TASK FORCE Lifeliners

October 2011 101st Sustainment Brigade

SPECIAL EDITION: Support Operations update

AIRBORNE

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Distribution Highlights and Challenges

Task Force Lifeliner continued to meet the demands of Afghanistan's very challenging distribution fight during 4th quarter 2011 as the brigade completed four company-level and six platoon / team-level transitions of authority. This, the final Quarterly Distribution Newsletter will highlight Task Force Lifeliner's many accomplishments over the past quarter, but more importantly, will also discuss the key challenges that Task Force Lifeliner navigated during 4th quarter as well as those challenges facing Task Force Muleskinner as they assume the mission.

During the past quarter, Task Force Lifeliner completed a third Green Belt certification class and continued to work on 38 Green Belt projects. Over half the projects are complete and saved the Government over $60 million in cost avoidance, primarily from the reduction of container detention and demurrage charges. Twenty-five Green Belt projects are in progress and should be complete by mid-October. Progress continued on construction of the new SSA, 142nd CSSB TOC, Class I Yard, CIF Facility, and other Bagram After Next construction initiatives. Winterization preparation continued during 4th Quarter with increased stockage levels for critical classes of supply in place. Task Force Lifeliner continued to be constrained with no Low-Cost Low-Altitude contract, relying solely on limited and sporadic CJSOTF assets. Task Force Lifeliner also worked through the transition of the multi-billion dollar Host Nation Trucking contract to the new National Afghan Trucking contract. The mid-September transition came on the heels of Ramadan and Eid al-Fitr which created a ten-day window where no host-nation trucks ran and all ground distribution requirements had to be moved by green convoy assets. Another direct impact of the HNT-NAT transition was Regional Contracting Command's inability to meet the plan to implement Task Force Lifeliner's Afghan Trucking Network-North contract by mid-October. Vendor selection will now occur under the purview of Task Force Muleskinner with a new implementation date between late December 2011 and early January 2012. At the direction of JSC-A, Task Force Lifeliner completed a plan to off-ramp almost 700 Soldiers by the end of 2011 and established contracted solutions to take their place.

During the next quarter, Task Force Muleskinner will face a perfect storm of challenges that will each directly impact the distribution mission. Force reductions will require the off-ramp of ground distribution assets amounting to one third of current capability. Winter weather will impact both ground and air assets. The Air Force continues to be inflexible and risk averse in their support of air drop missions. Low Cost Low Altitude air drop capability has been severely hampered since February 2011 but a pending RC East contract promises to add one aircraft by the end of 4th Quarter. Eid al-Adha, the second or "Greater Eid" of 2011 occurs on November 7th and should impact the availability of NAT trucks by up to seven days. Several brigade-level RIP-TOAs will add distribution requirements during First Quarter 2012, and the requirement to move MRAPs to support UIK installs will continue. Perhaps most concerning, distribution requirements to support future retrograde operations associated with the force reductions are still unclear as planners above the sustainment brigade continue to develop the force reduction and retrograde plans. Finally, recent friction between the United States and Pakistan threatens to further disrupt or close the PAC-GLOC.

Distribution Operations

Several events earmarked the past quarter with significant impact to the distribution network. First, during the Eid al-Fitr holiday the first week of September, Host Nation Trucks were not available to distribute requirements throughout RC-East, Capital and North. At no other time was the daily Distribution Management Board more important as Task Force Lifeliner worked priorities of movement with CJTF-1 and the Brigade Combat Teams. Between the 142d CSSB and 530th CSSB, the Brigade utilized all organic assets, including the Personal Security Detachment, to move a total of 2.1 million pounds of cargo, including an entire aerostat system to a remote COP in RC-East. The combined efforts of CJTF-1, the Sustainment Brigade and the CSSBs bridged the gap in HNT support and provided exact distribution support. To provide a daily quick reference for ground escort capability matched against current requirements, Task Force Lifeliner created the Ground Distribution Summary (Figure 1).

The second significant event began on 16 September as the old Host Nation Truck contract ended and the new multi-billion dollar National Afghan Trucking (NAT) contract began. The NAT contract addresses many of the challenges and shortcomings of the HNT contract. The contract consists of 20 new prime contractors; however, all sub-contracted carriers remain exactly the same. To welcome the 20 new NAT carriers and clarify processes, procedures, and expectations, the 313th Joint Movement Control Battalion hosted a very successful NAT conference in Kabul in early September.

The NAT contract is expected to improve the distribution pipeline with more responsive, predictable and accountable carriers the sustainment brigade relies on to move critical sustainment cargo. The contract includes more detail to hold the vendors accountable for poor performance. Most notably, carriers are now financially penalized and payments withheld when they do not comply with all requirements specified in the contract. With the enhanced statement of work, the NAT contract provides the Movement Control Battalion much more influence to hold the carriers liable and accountable for critical sustainment missions.

When the new contract went operational on 16 September, 80% of the carriers where in compliance and over 190 TMRs were dispatched on the first day. By 27 September, all backlogged cargo resulting from the combined impact of Eid al-Fitr and NAT contract mobilization had been cleared and ground distribution was back to steady-state.



Figure 1.

Distribution Management Board

The Distribution Management Board continues to be successful in highlighting distribution operations and initiatives, identifying possible shortfalls or operational needs, and coordinating with applicable agencies to fill in the gaps and ensure uninterrupted distribution operations. Preparation for Ramadan and Eid al-Fitr during the DMB yielded huge advantages, as movement requirements and convoy operations adapted to ensure timely delivery of critical sustainment stocks of ammo and CLVII. In the month of August, over 200 MRAPs were distributed in addition to all other requirements, including the continued transportation of uninstalled UIK kits, to assist in providing initial seed fleets for DS hubs to begin UIK installation and replace BD/BL MATVs throughout RC-E.

