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

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

DEPARTMENTS

ON THE COVER
A Malian soldier practices marksmanship under the watchful eyes of an SF adviser.
U.S. Army photo

SUBMISSIONS

Special Warfare welcomes submissions of scholarly, independent research from members of the armed forces, security policy-makers and -shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists and civilians from the United States and abroad.

Manuscripts should be 2,500 to 3,000 words in length. Include a cover letter. Submit a complete biography with author contact information (i.e., complete mailing address, telephone, fax, e-mail address).

Manuscripts should be submitted in plain text, double-spaced, and in a digital file. End notes should accompany works in lieu of embedded footnotes. Please consult *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 15th Edition, for footnote style.

Submit graphics, tables and charts with source references in separate files from the manuscript (no embedded graphics). *Special Warfare* may accept high-resolution (300 dpi or greater) digital photos; be sure to include a caption and photographer's credit. Prints and 35 mm transparencies are also acceptable. Photos will be returned, if possible.

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Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

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One of the primary missions of Special Forces Soldiers has always been the training of foreign military forces. These missions have long taken advantage of SF soldiers' military skills, language proficiency and ability to understand and influence other people.

Two articles in this issue of *Special Warfare* give readers an idea of the range and sensitivity of foreign-training missions and their role in foreign internal defense. As Lieutenant Colonel John Mulbury points out in his article, the mission of training foreign forces is receiving greater emphasis by the Army than ever before. Foreign internal defense is also part of the indirect approach that is a significant factor in the U.S. Special Operations Command's strategy for the Global War on Terrorism. With the greater emphasis on foreign internal defense, and the magnitude of the task at hand, conventional forces will continue to be tasked for some foreign-training missions. But as Mulbury explains, FID is complex. It has aspects other than military action, and even the military aspect involves more activities than simply foreign military training. Some FID missions are appropriate for ARSOF and some for conventional forces, and there is no quick rule of thumb for assigning missions to one force or another. The requirements of the mission will determine which force is most appropriate.

In his article on the challenges of service as a military adviser, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Grdovic shows that foreign military training can be a complex activity. If an adviser is to be more than a liaison officer, he must be able to achieve influence with host-nation forces, and that influence will be a product of his rapport with his counterparts, his credibility and the value of the training he provides. Achieving influence can be difficult if the counterpart resents having an adviser, is reluctant to admit that he needs advice or questions the adviser's credibility. Factors such as the adviser's persuasive skills, military experience, regional and cultural knowledge, and ability to speak the language can contribute greatly toward establishing rapport and credibility.

Special Forces selects and trains Soldiers to meet these requirements and have historically performed many of the advisory and foreign-training missions that the U.S. government has directed. Today, we continue to emphasize adaptability and persuasiveness in our training, as well as the need for regional knowledge, and language and interpersonal communication skills. FID will always require a force that has political sensitivity, as well as an ability to understand the people and to work by, with and through them. Special Forces Soldiers have both, and they have the command of military skills necessary for them to be expert trainers.

The Quadrennial Defense Review published in 2006 re-emphasizes the long-term importance of FID to ultimate success in the GWOT. FID is a core mission for us, and ARSOF units must understand the concepts and master the skills discussed in this issue. We at the Special Warfare Center and School remain committed to this mission. Our partners, our allies and our Nation demand no less.

Major General James W. Parker

RANGER NAMED SOLDIER OF THE YEAR

A Soldier from the 75th Ranger Regiment, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, has been named the Army's Soldier of the Year.

Specialist Heyz Seeker, an automatic rifleman with Company C, 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort Benning, Ga., earned the title by winning the Army's Best Warrior Competition, held Oct. 1-5 at Fort Lee, Va.

Twenty-six warriors from 13 major commands competed in the NCO and Soldier of the Year competition, which saw the warriors in a battle of skills, wits, physical prowess and leadership.

"These soldiers are masters of development and self-study," Sergeant Major of the Army Kenneth Preston said in an awards ceremony at the Association of the United States Army conference.

To compete in the Best Warrior Competition, Soldiers must have won the title at the local and regional levels. The final competition combines tests of land-navigation skills, weapons fundamentals, marksmanship, preventive maintenance, fitness, first aid, Army history and more.

"This competition addresses a wide variety of matters. These Soldiers are experts in every category," Preston said.

On the final day of the contest, the 26 competitors, fatigued from days of battle-skills tests, endured a barrage of "mystery tests," including an exercise to egress a Humvee under attack, starting an IV on a Soldier, a test of their "shoot or no shoot" decision-making in an engagement-skills trainer and participation in a combatives tournament.

^ **TOP WARRIOR** Specialist Heyz Seeker, an automatic rifleman with Company C, 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, was named the U.S. Army Soldier of the Year during the Association of the United States Army conference in Washington, D.C., Oct. 8. *U.S. Army photo.*

"All 26 of these Soldiers, they are all winners out there. The competition is a tribute to the company commanders and first sergeants that are out there today," Preston said.

Seeker is a native of Grover, Calif. A veteran of both Iraq and Afghanistan, he is airborne-qualified, as well as having the Ranger tab and combat-lifesaver qualification.

Staff Sergeant Shane A. Cherry, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command's NCO of the Year, also competed in the Best Warrior Competition.

SORB SOLDIER NAMED USAREC NCO OF THE YEAR

A Soldier from the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion was selected as the U.S. Army Recruiting Command NCO of the Year at the recruiting command's annual leaders training conference, held in Denver Oct. 16.

Staff Sergeant Mark Hawver is a Special Forces engineer sergeant and a Special Forces recruiter stationed at Fort Drum, N.Y. Staff Sergeant Phillip Spaugh, also of the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion, was the runner-up.

For the USAREC competition, testing was conducted in four parts: the Army Physical Fitness Test, an essay, a written test and a formal board.

"The most difficult part was the formal board," said Hawver. "Some of the questions that were asked were not the ones I thought they would ask, even though they were in the study guide."

"The competition for NCO of the Year was tough: There were six other NCOs from USAREC competing, and all performed very well," Hawver added.

"I believe the margin of victory was very small," Hawver said. "And it is significant because it is a major command-wide competition, in which only one NCO is named the winner. To be honest, it doesn't really seem all that important to me, but everyone tells me it is a big deal."

Hawver and Spaugh were also inducted into the Sergeant Audie Murphy Club Nov. 2.

"It is an honor to be inducted in the Sergeant Audie Murphy Club," Hawver stated. "To me it is, more than anything, an excellent way to honor and commemorate a great American Soldier who served his country in exemplary fashion, and I am glad to be a part of that." — *Sergeant Curtis Squires, SWCS PAO.*

^ **STAR STRUCK** Six Soldiers from the 3rd Special Forces Group were awarded Silver Stars during a ceremony at Fort Bragg, N.C., Oct. 4. *Photo by Gillian M. Albro, USASOC PAO.*

3RD SPECIAL FORCES GROUP SOLDIERS HONORED

Thirty-nine members of the 3rd Special Forces Group, based at Fort Bragg, N.C., received awards, during a ceremony held on Meadows Field Oct. 4, for their valorous actions over the course of their last deployment to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

"This is more than a great day for the 3rd Special Forces Group and our families; this is a remarkable day," said Colonel Christopher K. Haas, commander, 3rd SF Group, during his closing remarks. "I would even characterize it for the 3rd Special Forces Group as a historic day."

During the ceremony, Soldiers received six Silver Star Medals, eight Purple Heart Medals, 15 Bronze Star Medals and 23 Army Commendation Medals for valor. Haas said that the number of awards presented during the ceremony correlates to the increase in enemy activity experienced during the deployment, compared to the group's previous deployments.

The citations gave accounts of an emboldened enemy in Afghanistan who has increased in size and sophistication of attacks against U.S., Afghan and coalition forces. The theme that rang more clearly with each citation was that of the grit and valor of the Green Berets to succeed against overwhelming odds.

For one Silver Star recipient, it was the recognition, more than the award itself, that was most gratifying and humbling.

"The individual who wrote the award and suggested that it is what I deserve, that is what means a lot to me," said Sergeant First Class Matthew J. Julian, Company B, 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group.

"Ninety percent of the time, it is someone who has more experience than you, and you look up to them. It means a lot to have some one you look up to say, 'What you did was outstanding, and you deserve this award.' That is what I appreciate the most."

Although the awards were given to individuals, the recipients viewed the recognition as being larger than themselves.

