairman of CALEA provided a basic overview and described the process of becoming a CALEA-accredited organization.

CALEA was established in 1979 in an effort to create a standardizing body for the policy and procedure of law enforcement agencies. The goals of CALEA are to—

- Strengthen crime prevention and control capabilities.
- Formalize essential management procedures.
- Establish fair and nondiscriminatory personnel practices.
- Improve service delivery.
- Solidify interagency cooperation and coordination.
- Increase community and staff confidence in the agency.

The mainstay of CALEA is the accreditation process, which consists of five steps:

- **Enrollment**. An agency conducts research on CALEA and decides to complete an enrollment package.
- **Self-assessment.** Depending on the specifics of the agreement, the agency is allowed 24 or 36 months to assess itself and develop proofs of compliance in preparation for an on-site assessment.
- **On-site assessment.** Following the self-assessment, a team of CALEA-trained assessors visits the agency to view operations, determine compliance, conduct a public information session, and prepare a report of findings for the commission.
- **Commission review and decision.** The report of findings is considered at a triannual CALEA conference, and an accreditation decision is made.
- **Maintenance of compliance and reaccreditation.** An agency's accreditation is valid for 3 years. During that

time, the agency must maintain compliance and submit annual reports. The accreditation cycle (including another successful on-site visit and commission hearing) is repeated every 3 years.

Where Does CALEA Fit?

The most important thing to note about CALEA accreditation is that it focuses on organizational standards, which are not so foreign to the Army. As an armed force, we recognize the need for standards, we codify them, we expect our Soldiers to follow them, and we take action against those who do not. A couple of examples of standards that provost marshal's offices already follow involve the assignment of one weapon system for all Soldiers and a linkage with standardized national reporting systems. Accepting additional standards or slightly modifying existing standards would not be an issue for military police operations. Incorporating CALEA standards into the Army would mean striking a balance between aligning our provost marshal operations with national "best practices" and recognizing the fact that we are a unique policing entity. This would certainly be a challenging endeavor, but not an impossible one.

Not everyone acknowledges the value of CALEA accreditation; however, some respected police associations recognize its merits. Many law enforcement agencies discovered that citizen complaints, insurance rates, and operating costs decreased once accreditation standards had been met.[1] Although lowering insurance rates and operating costs may not be a provost marshal's main concern, these metrics signify a leaner, more efficient organization. And in these times of heightened fiscal concern and responsibility, cost-cutting measures are an important aspect of accreditation.

Where Doesn't CALEA Fit?

One of the biggest differences between civilian law enforcement agencies and Army provost marshal's offices is the diversity in the size and location of operations across our installations. For the purpose of accreditation, civilian agencies are generally handled as single organizations, with visits to remote stations conducted as necessary during on-site assessments. But due to the decentralization of command, there is really no option to treat the Army in this manner. Installations operate independently of one another, and there is certainly no "standard" Army installation population. Due to population differences, standards that must be met by the provost marshal's office at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, may not necessarily be the same standards that must be met by the provost marshal's office at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. This situation would require a significant departure from the usual CALEA accreditation operations, but the problem could certainly be overcome.

Another accreditation complication lies with the Army law enforcement command structure, which differs greatly from that of civilian agencies. The U.S. Army Installation Management Command is responsible for directing, manning, and equipping provost marshal's offices. The director of emergency services reports to the garrison commander, who is an Installation Management Command representative to the senior mission commander on the installation. The Office of the Provost Marshal General—an organization that, at least in title, could reasonably be compared to the headquarters of a civilian law enforcement agency—is not in command of the units that would be accredited. I'm not sure whether this situation warrants a change in the command structure of the provost marshal's offices, but it does make the accreditation process more difficult. Further complicating the matter, the Office of the Provost Marshal General has authority over policy—certainly nothing to be underestimated.

A final problem with CALEA accreditation involves the cost of accreditation. CALEA charges are based on the number of "authorized, full-time employees" within the agency. This number is, of course, different for different installations (and a discussion regarding how rotating military police companies would be counted would be necessary). However, based on the average size of a provost marshal's office, the initial cost of accreditation is estimated to be about $10,000 per installation, with an additional annual fee of about $4,000 per installation. Without knowing how each provost marshal's office purchases insurance and handles the operating costs of the organization, I am unable to complete a cost-benefit analysis. However, I don't believe that accreditation would be a zero-sum proposition for the Army.

What's the Verdict?

After carefully weighing both sides of the debate, I believe that the Army should seriously consider adopting CALEA (or similar) accreditation standards. The unique complications related to Army accreditation could certainly be overcome. For example, it might be necessary for CALEA to produce a version of the standards specifically for use by the Army (or perhaps military Services in general). However, considering the impact that CALEA accreditation could have on professional recognition and on the ability to enhance Soldiers' employment opportunities following military service, I believe accreditation would serve our provost marshal's offices well.

In speaking to the 16th Military Police Brigade at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Regimental Command Sergeant Major John McNeirney recently made a statement that really caught my attention. Although he was discussing the certification of military police Soldiers by state peace officer standards and training agencies, I believe that his statement applies equally to the accreditation of provost marshal's offices. He said, "Law enforcement agencies outside our installations are following these standards. Do our families deserve any less because they live on installations?"

Endnote:

[1]John Neilson and Danny O'Malley, "Accreditation Saves Money," *CALEA Update*, February 1999.

Captain Jonas is the aide-de-camp to the chief of the Military Police Corps Regiment and commandant of USAMPS, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York.

The Need to Integrate Cross-Cultural Competencies and Ethical Considerations Into Military Police Training

by Dr. Boshra N. EL-Guindy

U.S. Army military police respond to a myriad of situations and potential conflicts in wartime and peacetime and during stability operations and support operations. Because military police units doctrinally operate over an extensive area, decentralized decisionmaking is routine. This enables military police to provide the most effective and flexible support. Generally located away from company headquarters, platoon leaders operate under indirect supervision. This differs from leaders of other military units, whose companies are located in close proximity to the next higher headquarters.

"These cultural capabilities are portable and can be used efficiently wherever military police are deployed. Cross-cultural skills and competencies and a complete awareness of the ethical procedures necessary for conducting missions must be consistently incorporated as essential training tasks for military police leaders and Soldiers."

Cross-cultural skills and competencies are especially crucial for military police leaders and Soldiers due to their authority, duties, and potential for deployment to many areas of conflict. These leaders and Soldiers, who serve as the police within the military establishment, are assigned law enforcement duties that are similar to those of their civilian counterparts. Their responsibilities include detaining individuals who negatively impinge on the good order and discipline of the military installation within their jurisdiction.

Priority mission sets for military police units in support of the maneuver commander and the establishment of the rule of law include law enforcement, criminal investigation and detention operations, police intelligence operations, and operations involving multinational coalitions. Enhancing the law enforcement skills and capabilities of military police and the resources available to them will significantly contribute to the success of complex warfare operations that our Army faces now and will face in the future.

In addition to professional and technical training, military police also need to receive cross-cultural competency training. This additional requirement for cross-cultural competencies is a reflection of the tendency for military police to be deployed to a variety of areas around the world throughout their careers. These cultural capabilities are portable and can be used efficiently wherever military police are deployed. Cross-cultural skills and competencies and a complete awareness of the ethical procedures necessary for conducting missions must be consistently incorporated as essential training tasks for military police leaders and Soldiers.

Cross-Cultural Competencies and Ethical Considerations in Law Enforcement

The purpose of military police law and order operations is to ensure that stability and security are maintained throughout the area of operations. Military police are trained in the area of human dimension/attitudinal development; they learn about the dynamics of dealing with people across the domestic and international cultural spectrum and about instilling core values such as patience, caring, compassion, and fairness. These core values are instrumental in determining the degree of success achieved in situations of stress, conflict, conflict resolution, deterrence, and many additional other-than-war missions.