JDMC Distribution Stats

The Joint Distribution Management Center continues to operate through streamlined movement processes with all transportation players/unit reps working out of one location. While distribution operations continue to flow with little interruption or delays, new initiatives to export lessons learned at Bagram to other locations across the battlefield have begun. With the assistance of the 313th JMCB, LMR process improvements at Jalalabad have begun to render significant results such as increased visibility of backhaul requirements and decreased HNT demurrage charges. And, through the coordination between the 101st Sustainment Brigade and CJTF-1, unit RIP/TOA lessons learned as they apply to distribution have been tied into the current RIP/TOA of 5 separate Brigades in RC-East, ensuring a seamless transition of cargo coming in and out of Bagram.

To date, the Sustainment Brigade has been able to improve processes that resulted in over 229 million pounds of cargo being pushed by ground as reflected in the charts below (Figure 2). Figure 2 also represents the statistics of Combat Logistics Patrols as compared to LMRs that have been submitted as well as missions cancelled. This chart reflects that we have completed over 99% of our 1,449 total LMR that have been submitted in the last 11 months. Figure 3 below shows the breakdown of Convoys conducted by commodities of supply that shows the volume of each type of commodity we push. Currently, we push more CLVII than anything else which accounts for the MRAPs that we are distributing throughout RC-East, Capital, and North.



Figure 2. Pounds Pushed and Escorted Fuel



Figure 3. Distribution Break Down and Combat Logistics Patrols

BAF Distribution Network Improvements

Task Force Lifeliner continued to improve the Bagram distribution network, primarily through the Lean Six Sigma Green Belt projects. The result was continued reduction of backlog across all nodes in the distribution pipeline. Most notably, in December 2010 detention charges at BAF accrued over $504,000 in estimated monthly detention charges (Figure 4). Through the application of Green Belt initiatives, Task Force Lifeliner streamlined processes that eliminated backlog at the Bagram ECP, CRSP, and SSA resulting in a reduction of detention charges by over $500,000 per month (Figure 5). As we enter 1st Quarter FY-12, Bagram, Salerno and Shank are at "free flow" of cargo, meaning there is no backlog in the Kabul carrier holding yards for these FOBs (Figure 6). The focus has now turned to the remaining backlog for Fenty, Sharana, and Camp Phoenix. Through a combination of BAF Lean Six Sigma site assistance visits, additional MHE and RTCH support, and increased SDDC delivery, we expect the remaining three FOBs with backlog to be healthy by mid 1st Quarter.



Figure 4, December 2010



Figure 5, July 2011



Figure 6, September 2011

Contract Oversight

Operational Contracting Support (OCS) has become a norm for logistics support on the battlefield. Most if not all the Support Operations commodities within Task Force Lifeliner oversee or are reliant upon some type of contract that supports their daily operations. Examples include line-haul trucking via the National Afghanistan Trucking contract, container management and Supply Support Activity operations under the multi-billion dollar LOGCAP contract, maintenance support for our vehicles, force protection for our FOBs and COBs, facilities management, and support for food and water to the dining facilities across the Theater. Task Force Lifeliner implemented many initiatives during their OEF 10-11 deployment that directly improved contract oversight and contractor performance, mitigated the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse, and ultimately saved the American tax payer an estimated $272.6 million in 2011 and an estimated $341.7 million in cost avoidance projected to the end of 2014. Figure 6 provides a summary of contracting accomplishments and challenges.

Task Force Lifeliner's OCS Team supervised more than 120 Contract Officer Representatives (CORs) overseeing 140 RCC contracts valued in excess of a $150 million, and for the $1.6 billion in LOGCAP Support Services within our area of responsibility. A key lesson learned during the deployment was ensuring that the right Soldier was selected for COR duties. Junior, inexperienced Soldiers are no match for the seasoned LOGCAP managers and supervisors, most of who are retired military and have multiple years experience in theater. Task Force Lifeliner worked with DCMA and LOGCAP to enhance COR checklists used the hold the contractor accountable. After retraining the CORs with the new checklists, the contractor was cited for multiple shortcomings in CRSP, container management, and SSA operations which ultimately resulted in a letter of concern, corrective action, and improved performance. Task Force Lifeliner now holds a weekly LOGCAP IPR to discuss any issues or friction points with LOGCAP, DCMA, and the contractor. During the deployment, the OCS team conducted 12 internal COR Audit Boards and 24 Working Groups throughout the brigades footprint and shared these findings and data to other Sustainment activities within the CJOA-A. These meetings were conducted monthly to provide contract performance assessment data to the chain of command and commodity managers that ensured the government received the best service for contract support. The boards not only provided oversight to each contract, they also provided insight to non-vendor payments, non-compliance to the statement of work and cost savings for future contract solutions.

While LOGCAP performance continued to improve over the past quarter, Task Force Lifeliner was challenged with Regional Contracting Command friction. Most notably, RCC was unable to meet our

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

Figure 7. Operational Contracting Support

CONTRACTING

agreed upon deployment timeline for the Afghan Trucking Network-North (ATN-N). This impacted the vendor selection process, which will now have to be performed by Task Force Muleskinner, and added several months to the projected contract award date. The ATN-N contract, as well as several BAF After Next construction projects were impacted by frequent RCC contracting officer (KO) turnover. Each time KO turnover occurred the projects took delays. Projects awarded to Afghan contractors were constrained by the contractor's inability to provide qualified workers stipulated in the contract, and by problems with the badging process. It seems customary for RCC to award a contract to an Afghan vendor, only to have the vendor show up with ten percent of the laborers stipulated in the contract. The project is delayed as the KO goes back and forth with the contractor for weeks or months to correct the problem. To address this problem, RCC must improve vendor vetting prior to contract award. To address the badging problem, RCC now withholds the contract notice to proceed until the contractor can demonstrate that he has enough qualified workers badged to begin the work. This new practice can still create significant delays to a planned project start date.