"I went over with a great team, and we all did what we had to do," said Silver Star recipient Master Sergeant Haldon H. Huber, Company B, 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group. "Each and every one of them deserve this moment."

Huber, who also received two Bronze Stars with "V" device, was credited in his citation with moving his vehicle forward under the intense fire of an ambush to draw the enemy's fire away from members of his patrol who were pinned down. Once the fire became too intense, he exited the vehicle so that he could return fire with a 60 mm mortar to allow the rest of the patrol to withdraw and consolidate. With the group reorganized, Huber then assisted in evacuating and providing aid to the casualties. As the patrol made its way back to the firebase, Huber returned fire and covered the trail of the patrol for more than six kilometers.

During closing remarks, Lieutenant General Robert Wagner, commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, gave credit to all of the Soldiers gathered on the field.

"We gave some awards to some very distinguished individuals," said Wagner. "But from my perspective, there is not a person on this field who isn't a hero — a hero of our nation. Each one of you represents the very best of America." — *USASOC PAO*

REUNION BRINGS SF SOLDIERS FACE-TO-FACE WITH THEIR HEROES

Baseball players have their heroes — Cobb, Ruth, Mantle and Mays. Special Forces Soldiers also have their heroes — Donovan, Bank, Peers and Eifler — all leaders within the Office of Strategic Services during World War II.

More than 60 years later, members of Detachment 101, in which William Peers and Carl Eifler served, were honored by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, at the detachment's reunion Oct. 11-13.

While at Fort Bragg, the veterans toured the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Museum, were briefed by USASOC commanders, observed Special Forces training and equipment demonstrations, fired current weapons and swapped stories with today's Special Forces Soldiers.

"They were the forefathers for the force today," said Lieutenant General Robert W. Wagner, commander of USASOC. "They are people you have read about and studied about. It's a historic moment when we get a chance to meet these people and share and show them what today's Soldiers are capable of doing."

During the Burma campaign, Detachment 101 had the mission to conduct reconnaissance behind enemy lines and build relationships with the indigenous populace. After a year of operations, with no more than 120 members operating at any one time, the detachment was able to build and train a force of more than 10,000 native Burmese Kachin tribesmen. The detachment also conducted search-and-rescue operations for downed allied pilots, achieving 425 successful rescues.

^ **WAR STORIES** Herb Auerbach, a veteran of OSS Detachment 101, shares the memory of how he sliced off part of his finger with a machete. Staff Sergeant Jesse Davis, 2nd Battalion, 7th SF Group, listens intently.

^ **CHOW TIME** Office of Strategic Services Detachment-101 veteran Peter Lutken, left, and British SAS veteran Lord John Slim, right, prepare their Meals Ready to Eat with the help of Major General James W. Parker, commander, John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, and Staff Sergeant Michael D. Willingham, USASOC, during the detachment's annual reunion, which was held at Fort Bragg Oct. 11-13. *Photos by Sergeant First Class Jason B. Baker, USASOC PAO.*

As their association's Web site claims, "They pioneered the unique art of unconventional warfare, later incorporated as fundamental combat skills for our Army Special Forces. They have been credited with the highest 'kill/loss ratio' for any infantry-type unit in American military history."

On the final day of the reunion, the "101ers" and their families attended the official ribbon-cutting ceremony for a special exhibit dedicated to the OSS at the U.S. Army Airborne & Special Operations Museum in downtown Fayetteville, N.C.

For many of the family members, it was the first opportunity they had to learn what their relatives did during the war.

"Normally, I'm a pretty quiet guy," said Detachment 101 radio operator John Breen. "When I got around you guys, I just didn't know when to shut up."

Their Green Beret escorts were all too eager to listen to every word they had to say.

"To actually hear their first-hand accounts of what they did is just unbelievable," said Staff Sergeant Jesse Davis, 2nd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group. "We would come upon an exhibit, and he would say, 'I was right there; we did this at nighttime, and when we woke up, the geese were flying overhead,' or 'We jumped into that rice paddy, right there.' We could spend three months with them and never get tired."

All around the exhibit, memories were being rekindled by the artifacts and photographs on display.

Hunched over a display case containing a captured Japanese flag and a machete, OSS veteran Herb Auerbach described to a group of Soldiers what it was like to hack through the thick jungle and the accident he had one day using a similar machete.

"I would hold the branches back with one hand and chop through with the other," the former Detachment 101 cryptographer said. "Well, one time I got it a little too close and took off this part of my finger right here."

Auerbach later was flown to a hospital for treatment of infections and lost all of his nails.

Nine members of the detachment, one distinguished guest, two Burmese nationals and several friends and family members were able to attend this year's reunion.

The Detachment 101 members were Sam Spector, Oliver Trechter, Peter Lutken, John Dempsey, Allen Richter, Ed Wrenn, John Breen, Herb Auerbach and Dan Weinstein.

The distinguished guest and Detachment 101 Association supporter was Lord John Slim, the son of Field Marshal William Joseph Slim, the commander of British forces in Burma during World War II. — *USASOC PAO*

7TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP SOLDIERS HONORED

Three Soldiers from the 7th Special Forces Group were awarded the Silver Star, and three others were awarded the Bronze Star Medal with "V" device, in a valor ceremony held at the United States Army Special Operations Command headquarters Nov. 15.

The following Soldiers received the Silver Star: Captain Sheffield Ford III, of Dixon, Calif.; Master Sergant Thomas D. Maholic (posthumous award), of Bradford, Pa.; and Staff Sergeant (retired) Matthew Binney, of Payson, Ariz.

The following Soldiers received the Bronze Star Medal with V device:

Sergeant First Class Ebbon E. Brown, of Annapolis, Md.; Staff Sergeant Charles Lyles, of St. Petersburg, Fla.; and Staff Sergeant Michael Sanabria, of Cleburne, Texas.

Maholic, who was mortally wounded during the operation, was represented by his wife, Wendy, and his son, Andrew, in the ceremony.

^ **SHINING STAR** Lieutenant General Robert Wagner presents a Silver Star to Captain Sheffield Ford III. *Photo by Gillian M. Albro, USASOC PAO.*

"The events that took place are what history is made of and what you would see on television," said Major General Thomas Csrnko, commander of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command. "Regardless of this, each one of these men would simply say that they were doing their job and taking care of their fellow teammates."

The awards were presented to the six service members for their actions in Operation Kaika, June 23-24, 2006, in Afghanistan. The operation was designed to capture or kill Taliban leadership in the Panjawi District in the southern part of the country.

SF detachment A-765 and supporting elements fought alongside 48 Afghan National Army soldiers in a 17-hour firefight that claimed the lives of two American Soldiers, three interpreters and an estimated 125 insurgent fighters, including two enemy field commanders.

"Each team member played an integral part in the success of our mission and our very survival," said Ford. "There were times when we were surrounded, but we never gave up, and we never backed down. These men that fought alongside me are the ones that really deserve recognition today."

Silver and bronze medals for valor have long been used to recognize Soldiers who show exceptional bravery and proficiency on the battlefield. The Silver Star is the fourth highest overall award that can be given in the military, and the third highest for valor. The Bronze Star Medal, when awarded with the V device, is the fourth highest combat award.

NEW PROGRAM HELPS SF ENLISTED SOLDIERS EARN COLLEGE DEGREES

A new education program offers enlisted Soldiers in five Special Forces military occupational specialties the chance to apply their military training and experience toward credit for college degrees.

The University of Maryland University College, or UMUC, in conjunction with the Servicemembers Opportunity Colleges Army Degree program, now offers degree programs for SF Soldiers in MOSs 18B (weapons), 18C (engineer), 18E (communications), 18F (intelligence) and 18Z (senior sergeant). The degree programs are designed as distance-learning programs to give SF Soldiers the flexibility to continue their education regardless of their home station.

Soldiers in all five MOSs can pursue associate of arts and bachelor of science degrees in management studies. SF communications sergeants also have the option of pursuing associate's and bachelor's degrees in computer studies.

UMUC requires that Soldiers enrolled in the bachelor's program earn at least 25 percent of their degree credit hours (30 semester hours) through UMUC. At least 15 semester hours must be earned through upper-level courses (300- and 400-level). At least half of the credit hours applied toward a student's major (18 semester hours) must also be upper-level course work. Half of the credit applied toward the major must also be earned through graded coursework. UMUC distance-learning courses can meet these requirements.