Enlisted personnel involved in law enforcement operations must have a minimum level of human dimension/attitudinal development knowledge, particularly since most of the host nation public deals with enlisted Soldiers rather than officers. Officers, however, need special training in the cause of the conflict, in the cultural and political background of the conflict, and in current developments in order to make proper decisions and to adequately lead the force. Effective mission command of multinational law enforcement operations requires good cross-cultural communication.

Cross-Cultural Competencies and Ethical Considerations in Criminal Investigation and Detention Operations

Under the law of military justice, military leaders are responsible for the conduct of their troops. Insufficient forces, inadequate leadership and training, uncertain goals and objectives, vague or contradictory orders, dehumanizing characterizations of enemy forces and civilian populations, and convenient interpretations of rules of combat that define acceptable levels of "collateral damage" often create an environment that is conducive to criminal acts by our Soldiers at war.

The United States has signed and enacted numerous instruments that contain voluntary or mandatory standards barring U.S. armed forces from practicing the degrading treatment or torture of all persons. Some examples of these instruments include the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights;"[1] the "Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment;"[2] the "Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners;"[3] the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,"[4] and U.S. military internment and interrogation policies.

Military police personnel should be properly trained to protect the human rights of detainees, to adhere to the rules of engagement and legal and ethical procedures of interrogations, and to properly report injuries or deaths in cases of abuse. The job of the Army is not only to win America's wars, but also to defend America's values. Military police are trained to create a secure and humane world and to advance justice, human dignity, and respect for the rule of law.

Cross-Cultural Competencies and Ethical Considerations in Police Intelligence Operations

Military police conduct police intelligence operations through integrated mounted and dismounted patrols and in coordination with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational assets. Military police patrols contribute to confirming or denying the commander's critical information requirements.

In most government circles, sociocultural perspectives have received increased attention since 11 September 2001. These sociocultural perspectives have been applied to many dimensions of national security, including intentions; threats; capabilities; and preventive, protective, and predictive strategies.

With the end of the Cold War and the rise of asymmetric terrorist threats in the late 20th century, the need for sociocultural perspectives has increased. These new threats and crises have arisen from worldwide regions and cultures that are relatively unfamiliar to Western analysts. The need for sociocultural perspectives emerged as a major theme in comments from military personnel returning from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Officers cited their practical ground experience in dealing with nontraditional warfare, local populations, and inadequate cultural and linguistic knowledge. A growing body of testimonials and studies regarding lessons learned and recommendations for change further validates the need for sociocultural perspectives.

Culture as a Framework for Understanding

Most people within the intelligence community now recognize that an understanding of a culture helps in establishing a context for human activity and provides key insights into the potential meaning and significance of actions. It helps analysts determine the "why" and the "so what" of a particular behavior. In this way, sociocultural perspectives provide a framework for understanding. The contributions of social and behavioral sciences to the predictive capabilities of intelligence depend on the critical factors that shape leaders' decisions in different contexts and on the criteria that are used to the select circumstances of, and methods for, intergroup negotiations.

The Path Forward

The July 2003 *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Discriminate Use of Force* concluded that there was a need for a "comprehensive, long-term, and coherent effort to understand adversaries in a systemic way"[5] and that this would require models which account not only for physical dimensions, but also for "softer" social and cultural dimensions.[6] The task force also noted the current immaturity of capabilities in this area.[7] Furthermore, the *Defense Science Board 2006 Summer Study on 21st Century Strategic Technology Vectors* ranks social science foremost among the four operational capabilities and enabling technologies needed to support future military missions and emphasizes that "Perhaps most central is to gain deeper understanding of how individuals, groups, societies, and nations behave and then use this information to (1) improve the performance of U.S. forces through continuous education and training and (2) shape behaviors of others in pre-, intra-, and post-conflict situations. Key enablers include immersive gaming environments; automated language processing; and human, social, cultural, and behavior modeling."[8]

Ethical Considerations Along the Path

Members of several social science disciplines have raised ethical concerns about the collection and use of sociocultural knowledge in a national security environment. For example, the American Psychological Association has issued a formal statement regarding the ethics of using psychology and psychologists in interrogations.[9] In addition, the American Anthropological Association has established an ad hoc commission to investigate the implications of member participation in national security activities, and a heated internal debate is currently underway.

There is a keen interest in, and a strong need for, sociocultural data, analyses, and approaches in a wide range of critical national security endeavors. This need is especially crucial within the military police intelligence community. Answers to questions regarding tools (including issues related to the development and use of computational models), methods (including issues related to data collection, analysis, and dissemination), ethics, and the development of cross-community and interdisciplinary ties are essential to moving forward.

Military Police Operations in a Multinational Coalition Peacekeeping Environment

Coalition peacekeeping operations often take place in complex, chaotic, and unpredictable environments. The local intervention zone often remains in, or is just outside of, a state of war or turmoil. Strong leadership is demanded at all levels in such unstructured operational areas. In addition to the complexity of traditional military police interventions, coalition peacekeeping interventions most often involve multinational units. Therefore, military police personnel are often confronted with significant cultural differences not only between themselves and the host culture (with which they must interact to bring quick relief to civilian victims), but also among the members of their own multinational unit. In addition to managing the chaotic situation and respecting mission-specific rules of engagement, military police leaders and Soldiers must also build effective, high-performing multinational units within a limited time frame.

Compared to a monocultural environment, a multinational environment calls for additional cross-cultural competencies—particularly in the areas of interpersonal communication, problem solving, and decisionmaking. Significant cultural differences between multinational coalition troops and the host country and among troops present a barrier to successful mission command from the coalition. In such an environment, military police leaders must establish a system that works throughout the various cultures to achieve mission success. One of the most important success factors in implementing such a system is good interpersonal interaction between leaders at all levels and from all different nationalities.

Most psychological research on successful cross-cultural leadership focuses on individual leadership competencies in a cross-cultural environment. For example, successful cross-cultural leaders use what researchers refer to as a "cultural lens" to "see" things from a different perspective and through different "eyes." This competency helps leaders to understand the motives and reasons of others and to predict their behaviors and reactions.

In addition to individual cross-cultural competencies, team cross-cultural competencies also need to be integrated into military police training. Research has indicated that successful cross-cultural teams develop and define new group cultures that lead to the establishment of mutual trust between individual team members from different cultures. However, the process of implementing the new group culture takes much longer than it does for monocultural groups. As a result, more opportunities are required for individuals within multicultural groups to get to know each other and to develop their group culture.

The focus of military police training for individual and team cross-cultural competencies should be placed on real-life scenarios, rather than on general theoretical reflections about cross-cultural competencies. The closer the training situation approximates the natural environment, the more useful the training will be. Cross-culturally competent behavior is based on the ability of leaders to understand and manage the dynamics of a team and on individual cross-cultural competencies. Military police leaders and Soldiers must be trained and prepared for cross-cultural interaction, problem solving, and command execution to ensure that processes and actions are well rehearsed and that they result in successful multinational peacekeeping missions.

Conclusion

The U.S. Military Police Corps conducts unified land operations in support of maneuver commanders in counterinsurgency and stability operations environments. This often requires that the military police organization train and professionalize indigenous police forces; establish and implement a rule of law program; determine doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) requirements; and perform other law enforcement-related functions. In addition to their rigorous professional training, military police must achieve cross-cultural competency and an awareness of ethical procedures, as these are key to the success of military police multivariate missions.

Endnotes:

[1]"Universal Declaration of Human Rights," United Nations, 1948, <http://www.un.org/rights/50/decla.htm>, accessed on 9 January 2013.

[2]"Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment," General Assembly Resolution 43/174, 9 December 1988, <http://www.tjsl.edu/slomansonb/10.3_DetentionImprisonment.pdf>, accessed on 15 January 2013.

[3]"Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners," First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 1955.

[4]"Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment," 10 December 1984, <http://www.unhchr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3a94.html>, accessed on 15 January 2013.