Winterization

For the past two winter seasons Afghanistan experienced less than average amounts of winter precipitation. The 2011-12 winter season is predicted to be colder with more precipitation than average. Winterization efforts to increase commodities must begin as soon as winter weather from the previous season begins to recede. This normally translates to a March-April timeframe to begin a concerted effort to increase stockage levels in preparation for the next winter. Unlike the fight in Iraq, it can take several months to build stockage levels because of the effects of terrain, weather, enemy and capability. The impact of Ramadan and Eid al-Fitr cannot be overlooked as commercial trucks slow to a halt during Eid. The goal for winterization should be to build stockage levels prior to the onset of these holidays.

Task Force Lifeliner approached winterization as a team effort between the Regional Commands and Brigade Support Battalions, identifying shortfalls early on, and correcting them prior to the onset of winter. TF Lifeliner facilitated weekly updates during the LOGSYNC in which all elements updated their status and addressed new or reoccurring issues (Figure 7). All Support Operations commodities took great initiative to fill increased stockage objectives for the supported units: SPO CL V worked with JSC-A and 1st TSC to increase the winter stockage objective for ammunition from 100% to 150% on certain critical munitions; while the CL I section analyzed historical data for consumption and distribution and determined stockage objectives and transit times for the taskforces. One of Task Force Lifeliners greatest accomplishments was the increase of fuel capacity, which expanded so winter operations can commence uninterrupted with consideration of the enemy, weather and distribution delays.



Figure 8. SPO Winterization Readiness

BAF After Next

The internal reorganization of the space within the BAF CRSP complex is essentially complete. The combined efforts of the 101st Sustainment Brigade, 313th Movement Control Battalion, and the LOGCAP contractors Fluor and ITT have yielded dramatic improvements to the way in which land is used in support of distribution operations on BAF. The end result is further improvements to container throughput and accountability, and the freeing up of space to enable construction projects such as the new BAF SSA. The 101st Sustainment Brigade continues to work on three major projects that will complete the reorganization of the Bagram Logistics Complex. The construction of a new TOC for 142nd CSSB is currently underway and scheduled to be complete by the end of the year. The contract to construct the new 7-building SSA has been awarded to a pair of companies - one US-based and one local owned and operated - and work should begin shortly. The proposal for construction of a Class I complex for dry goods, bottled water and other liquids, and operational rations have been approved by the local BOS-I and are currently awaiting funding and solicitation. We are working with the US Army Corps of Engineers to design facilities that will provide refrigerated and frozen food storage capacity, to replace the capacity lost to last year's fire in the current Class I yard.

A Consolidated Rigger Shed that will house both conventional and special operations rigging operations is scheduled to begin construction in early 2012 as part of a larger USACE construction program for BAF. The estimated completion date for this project is the end of 2012. In the interim, the Sustainment Brigade will shift rigging operations from its current location to a secondary site on the airfield in order to enable a series of MILCON projects that will support the USAF and the larger BAF community. Additional distribution-focused and/or customer-oriented projects such as the Main Mail Terminal (MMT), the new CIF facility and retail finance facility are all also programmed to begin and complete construction during 2012. The construction of a new Ammunition Supply Point continues to be delayed due to funding issues, and will likely not be completed until 2013.

While 101st SBDE has managed to make significant strides in developing the log infrastructure at BAF, progress has been slowed in a number of areas. While many of the unexpected delays are a direct byproduct of the number of projects undertaken and the ability to work each simultaneously given the limited engineering resources of a Sustainment Brigade, many others are a product of the conditions associated with construction on BAF and in the CJOA-A as a whole. Limited military construction resources, focused first and foremost at outlying FOBs/COPs and outside the wire, require most if not all work to be done through contracted mechanisms. Competing requirements from multiple organizations to the same limited Base Operations, Base Engineer and Regional Contracting Command personnel create backlogs under the best of circumstances - regular turnover of personnel and the subsequent changes to standards/requirements/expectations at each level create additional delays. Additionally, tightening fiscal policy - already a source of tension between the enduring presence BAF is being constructed for and the expeditionary practices being used to construct it - places additional scrutiny on construction proposals. The result is multiple rounds of review, oftentimes with requirements that do not have clear Ways Ahead for units outside the RC structure.



Figure 9. BAF After Next Construction / Reorganization Projects



Figure 10. BAF After Next Construction / Reorganization Projected Timeline

Mail Distribution & Holiday Postal Mission

The holiday mail season is quickly approaching in Afghanistan. Many supporting transportation units, contracted postal operations, distribution companies, and Task Force leaders are currently planning how best to utilize their assets to react to the increased mail volume; planning is ongoing. In order to effectively plan for expeditious mail movement, postal planners must consider the following: 1) What modes of transportation will be available and how must this number increase to meet the demand of increased mail volumes and reduced transportation assets at many locations, 2) What is the mail storage capacity at each of the mail hubs and how much additional space is needed, 3) How must operating procedures be adjusted to accommodate increased mail volumes, and 4) How many additional personnel will be required to support increased postal operations and distribution requirements?