SF medical sergeants can already earn college degrees through a program offered by Western Carolina University. Interested Soldiers can view all the MOS degree plans online by going to: http://www.soc.aascu.org/socad/ACD.html#MOSList. Click on the appropriate MOS under the "Army Career Degree Plans listed by MOS" link.

Soldiers can also contact UMUC's military advising team by visiting their Web site at http://www.umuc.edu/index.shtml or by calling 1-877-275-8682. They can also call or visit their local Army education center.

SOFTWARE MATRIX DEVELOPED TO SUPPORT MILITARY LANGUAGE REQUIREMENTS

The Army Special Operations Forces Language Office, or ARSOFLO, in conjunction with the SOF Language Office of the United States Special Operations Command, has made an extensive suite of language-learning software applications and content available to all military and civilian members of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

The CL-150 Technology Matrix for Critical Languages, developed by Transparent Language, Inc., is designed to support the foreign-language requirements of U.S. military personnel. ARSOFLO is responsible for providing USASOC's oversight and feedback to the CL-150 initiative and is a CL-150 commissioning organization.

SOFTWARE

The CL-150 matrix consists of five core software applications, each of which supports a number of languages and can operate on a variety of platforms. The CL-150 matrix generally supports Windows desktop and laptop, Palm PDA, Pocket PC PDA and Web-browser formats, but not all component applications are supported on all platforms. The CL-150 applications are:

Talker. This application provides basic, multi-language, one-way communication. The user selects an English phrase from a list, and the device will display and speak that phrase in the selected target language. Supported platforms are Windows desktop and laptop systems, Palm PDA devices and Pocket PC PDA devices.

Rapid Rote. This application allows the user to review and learn vocabulary, phrases and sentences with proper pronunciation and to make and edit new lists on the fly. Supported platforms are Windows desktop and laptop systems, Palm PDA devices and Pocket PC PDA devices. The application also converts files for use on MP3 players.

Alphabet Exploder. This application allows users to understand and learn the alphabet of the target language.

LanguagePro. This application allows users to build skills in a target language using a range of activities. It features video-based scenarios, multiple audio renditions, fully contextualized grammar linking, word-level and sentence-level meaning, native pronunciation comparison, and specialized military and intelligence role-playing situations. Supported platforms are Windows desktop and laptop systems.

Culture Overview and Reference. This interactive multimedia application allows users to learn about the people, lands, religions, economies and governments associated with a target language. It features topic introductions and detailed reference materials.

LANGUAGES

The CL-150 focuses particularly on languages of national-security interest. It includes tactical language kits that allow users to learn language and culture beginning at the zero level. Tactical language kits are now available in Chechen, Hindi, Iraqi, Pashto, Farsi, Tagalog and Urdu. Other kits will be available in the future.

CL-150 also provides more than 100 video-based immersion environments for LanguagePro. These are currently available in Arabic (MSA), Armenian, Azerbaijani, Chechen, Chinese (Mandarin), Dari, Farsi, Georgian, Hindi, Indonesian, Iraqi, Korean, Pashto, Punjabi, Russian, Kurdish (Sorani), Tagalog, Turkmen and Urdu.

CL-150 offers more than 1,000 vocabulary and phrase-learning lists for use with Talker and Rapid Rote. These lists were developed either by U.S. government organizations or by Transparent Language, Inc., under government commission.

DOMAINS

The specialized military and intelligence domains addressed by CL-150 content include military control checkpoint, open skies treaty interview, basic personal data interview, displaced-persons assistance, Civil Affairs needs assessment, force-protection interview, nuclear treaty interview, strategic-arms verification interview, enemy-prisoner-of-war questioning, constabulary patrol, basic WMD interview, WMD follow-up, directions and arrangements, Level II personal data interview, personal/vehicle search, and basic medic.

Authorized users may obtain copies of the CL-150 applications and an authorization code from their unit command language program manager, or CLPM, or download them from the Transparent Language, Inc., Web site (www.transparentlanguage.com/usg).

The following is a list of unit CLPMs and their contact information:

Command Language Program Managers		
U.S. Army Special Operations Command	Terry Schnurr	(910) 432-6699
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3rd Special Forces Group	Mickey Taylor	(910) 432-8340
5th Special Forces Group	CW4 Joe Shakeenab	(270) 956-3300
7th Special Forces Group	SFC Philip Carter	(910) 432-3503
10th Special Forces Group	SFC Lance Barrett	(719) 526-3724
19th Special Forces Group	SFC Shad Holden	(801) 523-4516
20th Special Forces Group	CW2 Kenneth Waller	(205) 957-2309
USA JFK Special Warfare Center & School	Rusty Restituyo	(910) 907-2941
1st Special Warfare Training Group	John Barrera	(910) 432-4018
95th CA Brigade	SFC Telemachus Harrison	(910) 907-3842
4th PSYOP Group	Debra Ambrose	(910) 432-0232
1/75th Ranger Regiment	1LT Nathan Pullin	(912) 315-6410
2/75th Ranger Regiment	CPT Dallen Arny	(253) 967-5211
3/75th Ranger Regiment	SFC Lee Garcia	(706) 545-6952

Integrating Intelligence With Operations

BY CAPTAIN MIKE ERWIN



"Intelligence drives operations" — perhaps no phrase is heard more often on today's battlefields in Afghanistan and Iraq. Understanding the enemy — who he is, what motivates him, where he is located and how he fights — is critical to planning and conducting successful operations in an unconventional warfare, or UW, environment.

Accurate and timely intelligence often makes the difference between success and failure in the cities and villages and on the lines of communication. For military units to successfully combat an insurgency, especially a Special Forces task force that uses such a small force structure, every mission must be focused upon affecting the enemy in some shape or form. Sometimes this means aggressive lethal operations targeting the enemy on the battlefield; other times, it involves eroding the enemy's influence over the populace with effective nonlethal missions. Regardless of the method used, conducting operations that are truly intelligence-driven will have a significant impact on the enemy, thus weakening the insurgency.

The operating environment is driven by an understanding of the enemy. Gaining this understanding requires efficient intelligence-gathering apparatuses and analysis, because the enemy is constantly adapting his techniques, tactics and procedures to combat coalition forces. Intelligence support at the SF-battalion level has changed drastically over the past six years.

Today's SF battalion's military intelligence detachment, or MID, consists of two analysts of imagery intelligence, or IMINT; five of signals intelligence, or SIGINT; five of human intelligence, or HUMINT; and eight all-source analysts. The demand for intelligence at the tactical level has created changes that allow the MID to provide necessary intelligence to the battalion commander and Special Forces detachments in a timely manner.

Just as the force structure of the intelligence shop has changed since 2001, so have the functions performed to accurately track the enemy in the contemporary UW operating environment. Gone are the days of acetate and enemy order of battle. They have been replaced by complex and nontraditional databases that are necessary for monitoring everything from attacks to shifts in enemy leadership.

The process of gathering intelligence is facilitated by all facets of collection. Real-time intelligence-surveillance reconnaissance is one component. Unmanned aerial vehicles patrol the skies above the battlefield to monitor enemy movement, enabling the IMINT analysts to provide the battalion commander with a current enemy disposition during an engagement. IMINT fulfills other functions, such as providing pattern-of-life data and monitoring known enemy compounds. IMINT analysts also facilitate operations by providing SF detachments with the most updated maps and by performing terrain analysis.

SIGINT is necessary for generating an assessment of the enemy. Interception of enemy communications provides an understanding of their intentions, fighter strength, supply status and morale. SIGINT also helps to track enemy movement on the battlefield, providing knowledge of the enemy's priorities and enabling a predictive analysis to determine the enemy's next step. All of this collection helps to drive operations to the areas where they will have the most effect against the enemy.

Accurate HUMINT is critical to understanding the enemy, as well as to determining which operations must be conducted. Gathering HUMINT is one of the best methods for keeping a pulse on the populace, and it can be accomplished in several ways. Informants provide coalition forces information on the enemy, such as where they store weapons and where they live. Patrols also acquire this information through the indigenous military force.

In Afghanistan, the Afghan National Army engages the populace in the villages and bazaars to determine what presence the enemy has in the area and what methods they are using to control and influence the locals. This information is later gathered by the tactical HUMINT teams and passed to the battalion intelligence section by electronic dissemination; enabling operations officers to differentiate between areas that require more supplies for humanitarian assistance and locations that require more direct operations.