[5]*Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Discriminate Use of Force*, U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), July 2003.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Ibid.

[8]*Defense Science Board 2006 Summer Study on 21st Century Strategic Technology Vectors*, Vol. 1, Main Report, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, February 2007.

[9]*Report of the American Psychological Association Presidential Task Force on Psychological Ethics and National Security*, June 2005.

References:

John P. Abizaid, "Lessons for Peacekeepers," *Military Review*, March 1993.

Sarah E. Archer, "Civilian and Military Cooperation in Complex Humanitarian Operations," *Military Review*, March–April 2003, pp. 32–41.

Army Regulation (AR) 190-8, *Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other Detainees*, 1 October 1997.

Charles M. Ayers, "Peacekeeping Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures," Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, April 1989.

K.K. Bartels et al., "The Relationship About Ethical Climate and Ethical Problems Within Human Resource Management," *Journal of Business Ethics*, Vol. 17, No. 7, 1998, pp. 799–804.

H.R. Bernard, *Research Methods in Anthropology*, Alta Mira Press, Walnut Creek, California, 2001.

Salvotre P. Chidichimo, "Training Leaders for a Force Projection Army," *Military Review*, March 1993.

P.C. Earley and S. Ang, *Cultural Intelligence: Individual Interactions Across Cultures*, California Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 2003.

E. Elron et al., "Cooperation and Coordination Across Cultures in Peacekeeping Forces: Individual and Organizational Integrating Mechanisms," *The Psychology of Peacekeeping: Lessons from the Field* (T.W. Britt and A.B. Adler, editors), Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, 2003, pp. 261–282.

Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 1949, <http://www.unhchr.org/reworld/docid/3ae6b36c8.html >, accessed on 5 December 2012.

R.J. House et al., "The Road to Abu Ghraib," *Culture, Leadership, and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies*, Human Rights Watch, Sage, London, June 2004.

T.M. Jones and L.V. Ryan, "The Link Between Ethical Judgment and Actions in Organizations: A Moral Approbation Approach," *Organizational Science*, Vol. 8, November–December 1997, pp. 663–680.

R. Kerr et al., "Issues for the Intelligence Community: Collection and Analysis on Iraq," *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 49, No. 3, 2005, pp. 152–161.

J. Kipp et al., "The Human Terrain System: A CORDS for the 21st Century," *Military Review*, Vol. 8, September–October 2006, pp 108–111.

H. Altmann Klein et al., "Cultural Barriers to Multinational C2 Decision Making," *Proceedings of the 2000 Command Control Research Technology*, <www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA461631>, accessed on 16 January 2013.

J.S. Lantis, *Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism*, prepared for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency Comparative Strategic Curriculum, October 2006, pp. 3–12.

M. McFarland, "Military Cultural Education," *Military Review*, Vol. 2, March–April 2005, pp. 62–69.

Montgomery McFate and Andrea Jackson, "An Organizational Solution for DoD's Cultural Knowledge Needs," *Military Review*, Vol. 18, July–August 2005.

O. Moorehead-Slaughter, "Ethics and National Security," *Monitor on Psychology*, Vol. 37, No. 4, American Psychological Association, 2006, pp. 60–66.

J.G. Morrison et al., "Tactical Decision Making Under Stress (TADMUS) Decision Support System," 1996.

K.Y. Ng et al., "Cultural Intelligence: Its Potential for Military Leadership Development" (paper presented at the 47th International Military Testing Association Conference), Singapore, 2005.

Donald Snow, "Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peace Enforcement: The U.S. Role in the New International Order," Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 1993.

J. Soeters and M. Bos-Bakx, "Cross-Cultural Issues in Peacekeeping Operations," *The Psychology of Peacekeeping: Lessons from the Field* (T.W. Britt and A.B. Adler, editors), Praeger, Westport, Conneticut, 2003, pp. 283–298.

"Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Enforcement, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, Humanitarian Assistance, and Joint/Combined/Interagency Operactions," 21 December 1992, <http://oai.dtci.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html>, accessed on 16 January 2013.

Antonio M. Taguba, "Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade" (the "Taguba Report"), <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4894001>, accessed on 16 January 2013.

D.C. Thomas and K. Inkson, *Cultural Intelligence*, Berrett-Koehler Publishers, San Francisco, 2003.

A.T. Turk, "Sociology of Terrorism," *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 30, 2004, pp. 271–286.

"United Nations U.S. Participation in Peacekeeping Operations," Report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, and House of Representatives from the U.S. General Accounting Office, September 1992.

Y. Yamazaki and D.C. Kayes, "An Experimental Approach to Cross-Cultural Learning: A Review and Integration of Competencies for Successful Expatriate Adaptation," *Academy of Management Learning and Education*, Vol. 3, No. 4, 2004, pp. 362–379.

Dr. EL-Guindy is a cultural and language advisor, Maneuver Support Center of Excellence, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He holds master's and doctorate degrees in applied linguistics from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, master's degrees in education and psychology from Ain Shams University, Cairo, Egypt, and graduate diplomas in English as a second language from the American University in Cairo and the Colchester English Study Centre in Colchester, United Kingdom. He has taught at universities in Egypt, Australia, and the United States.



Military Police and CID Operations in Korea, 1945–1949

By Master Sergeant Patrick V. Garland (Retired)

When the Japanese capitulated, ending World War II in 1945, the U.S. Army's 24th Corps was dispatched from Okinawa, Japan, to the Korean Peninsula to accept the surrender of the Japanese forces that had occupied that country. Russian forces also entered Korea from its northern border with Mongolia. In a mutual agreement between U.S. President Harry Truman and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, Korea was divided at the 38th Parallel, with the Russians occupying the northern half and the United States holding the southern half of the country. According to General Order No. 1, "The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air, and auxiliary forces within Manchuria, Korea, north of 38º north latitude and Karafuto (Sakhalin) shall surrender to the commander in chief of Soviet forces in the Far East. The Imperial General Headquarters; its senior commanders—and all ground, sea, air, and auxiliary forces in the main islands of Japan; minor islands adjacent thereto; Korea south of 38º north latitude; and the Philippines shall surrender to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific."[1]

Lieutenant General John Hodge, commander of the 24th Corps, was appointed the U.S. occupation commander governing southern Korea. The organization that he headed was known as U.S. Forces in Korea, and it consisted of Headquarters, 10th U.S. Army; two infantry divisions; and support elements.

Coincident with their surrender, the Japanese resumed passenger ferryboat transportation between Japan and Korea. This was promptly augmented with short-range Japanese vessels assisting in the repatriation of the Japanese from Korea. By the end of September 1945, an average of 4,000 people were being evacuated from South Korea each day. Additional shipping spaces were gained by shuttling the Japanese from Korea in landing ships, tanks (LSTs), which were under the control of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Command, and were engaged in moving 24th Corps personnel from Okinawa to Korea. Twenty LSTs were employed, and about 20,000 Japanese were returned to Japan 12–16 October 1945. In addition, LSTs were used to evacuate about 50,000 Japanese from Saishu, a large island off the southern tip of Korea.[2]

The United States established a military government in Korea, and provost courts were organized to handle cases involving Korean or Japanese subjects. The military government retained many Japanese officials for positions that the United States was unable or ill-equipped to fill.

The 36th Military Police Criminal Investigation Detachment (CID)—which was established at Camp Custer, Michigan, on 29 August 1944—was assigned to Headquarters, 10th U.S. Army, in July 1945 and was sent to Korea the following month. On 1 August 1945, the unit (with an authorized strength of one officer and 10 enlisted men) arrived in Seoul, where it was attached to 24th Corps. A subsection of the 36th was assigned to the port at Inchon. On 1 August 1946, the 36th was redesignated as the 25th Military Police CID and two new detachments—the 1st Military Police CID in Inchon and the 24th Military Police CID in Pusan—soon became operational.

