A Tale of Three Commanders – A Reintegration Parable

KABUL, AFGHANISTAN

06.15.2010

Courtesy Story

International Security Assistance Force HQ Public Affairs

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By Col. Christopher D. Kolenda

KABUL, Afghanistan - Three battalion level commanders in Afghanistan had very different views on their roles.

The first battalion commander saw his task as killing or capturing the enemy. Issues such as governance, development, and interaction with local leaders and people were someone else’s problem.

The ISAF counterinsurgency guidance and other directives were mildly interesting. Reintegration was a waste of time. He was taking the fight to the enemy with the conventional tools at his disposal.

The second commander saw his task differently. He understood how governance, development, and engagement with local leaders and people, if done well, could help improve security in his area. He also knew that, if done poorly, those factors could feed the insurgency.

He was seeing striking evidence of the latter. He repeatedly asked for Afghan government programs to improve the situation. These were always discussed but never delivered. He heard some examples of ISAF commanders being criticized for dealing with those issues themselves, so asked for permission to take action.

He was told to wait for the Afghan government. He wanted to talk to interlocutors from the insurgent groups who presented themselves to him, but believed he had no permission to do so.

He sent them instead to the corrupt officials the insurgents were fighting. He wrung his hands over lack of guidance and programs.

The third commander saw his task and situation similar to the second. While he understood his lane, he also was the type to beg forgiveness rather than ask permission.

When he saw the district governor marginalize social groups, he took careful action to ensure they were included in decisions that affected their communities. When he saw abuse of power and theft of development funds, he quietly confronted the governor and police chief with the evidence – stating that he did not want to report it but would be compelled to do so if the behavior continued.

He actively combined CERP and other economic capabilities with creative efforts toward social mobilization to develop local ownership and support. He spoke with local insurgent interlocutors, understood grievances and reasons for fighting, and coordinated action with his Afghan counterparts to deal with them.

He rolled up his sleeves to deliver results in ways that did not undermine the government or forthcoming programs – which he knew the ISAF leadership was pushing the Afghan government to enact. He found informal, common-sense ways to achieve desired outcomes at the local level.

The first and second commanders killed plenty of insurgents, but nonetheless saw violence rise in their areas. The first commander reveled in the violence, celebrating the bravery of his soldiers in large firefights.

The second came away frustrated and disillusioned – he knew what to do but never felt he had explicit permission to do it. Once enacted, reintegration was limted due to failed expectations.

The third commander killed plenty of insurgents as well, but saw violence drop significantly in his area. Communities banded together, abuse of power was curtailed, and the commander worked carefully with local leaders and his Afghan counterparts to redress grievances and create different choices for local insurgents.

Hundreds of fighters came off – and stayed off – the battlefield. He simply called it good counterinsurgency, or “setting conditions” for reintegration. When the Afghan reintegration program finally came on line, various former insurgents enrolled. Others simply carried on with their lives. The area remained secure.