The final component of the intelligence process is the fusion of all the intelligence disciplines by the all-source section, which is staffed by analysts who create finished intelligence products to support the commander and the SF detachments. Over the past decade, all-source analysts' jobs have evolved, with today's analyst possessing the capability to integrate all aspects of information in the intelligence field and to be able to write papers and brief his assessments to a wide range of audiences at various tactical and operational levels. It is essential that the all-source section manage the overwhelming flow of intelligence reporting, ensuring the quick dissemination of the right intelligence reports to the SF detachments and other organizations.

One of the challenges in an intelligence shop is the integration of the different forms of intelligence. During the operations of Special Operations Task Force 31 in Afghanistan, from August 2006 to April 2007, we found

"Recent years of fighting insurgencies have demonstrated that the most effective lethal operations are accomplished by effects-based targeting."

^ **INTEL HUB** 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group's placement of the maximum number of the analysts that space allowed — SIGINT, HUMINT, IMINT and all-source — in the same room to facilitate cross-talk between each element enabled a seamless flow of intelligence between the disciplines and allowed the all-source analysts to ask the subject-matter experts for clarification on reports. *U.S. Army photo.*

it beneficial to place the maximum number of the analysts that space allowed — SIGINT, HUMINT, IMINT and all-source — in the same room to facilitate cross-talk between each element. This enables a seamless flow of intelligence between the disciplines and allows the all-source analysts to ask for clarification on reports. Otherwise, in a high operational environment, it is very easy to allow intelligence to become compartmentalized for hours at a time. Avoiding this trap is essential to providing timely and accurate intelligence to the commander and SF detachments.

SOTF-31 employed a weekly intelligence update brief to ensure that the commander was aware of the changes in the enemy situation and intentions throughout the battlefield.

In this meeting, the intelligence officer cites recent reports to provide an assessment regarding the enemy and how it has shifted focus from the previous week. This also affords the commander a chance to ask the intelligence section questions to improve his understanding of the enemy for the week ahead. The intelligence update provides the commander with the latest intelligence assessment to facilitate his issuing of guidance to the operations section and the SF detachments.

Internal synchronization of intelligence within a unit is vital, but coordination with external units, especially in coalition warfare, is important to ensure that a common intelligence picture is understood and is driving operations across the battlefield. The enemy does not operate under the constraint of provincial boundaries, so their activity in one unit's area of operations, or AO, regularly affects another unit's battlespace. Today in Afghanistan, a separate AO often means an entirely different country. For these reasons, we found it beneficial to hold a one-day intelligence synchronization conference every quarter. Intelligence professionals from many different units gather to discuss their perspective on the enemy, enabling a more detailed understanding of the insurgency for all personnel involved. Critical to success of the overall mission in Afghanistan is the integration of coalition partners into the intelligence process.

^ **HUMINT COLLECTION** Through their contact with the populace, teams can gather information about the enemy presence and the methods they are using to control and influence the locals. That information can be relayed to the intelligence section electronically, giving immediate updates on areas that require more humanitarian assistance. *U.S. Army photo.*

Coalition partners must be brought into every aspect of intelligence processes; working closely with other nations, despite national caveats, will help improve intelligence collection and influence operations.

The unified structure of the intelligence section plays a critical role in the successful synthesis of the intelligence shop, but that is only half of the equation. The former commander of the 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group, Lieutenant Colonel Donald Bolduc, said, "Operations and intelligence fusion is the most critical function in an Operation Center. In a COIN (counterinsurgency) environment, intelligence drives operations, and if you are not organized to facilitate bottom-up planning and top-down guidance, your I/O campaign will be ineffective, and you will not conduct the right operations at the right time and at the right place to have a disrupting effect on the enemy infrastructure and a positive effect on the populace."

Two-way communication and daily discussions are essential to establishing seamless operations on the battlefield. The operations and intelligence sections located at the battalion headquarters coordinate with the SF detachments on a daily basis by phone, FM radio, Internet chat or electronic mail, ensuring that the commander is cognizant of the changes in the operational environment.

One of the most important roles the intelligence shop plays is identifying the enemy's overarching strategy and plans for accomplishing his goals. This process is cyclical because of the enemy's adaptive nature — and his demonstrated tendency to change with the seasons. An accurate intelligence picture drives operations by enabling the development of a force structure to effectively counter the enemy's plans. After receiving the intelligence, the operations section determines where they can best attack the insurgency, while simultaneously supporting the populace. We have noted that placing a firebase inside a populace center is ineffective, because it allows the enemy to attack but keeps SF from making a direct response because of the threat of col-

lateral damage. The most successful firebases are those separated from the populace centers but located close enough to project a presence that will prevent the insurgents from coercing support from the population.

Intelligence not only determines where reconnaissance patrols must go but also the mission they execute once they leave the firebase. Fused and analyzed intelligence helps to identify where the enemy's command-and-control nodes are located, as well as the villages where the populace is being intimidated. Acquiring this knowledge is critical to planning every mission, because it focuses the SF detachments in the right direction. Conducting operations for the sake of conducting operations is a misuse of time and resources.

The effective fusion of intelligence and operations helps the SF detachments determine whether they need to clear a line of communication, conduct a psychological operation, meet with the village elders to discuss a problem or distribute supplies for humanitarian assistance needed to build rapport with a certain village. Executing the wrong type of mission is counterproductive; it can actually benefit the enemy and have a negative impact on the populace. The conduct of an appropriate intelligence-driven mission will have the opposite effect: It will erode the strength of the enemy and increase the support and trust of the people for the coalition.

The enemy dictates whether the appropriate type of operation for an area will be lethal or nonlethal. In the lethal realm, understanding the enemy is critical to planning for the mission. How many fighters are there? Is there a key leader located in the village? What type of weapons are they armed with? Where does the terrain favor the enemy and are they likely to set up an ambush? Having answers to these questions before a patrol leaves the firebase enables an SF detachment to be successful in the event of an enemy attack.

Another component of intelligence-operations fusion in the lethal realm involves targeting key leadership. An SF battalion has the most significant impact on the enemy and the populace when it maintains a consistent presence in the villages and on its lines of communication. The planning cycle required to effectively target an insurgent leader is intense, often requiring several weeks of intelligence collection and analysis before the conditions are set for mission execution. The time and effort required to develop an accurate intelligence picture takes away from the SF detachment's ability to project a presence into the populace centers. This time is critical, because it provides the enemy with an unimpeded opportunity to expand his influence over the villagers through information operations and intimidation campaigns. The enemy cannot be afforded these opportunities, because he will seize them to gain control over the populace.

The insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq have taught the intelligence community a valuable lesson in recent years: Successful targeting of enemy leadership is relatively ineffective

^ **LETHAL TARGETING** Direct-action missions do not defeat the enemy, but they may be necessary to weed out the insurgency's expertise. The planning required for targeting is intense, often requiring several weeks of collection and analysis. *U.S. Army photo.*

at hindering the insurgency's ability to operate. The Iraqi insurgency has only grown in size and capacity since its leader, al-Zarqawi, was killed. Coalition forces in Afghanistan killed numerous Taliban leaders in 2006, yet it was the insurgency's strongest year to date. A structured insurgency is filled with power-hungry and capable leaders; when one is killed, there are five men ready to fill his shoes.

Focusing lethal operations in areas where the enemy operates freely deals the insurgency a bigger blow than the sporadic loss of some of its leaders. Lethal operations set the insurgency back, making possible further intelligence-collection and analysis. That collection and analysis will make it easier to determine where the enemy presence is strongest and to coordinate operations that will target that area in a timely fashion.

In September 2006, in the Panjawayi District of the Kandahar Province, lethal operations derailed Taliban plans to control Kandahar City by the winter. Our unit targeted the area — but not particular leaders in the area — and achieved great success. However, the continual SF presence in the area forced the enemy's leaders to step onto the battlefield to lead their fighters, exposing themselves in ways they typically avoid. The result was that five Taliban commanders were killed in action. By applying the same principle, SOTF-31 achieved similar effects in other districts and provinces throughout southern and western Afghanistan.