Due to an acute shortage of military police within 24th Corps, Lieutenant General Hodge designated one field artillery battalion as military police. The unit was known as the 31st Field Artillery Battalion Military Police, 7th Infantry Division.[3] In addition, a military police school was established in Seoul.

A former member of another 24th Corps unit—the 207th Military Police Company, based in Seoul—relates his experiences:

I was assigned to the 207th MP [Military Police] [Company] in Seoul; and when the troops left Korea, I stayed with the KMAG [Korean Military Advisory Group]. We had 12 MPs and a provost marshal's office. While in the 207th, we were under the 24th Corps and worked for the 24th Corps Provost Marshal, a Colonel Baird, providing patrols in Seoul [and] security at several generals' homes and the 24th Corps Headquarters; we had some static post[s] at places like the movie theater, the Chosen Hotel, and the Bondo Hotel. The 25th CID was located in the same building with the 24th Corps Provost Marshal. I stood a good many days outside of Lieutenant General John R. Hodge's door at the 24th Corps Headquarters, either at attention or parade rest.[4]

The country of Korea was in turmoil during the evacuation of the Japanese military and the return of repatriated Koreans from Japan. Adding to the unrest, many Koreans who were in desperate need of food, housing, and jobs fled the North

to escape the communists who had taken over that part of the country. Black marketeering became a major industry; stolen and diverted relief supplies, U.S. government property, and U.S. currency became major items of trade in this illegal operation. Most of the cases handled by what had been the 36th Military Police CID centered on Japanese civilians claiming property that did not belong to them and, conversely, Korean nationals claiming Japanese property.[5]

One case involving the theft and diversion of U.S. aviation fuel was solved when a Korean seagoing junk (boat) was discovered heading for North Korea with 250 fifty-five-gallon barrels of gasoline onboard. Another major case involved an unidentified colonel who was appointed to the military government and was extorting property from the Japanese who remained in positions of importance. He reportedly received jewels, wood carvings, furs, rare tapestries, and the largest butterfly collection in the Far East—and shipped them home. The officer was punished and dismissed from the Service.[6]

From 1947 to 1949, the manpower of the 25th Military Police CID did not exceed two officers and 12 agents. Early on, a normal caseload consisted of four cases per agent at any time. This number later expanded until each agent carried a load of 12 open cases. The Korean National Police Crime Laboratory provided crime laboratory support for the CID agents—at least until 1948, when the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory–Japan reached full capacity.

Former CID agent Chief Warrant Officer Three Carl Craig (Retired) recalls the time that he spent attached to the 24th Military Police CID:

Everything in Korea during my 1948–49 tour was under 24th Corps. I now recall the confusion that it caused when the numeric designator clashed with the 24th Military Police [CID] that was headquartered in Pusan with the 6th Infantry Division. I was located at Kwangju with the 20th [Infantry Regiment] of the 6th [Infantry Division]. There were two agents assigned to Kwangju out of Pusan: Chester F. Burns and Chester D. Mansker. The office was located in a former Japanese general's quarters, built during Japan's occupation of Korea from about 1898 to 1945.

We had our own kitchen [and] drew rations from ration breakdown, and our meals were prepared by contract Korean cooks and [kitchen patrols]. They brought me into CID from the 6th MP Company as a very young buck sergeant. It wasn't until February 1949, at age 20 and [with] a 1-year age waiver (had to be 21), that I was awarded MOS [Military Occupational Specialty] 301. That was also the same MOS for [counterintelligence] agents at the time.

The most significant cases that I remember were the theft of military motor vehicles of any kind—especially 2½-ton trucks, which were virtually converted overnight to some God-awful-looking bus. The [petroleum, oils, and lubricants] dump was constantly breached by cutting the fences and tunneling under the fence from huts or houses just outside the fence line. Black-market of cigarettes was rampant. At a dollar a carton, they were sold for as much as $30 or more. Any kind of food was in high demand. The major crime rate was not that bad. There was a very strict nonfraternization policy in effect, and anyone that got caught was reduced to private and, most often, served stockade time for the catch-all violation of a general order.

The fledgling Korean police force was not very much help. Many of them were in cahoots with the thieves—or they merely confiscated the illicit loot or military payment certificate currency and kept it themselves. Things did get a little better when the area commanders cracked down on them and "a few heads rolled from the top down." Crimes by GIs against GIs [were] almost nonexistent—other than barracks thieves. The amount of money that constituted grand larceny back then was $50. In fact, it was rare that a Soldier had $50 to begin with.

CID investigated all fatalities back then, and most were traffic-related. Invariably, [a] papasan (slang for elderly male Korean) riding a makeshift bicycle or carrying an "A frame" with a 55-gallon drum on it would veer or walk into the path of a military vehicle. Homicides, in general, were very rare. There were several legitimate rape cases of very young Korean girls that I remember. Others reported as rape were classified as the failure of payment of the negotiated price for services.[7]

In June 1949, Koreans elected a new government and the U.S. occupation ended. Most of the U.S. troops were withdrawn, leaving a small KMAG.

Endnotes:

[1]General Order No. 1, Military and Naval, "Instruments for the Surrender of Japan," U.S. military forces Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 August 1945.

[2]U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) Publication (Pub) 13-4, *MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase, Volume 1 Supplement*, Reports of General Douglas MacArthur, 1966, 1994.

[3]Personal correspondence with Mr. Carl Hoerman (a former member of the 31st Field Artillery Battalion Military Police), 5 March 2012.

[4]Personal correspondence with Sergeant Major Burton Murrow (a former member of the 207th Military Police Company), 10 March 2012.

[5]William Schickhardt, "Unit History—25th Military Police Criminal Investigation (USAFIK), January 1945–June 1949."

[6]Ibid.

[7]Personal correspondence with Chief Warrant Officer Three Carl Craig (Retired), 17 May 2012.

Master Sergeant Garland retired from the U.S. Army in 1974. During his military career, he served in military police units and criminal investigation detachments and laboratories. At the time of his retirement, Master Sergeant Garland was serving as a ballistics evidence specialist at the European Laboratory. He remained in this career field until retiring from civilian law enforcement in 1995.

Book Review



Warrior Police: Rolling With America's Military Police in the World's Trouble Spots, by Gordon Cucullu and Chris Fontana, St. Martin's Press, 2012.

Warrior Police: Rolling With America's Military Police in the World's Trouble Spots is a book that every member of the Military Police Corps should not only read, but also own—and share with family and friends. If you've ever tried to explain to civilians (or even fellow Soldiers) what it is that military police do, you've probably experienced your fair share of frustration and lame jokes. Well, this book will do the explaining for you. It also serves as a tribute—in the form of gritty reporting—to the men and women who wear the crossed pistols and rarely receive the accolades they deserve.

Based on extensive embeds in Iraq and Afghanistan, this book covers an amazing amount of (sandy) ground. The always grueling, frequently heroic combat sequences—from the defense of posts betrayed by allies to convoy rescues conducted in the spirit of old frontier cavalry films—may represent the highlights for general readers, but military police veterans will treasure the sharp depictions of the wide range of Corps functions—from the handling of prisoners to the little-known lifesaving work of dog handlers involved in special operations.

Coauthored by Army veteran Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Cucullu (Retired) and terrorism expert Chris Fontana, *Warrior Police: Rolling With America's Military Police in the World's Trouble Spots* benefits from Cucullu's combat experience and grasp of Army complexities and Fontana's knack for clarifying issues that Soldiers often take for granted—with the key being the authors' lengthy embeds in our recent wars. The result is an honest, tough-minded book that is easy to read and hard to forget.

Accounts of noncommissioned officers and junior enlisted personnel comprise most of the book, and depictions range from the risks of ill-conceived patrols, through the challenges of training host nation personnel, to combat actions so intense that few infantry Soldiers experience the equivalent. It turns out that some of the toughest military police are females—including one noncommissioned officer whose guts and decisiveness when facing a convoy ambush saved many friendly lives and resulted in a very bad day for the terrorists.