Last year, Afghanistan experienced a mild winter. However, expeditious mail movement across the battlefield still required utilizing a diversified set of transportation assets. At the peak of the Holiday Mail Season, 10-15 mail containers a week were transported to Fenty and Shank, 3-4 mail containers a week were sent to two of Shank's supported locations: Ghazni and Gardez. The remaining Shank and Fenty mail was delivered primarily with Short Take Off and Landing (STOL) aircraft. On occasion, mail was moved using USAF Grey Tails. Salerno mail was moved primarily by STOL and USAF C-130. Kabul mail was sorted at Bagram and transported to RC-C locations by STOL and contracted ground mail trucks. Many RC-E locations received additional mail movement support through the use of Contracted Air Helicopter (CA Helo). CA Helos supported mail transportation from Fenty and Shank to their respective outlying locations. Using CA helos at outlying mail hub locations helped to alleviate backlogged mail volumes at Bagram by reducing the volumes at mail hubs with limited storage capacity. Bagram's Mail Movement Team was able to continue to push mail to these locations on a routine basis.

Additional manpower to support increased mail volumes were requested and provided by supported Task Forces and postal contractors. Coordinating for the use of various modes of transportation assets, increasing military and contracted personnel across the battlefield, adjusting all aspects of postal functions to a 24-hour operating concept, and procuring adequate storage space for inbound mail volumes at all locations were the keys to success during last year's Holiday Mail Season.

This year's Holiday Mail Season brings new challenges. Supporting transportation units, contracted postal operations, distribution companies, and Task Force leaders must effectively plan for the next four months. The following is a list of potential issues and challenges involved with the holiday postal mission: 1) The contract for multiple CA Helos is no longer available for Bagram to help support movement to Kabul, Shank, Fenty, or any of the outlying Shank and Fenty mail hubs, 2) Currently, only one CA Helo is available two days a week to move mail, 3) SB-level transportation cells have become responsible to move mail to their respective locations (the BSB SPO Transportation Cell has other commodities, that may have priority of movement over mail), 4) Mail for RC-C is no

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longer sorted at Bagram therefore mail to KAIA can no longer be moved using STOL, 5) Restructuring and establishment of Army Post Offices and Military Mail Terminal locations require additional MHE, trucks and personnel, 6) Additional storage areas and resources will have to be identified to support increased mail volumes and additional APOs, and lastly, 7) USAF weather forecasters project winter will begin earlier this year with harsher weather patterns requiring more diversified modes of transportation.

To adapt to the demands of 2011-2012 holiday mail, we have committed to several initiatives. First, we have requested and been granted additional covered storage space at Bagram for inclement weather days when a reduced amount of movement will occur, as well as 30 pallet spaces near the Special Handling Yard for increased use of USAF assets. Second, we have diversified our access to transportation resources adding closer coordination with green convoys and contracted fixed wing aircraft. In further preparation, we have coordinated with STOLs and our Ground Transport Contractor to increase the amount of mail volume that is moved by the first of November. Lastly, a change in operational flow in Bagram and a surge of contract postal personnel will provide necessary operational support for the holiday mail volume. Even with all the mitigating factors in place, APOs at Shank, Fenty and Kabul will have a significant challenge to push a sufficient amount of mail to their outlying Camps, FOBs and COPs in timely manner.

It is well known that the postal mission is a huge boost to the morale of our military service members, especially during the holiday season. When Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines are away from their families and friends during the holidays, the proper execution of holiday mail movement can have a synergistic effect on morale. A special package from home is priceless. This part of the postal mission will be our greatest success.



Figure 11. 2010-11 Mail Surge Volume

Finance Distribution

The use of money in Afghanistan ranges from a source of morale for Soldiers to payment for building a road. Getting currency in theater is not as easy as going to an ATM and withdrawing it. It has to be hand carried from Germany all the way to the Soldier. So far in 2011 the 101st Financial Management Company supporting RC-E/N/C passed through its vaults over $469 million in US Dollars and Afghani. This article will discuss how money gets to the Soldier and why currency has to be retrograded out of Afghanistan.

Cash within theater is driven by two factors; demand and the cash holding authority (maximum cash allowed on hand) of the Disbursing Officer (DO) in theater. The daily operation of the disbursing office is handled by the Deputy Disbursing Officer (DDO). When US Dollars are needed the DDO will request money from the Theater Financial Management Center (TFMC) who will then order it from Germany. Once the US Currency is ordered the FM Co will have a team of 5-12 Soldiers fly to the TFMC in Kuwait and pick up the money and bring it back. This costs about $5600 round trip from Bagram to Kuwait and up to a week of travel time. If the DDO is in need of local currency, Afghani, they will order it from the local Afghan Bank, currently Afghanistan International Bank (AIB), instead of the TFMC, which is brought onto post by the bank. When US Dollars or Afghani are needed at the FM Det level the Disbursing Agent (DA) will request the money from the DDO. The FM Det will then send a team of three Soldiers to the FM CO to pick up the money needed. Travel time can be up to a week. Once the DA receives the currency they fund the Financial Management Support Teams (FMST), Class B agent, Field Ordering Officer/Paying Agent (FOO/PA) teams, and Project Payment Officer/Paying Agent (PPO/PA) teams.

The FMST is a group of three FM Soldiers that travel to locations that do not have full time FM support. These teams are responsible for providing Financial Management (FM) support to fill Soldiers needs. FMST teams are used at the request of the battlespace owners, usually BASEOPS. BASEOPS will coordinate travel and life support with the FM Det FMST to come to that location to provide FM support to the Soldiers. These teams move based on a hub and spoke method. Basically the FMST is located forward and

subsequently supports outlying locations from there. FMSTs cycle rotational schedule can be from a 14 day cycle to 180 day cycle depending on the needs of the battlespace owners. A Class B agent is an appointed NCO which provides cash to Soldiers and is used to augment a FMST cycle if the location is too remote. The use of FOO/PA teams and PPO/PA teams are used to purchase goods off the local economy and to pay vendors for services. These teams normally deal in local currency to make payments.