Although recent years of fighting insurgencies have demonstrated that the most effective lethal operations are accomplished by effects-based targeting, that is not to say that targeting insurgent leaders is unimportant. Direct-action missions do not defeat the enemy, but they are necessary for reducing coalition forces' casualties by weeding out the insurgency's expertise. The most effective targeting has proven to be missions that eliminate the makers of improvised explosive devices, leaders of suicide networks and commanders of auxiliary forces. These are not the only insurgents who create casualties, but their positions are the most difficult for the enemy to fill. Identifying and tracking these key enemy leaders demands a specialized and organized intelligence section with access to a considerable amount of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and a capability for collecting HUMINT. An SF battalion is not as well-suited for this mission as other SOF organizations.

While intelligence drives lethal operations to a great degree, it also plays a key role in nonlethal targeting. Analysis of HUMINT reporting helps to develop a fundamental understanding of the enemy's influences in different areas. Acquiring this knowledge is essential to establishing the right approach in various locations. How has the enemy achieved control over the populace? Has the enemy coerced the village elders, or do they have tribal and familial ties to the elders? How does the populace feel about the insurgents' presence? Is the enemy making life better for the populace in any way? Answering these questions facilitates the development of an effective plan, because different situations require different approaches to gaining the support of the populace.

Once a sound intelligence estimate has been developed through analysis of corroborative reporting, the SF detachments have a wide-ranging arsenal of nonlethal operations they can use to target the enemy and the populace. To counter enemy propaganda, Psychological Operations, or PSYOP, use radios and loudspeakers as an important means of dissemination in areas where the population is illiterate. PSYOP's use of leaflets is ineffective in most of Afghanistan, because a large portion of the population is illiterate.

Civil military operations, or CMO, are another nonlethal option for the SF detachments. Depending on the needs of the locals, the best targeting may be through helping build schools, bridges, roads or power stations. In Afghanistan, CMO missions have frequently caused the locals to turn their backs on the Taliban. Humanitarian aid and medical civic-action programs are a valuable nonlethal approach when intelligence indicates that these methods will be the most effective method of targeting the enemy and garnering popular support. Providing medical assistance and distributing items such as blankets, copies of the Quran and food are effective ways of demonstrating that coalition forces and indigenous forces, unlike the insurgents, are there to help better the people's lives.

Intelligence is the collection, organization, management and analysis of intelligence reporting. Without it, operations would be inconsistently effective at best. By allowing accurate and timely intelligence to drive operations, a special-operations task force can accomplish what a conventional brigade typically does. Operations driven by intelligence means not only analysts in the operations center monitoring the collection of intelligence but rather *all* the intelligence disciplines working in a collaborative environment toward building a common intelligence picture.

Analysts of IMINT, HUMINT, SIGINT and all-source intelligence must continue to work together, communicate and conduct the analysis necessary to conduct operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. This in-depth analysis is the basis for targeting the right locations at the right time, while building an understanding of where the enemy came from and where he is going. The enemy in Afghanistan and Iraq will remain adaptive, and intelligence-driven operations will continue to be the best weapon in the arsenal for defeating insurgency. **SW**

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ARSOF, GENERAL

WHO DOES

PURPOSE FORCES AND FID:

WHAT, WHERE AND WHEN?

BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN MULBURY

When is it appropriate for Army special-operations forces to conduct foreign internal defense, or FID? When should general-purpose forces, or GPF, conduct FID? How is ARSOF FID different from GPF FID? The doctrine writers at the U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School are working to answer these questions as they write the new ARSOF FID manual. FID is an ARSOF core task that has been the topic of much interest and debate lately, as we increasingly emphasize the "indirect approach."

In light of such recent guidance as the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, which directs GP ground forces to "train, mentor and advise foreign security forces,"[1] and in light of the realities of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army as a whole is focusing more than it ever has before on training foreign forces. This increased interest requires that ARSOF clearly understand FID, what their role is in it, and why ARSOF will remain the force of choice for conducting FID in certain circumstances. This article will review the definition of FID in the context of irregular warfare and examine when FID is more appropriately conducted by ARSOF than by GPF.

Although on the surface, FID appears to be a relatively simple concept, that appearance is deceptive; FID is a much more nuanced and complicated operation than its definition at first implies. FID is often confused with or equated to training foreign forces, when in reality, there is much more to it.

A common perception is that when the scale of a FID operation is small enough, it is appropriate for ARSOF to execute the mission, but when the scale of the operation increases in size — beyond the ability of ARSOF to support — it becomes appropriate for GPF to participate in FID. This perception was clearly presented in a recent *Military Review* article by Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, in which he wrote, "The Special Forces do this mission [developing other countries' indigenous security forces (ISF)] well on the scale that is normally required for theater security cooperation and other routine foreign internal defense missions. … We should ensure our conventional forces have the inherent flexibility to transition to ISF support when the mission becomes too large for the Special Forces."[2]

The article goes on to make a great argument for improving the ISF-support capabilities of conventional units already operating in an area of operations, rather than "splitting the force" and creating new organizations to do so.[3] However, this line of reasoning assumes that no factors other than scale differentiate FID conducted by ARSOF and GPF. It is true that at times, the scale of operations may be such that ARSOF alone cannot meet all FID requirements, and during those times, it may be appropriate to use GPF. Current U.S. FID efforts in Iraq are an excellent example.

To ARSOF, it is clear that more than the scale of operations should determine when ARSOF conduct FID. The reasoning that "FID on a small scale should use ARSOF, and FID on a large scale should use GPF" misses the point that in addition to the quantitative reasons discussed above, there are qualitative advantages and disadvantages to using either force. Simply stated, ARSOF is the force of choice for conducting FID when the conditions require skills that are unique to ARSOF. This statement may seem to oversimplify the issue or to restate the obvious, but a careful examination of the nature of irregular warfare, or IW, and the nature of FID as an IW activity, shows precisely what differentiates ARSOF's role in FID from the role of the GPF.

Specifically, certain FID efforts require a mature, experienced force made up of carefully selected personnel, skilled in cross-cultural communication and able to operate at great distances from their operational bases, who understand the political context of their environment and who can assume a higher-than-normal degree of political risk. Those requirements characterize ARSOF. Because of these characteristics, ARSOF maintain a unique role in conducting FID and therefore cannot divest specific tasks or aspects of FID to GPF. Likewise, GPF have their own distinct role to play in the conduct of FID when conditions dictate requirements other than those listed above.

Joint doctrine defines FID as "the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency."[4] This definition makes clear the significance of the civil society and the population that composes it. To better understand FID, it is important to consider it in the context of IW. The Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, or IW JOC, approved in September 2007, clearly identifies FID as one of the operations and activities that compose IW. That classification makes sense, because IW focuses on a relevant population, with the purpose of gaining influence over that population.[5]

It is also important to recognize that FID is but one component of a nation's strategy for internal defense and development, or IDAD — a strategy that focuses on building viable institutions within a nation.[6] One of those institutions is the nation's military. Over the years, military training has come to be the aspect most commonly associated with FID. Certainly, if a nation's military is to be a viable institution, it must be trained. But to be successful, FID must support the building of all a nation's required institutions, not the military alone. All the other instruments of national power — diplomatic, informational and economic — must be employed in a successful FID campaign. That is perhaps the most significant of the points lost on those who equate FID with foreign military training. If we consider FID in the context of IW and remember its focus on the population, it will be easier to keep the proper perspective on the requirement to make all national institutions viable.

Furthermore, the necessity of employing all the instruments of national power demands that FID be a true interagency effort. Although the military naturally tends to focus on the military aspects of FID, joint doctrine is clear that "the military plays an important [but] supporting role in the overall FID program, and this role cannot be conducted in isolation."[7] ARSOF doctrine also recognizes the significance of interagency participation in FID and lists

^ **ON THE MAP** A Special Forces Soldier teaches a land-navigation class to members of the Iraq Army. *U.S. Army photo.*

those agencies that play major roles corresponding to the instruments of national power, such as the Department of State, or DoS, and its Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (the diplomatic instrument); DoS's Bureau for International Information Programs (the informational element); and the United States Agency for International Development (the economic element).[8]

FID is not conducted solely by special-operations forces, or SOF, even though it is a SOF core task. Joint FID doctrine states "although USSOCOM is legislatively mandated to conduct FID, which it does as a core task, other designated DoD conventional forces may contain and employ organic capabilities to conduct limited FID indirect support, direct support and combat operations."[9] Therefore, the direction in the 2006 QDR and other documents seeking to increase GPF participation in FID is not a radical departure from our current, well-established doctrine. GPF certainly have a role in FID, and they can execute that role without affecting SOF's conduct of FID.