And how many other books about our military forces capture the dysfunction that can occur when a new commander arrives during the middle of an operation or when two strong-willed officers disagree about something? *Warrior Police: Rolling With America's Military Police in the World's Trouble Spots* nails those "inside" situations and more. Through revealing tactical vignettes (many of which should be taught in military police training courses), the book addresses strategic considerations—with a disheartening account of the scrubbing of essential military police brigades from the troop list for the invasion of Iraq and a description of the long-term consequences of occupying a foreign capital without troops who are versed in the complex skills of law enforcement in a conflict zone. Apart from the shameful lack of an occupation plan, the biggest deficiency in those early days in Baghdad was the lack of military police.

Finally, a confession: Despite having served in the Army for more than 2 decades (as an enlisted man and an officer) myself, I did not fully appreciate the broad range of military police capabilities until I read this book. After you have read it, reread it, and shared it with your family and friends, you might also want to pass it along to that grunt down the hall who's always yelling, "Hoo-ah!" He just might learn something about the many faces of heroism.

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Peters (Retired), Fox News *strategic analyst and author of* Cain at Gettysburg.

Lessons Learned From Austere Challenge 2012

By First Lieutenant Jessica Letarte

When I entered the U.S. Military Academy in 2007, I expected to be deployed within the year following my graduation. I chose to join the Military Police Corps because of the awesome opportunities available for women and because I felt that it offered the best chance for me to lead a platoon in combat. I never imagined that I would have the opportunity to take a select number of Soldiers to Israel and that force protection—rather than combat operations—would be our primary focus. However, that is exactly what happened during Exercise Austere Challenge 2012. As military police, we served as force protection liaisons and as antiterrorism and force protection officers, executing all force protection taskings for the base. As an additional challenge, our group—which was already small—was further split, with the various components independently focused on different antiterrorism and force protection missions. Through this rich and rewarding experience, I realized the importance of the force protection mission and military police, small-unit autonomy within the Military Police Corps.

After graduating from the U.S. Military Academy, I was assigned to the 615th Military Police Company, Grafenwoehr, Germany, where I learned that the daily execution of the military police mission is much different than I had imagined. The 615th Military Police Company places a greater emphasis on maintaining and improving Soldier policing skills than on focusing on the road to war. Because the 615th does not conventionally deploy, the main focus of the company is on executing professional law enforcement in the Grafenwoehr-Vilseck community. And although the 615th is involved in unconventional deployments, those deployments do not drastically affect day-to-day operations. Aside from tweaks to the green cycle training, my platoon—and the 615th Military Police Company—carry on with our garrison mission as usual, with one exception: when the 615th participates in missions to locations where contingency operations may occur. These missions provide company leaders and military police Soldiers with an opportunity to practice contingency plan activation and to experience the difficulties that they could face in an actual contingency operation. They also provide leaders with an opportunity to solve problems that could be encountered in a future contingency operation. Participants work with personnel from other military branches and foreign militaries; and perhaps most importantly, they learn what foreign armies and branches expect from the 615th Military Police Company Soldiers who are augmented to them.

The 10th Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) requested the assistance of 17 U.S. Army Europe military police Soldiers to fulfill a force protection mission during Austere Challenge 2012 (a joint U.S.-Israel ballistic missile defense exercise). Sixteen fellow members of the 615th Military Police Company and I were chosen to participate in the exercise. My platoon sergeant, my driver, a full squad from my platoon, the leader of the 1st Platoon, the platoon sergeant from the 2d Platoon, and I were deployed to Israel, where we worked for the 10th AAMDC and the Joint Defense Force–Israel for 6 weeks.

Upon our arrival in Israel, we were split into three groups. My platoon sergeant and I were assigned to the 10th AAMDC and were tasked as antiterrorism officers (ATOs) for the duration of the exercise. The squad, which comprised the second group, was tasked to work for the base mayor cell, providing force protection for the 10th AAMDC headquarters and the Joint Defense Force–Israel. This consisted of checking identification badges at the entrances of secure facilities and emplacing force protection measures around the base. Members of the third group were assigned as force protection liaisons to the Ballistic Missile Defense Sustainment Operations Group. While my platoon sergeant and I remained ultimately responsible for our squad, we worked for a completely different organization and it was clear that we were to be ATOs first and platoon leader/platoon sergeant second. My two primary observations of relevance to the Military Police Corps during this exercise centered on the 10th AAMDC expectations of military police

force protection knowledge and the requirement for "plug and play" military police forces.

In preparation for our job as 10th AAMDC ATOs, my platoon sergeant and I completed the Antiterrorism Officer Basic Course shortly before we arrived in Israel. Therefore, we were fully qualified as ATOs at nearly all levels and we were qualified to develop and evaluate antiterrorism plans that satisfied all requirements. However, I soon learned that the questions and problems with which I was presented covered more than antiterrorism. In the eyes of the 10th AAMDC, my "military police" title automatically made me the foremost expert on all issues related to force protection as well—even though I had no training other than the Military Police Basic Officer Leader's Course and no experience other than my time as a platoon leader. I did not immediately know the answers to many of the questions and problems that I faced. To locate the answers, I usually turned to information available in the manuals that I had received.

"I also learned about the importance that commanders place on the "plug and play" capabilities of military police forces. Leaders at all levels should realize that, for any given military police mission, they may represent the only readily available military police expertise. Leaders and Soldiers must be proficient in all military police functions—even at the team level."

The 10th AAMDC sent me to evaluate the force protection status at Patriot missile sites throughout Israel. I found the job to be challenging and rewarding. I learned about Scud missile bunkers and safe standoff distances, and I expanded my knowledge regarding force protection requirements. The improvements that were made to the sites and site plans as a result of the evaluations were inspirational.

While I managed to successfully complete my job as a 10th AAMDC ATO, the realization that the 10th AAMDC expected me, as a military police lieutenant with very little formal force protection experience, to be a force protection expert was eye-opening. Furthermore, that expectation also extended to the squad. While any Soldier might be asked to emplace force protection measures around a base, the fact that the squad was tasked with those missions further verified that military police leaders and Soldiers are expected to be experts in tasks related to force protection.

I also learned about the importance that commanders place on the "plug and play" capabilities of military police forces. Leaders at all levels should realize that, for any given military police mission, they may represent the only readily available military police expertise. Leaders and Soldiers must be proficient in all military police functions—even at the team level. It seemed to me that, for Austere Challenge 2012, the 10th AAMDC didn't want a platoon of military police; rather, it wanted a lieutenant, a sergeant first class, and a squad to perform different missions. Therefore, company leaders need to prepare team-size elements and higher for executing missions during extended periods of time away from direct supervisors. Platoon leaders need to focus on their own separate missions, but retain responsibility for their personnel. I believe that military police forces will continue to be decentralized over a large operational area and that leaders and Soldiers will continue to be assigned different responsibilities and missions.

It is my understanding that military police—especially U.S. Army Europe military police—will transition to work directly under different branches. Therefore, they will be responsible not only for living up to the expectations of Military Police Corps leaders, but also for conveying their capabilities to the commanders of the other branches. Military police need to become the foremost experts in antiterrorism and force protection, and as many leaders as possible should be sent to training so that they are not caught unprepared for these future missions. Military police Soldiers must continue to be trained in the enforcement of force protection standards, and military police leaders must advocate for greater responsibility for Soldiers involved in these exercises. Because their professionalism, customs, and courtesies separate them from other Soldiers, military police Soldiers will probably always be considered the prime choice for checking identification badges at guard posts. However, they are also the ideal choice for manning entry control points and conducting security patrols, which fall under the force protection mission. Participation in these activities also allows military police to make use of their tactical knowledge. It is our responsibility as military police leaders to help them find jobs that encourage their growth.

