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by Lori S. Stewart, USAICoE Command Historian
AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE IN BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND
On 27 August 1776, General George Washington’s American forces on Long Island were routed by the British in the first general engagement of the American Revolution. Faulty terrain analysis, lack of reconnaissance, and an inaccurate analysis of the enemy’s intentions played a role in this defeat.
By August 1776, General Washington had been in command of the Continental Army for more than a year. During that time, American and British forces had engaged in several skirmishes and sieges. After withdrawing from Boston earlier in March following an unsuccessful eleven-month siege, the British set their sights on New York City. There, British commanders in North America planned what they believed would be a single decisive blow to end the colonial rebellion.
Washington recognized New York City would be a strategic prize for the British. Not only did it have a safe harbor for their fleet but holding it and the Hudson River would drive a wedge between the northern and southern colonies. Determined to keep the British from taking the city, Washington stationed 11,000 of his troops in Manhattan and another 8,000 across the East River in Brooklyn Heights on Long Island, which overlooked Manhattan and the water approaches.
By mid-August, Brig. Gen. William Howe had amassed about 40,000 British soldiers and sailors on more than 400 ships in the Narrows near Staten Island. On 22 August, 15,000 men landed on Long Island approximately ten miles south of Brooklyn Heights. In New York at that time, Washington was misinformed that the size of the enemy force was only 8,000. That news led him to believe the British landings were a feint meant to hide their true intent to sail up the Hudson and East rivers and attack Manhattan from the north. Unwilling to weaken his defenses on Manhattan, Washington sent just 1,500 troops to reinforce those on Long Island.
Temporarily in command of the Continental, state, and local forces on Long Island, Maj. Gen. Israel Putnam had little knowledge of the local terrain. He placed 6,000 of his men behind the fortifications on Brooklyn Heights. Another 3,000 men defended a six-mile-long ridge called the Heights of Guana in front of the line. These men were concentrated in three of the ridge’s narrow passes (from west to east: Gowanus, Flatbush, and Bedford). Putnam believed the distance too far for the British to advance around the fourth pass, Jamaica, on the far east of the ridge. Therefore, he covered this pass with just five soldiers to provide early warning if the British headed that direction. Unfortunately, the rugged terrain of the ridge was so heavily wooded, the forces could not see beyond the trees, and they had no cavalry to conduct proper reconnaissance.
Before beginning their advance toward Brooklyn on 27 August, the British forces heard from residents the Americans were entirely behind their fortifications. Howe’s advance guard soon learned differently when they met American forces in Bedford Pass. A thorough reconnaissance soon revealed Jamaica Pass was unguarded. Howe planned to leave the main body of his army to pin the Americans down at Gowanus, Flatbush, and Bedford passes, while the rest of his army marched through Jamaica Pass.
At 2000 on 26 August, leaving their tents erected, the British set out for Jamaica Pass on a silent night march. By 0700 the next morning, they had captured the five guards and marched through the pass to the surprise of the American left flank. Simultaneously, the rest of the British force attacked the American right flank at Gowanus Pass. The Americans were routed within a couple of hours.
Although significantly outnumbering the Americans in Brooklyn Heights, Howe opted to lay siege to their fortifications instead of pressing the attack. To preserve his army and protect New York City, Washington quietly and efficiently withdrew his army across the East River to Manhattan overnight on 29-30 August. The Battle of Long Island was one of the key events that convinced the American commander to establish better intelligence networks to provide him with accurate and timely information.
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| Date Taken: | 08.23.2024 |
| Date Posted: | 08.23.2024 17:41 |
| Story ID: | 479353 |
| Location: | US |
| Web Views: | 341 |
| Downloads: | 0 |
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