Photo By Lori Stewart | As American troops moved toward St. Mihiel, they needed detailed intelligence about...... read more read more
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by Lori S. Stewart, USAICoE Command Historian
INTELLIGENCE IN THE ST. MIHIEL OFFENSIVE
On 12 September 1918, the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) launched its first independent offensive against the Germans at the St. Mihiel salient in northeastern France. The Germans had occupied this two-hundred-square-mile bulge in the front line for four years, blocking critical allied communications and supply routes. After a four-day battle, the First U.S. Army reduced the German-held salient, freeing up the Paris-Nancy railroad and securing the AEF’s rear for its next offensive in the Meuse-Argonne. This success gave green American forces experience in directing a multi-corps combined arms battle and elevated the Allies’ impressions of the U.S. Army. To varying degrees, every intelligence discipline played a part in this victory. General John J. Pershing, commander of the AEF, later declared, “No army ever went out with the information as to what was in front of it as the American Army did at St. Mihiel...”
SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE. Maj. Dennis Nolan, the AEF G-2, said about radio intelligence: “Just before the American attack on the St. Mihiel Salient there were many indications that the enemy had withdrawn, and…advancing the infantry without artillery preparation was seriously considered. The final decision to make the attacks as originally planned [with a preparatory barrage] was largely based on the evidence…that enemy radio stations were still active in their old locations. In fact, the only evidence we had on the night of September 11th that the enemy had not withdrawn was the fact that the wireless were operating in their old places…. An attack was made and over 15,000 prisoners were taken as a result.”
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Capt. Charles Dienst, of the 89th Division’s 353d Infantry Regiment, recalled, soon after the advance began, “prisoners were coming back in groups of 15 to 20 and 30. Men of the Intelligence Section cut the shoulder straps from their blouses, collected ‘sold buchs’, secured strength of their forces, and dispatched information to Brigade Headquarters.” Additionally, within the buildings of Bouillonville, they located maps, charts, orders, and artillery codes. Dienst wrote, “And in the least expected place—the upstairs office of a German dental surgeon, carefully tucked away in the lower drawer of a cabinet—were found maps showing the German line of resistance in the rear of the portion of the famous Hindenburg Line which we were then facing.” Meanwhile, counterintelligence agents cleared enemy informers out of the area of operations by setting up a system of travel controls that stopped refugees and line crossers without proper identification.
PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE. Prior to D-Day, the U.S. Army’s Observation Squadron took more than 2,300 aerial photographs of the terrain. During the offensive, when poor weather kept lighter observation aircraft grounded, high-powered pursuit aircraft took up the task of artillery observation and long-range reconnaissance.
OBSERVERS & SCOUTS. Sgt. James F. Carty, an observer with the 102d Infantry, 26th Division, was one of the first to recognize and report that German forces were already withdrawing from the salient but, determined to protect a vital supply route, were well positioned to wage a rear-guard action. He and Pvt. Harold F. Proctor focused on an enemy machine-gun nest that had been holding up the American advance for five hours. The two observers captured forty German soldiers in the stronghold and obtained information that allowed the First U.S. Army to capture two trainloads of retreating German soldiers.
SOUND AND FLASH RANGING. Months before the offensive began, sound and flash ranging systems sent to the area pinpointed enemy artillery batteries. As First U.S. Army advanced, the sound and flash rangers “established posts in advanced positions and continued to give valuable information regarding the activities within the salient.” Near St. Mihiel, after witnessing the death of his three fellow flash rangers, Pvt. Edward Trueblood solely manned a twelve-foot-diameter flash-ranging post. He was able to determine the location of concealed enemy machine gun nests holding up the American advance and directed artillery fire for twenty-four hours before being relieved.
For more information on these topics, see This Week in MI History #56, 107, 152, and 203.
New issues of This Week in MI History are published each week. To report story errors, ask questions, request back issues, or be added to our distribution list, please contact: TR-ICoE-Command-Historian@army.mil.
| Date Taken: | 09.06.2024 |
| Date Posted: | 09.06.2024 16:26 |
| Story ID: | 480307 |
| Location: | US |
| Web Views: | 85 |
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