As the shift in focus to law enforcement continues to be embedded in military police companies around the world, it is important to recognize that our knowledge, and more importantly our perceived knowledge, of antiterrorism and force protection will have an impact on the missions that we receive. To reinforce our usefulness to the Army, we need leaders and Soldiers to become experts in these areas. In addition, we need to develop team and squad level leaders who are capable of functioning alone for long periods of time. Our professional law enforcement skills, in conjunction with these two concepts, will carry us into a future where military police will be best able to serve ground force commanders in contingency operations.

First Lieutenant Letarte is the platoon leader, 3d Platoon, 615th Military Police Company. She holds a bachelor's degree in international history from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York.



A Place to Honor History

By Mr. Jim Rogers

An effort is now underway to add a multipurpose building adjacent to the existing U.S. Army Military Police Museum, John B. Mahaffey Museum Complex, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. A design team from the Directorate of Public Works, Fort Leonard Wood, is currently working on conceptualizing the initial design, securing regulatory approvals, and settling on a firm estimate to be considered for a midyear funding approval. The Directorate of Public Works design team is working closely with Military Police Museum staff to determine facility use requirements and arrive at an interior design concept.

The completed addition, which will be designated the Military Police "Regimental Room," will serve the U.S. Army Military Police Corps and the U.S. Army Military Police School in several important capacities. And its close proximity to the museum, coupled with its interior design, is intended to promote branch esprit de corps among those attending the many functions to be held there. The proposed interior design is reminiscent of the interiors of the more finished World War II-era U.S. Army mobilization buildings—such as chapels and recreation buildings—and roughly patterned after the American Craftsman Style that was so popular during the early 20th century. This design concept was intentionally selected to reflect the interior designs that were in place during 1941, when the Military Police Branch was established as a permanent branch of the U.S. Army.

The main double-door entrance to the room will be located where the Mexican-American War exhibit (already slated for replacement) is now. A second, single-door access will be placed at the entrance of the World War II Gallery.

Encompassing an estimated 2,000 square feet, the new room is expected to have the capacity for 210 auditorium or lecture style seats to accommodate regimental functions, military police classes and graduations, and other ceremonies and presentations. With versatile seating and tables, it is also anticipated to be used as a meeting room, conference room, reception area, and modest banquet hall. It will feature audiovisual capabilities, a caterer preparation area, and table and chair storage.

In addition, the new room will house both of the formal features of the current museum Hall of Fame Room: the Military Police Hall of Fame and the Military Police memorial panels. However, these displays will be redesigned to complement the early 1940s interior design. The original paintings of "Of the troops and for the troops" and "Dawn of the Regiment"—along with appropriate, framed period photographs and posters—will also be prominently displayed. Furthermore, several period style cases will exhibit military police equipment, uniforms, and insignia from before and during World War II.

Once the new facility has been completed, there will be additional exhibit space available in the present Hall of Fame Room. Although the room currently consists of about 625 square feet, all walls could be removed and a new exhibit area of about 2,500 square feet could be designed. This would allow for more complete artifact coverage of heretofore underrepresented portions of the museum story line. For example, an M1114 Humvee, which is currently on outdoor display, could be moved indoors, where it could serve as an anchor for a new War on Terrorism gallery (and where it could be better preserved). The Marechaussee diorama could be retained, but repositioned so that it could be viewed from the gallery entrance.

The Military Police Museum addition project will provide space for regimental functions; military police classes, graduations, ceremonies, and presentations; meetings; conferences; receptions; and banquets within the footprint of the Military Police Museum—an intentional juxtaposition designed to emphasize branch heritage and traditions and to promote Army values and esprit de corps. In addition, the new arrangement will encourage Soldier and family museum visitation and support the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) core functions of leader development, training support, lessons learned, and the sustainment of quality of life, as set forth in TRADOC Regulation 10-5, *U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.*[1] It will also directly support the TRADOC Military History Program with regard to Soldier education and will serve as a key enabler in TRADOC's quest to turn citizens into Soldiers and Soldiers into leaders.

Endnote:

[1]TRADOC Regulation 10-5, *U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command*, 18 December 2009.

Mr. Rogers is the director of the U.S. Army Military Police Museum, Fort Leonard Wood.

DOCTRINE UPDATE

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence Capabilities Development Integration Directorate Concepts, Organization, and Doctrine Development Division			
Publication Number	**Title**	**Date**	**Description**
Current Publications			
ATTP 3-39.10	Law and Order Operations	20 Jun 11	A manual that addresses each element of the military police law and order mission, including planning considerations, police station operations, patrol operations, police engagement, traffic operations, and host nation police capability and capacity. **Status:** Current.
ATTP 3-39.20	Police Intelligence Operations	29 Jul 10	A manual that addresses police intelligence operations which support the operations process and protection activities by providing exceptional police information and intelligence to support, enhance, and contribute to situational understanding, force protection, the commander's protection program, and homeland security. **Status:** Current.
ATTP 3-39.32	Physical Security	3 Aug 10	A manual that establishes guidance for all personnel responsible for physical security. It is the basic reference for training security personnel and is intended to be used in conjunction with the Army Regulation 190 (Military Police) Series, Security Engineering Unified Facilities Criteria publications, Department of Defense directives, and other Department of the Army publications. **Status:** Current.
ATTP 3-39.34	Military Working Dogs	10 May 11	A manual that provides commanders, staffs, and military working dog (MWD) handlers with an understanding of MWD capabilities, employment considerations, sustainment requirements, and the integration of MWDs in support of full spectrum operations. **Status:** Current.
FM 3-19.4 (will be TM 3-39.30)	Military Police Leaders' Handbook	2 Aug 02	A manual that addresses military police maneuver and mobility support, area security, internment/resettlement (I/R), law and order, and police intelligence operations across the full spectrum of Army operations. It primarily focuses on the principles of platoon operations and the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) necessary. **Status:** Under revision; projected for publication 4th quarter, fiscal year (FY) 13.
FM 3-19.11 (will be ATP 3-39.11)	Military Police Special-Reaction Teams	13 May 05	A manual that serves as a guide for commanders, staffs, and trainers who are responsible for training and deploying military police special-reaction teams. **Status:** Under revision; projected for publication 2d quarter, FY 13.
FM 3-19.12 (will be ATP 3-39.35)	Protective Services	11 Aug 04	A manual that addresses TTP for special agents of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly referred to as *CID*) and military police assigned to protective services duties. **Status:** Under revision; projected for publication 2d quarter, FY 13.
FM 3-19.13 (will be ATP 3-39.12)	Law Enforcement Investigations	10 Jan 05	A manual that serves as a guide for military police, investigators, and CID special agents operating in tactical and garrison environments. **Status:** Under revision; to be published 4th quarter, FY 13.

DOCTRINE UPDATE

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence Capabilities Development Integration Directorate Concepts, Organization, and Doctrine Development Division			
Publication Number	**Title**	**Date**	**Description**
Current Publications (continued)			
FM 3-19.15 (will be ATP 3-39.33)	Civil Disturbance Operations	18 Apr 05	A manual that addresses continental U.S. and outside the continental U.S. civil disturbance operations and domestic unrest, including the military role in providing assistance to civil authorities. **Status:** Current.
FM 3-37.2 (will be ATP 3-37.2)	Antiterrorism	18 Feb 11	A manual that establishes Army guidance on integrating and synchronizing antiterrorism across the full spectrum of conflict and into the full range of military operations. It shows how antiterrorism operations nest under full spectrum operations, the protection warfighting function, and the composite risk management process. **Status:** Current.
FM 3-39	Military Police Operations	16 Feb 10	A keystone manual that describes military police support to Army forces conducting full spectrum operations within the framework of joint operations. It emphasizes the importance of simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations and contains a critical discussion of civil support operations. **Status:** Under revision; projected for publication 3d quarter, FY 13.
FM 3-39.40 (will be FM 3-63)	Internment and Resettlement Operations	12 Feb 10	A manual that describes the doctrinal foundation, principles, and processes that military police and other elements employ when dealing with I/R populations. **Status:** Under revision; projected for publication 1st quarter, FY 14.
FM 3-90.31 (will be FM 3-81)	Maneuver Enhancement Brigade Operations	26 Feb 09	A manual that provides operational guidance for commanders and trainers at all echelons. It facilitates operations and employment considerations of the maneuver enhancement brigade as it organizes, prepares for, and conducts full spectrum operations. **Status:** Under revision; projected for publication 1st quarter, FY 14.
FM 19-25 (will be ATP 3-39.12)	Military Police Traffic Operations	30 Sep 77	A manual that addresses traffic operations in garrison and combat environments. **Status:** Under revision; projected for publication 4th quarter, FY 13.
TM 3-39.31	Armored Security Vehicle	20 Aug 10	A manual that provides military police forces with the TTP and related information necessary for the employment of the armored security vehicle. **Status:** Current.