Movement of physical currency out of theater begins when a DA is approaching their cash holding authority or needs to exchange large denominations for smaller denominations. The DA will send a three person team to the FM Co to turn in the US currency or exchange it for smaller bills. After this is done, the DDO returns the dollars back to the TFMC with a team from the FM Co. This happens about 4-9 times a year at a cost of $5600 per trip. The source of retrograding cash out of theater is a result of deposits made by AAFES and Post Office. These deposits can reach upwards of $1.5M, normally in large denomination and are not reused by the FM Co. These denominations come from the local bank ATMs and AIB branch on post. AIB on post provides accounts for Other Country Nationals (OCN) and Local Nationals (LN) who are paid by Other Government Agencies, Contractors and Subcontractors on posts in Afghanistan. AIB has distributed $48M between the Kandahar, New Kabul Compound (NKC) and Bagram Airfield locations. This increases the cash on hand and increases the frequency at which dollars need to be retrograded costing the US Government $5K-$7K per retrograde.

BAF Fuel

Over the past three months, we continued to change fuel operations across the battlefield by creating additional direct delivery locations. Direct delivery from the supplier to the customer creates an efficient method by which the middleman, Bagram, is not the primary supplier to outlying locations. We also continued to create more hub suppliers, which enabled supply of fuel to the end user in less time. Fuel distribution drastically changed for the better, taking Soldiers off the road during the winter months for fuel distribution into arduous locations. Our capacity buildup in difficult locations also helped improve our fuel posture to sustain operations during the numerous Afghan holidays. In closing, direct delivery and all of the fuel improvements have set us up for success moving into the winter months.

Despite the numerous improvements in fuel distribution and support, there are several challenges that continue to plague accountability throughout the battlefield. Proper accountability of fuel receipts from host nation fuel tankers is a critical part of deterring pilferage of fuel. Fuel meters are an effective means of detecting hidden compartments in the host nation trucks that deliver the majority of the fuel to outlying FOBs. However, in order to provide the most accurate measurement, the meters need to calibrated and present. Both of these problems have yet to be resolved in their entirety across the AOR. A solution to have all meters in the AOR calibrated under the current DLA-E calibration contract is currently being reviewed as a possible course of action.

In addition to the direct measurement of fuel to maintain proper accountability, the completion and submission of DD 250s require constant attention to ensure their timely completion. The DD 250s, which are used to reconcile the receipt of fuel with the host nation truck carrier contractors, allow the military to validate payment to the contractor for services provided. Timely completion of these documents gives the military the opportunity to recoup funds for any amount fuel that has not been delivered per the original loading documentation. Delayed completion of these documents creates unnecessary friction with the carriers, and decreases the chances that the any amount of fuel that was not delivered will be properly annotated on the DD 250. Revision of the current DD 250 close-out process, wherein the location where fuel is uploaded is responsible for the generation and completion of the DD 250, is being staffed as a reliable method of eliminating many of the hurdles associated with the current DD 250 process.



Figure 12. Fuel Direct Deliveries

Ammunition Initiatives

Task Force Lifeliner began a key initiative during 4th Quarter called "Ammunition Clean Sweep (ACS). The goal of ACS is to push forward expedition teams forward to the battle space owners to help them identify explosive hazards and ammunition issues at their forward locations, improve their Ammunition Explosive (AE) storage sites , and identify unserviceable ammo and legacy ammo for retrograde.

Initially, Task Force Lifeliner put together a Site Assistance Visit Team (SAVT) consisting of a 101st CLV representative, a Logistics Ammunition Representative (LAR) and a Quality Assurance Specialist Ammunition Surveillance (QASAS). The intent of this team was to circulate the battlefield in order to inspect the serviceability of munitions and provide technical assistance for explosive safety practices. The reports that came back from the teams were disconcerting.

The SAVT identified an abundance of unserviceable ammunition that was allocated for combat use. It was evident that units did not have sufficient storage space to properly store munitions and the lack of space further contributed to explosive hazards.

As a result, Task Force Lifeliner lobbied to USFOR-A, USATCES, JSC-A, CJTF-1, ARCENT, JMC and AMC to combine efforts and support the Ammunition Clean Sweep efforts. Synchronizing the different agencies and partnerships, the Lifliners took lead over the planning, coordination and C2 for the Ammunition Clean Sweep mission. The alliance between each organization and efforts to pull together the teams, funding, and resources proved to be a challenge but not impossible.

Fifteen Task Force Lifeliner Soldiers trained for 30 days with the 592nd Ordinance Company and QASAS at the BAF ASP to prepare for the mission. They worked with each BSB in each battle space to allocate the resources, transportation and life support needed. By late July, five teams were put together and prepared to go out into each battle space as early as August. Presently, the teams are out in each battle space physically inventorying, identifying, teaching and assisting these sites with their clean up to support the removal of legacy munitions and unserviceable munitions from the battlefield.

The value to the maneuver units is that these teams are helping them sort through their unserviceable

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ammunition and preparing it for retrograde. The majority of the times, these sites are ran by Soldiers who often don't have the technical knowledge, the time or manpower to do this all on their own. Their mission is to supply the munitions necessary to keep the war fighters in the fight. The Ammunition Clean Sweep operations is directly contributing to the combat readiness of munitions serviceability and safety for the war fighters, company commanders, leaders and battle space owners.

