Managing Civilian Workyear Executions in an OCONUS Environment

WIESBADEN, HE, GERMANY

04.10.2017

Courtesy Story

U.S. Army Career Program 26

By: Mr. Jim Davis, Chief, Manpower and Management Division at U.S. Army Europe, Wiesbaden, Germany

** Mr. Jim Davis wrote the following article in October of 2015 while serving as USAREUR’s Deputy Chief of Staff G-8. His words will resonant with OCONUS organizations as these organizations strive to manage their civilian workforce under a variety of unique challenges. Mr. Davis encourages us to view workyears as a resource and he offers a proactive approach to maintaining a steady civilian workforce. **

BACKGROUND. Working in a variety of Manpower Management positions throughout the DoD for the past 30+ years prepared me for my current assignment - or so I thought.

A little over two years ago, my career with the Army Manpower Management Community and life as a CP26 began and what a ride it has been. My first couple of months were spent feverishly working on reduction-in-force (RIF) mitigation efforts in response to previously programmed reductions and moving the command from Heidelberg to Wiesbaden, Germany. Imagine having a crash course in Army processes, terminology and culture, while running split operations an hour apart.

If that wasn’t enough, just as we began to feel that U.S. Army Europe was ahead of the drawdown, the focus seemingly changed overnight. The Army began to react negatively toward underexecution. This shift occurred as the Army was simultaneously dealing with emerging missions and Congressional interest in civilian workyear underexecution. We were labeled a “habitual, chronic and significant” underexecutor of civilian workyears and had to defend against additional manpower reductions.

Against this backdrop, we were in planning meetings on how and where to take a 40% reduction to the command staff as a result of the focus area review group (FARG) decisions (couple this with the continuing European transformation, reductions in civilian pay accounts, sequestration, hiring freezes and previously announced drawdowns). As the new guy, I have a perfect credibility problem. Which is it --- hire or fire? I am sure my boss was having doubts about hiring me when I responded, “It’s obvious; they want you to do both.” Of course, it had to be done with a thoughtful approach, but with the help of an outstanding team of manpower analysts we have accomplished just that.

UNDERSTANDING UNDEREXECUTION. So how did we address the problem? Are there lessons learned that we can share? While not a lean six sigma project, we used the Define, Measure, Analyze, Improve and Control (DMAIC) model to guide the project:

Define. Defining the problem seemed simple enough. Between vacant positions and a significant lag between one person leaving and the arrival of the replacement, we were not spending the workyears and civilian pay dollars that were budgeted.

Measure. Did we understand the factors that contributed to under-execution? The first working theory was that we weren’t doing anything wrong and were simply exercising due diligence in managing a shrinking workforce. We dubbed this “an era of uncertainty – a conservative approach to managing the workforce.” By adopting this conservative approach, we implemented a 30+ % reduction to the U.S. civilian end-strength without a RIF.

As you can see in our first working model (Figure 1), our projection looked simple. The onboard line lagged the authorized line by 18 to 24 months. This meant a loss of authorizations would begin manifesting as reduced onboard strength about a year and a half earlier, which we tried to statistically prove. Our hypothesis was that the amount of underexecution could be quantified as the sum of reductions each year times the projected vacancy rate. Three-years out the projected rate of vacancies was 25%, two-years out it was 50% and one-year out it was 75%.

Analyze. As it turns out, the effects of our programmatic actions were more subtle than we appreciated. While programmatic losses were the number one contributor to underexecution, there were several other factors that contributed as well. The three remaining factors were:

a. Hire Lag – the second largest contributor to underexecution is defined as the time between the departure of an employee from the command and arrival of the eventual replacement. A common misperception is that this can be quantified as the time to process a request for personnel action (RPA), but equally important is the ratio of internal/external hires. From a command standpoint, it could take several hiring actions until someone is actually added to the end-strength.

b. Vacant Billpayers – vacant positions with a pending reprogramming action that will not be filled until the reprogramming is effective. While not a large number of positions, as few as 13 can affect execution by 1%.

c. LWOP/Part-time – onboard employees not executing a full workyear. Again, a relative small number of employees on extended leave without pay (LWOP) or part-time employees can affect the execution rate.