The Army currently considers FID to be a stability operation, and it therefore provides significant and specific directives to both the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC, in the Army's Action Plan for Stability Operations.[10] That plan correctly states that there is more to FID than training foreign security forces, and it directs the development of GPF doctrine to include nation-assistance, peace operations and foreign humanitarian assistance.[11] It is significant and appropriate that in developing this action plan, the Army had foresight enough to look beyond the current situation with its emphasis on foreign security-force adviser training and recognize the other operations that constitute FID. The Army's challenge in implementing the Action Plan for Stability Operations will be to maintain the proper focus on those other aspects of FID.

As CWO 4 Jeffrey Hasler noted in his article on defining war (*Special Warfare*, March-April 2007), FID is similar to — and therefore often confused with — counterinsurgency, but it is in fact distinctly different.[12] Even ARSOF Soldiers confuse FID with unconventional warfare, or UW, presumably because both are associated with training foreign forces. ARSOF's refined definition of UW in FM 3-05.201, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations*, helps alleviate much of this confusion, as it stipulates UW's use of irregular forces.[13] FID, on the other hand, concentrates on developing the regular military as a national institution and as one element in the equation of developing a nation's power.

Another common misconception about FID is that it is solely a peacetime training mission. In fact, joint doctrine clearly delineates three types of FID operations: indirect support, direct support (not involving combat operations) and U.S. combat operations.[14] Indirect support focuses on

providing equipment, training and services to host-nation forces. It includes security-assistance activities, such as providing equipment, providing services and conducting training; participating in joint and multinational exercises; and participating in exchange programs. Direct support (not involving combat operations) refers to U.S. forces conducting operations to support the host nation, such as civil-military operations, psychological operations or foreign humanitarian assistance. Finally, U.S. combat operations can be conducted as a part of FID, as we are seeing today in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

The discussions above stress the requirement for us to be as clear, specific and as correct as possible when discussing FID. FID is not a solely military effort: The military is usually subordinate to other instruments of national power. It is more than training foreign forces, and it is not simply joint and combined exercises for training or exchange training. FID is not solely a special operation, nor is it an operation that occurs only in peacetime.

A better understanding of FID will show that there are times when the FID mission will require the specific capabilities that ARSOF or GPF bring. Capabilities that ARSOF bring involve both "hard" skills (e.g., counterterrorism and advanced urban combat) and "soft" skills (e.g., language abilities, cultural awareness and regional orientation). FM 3-05, *Army Special Operations Forces*, the ARSOF capstone doctrinal manual, specifies ARSOF capabilities and characteristics:

- Specially organized, trained and equipped to achieve political, economic and informational objectives, as well as military objectives.
- Able to conduct operations with a high degree of acceptable political risk.
- Mature, experienced personnel who undergo a careful selection process.
- Mission-specific training beyond basic military skills.
- Regionally oriented, routinely trained in cross-cultural communications.
- Capable of conducting operations at great distances from operational bases.
- Capable of generating diplomatic advantages disproportionate to their size.[15]

To take advantage of ARSOF AND GPF's unique capabilities and characteristics, force selection for a FID mission must therefore be the result of thoughtful analysis and deliberate decision-making, rather than simply using ARSOF when the requirement is small and GPF when the requirement is large.

When we recall that FID includes much more than training foreign forces and in fact involves more than solely military operations and institutions, we can see the significance of carefully selecting the proper force.

Because a FID operation, as an IW activity, must focus on the relevant population, an organization conducting FID must be adept at working with that relevant population, whether the work is training military forces, conducting foreign humanitarian assistance or participating in exercises. That requirement is at times compounded by a need to respect political sensitivities or even to conduct limited diplomacy.[16] As established above, FID is an interagency activity in which the military usually performs a role subordinate to other agencies of the government applying other instruments of national power. All these requirements describe the unique capabilities of ARSOF. Moreover, because those capabilities result from the combination of factors that make ARSOF and ARSOF operators unique, GPF cannot replicate those capabilities simply by reorganizing or creating new organizations that focus solely on FID. So in operations that require a force capable of working closely with a local population, working as an interagency player or working under an extremely sensitive political situation, ARSOF will remain the force of choice.

Nowhere is this better exemplified today than in the Philippines, with the operations of Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines, or JSOTF-P. One could argue that the training JSOTF-P is providing is nothing that GPF could not. In fact, GPF are providing similar training in places such as Iraq. But the conditions under which JSOTF-P is providing the training differ significantly from those anywhere else in the world. Moreover, there are other, perhaps more significant aspects of the mission in addition to training foreign forces, such as capacity-building, civil-military operations and influencing others,[17] for which GPF are not organized, trained or equipped. The unique conditions of the FID mission in the Philippines require a force that can do more than train forces. They require a force that leaves a small footprint, not just in numbers of trainers, but also in logistics support, command and control, and other areas. They require a force that is capable of working with a local population and fully understands the positive and negative affects that their actions can have at the strategic level. Those unique conditions, and not simply the size of the force required, make ARSOF the force of choice — and probably the only force capable — of the Philippine FID mission.

Even when conditions are such that GPF can operate, there are still circumstances in which ARSOF are more appropriate for the FID mission. We can look to Iraq and Afghanistan to see examples of ARSOF conducting FID side-by-side with conventional forces. In some cases, this may be due to a legacy from earlier operations. Specifically, when ARSOF conduct classic UW and are present for the revolutionary inverse (when the irregular forces fighting an insurgency succeed and become the regular forces of the nation), it is quite appropriate for ARSOF to remain with them, then conducting FID rather than UW.

Such legacy circumstances aside, there are other cases in which the nature of the training itself will dictate that ARSOF are more appropriate. In these circumstances, the unique "hard skills" that ARSOF possess make them the force of choice for conducting the operation. For example, working with foreign units that require training in counterterrorism, advanced urban combat or other special operations would logically dictate that ARSOF provide the training. Likewise, in missions that build foreign GPF under the conditions that exist in parts of Iraq and Afghanistan, our GPF are certainly capable

and most appropriate for conducting the mission.

It is not only appropriate for ARSOF to continue to conduct FID — it is required. It is critical to make this requirement clear, because there is a perception in the Army today that ARSOF will conduct less FID in the future than today or in the past. One assumes this perception is based on the fact that ARSOF is a comparatively low-density asset that is currently in high demand in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Adding to that perception are the almost unanimous voices in the news media opining that regardless of when or how greatly GPF troop strength is reduced in Iraq and Afghanistan, SOF will continue to maintain a robust presence. This perception, however, is false, and to see that it is false, we need only look to the U.S. Special Operations Command's Capstone Concept for Special Operations, or CCSO, which describes how USSOCOM will focus SOF capabilities beyond the Future Years Defense Program. The CCSO states, "The challenges of the Long War compel USSOCOM to emphasize the use of indirect approaches rather than kinetic and direct activities at the tactical and operational level." FID, as established above, is a vital component of the "indirect" approach. Moreover, not only will ARSOF continue to conduct FID; USSOCOM will also continue to increase its capacity to do so:

"USSOCOM will increase its ability to advise and render assistance to other nations' security forces. … USSOCOM's indirect approach is key to long-term success in enhancing regional stability, preventing and defeating insurgencies, and waging irregular warfare offensively against hostile state and non-state enemies of the United States."

Thus, the indirect approach is a significant aspect of USSOCOM's plans for waging the Global War on Terrorism. Key to the indirect approach is building partner-nation capacity by developing their national institutions, thereby enabling them to protect themselves while contributing substantially to the partnership against terrorism. Therefore, as the CCSO makes very clear, ARSOF will continue to conduct FID as a high priority for a long time to come.

And what of other conditions under which it is more appropriate for GPF to conduct FID? In addition to Iraq and Afghanistan, where we see GPF supporting FID on a large scale, using military transition teams and other efforts, the operations of Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, or CJTF-HOA, provide excellent examples of the valuable role GPF plays in FID.

In CJTF-HOA, Army GPF units, along with their joint counterparts, have conducted humanitarian missions in Djibouti, Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya, and they have participated in military-to-military training in Djibouti, Uganda and Kenya.[18] Under the conditions currently faced by CJTF-HOA, ARSOF skills are not required for successful FID operations. Although much smaller in scale and less well-publicized than GPF activities in Iraq and Afghanistan, the FID operations conducted by CJTF-HOA throughout the Horn of Africa are a superb example of the way GPF forces — as part of a joint, combined and interagency effort — are training, mentoring and advising foreign security forces as directed by the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review.