Note: Current military police publications can be accessed and downloaded in electronic format from the U.S. Army Military Police School Web site at <http://www.wood.army.mil/usamps/>. Comments or questions about military police doctrine can be e-mailed to <usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.cdidcoddmpdoc@mail.mil>.

MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE LEVEL AND ABOVE COMMANDS

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM	CWO	UNIT	LOCATION
David E. Quantock	Gary J. Fowler		OPMG	Alexandria, VA
David E. Quantock	Thomas J. Seaman	T.L. Williams	HQ USACIDC	Quantico, VA
Mark S. Inch	John McNeirney	Leroy Shamburger	USAMPS	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
David E. Quantock	Jonathan O. Godwin		Army Corrections Cmd	Alexandria, VA
Mandi A. Murray	Jerome Wren		46th MP Cmd	Lansing, MI
Sanford Holman	Kurtis Timmer		200th MP Cmd	Ft Meade, MD
Mark A. Jackson	Richard A. Woodring		8th MP Bde	Schofield Barracks, HI
Scottie Carpenter	Gerald W. Capps		11th MP Bde	Los Alamitos, CA
Kevin Vereen	Scott R. Dooley		14th MP Bde	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Sioban J. Ledwith	Steven M. Raines		15th MP Bde	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Chad B. McRee	Thomas S. Sivak		16th MP Bde	Ft Bragg, NC
David D. Deadrich	Henry Stearns		18th MP Bde	Sembach AB, Germany
Dave L. Chase	Keith Devos		42d MP Bde	Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA
Thomas P. Clark	Joseph P. Klosterman		43d MP Bde	Warwick, RI
Kelly Fisher	Joseph Menard		49th MP Bde	Fairfield, CA
Robert N. Dillon	Peter Ladd		89th MP Bde	Ft Hood, TX
Michael White	Dale V. Clarmont		177th MP Bde	Taylor, MI
Samuel T. Nichols Jr.	Dennis Thomas		290th MP Bde	Nashville, TN
Therese M. O'Brien	Edward Simpson		300th MP Bde	Inkster, MI
Phillip Churn	Andrew Lombardo		333d MP Bde	Farmingdale, NY
Thomas H. Byrd	Andre Proctor	Kevin Roof	3d MP Gp (CID)	Hunter Army Airfield, GA
Robert K. Burk	Timothy S. Fitzgerald	David Albaugh	6th MP Gp (CID)	Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA
Donna W. Martin	Peter D. Harrington	John Welch	202d MP Gp (CID)	Kleber Kaserne, Germany
John G. Voorhees Jr.	Crystal Wallace	Mr. Steve Grant	701st MP Gp (CID)	Ft Belvoir, VA
John V. Bogdan	Michael H. Borlin		Joint Detention Gp	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

MILITARY POLICE BATTALION LEVEL COMMANDS

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM/1SG	CWO	UNIT	LOCATION
Sara K. Albrycht	Brian K. Garon	Dan Eaves	5th MP Bn (CID)	Kleber Kaserne, Germany
Geoffrey T. Stewart	Tara R. Wheadon	Keith McCullen	10th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Bragg, NC
Lawrence I. Stewart	Mathew J. Walters	Phillip Curran	11th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Hood, TX
Shannon Lucas	Charles Baker	Paul Bailey	19th MP Bn (CID)	Wheeler Army Airfield, HI
Thomas Russell-Tutty	Clyde Wallace	Mark Arnold	22d MP Bn (CID)	Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA
Ronald Bonesz	Jerry D. Clements		33d MP Bn	Bloomington, IL
Bob E. Willis Jr.	Michael P. Bennett		40th MP Bn (I/R)	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Stanley R. Oneal	Carrol J. Welch		51st MP Bn	Florence, SC
Guenther Pearson	David Burton		91st MP Bn	Ft Drum, NY
Jeffrey P. Bevington	James M. Schultz		92d MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Richard J. Ball	Timothy J. Lamb		93d MP Bn	Ft Bliss, TX
Todd E. Schroeder	Lisa C. Piette-Edwards		94th MP Bn	Yongsan, Korea
Joseph F. Decosta	Henry Stearns		95th MP Bn	Sembach AB, Germany
Elvis Hugee	Eric Mills		96th MP Bn (I/R)	San Diego, CA
Kevin A. Comfort	Patrick M. Quirk		97th MP Bn	Ft Riley, KS
Arthur E. Zegers IV	Thomas Ciampolillo		102d MP Bn (I/R)	Auburn, NY
Maceri Craig	Scott C. Smilinich		104th MP Bn	Kingston, NY
Warren R. Wintrode	Alpheus A. Haswell		105th MP Bn (I/R)	Asheville, NC
Clintis S. McCray	James A. Young		112th MP Bn	Canton, MS
Andrew W. Collins	Kimberly A. Mendez		115th MP Bn	Salisbury, MD
Barry Crum	Fowler L. Goodowens II		117th MP Bn	Athens, TN
Robert Hayden	David R. Morgan		118th MP Bn	Warwick, RI
Luis A. Munizmartinez	Armando Estradamiranda		124th MP Bn	Hato Rey, PR
Monica Alpi	Rene Torresestrada		125th MP Bn	Ponce, PR
Randal E. Brown	Ardis Harden		136th MP Bn	Tyler, TX
Theresa James	Lonnie R. Bryson		151st MP Bn	Dunbar, WV
William Allen	John Watts		160th MP Bn (I/R)	Tallahassee, FL
Barry L. Collins	Michael A. Gentry		168th MP Bn	Dyersburg, TN
Jonathan Adams	Donald Madden		170th MP Bn	Decatur, GA
John Benson	Edward Stratton		175th MP Bn	Columbia, MO

Current as of 4 January 2013

For changes and updates, please e-mail <usarmy.leonardwood.mp-schl.mbx.ppo@mail.mil> or telephone (573) 563-7949.