Armed with this knowledge, we set out to make sense of the data. We created a working model (Figure 2) to understand and visually depict the impact behind each of these factors. The key was to find the correct variable(s) associated with each factor. A look at the two largest contributing factors:

a. Programmatic Losses – based on historical trends, the impact begins to manifest itself as early as three years out once decisions are made in the PPBE process. As positions slated for reduction become vacant, managers become increasingly reluctant to hire since they are committing to a minimum three-year tour.

b. Hire Lag – this is influenced by several factors including the anticipated rate of departures (impacted by tour length management policies), the ratio of internal/external hires to the command and the number of days to process an RPA. There are other factors within the hiring process such as management time, delays in submitting the RPA, and the length of time to onboard the selectee. These are activities not included in the model as discrete variables but are opportunities for improvement as well.

Additional analysis of the subroot causes showed we had things in common with CONUS locations and some that were unique to OCONUS. These subroot causes could have either a positive or negative influence, but the solution had to consider all aspects:

a. Common with CONUS: CPAC staffing, workforce planning tool, hiring freeze, furloughs, HQ reduction uncertainty, quality of referral lists, etc...

b. Unique Overseas Factors: tour lengths, return rights, limited use of temps/terms in higher grades, local national versus DACs, etc...

Improve. Before designing the improve measures, we recognized there would always be some degree of underexecution (which is not necessarily a bad thing). The key was to accurately predict how much and then use the other tools at our disposal to mitigate the impact. The following has resulted in the command going from an 88% execution rate in FY13 to what we predict to be a 96% rate in FY16 and 98% in FY17:

a. The first thing we had to do was raise the awareness of the staff. We began an aggressive campaign aimed at managers and mid-level supervisors on the collective impact of their decisions and how to better accomplish workforce planning. On more than one occasion, the question was raised, “So you’re telling me we have been doing this all wrong?” My answer was always, “No, we were doing the prudent thing, but as conditions changed, we also needed to change to meet the challenges.” The bottom line was that the command needed to loosen the reins and allow managers and supervisors to make informed decisions on when to hire and when to defer.

b. Workyears needed to be treated like other fiscal resources. Managers are now required to have a budget and spend plan that ties their allocated work years to the strategic human capital plan. The workyears distributed through the Resource Guidance process is based on the expected execution rate. This allows the internal realignment to reflect what would actually occur during execution and identify gaps for future reprogramming actions.

Control. As we implemented the improvements, it was essential to put controls in place to ensure we didn’t over compensate and put the command into a RIF situation. To do this we:

a. Established a senior officer working group comprised of the GS-15s from across the staff and the major subordinate commands. This group was responsible for jointly managing the collective risk and making recommendations on workforce management and resource utilization policies to senior leaders within the command. The group reviewed the quarterly execution data and 18 months of projected end-strength data to determine if corrective intervention is required.

b. Automated our faces-to-spaces data system and incorporated an area for managers to document their projected workyear requirements.

c. Charged the Manpower staff with monitoring execution, ensuring GFEBS data is recorded correctly, preparing command forecasts and ensuring each manager has a resource management plan in place prior to submitting a recruitment action. In total, these responsibilities require the Manpower staff to be engaged with their counterparts across the staff and work the details before they can become issues.

CONCLUSION. In the past year, great strides have been made across the staff on anticipating how to manage a force in transition and understanding the second- and third-order effects. We are on course to meet the Army’s workyear execution target of 98% within the next year. At the end of the day the CP26 community can continue to be an enabling force to meet the Army challenges of the future, by using a systemic approach to problem solving.

• Date Taken: 04.10.2017
• Date Posted: 04.10.2017 14:51
• Story ID: 229839
• Location: WIESBADEN, HE, DE
• Hometown: WIESBADEN, HE, DE