It is evident that there will always be a requirement for ARSOF to conduct FID, for all of the reasons this article has attempted to point out. As a function of their defining characteristics, ARSOF will continue to provide capabilities for conducting FID that the GPF cannot match. At the same time, the requirement will remain for GPF to conduct FID. In light of the complexity of FID operations, it is not desirable, or even possible, for ARSOF to divest any of their FID tasks. Rather than expending its efforts looking at what FID tasks ARSOF should give to GPF or looking to form new GPF organizations for conducting FID, the Army should invest the effort to better understand all aspects of FID, to train ARSOF and GPF on their strengths and proper roles in FID, and to apply the appropriate force to the appropriate mission. **SW**

NOTES:

[1] 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 42.

[2] Lieutenant General Peter W. Chiarelli and Major Stephen M. Smith, "Learning from Our Modern Wars: The Imperatives of Preparing for a Dangerous Future," *Military Review*, September-October 2007, 8.

[3] Chiarelli and Smith, 7-8.

[4] JP 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*, 30 April 2004.

[5] IW JOC, 9.

[6] FM 3-05, *Army Special Operations Forces*, 137, AD, 2.

[7] JP 3-07.1, 1-4.

[8] FM 3-05.202, *Special Forces Foreign Internal Defense Operations*, 2 February 2007, 2-3.

[9] JP 3-07.1, V-4.

[10] Army Action Plan for Stability Operations, approved 2 August 2007.

[11] Army Action Plan, 8.

[12] CWO 4 Jeffrey Hasler, "Defining War," *Special Warfare,* March-April 2007, 23.

[13] FM 3-05.201, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations.*

[14] JP 3-07.1.

[15] FM 3-05, 1-11–1-12.

[16] Major General David P. Fridovich and Lieutenant Colonel Fred T. Krawchuk, "The Special Operations Forces Indirect Approach," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 44, 1st Quarter 2007, 24.

[17] Command Sergeant Major William Eckert, "Defeating the Idea: Unconventional Warfare in the Southern Phillipines," *Special Warfare*, November-December 2006, 16-22.

[18] "Old Guard in Djibouti," *Soldiers*, August 2007, 20-22.

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THE ADVISORY CHALLENGE

BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL MARK GRDOVIC

"I was sent to these Arabs as a stranger, unable to think their thoughts or subscribe their beliefs, but charged by duty to lead them forward and to develop to the highest any movement of theirs profitable to England. If I could not assume their character, I could at least conceal my own, and pass among them without evident friction, neither a discord nor a critic but an unnoticed influence."

- T.E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*

T.E. Lawrence's eloquent words succinctly capture the essence of being a military adviser. Critical to an adviser's success is his ability to achieve "an unnoticed influence" for the ultimate purposes of furthering the objectives of the adviser (which are the national-security objectives of the adviser's government). The amount of influence an adviser attains will be directly proportional to the sum of three factors: the rapport between the adviser and the host-nation commander or counterpart; the credibility of the individual adviser; and the perception by host-nation forces of the continued value of the relationship.

The complexity of these tasks and the unique skill set required have historically been underestimated, possibly because of a lack of personal experience or familiarity on the part of most military leaders. This limited exposure and understanding has contributed to a long-standing bias that questions the value of advisory efforts or, at least, whether advisory efforts warrant the expenditure and diversion of limited resources, such as personnel, which are needed by the conventional fighting force. The intent of this article is to convey some of the critical aspects that enable advisers to be effective. Many of these aspects are intangible, are often not required of leaders of U.S. forces, and are therefore relatively unfamiliar.

Perhaps the most-often overlooked aspect is that advisers must possess knowledge beyond that of normal soldiers in order to be effective. An adviser must possess a mastery of the tactical skills that would enable him to know what to do in the given situation (much the same as his conventional counterpart), but he must also possess the skills needed to impart his advice to a foreign counterpart effectively in order to achieve a desired effect. Accomplishing that requires more than language skills. A strong knowledge of tactics does not necessarily make someone a good adviser, any more than good advisory skills provide someone with the ability to make good tactical and operational decisions.

^ **ON TARGET** A U.S. Army Special Forces Soldier works on marksmanship skills with his Iraqi counterpart. By training together, the adviser and his Iraqi counterpart build trust and rapport. *U.S. Army photo.*

ESTABLISHING RAPPORT

Rapport is defined as "a sympathetic relationship based on mutual trust, understanding and respect." This is essentially getting to know your counterpart and making an effort to develop a positive relationship. While this might not appear to be a particularly difficult task, it is a slow and delicate process.

The adviser avoids rushing personal acceptance by the counterpart. Overselling himself will arouse suspicion and delay acceptance. Time spent developing a healthy relationship will pay large dividends later.[1]

One must pay a price to achieve influence, in both time and proximity: "Influencing [allied] military institutions to support a democratic process can only be done with the long-term presence of U.S. military personnel working alongside Host Nation forces.[2]

Rapport is often established more during the informal time spent with a counterpart — while socializing over meals or traveling — than during formal encounters. Advisers need to recognize and seize upon the value of these subtle opportunities. Eating the same food, using the same equipment

^ **FIRING LINE** Iraqi soldiers line up for marksmanship training. U.S. Soldiers' willingness to train with the soldiers shows mutual respect that is needed in the advisory environment. *U.S. Army photo.*

and enduring the same living conditions all contribute to rapport. They can demonstrate that the adviser has a genuine interest in the culture, and they can dispel any myths about arrogant Americans. Conversely, if the adviser continues to point out how different everything is from America, it can quickly offend and irritate a counterpart.

Host-nation counterparts generally expect that advisers need time to learn the nuances of a new region or command, but they also expect advisers to already understand the generalities of the country, culture and conflict. Advisers need to arrive with a reasonable macro understanding so that they are ready to start developing a micro understanding of their new environment. This region-specific, counterpart-specific, micro-level understanding, developed from time spent in country with the counterpart, provides clear signals that the adviser possesses a sincere desire to understand his environment, which is a precursor to developing valid opinions and rendering any advice.

Depending on the circumstances and environment, it may be permissible to soften the distinctive appearance of U.S. personnel and possibly even mimic the appearance of the indigenous forces. Small modifications to uniforms or personal appearance can have a huge impact on the perceptions of allied soldiers. They can include simple modifications to normal military grooming standards, such as growing a mustache. The same is true for distinctive items, such as unit scarves, patches or emblems. If advisers are presented such items, they should recognize it as an opportunity to demonstrate pride as a member of the organization and wear the items when it is practical. In many cases, these seemingly minor gestures are flattering to the counterpart, and the commonality achieved through such acts serves as a building block to rapport.

The reverse of this can also be true: If advisers insist on maintaining a uniquely American appearance, it neither helps nor hurts rapport. However, if advisers deviate from their normal U.S. military appearance, but not toward that of the allied military forces — for example, with a baseball cap or with grooming standards that are not culturally indicative of the allied-military unit — it will likely create an unintended perception of a lack of discipline on the adviser's behalf. Deviations from the normal U.S. military appearance can have significant benefits, but they require an understanding of the local customs and culture. They should be deliberate, controlled and taken with the U.S. chain of command's approval.

If the adviser possesses language

^ **NATIVE TRANSPORTATION** 3rd Special Forces Group Soldiers ride on horse patrol with their Afghan counterparts. Growing beards and adapting to the traditional Afghan means of patrol serve as building blocks to rapport. *U.S. Army photo.*

skills, achieving rapport will be easier and faster. Although not essential, language skills, however rudimentary, are among the few things that produce direct and tangible results in terms of enabling an adviser. While it should be a goal for all advisers to be able to communicate directly with their counterparts, reality often forces advisers to use translators. That reality should not prevent advisers from continuing to make an effort to learn more of the local language.

As essential as rapport is, it should not be confused with influence. The distinction is essential in understanding that rapport must never be gained at the expense of other factors that contribute to influence. If an adviser becomes fixated only on gaining rapport, it can be like a commander wanting to be popular with his or her troops: It would be easy to gain rapport by acquiescing to any request of a counterpart, but that could include acting in contrast to U.S. goals, objectives or standards of conduct.