MILITARY POLICE BATTALION LEVEL COMMANDS (continued)

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM/1SG	CWO	UNIT	LOCATION
Clifford W. Carter	James Coltrell		185th MP Bn	Pittsburg, CA
Paul L. Deal	Daniel F. Lawler		192d MP Bn (I/R)	Niantic, CT
Bren Rogers	Rich Yohn		193d MP Bn (I/R)	Denver, CO
John A. Treufeldt	Marshall P. Ware		198th MP Bn	Louisville, KY
Michael A. Izzo	Perry Hooper		203d MP Bn	Athens, AL
Rodney Ginter	Jonathan Stone		205th MP Bn	Poplar Bluff, MO
Scott W. Hiipakka	Jon Sawyer		210th MP Bn	Taylor, MI
Allen Aldenberg	Brian P. Branley		211th MP Bn	Lexington, MA
Steven Garcia	Randy E. Abeyta		226th MP Bn	Farmington, NM
James McGlaughn	Jimmy Patrick		231st MP Bn	Prattville, AL
John Baird	Steven Slee		304th MP Bn (I/R)	Nashville, TN
Jacqueline Gordon	Christopher Whitford		310th MP Bn (I/R)	Uniondale, NY
Charles Seifert	John Schiffli		317th MP Bn	Tampa, FL
Frank Stanley	Louis Ditullio		324th MP Bn (I/R)	Fresno, CA
Dominic Wible	Peter Schimmel		327th MP Bn (I/R)	Arlington Heights, IL
David Heflin	Richard Clowser		336th MP Bn	Pittsburgh, PA
Anthony Hartmann	Keith Magee		340th MP Bn (I/R)	Ashley, PA
Moses P. Robinson	Juan J. Mitchell		372d MP Bn	Washington, DC
David F. Albanese	Brett Goldstein		382nd MP Bn	Westover, MA
Kevin Keen	Edward Simpson		384th MP Bn (I/R)	Fort Wayne, IN
Jerry Chandler	Clayton Sneed		385th MP Bn	Ft Stewart, GA
Eric Engelmeier	Richard Wieder		391st MP Bn (I/R)	Columbus, OH
Sean Siebert	Allen Freeman	Manuel Ruiz	393d MP Bn (CID)	Bell, CA
William O'Bryne	Timothy Eddy		400th MP Bn (I/R)	Ft Meade, MD
Randy Ames	Richard Cruickshank		402d MP Bn (I/R)	Omaha, NE
Eric D. Nagy	Jonathan Williams		437th MP Bn	Columbus, OH
Mike Self	Anthony Pasqualichio		502d MP Bn (CID)	Ft Campbell, KY
Terry M. Nihart	Billy Ray Counts		503d MP Bn	Ft Bragg, NC
Lamar Parsons	Russel Erickson		504th MP Bn	Ft Lewis, WA
Robert Davel	Jeffrey Cereghino		508th MP Bn (I/R)	Ft Lewis, WA
Glen C. Schmick	Jonathan Narcisse		519th MP Bn	Ft Polk, LA
Darcy L. Overbey	Michael L. Baker		525th MP Bn	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
Martin Pennock	Jess Patteson		530th MP Bn (I/R)	Omaha, NE
Marshall Bacote	Norman Garnes		535th MP Bn (I/R)	Cary, NC
John Hafley	Troy Gentry		607th MP Bn	Grand Prairie, TX
Curtis M. Schroeder	Michael L. Cosper		701st MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Rolanda D. Colbert	Stephen J. Hansen		705th MP Bn (I/R)	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Steven G. Yamashita	Scott Anderson		709th MP Bn	Grafenwoehr, Germany
David G. Thompson	Willard Smoot		716th MP Bn	Ft Campbell, KY
Dave D. Stender	Myron J. Lewis		720th MP Bn	Ft Hood, TX
Victoria Hudson	Robert Eichler		724th MP Bn (I/R)	Ft Lauderdale, FL
Theresa Farrell	Bradley E. Cross		728th MP Bn	Schofield Barracks, HI
Sydney Wright	Craig Owens	Robert Mayo	733d MP Bn (CID)	Ft Gillem, GA
Stacy Garrity	Jason Wells		744th MP Bn (I/R)	Bethlehem, PA
Christopher A. Heberer	Barry R. Oakes		759th MP Bn	Ft Carson, CO
Emma Thyen	Marc Peterson		761st MP Bn	Juneau, AK
Christopher A. Rollins	Jesse S. Perry		773d MP Bn	Pineville, LA
Richard Atchison	Charlotte Randazzo		785th MP Bn (I/R)	Fraser, MI
Richard Heidorn	Richard E. Epps		787th MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Stephen E. Gabavics	Bryan Lynch		793d MP Bn	Ft Richardson, AK
Kyle W. Bayless	Angelia Flournoy		795th MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Matthew D. Stubbs	Paul Ohland		850th MP Bn	Phoenix, AZ
Jason M. Stoddard	Humberto Murati	William Tokash	1002d MP Bn (CID)	Warner Barracks, Germany
Richard Felices	Rhonda Brown		Benning CID Bn	Ft Benning, GA
Andrew P. Sullivan	Marvin Marlow		Washington CID Bn	Ft Myer, VA
Barbi L. Aleandre	Andrew M. Falk		Protective Services Bn	Ft Belvoir, VA

Current as of 4 January 2013

For changes and updates, please e-mail <usarmy.leonardwood.mp-schl.mbx.ppo@mail.mil> or telephone (573) 563-7949.

MILITARY POLICE Writer's Guide

MILITARY POLICE is a professional-development bulletin designed to provide a forum for exchanging information and ideas within the Army law enforcement and investigation community. We include articles by and about officers, enlisted Soldiers, warrant officers, Department of the Army civilian employees, and others. Writers may discuss training, current operations and exercises, doctrine, equipment, history, personal viewpoints, or other areas of general interest to military police. Articles may share good ideas or explore better ways of doing things.

Articles should be concise, straightforward, and in the active voice. If they contain attributable information or quotations not referenced in the text, provide appropriate endnotes. Text length should not exceed 2,000 words (about eight double-spaced pages). Shorter, after action type articles and reviews of books on military police topics are also welcome.

Include photos (with captions) and/or line diagrams that illustrate information in the article. Please do not include illustrations or photos in the text; instead, send each of them as a separate file. Do not embed photos in Microsoft PowerPoint or Microsoft Word. If illustrations are in PowerPoint, avoid excessive use of color and shading. Save digital images at a resolution no lower than 200 dpi. Images copied from a Web site must be accompanied by copyright permission.

Provide a short paragraph that summarizes the content of the article. Also include a short biography, including your full name, rank, current unit, and job title; a list of your past assignments, experience, and education; your mailing address; a fax number; and a commercial daytime telephone number.

Articles submitted to *MILITARY POLICE* must be accompanied by a written release by the author's unit or activity security manager prior to publication. All information contained in the article must be unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable to the public. *MILITARY POLICE* is distributed to military units worldwide and is also available for sale by the Government Printing Office. As such, it is readily accessible to nongovernment or foreign individuals and organizations.

We cannot guarantee that we will publish all submitted articles, photographs, or illustrations. They are accepted for publication only after thorough review. If we plan to use your article in an upcoming issue, we will notify you. Therefore, it is important to keep us informed of changes in your e-mail address or telephone number. All articles accepted for publication are subject to grammatical and structural changes as well as editing for style.

MILITARY POLICE is published semiannually in March and September. Submission dates for articles are 15 November and 15 May. Send submissions by e-mail to <usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.mdotmppb@mail.mil>. If you prefer, send an electronic copy in Microsoft Word on a compact disk (CD) and a double-spaced hard copy to *MILITARY POLICE* Professional Bulletin, 14010 MSCoE Loop, Building 3201, Suite 2661, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8702.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
KEEPING AMERICA INFORMED

PUBLICATION AND SUBSCRIPTION ORDER FORM

Order Processing Code: **3509**

Easy Secure Internet: **bookstore.gpo.gov**

Toll Free: 866 512–1800
DC Area: 202 512–1800
Fax: 202 512–2104

Mail: U.S. Government Printing Office
PO Box 979050
St. Louis, MO 63197–9000

Publications

Qty	Stock Number	Publication Title	Price	Total Price

Total for Publications

Subscription

Qty	List ID	Title	Price	Total Price
	708-069-00000-1	Military Police	13.00	

Prices include regular domestic postage and handling and are subject to change.
International customers please add 40%

Total for Publications

Total Cost of Order

Personal name (Please type or print)

Company name

Street address

City, State, Zip code

Daytime phone including area code

Fax or e-mail

Please return order form with payment

VISA

Check Method of Payment:

❑ Check payable to Superintendent of Documents

❑ SOD Deposit Account

❑ VISA ❑ MasterCard ❑ Discover/NOVUS ❑ American Express

(expiration date)

Thank you for your order!

AUTHORIZING SIGNATURE 10/07

Thank you for your interest in U.S. Government Information. ALL SALES ARE FINAL.

PIN: 103265-000