Operation Ammunition Clean Sweep uncovered a challenge with munitions retrograde from BAF to Kuwait. The onset of Ramadan, followed by Eid al-Fitr, brought unserviceable munitions retrograde (i.e. hellfire missiles, small arms, GMLRS, MLRS pods) to a halt. These munitions were in need of repair and had to be returned to Kuwait for screening to determine which munitions could be repaired in Qatar, and which needed retrograde to CONUS. During the holidays the Kuwaitis limited the times the U.S. military could run convoys between Ali Al Salem and Camp Arifjan. 1st TSC and 230th SBDE were required to use the times allotted by the Kuwaiti Government to push serviceable munitions forward to the war fighter which prevented the use of bi-directional convoys to push retrograde of munitions from Bagram Airfield to Kuwait. To mitigate the issue, Task Force Lifeliner formed a Residue Working Group including the 395th Ordinance Company, Air Force Aerial Port Command Team, Customs, Movement Control Battalion, and Air Force Special handling. Together we were able to make arrangements to process residue retrograde material and ship via 747 from Bagram to CONUS aerial port and then direct to depot for final processing.

Green Belt Projects

The 101st Sustainment Brigade continues to collaborate with ARCENT's Lean Six Sigma Team through 38 projects to streamline distribution processes, create efficiencies in redistribution, improve container management, and build effective procedures throughout several commodities (Figure 13). These projects are currently being completed in conjunction with Green Belt certification for the project leaders. Three Green Belt classroom courses have now been completed, and new projects are being identified for follow-on Sustainment Brigades to initiate and complete during future tours. In combination with the improved contractor performance triggered by improved COR oversight and the COR Audit Board process, these projects improved efficiency, reduced backlog and avoided an estimated $82.5 million in container detention and truck demurrage charges thru 2014.



Figure 13, LSS Project Topics

Mobile Container Assessment Team (MCAT)

1st TSC provided two Mobile Container Assessment Teams (MCAT) to support the 101st Sustainment Brigade from Jan 11 – Jun 11. The MCATs primary responsibility is to conduct 100% of containers inside of GEOLOCs and provide additional, on-the-spot training at selected FOBs. During their time on ground the MCATs were able to inventory 12 FOBs, consisting of over 150 GEOLOCS. They inventoried 31,034 containers, of those they had to create over 7,403 in IBS-CMM and identified over 1,089 carrier owned containers, with a price tag of over $2.9 million. Their efforts were directly attributed to the inventory percentage of the estimated over 90,000 containers in Afghanistan's inventory rising from 40% to 67% and the detention decreasing from an estimated 4 million to less than 1 million dollars, with a cost savings of over $18 million dollars during their 6 month tenure.

The MCAT initiative has proven to yield significant results. Considering there are still tremendous challenges and opportunities for better container management in Afghanistan, the MCAT teams should be resourced to continue their important mission. Soldiers resourced from 1st TSC could come from Kuwait on temporary change of station (TCS) orders without counting against Afghanistan's force cap.

Mobile Retrograde Team (MRT)

From November 2010 to May 2011 the United States Air Force provided the 101st Sustainment Brigade a four man team to act as the Mobile Retrograde Team (MRT). The MRT is responsible for inventorying the contents of frustrated and abandoned containers around the CJOA-A, which allows for battle-space owners to re-allocate useable cargo and freeing up containers that are accumulating detention. In May 2011, the USAF tasker was cut and the 101st SBDE took Soldiers from within their ranks to create 2 organic MRTs of 5 Soldiers each. Their joint efforts have enabled 456 containers to be cleared out, with over 413,000 items being returned to the fight, with a very impressive cost savings of over $183 million dollars, and counting.

A third MRT team will be built from the 236th ICTC at Bagram with the mission to work abandoned unit containers at the BAF RSOI yard. This will ensure responsiveness at Bagram as the two existing MRT teams travel often to assist the other BCTs. As the ICTC is replaced with a contracted solution in 2012, the MRT concept should be contracted to ensure the mission continues.

RIC GEO

The 101st Sustainment Brigade, while working with the RIC GEO, JSC-A, SPO Distribution, CJ-7 Engineers in the Regional Command, the Engineer Brigade, and the Brigade Support Battalion at Sharana, was able to divert excess class IV away from Sharana to fill critical shortages across RC-East and RC-North. Through our initiatives, we were able to divert 846 containers of critical Class IV. On average, it costs $19,075 to ship a container from the U.S. to Afghanistan. Costs vary depending on whether the container is shipped through the Pakistan GLOC, which is dramatically cheaper, or through the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). CLIV is made up of lumber and other building materials that are primarily brought through the NDN which can range from $15,834 per 20' container, to $31,437 for 40' container. By diverting the CLIV containers that we were able to divert, we did not have to order that critical class IV as we were able to cross-level and fill the shortages from within Afghanistan--a procedure that previously was not being executed. Overall, our diversions created estimated savings to the government of $16,137,450.

Rhino Air

Rhino Air continues to turn its blades and is receiving rave reviews for its services. The air service is essentially alleviating much of the requirements that the Rhino Bus (ground service) has been responsible for. This is the first time during our 10 year occupation of Afghanistan that an air shuttle service has been offered in the Kabul Base Cluster. For the most part, customers are very satisfied and are taking full advantage of the opportunity. Since 10 June, Rhino Air has provided safe travel to over 1,000 passengers and

the requirements continue to grow on a daily basis. Its popularity is rising and it's hard to miss that little blue dot in the sky.

Aerial Delivery

During the past quarter, the Bagram Aerial Delivery Team pushed over 5.7 million pounds of various supplies to FOB's and COP's throughout RC-E, N, and S. Fuel remains the commodity, most commonly delivered via airdrop. As of today (08 October, 2011) the Airdrop Team has dropped a total of 17 million pounds, of various supplies, to the most remote locations throughout Afghanistan. The most recent triumph for the Airdrop Team, was the completion of a Type V Platform, Heavy Drop. The 101st dropped two Type V Platforms containing almost 30,000 pounds of CL IV items, to Dehdadi II. This was the first Type V Drop in Afghanistan since 2009 and marks the successful restoration of a significant asset. The 101st SBDE will be leaving the 10th SBDE with 10 complete Type V Airdrop Systems and the encouragement to maintain this capability.

Afghanistan is a very complex theater with poor infrastructure, mountainous terrain, extreme variants in weather, and roads caked with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and land mines.

To deploy a convoy, anywhere in Afghanistan, is a tremendous risk to the lives of our Soldiers. For this reason, airdrop is the Army's delivery method of choice for this theater.

The Army utilizes C-17s and C-130s (Air Force Aircraft) to drop Container Delivery Systems (CDS). These containers can be filled with any type of commodity weighing between 501 pounds and 2,200 pounds. A variety of parachute systems are used to deliver these containers and all provide a unique effect. The High Velocity (HV) parachute system allows the Army to drop durable items (MREs and Water) from higher altitudes with precision, but because of the high rate of decent (80' per second) they can only be used on such durable items. When dropping non-durable items (fuel and ammunition), the Army can choose to use the Low Velocity (LV) parachute system, which is not as precise as the HV Systems due to a slower decent (30' per second). The slower decent allows the bundles to drift further away from the intended point of impact (PI), but provides a much higher survivability rate. Then there are times in which there is a need for both precision and survivability and for these circumstances, the Army can chose the Firefly 2K Joint Precision Airdrop System (JPADS). The 2K JPADS are designed to hold a suspended weight between 501 pounds and 2,200 pounds. The JPADS can be dropped from 20,000' Mean Sea Level (MSL) and 10 miles away from their intended point of impact (PI) and land within 100 meters of the PI. The JPADS, like the LV Systems, drop at approximately 30' per second,

providing a high probability of commodity survival. Occasionally, there are units in need of resupply directly into their Forward Operating Base (FOB) due to the threat level of their surroundings and the inability to leave their sanctuary to set up and secure a drop zone. For situations such as this, the Army would choose to utilize the Low Cost Low Altitude (LCLA) resupply method. Units conduct LCLA drops out of CASA 212s (small fixed wing aircraft, contract aircraft & crew). This method allows the Army to drop small bundles weighing between 150 and 500 pounds of any commodity from 150' above ground level (AGL). LCLA is a very precise method and utilizes a parachute system that allows for a survivability rate similar to that of the LV System. This system is also commonly used for units that are on dismounted patrols and in need of resupply in small, precise amounts.

Effects of the loss of LCLA Capability: Several of the RC-E and RC-N FOBs/ COPs are located in areas that require daily/ weekly resupply via airdrop. Because of the confined locations of these FOBs/ COPs, LCLA is often the only means of resupply for the Soldiers defending these strong holds. Without LCLA, supplying these locations can be very difficult and even impossible. JPADS is generally not an option for such locations, due to the extremely limited Drop Zone space and the unit's inability to retrograde. After all, if retrograde was feasible there would be no need for airdrop resupply. Without LCLA Capabilities, these units must rely solely on sling-load operations for support. As viable as sling-load is, it does not have the quick response time of LCLA and cannot deliver

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an equal quantity per lift. LCLA is a tool that must be reestablished and maintained in Afghanistan. The LCLA Capability was initially lost in February 2011 and has not been reestablished to date (October 2011). The number one show stopper for LCLA, has been the lack of mandatory Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Certifications. The FAA has not allowed LCLA Operations, from contract aircraft, to proceed since February 2011. With the loss of CASA-212's, CJTF 1 has procured a new contract with Flight Works Airlift. Flight Works will be providing a DHC-4 to accommodate LCLA Operations throughout RC-E and N. The 101st Aerial Delivery Team will be conducting several test drops, in order to certify the DHC-4 for LCLA OPS.

JPADS Usage Increase Issues: The Air Force is intent on increasing the usage of JPADS, mainly to keep the aircraft and crews at a safe altitude. The 101st has completed five successful JPADS OPS from January – October, 2011. The most recent JPADS Operation resulted in 8 systems landing within 35 meters of the intended point of impact (PI). Despite these successful operations, JPADS is not the most popular Airdrop System for the Army. At 32,000 each, the Firefly 2K JPADS System cannot be considered for routine missions. As most of the locations that would require the JPADS Capability are air only, they are unable to retrograde the Autonomous Guided System back to Bagram. Without the retrograde of JPADS, we would lose $256,000 for every eight bundles delivered. With the variety of Airdrop Systems/ capabilities available, it does not seem sensible to make this restricted and expensive system the primary system of choice. JPADS must only be used for emergency situations and under circumstances where no other choice is available, due to terrain and or threat level.

The Future of Airdrop: As the Army continues to sustain the fight, there are requirements to continue improvements on the current Airdrop Systems. As the Army is interested in protecting its Soldiers, the Air Forces is equally interested in protecting its flight crews and airframes. The project managers at the Natick Massachusetts (Soldier Training and Development Center) are working on a low cost system that will provide the Army and Air Force with the ability to keep their personnel safe, and deliver the requested supplies with precision and survivability. What may be considered the Airdrop System of the future is the Improved Container Delivery System (ICDS). This system will allow the extraction of CDS Bundles from 20 thousand feet MSL, under a 15' Drogue Parachute (stabilizing Parachute). The 15' Drogue Parachute will stabilize the load and drop it very quickly to its intended target. At approximately 1,000' AGL, a release will allow for the deployment of a larger, low velocity parachute. The low velocity parachute will slow the descent and land the bundle safely and on target. In addition to this system, Natick Labs is also working on a similar system for the larger and heavier Type V Platforms. This innovative system will allow for the survivability and precision of JPADS at a fraction of the price.

Distribution Initiatives

During their deployment, Task Force Lifeliner introduced several initiatives which had very positive results. For example, Task Force Lifeliner drew on a proven concept – combat configured loads – to address the significant buildup of excess CLIV in theater. By developing a bill of materials (BoM) list for a standard B-hut, Task Force Lifeliner was able to ship over 100 pre-configured B-hut kits to both conventional and special operations units throughout RCs East and North. Prior to this initiative, units struggled to piece together the required materials to construct a B-hut. With the pre-configured kits, units requiring B-huts for FOB construction had complete kits delivered within a week of ordering them. The project – also nicknamed "the Schafer Shacks" – consisted of a 20' government-owned container filled with lumber, sheets of plywood, insulation, electrical hardware and other material needed to construct a complete open bay B-Hut. It also included blueprints and instructions on how to actually construct it. The project was very successful and proved that pre-configured kits should be resourced by Defense Logistics Agency in CONUS and shipped to theater as complete kits.

Another highly successful system which greatly enhanced Task Force Lifeliners' vehicle recovery capability was the Joint Recovery and Distribution System (JRaDS). This system addressed current shortfalls experienced with recovery operations in Afghanistan. What makes the JRaDS system unique is that it can perform both catastrophic vehicle recovery and distribution operations making it a multi-mission capable system. In addition to being able to recover MRAP vehicles up to 80,000 lbs it can also perform distribution missions by loading and transporting the following: 463L Pallets, 20 & 40 Ft ISO Containers, Flat Racks, CROPS, AH-64 & UH-60 Series Helicopters, and Construction & Engineering Vehicles.

Task Force Lifeliner currently has three JRaDS systems in inventory with a fourth currently in route. During their deployment, Task Force Lifeliner completed over 12 successful combat recovery missions including the recovery of an AH-64 helicopter. Without this system this aircraft could not have been recovered by any other means available. Because of these very successful results, Task Force Lifeliner submitted an Operational Needs Statement (ONS) for eight additional systems. Joint Sustainment Command – Afghanistan also placed an ONS for 76 additional systems intended to replace old M870 trailers at the task force BSB level.

The Task Force Lifeliner Container, Unitized Bulk Equipment (Lifeliner CUBE) originated with the need to eliminate issues with 500 gallon fuel blivets. The standard (round) blivet does not always stay in position when delivered, via sling-load, to any of the austere mountainous locations throughout RC-E and RC-N. When released from the hook of a CH-47, a blivet would bounce and roll until it burst. To alleviate this issue, the 101st Sustainment Brigade requested the development

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of a square blivet. The NATICK Massachusetts, Army Soldier Training and Development Lab was alerted to the need for a square blivet and thus created the Lifeliner CUBE. The Lifeliner CUBE consists of a Low Cost Net, plastic crate, liner, and square blivet with 2x hose connections. NATICK Labs created two types of blivets for the Lifeliner CUBE, water and fuel. The Lifeliner CUBE Crate can be lifted from any side by forklift. Multiple Lifeliner CUBES can be linked together and used as a Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP). During the 2010-11 deployment, Task Force Lifeliner procured and distributed a total of 54 Lifeliner CUBEs to both conventional and special operations forces. There are currently 100 additional systems on order and in route to Afghanistan.

In addition to the Lifeliner CUBE, Task Force Lifeliner partnered with NATICK Labs to test and implement a new Low Cost Helicopter Sling Load Cargo Net. The new net is produced from polypropylene and is significantly cheaper than conventional spliced rope production methods, requiring only 1/3 of the original cargo net cost but with the same strength. To date, Task Force Lifeliner has procured and distributed 154 of the low cost cargo nets as a component of the Lifeliner CUBE initiative. However, the nets can be used independently from the Lifeliner CUBE.

Closing

Afghanistan contains the most harsh, mountainous, and undeveloped terrain in the world. Heavy snows close mountain passes for weeks and rains wash away unimproved roads making them temporarily impassable. Severe weather and limited visibility impact both rotary and fixed-wing aircraft and the mountains channel their flight paths. The decentralized nature of the fight combined with severe terrain/weather, immature infrastructure and a determined enemy creates an environment requiring "anticipatory, masters-level logistics". Sustainment units that cannot predict logistics requirements and position them months in advance will leave the supported force short of critical requirements.

Over the past twelve months Task Force Lifeliner consistently turned these distribution challenges into opportunities by mastering the three pillars of "Three Dimensional Distribution", capacity, visibility, and control. Task Force Lifeliner optimized the use of every available node and mode of transportation; contract rotary and fixed-wing aircraft, combat logistics patrols, low-cost low-altitude aerial delivery, green air, Air Force CDS aerial delivery, and host-nation trucks (capacity); refined the use of the Joint Distribution Management Center to see unit distribution requirements and strategic, operational, and tactical distribution assets moving on the battlefield (visibility); and used the daily Distribution Management Board to execute operational battle command and align distribution assets with movement priorities (control).

The Duke of Wellington once said during the Peninsular War "It is necessary to trace a biscuit from Lisbon into a man's mouth on the frontier, and provide for its removal from place to place, by land and by water, or no military operations can be carried on." This statement, made 200 years ago, is just as applicable today. As Task Force Lifeliner concludes combat logistics operations during OEF XI and hands off this critical mission to the 10th Sustainment Brigade, the team was successful in the distribution of more than 300 million pounds of cargo by ground and air using every available asset. At the same time, Task Force Lifeliner saved the U.S. government over $200 million through cost savings and cost avoidance initiatives as it provided flawless support to thirteen brigade combat teams, special operations forces, and interagency teams.

As Task Force Lifeliner departs theater, other Lifeliners remain in the fight both in Afghanistan and Iraq. In fact, every day since 9-11 there has been a Lifeliner in the fight. Until our next rendezvous with destiny,

"LIFELINERS!!" AIR ASSAULT!!