ESTABLISHING CREDIBILITY

Advisers need to realize that the decision to provide advisory assistance will be agreed to and coordinated at the highest levels of the government … not at the tactical level of command. Few indigenous commanders are enthusiastic about receiving an "adviser." Because of this, advisers generally do not begin the relationship with a pre-established line of good credit in terms of credibility. Host-nation commanders will normally ask, "How much combat experience do you have in these types of operations?" and "Have you commanded at the level I am commanding at now?" This is a polite method of asking, "What qualifies you to advise me?" If a counterpart does not ask these questions, it is probably because he believes he already knows the answers. These answers will serve as a basis for the counterpart's initial impressions.

Most foreign commanders are generally not inclined to refer to advisers by that title, because it can give a demeaning perception of incompetence that requires advice from "professionals." American advisers need to appreciate and respect that sensitivity. For this reason, advisers often begin a relationship with a higher-ranking counterpart with the understanding that they are acting more as a special staff officer within the headquarters rather than as an adviser. Advisers are there to assist in coordinating operations with other U.S. units or integrating U.S. intelligence or capabilities into host-nation planning efforts. If credibility is established and the host-nation commander regards the adviser as a trusted confidant, the adviser will be in a position to legitimately provide advice on a number of aspects.

^ **AT ARMS** A Soldier from the 3rd Special Forces Group inspects Malian army soldiers' weapons at their garrison in Tombouctou, Mali. Demonstrating weapons proficiency (out-shooting indigenous soldiers on a training range) with a U.S. Army rifle can serve to alienate advisers by creating envy or animosity; however, demonstrating proficiency with indigenous equipment will gain advisers instant credibility. *U.S. Army photo.*

Providing high-quality training has traditionally been an effective means of establishing rapport and credibility while not offending a host-nation unit. Regardless of the unit, there is some type of training that would be regarded as valuable, whether it is individual soldier training, collective squad- or platoon-level training, or training in specialty skills, such as training for medics or machine-gun and mortar crews. If the training is considered valuable by the individual soldiers, particularly astute commanders will, rightly so, capitalize on the opportunity to reinforce their own credibility in the eyes of their soldiers. This, in turn, will foster genuine rapport between the Americans and the host-nation commander.

Training sessions are also a great opportunity for individual advisers to gain credibility by demonstrating proficiency in military skills. Demonstrating weapons proficiency (out-shooting indigenous soldiers on a training range) with a U.S. Army rifle can serve to alienate advisers by creating envy or animosity; however, demonstrating proficiency with indigenous equipment will gain advisers instant credibility. Advisers may want to consider carrying the same weapons and gear as the local soldiers. That will not only gain credibility but also prevent the "American adviser" from standing out as a high-value target for the enemy and will allow better integration during combat operations.

Any training conducted by advisers comes with an unspoken guarantee of effectiveness. If the techniques provided prove to be inappropriate to the environment (for example, doctrinally generic), or if the training is provided in an ineffective manner, credibility will be lost immediately. The best means of demonstrating the guarantee of effectiveness has always been for U.S. personnel to accompany the individuals they have trained on actual combat operations. This practice has tremendous advantages for rapport and credibility, as well as for the operational experience of the advisers.

While political realities of the situation in a specific country may often preclude it, U.S. military planners need to always remember that accompanying the indigenous forces is the most desirable course of action. Leaders and planners at all levels need to appreciate and understand the potential value gained in comparison to the potential risk to U.S. personnel.

MAINTAINING VALUE

While personal relationships are vital to the establishment of influence, it is essential that the goals of both parties remain nested. Both sides need to see their relationship's value

^ **FORGING BONDS** A Special Forces Soldier living and working in the remote regions of Afghanistan earns respect and credibility from his counterparts. *U.S. Army photo.*

to the achievement of their individual goals. The indigenous commander may like his adviser — he may even respect him as a combat leader. But if the commander does not perceive how important their continued relationship can be to the achievement of his goals, it will have a negative effect on the adviser's ability to influence the commander's actions.

While there are many ways in which an advisory effort could be valuable to a host-nation commander, ideally, the value comes from the advice provided. In order to provide worthwhile advice, the adviser must be able to analyze a situation and make tactical decisions with no more information than his counterpart has. This can be challenging for advisers who have never served in a position equivalent to the one they are advising, or who lack combat experience specific to the nature of the indigenous threat.

Additionally, an environment that warrants the commitment of U.S. advisers is probably less than stable and very different from the traditional U.S. military experience. Advisers will likely be exposed to a variety of unorthodox situations not normally faced by U.S. commanders. For example, individuals within the host-nation organization (military or civilian) may provide information to local criminal or insurgent groups, as a result of recruitment, threats to family members or merely corruption fueled by greed and the host-nation's inability to pay its soldiers.

A large percentage of the host-nation soldiers may be conscripts, and desertion or other discipline issues may be significant. Advisers need to appreciate the realities of the "leadership challenges" facing their counterparts and realize that their advice will be of little value if it is merely, "This is how the U.S. military would do this." Such an environment requires a greater degree of flexibility, adaptability and initiative.

It is entirely possible that the adviser may be exposed to acts that could constitute violations of the Law of Land Warfare, or to other illegal or unethical behavior. In such cases, advisers may be emotionally and morally inclined to disengage and terminate further U.S. support. However, these situations are exactly where a successful advisory effort is needed most.

These cases put advisers in a Catch-22 situation: If an adviser ignores the obvious violations in the belief that the importance of the relationship supersedes his personal objections, he inadvertently condones counterproductive tactics and behavior and subsequently damages the overall effort, as well as his own credibility. If he directly challenges his counterpart, it will likely damage his rapport. An adviser must use all means at his disposal to alter the situation to a more favorable one.

There are times when situations may warrant discontinuing a relationship with certain units or commanders. Disengagement, while an easier short-term solution, contributes little to the overall U.S. strategy that required the advisory effort in the first place. Disengagement is the extreme exception to the rule and not the standard solution for challenging situations. The goal is to develop capable, self-sufficient units, not merely to find existing ones to work with in order to satisfy the advisory effort's requirements. If the host-nation army was already self-sufficient, it is unlikely that a need for adviser support would have been generated.

The example of U.S. training and advisory support to El Salvador highlights a significant point regarding human-rights abuses by host-nation military forces. When the U.S. began providing advisers in the 1980s, accusations of human-rights abuses by the Salvadoran military were a significant

issue of concern. While many critics argued at the time that the U.S. should have ceased all support to the Salvadoran military, that would not have achieved any U.S. objectives for the region.

Advisers remained engaged with their counterparts and often challenged Salvadoran tactics. Over a period of nearly 10 years, the advisers were able to develop enough influence to significantly reduce the number of human-rights violations. As this occurred, the Salvadoran government and military gained a degree of legitimacy with the population, and the insurgents' cause lost its main source of justification.

CONCLUSIONS

Historically, U.S. advisory efforts have suffered from an inaccurate perception that they are merely a sideshow effort — somewhat important, but not enough to warrant the diversion of resources from the conventional warfighting capability or the alteration of the career tracks of the best officers and NCOs from the mainstream. In order to be effective, advisory efforts must have the same criticality and legitimacy of all other major operational and strategic efforts within the military. No aspects of a military operation demonstrate its importance more clearly than the recruitment, selection and career-management of the operation's assigned personnel. Recruitment efforts need to be selective and attract only qualified volunteers who possess the unique qualities required of an adviser.

During the Vietnam War, General Creighton Abrams observed that U.S. advisers saw themselves as second-class citizens in the Army and were treated as such. Despite General William Westmoreland's plans to upgrade their status (and provide command credit), many American advisers viewed their assignments as detrimental to their careers, and indeed this seems to have been the case.[3] In his memoirs of the war, Westmoreland credited the advisers with literally holding Vietnam together during the darkest days of the war.[4]

While the debate over the role of advisers is not a new one, the war in Iraq has forced its revival, against the desires of many military professionals. A study called *The Army's Role in Counterinsurgency and Insurgency*, published by the RAND Corporation in 1990, states:

In the past the U.S. military has failed to comprehend the amount of experience and specialized area, language, and military expertise needed for effective advisory and training missions in the third world. According to a recent Army history of the advisory effort [in Vietnam], the preparation for the advisory duty was minimal and the six week [adviser training] course at Fort Bragg remained weak.[5]

Training programs should focus on the unique skills associated with counterinsurgency tactics and the unique skills associated with being an adviser, rather than on refreshing common Soldier skills.[6] Training for a long-term program must include training for language skills, which would be facilitated if the personnel-management process had the ability to assign personnel at least one year prior to their envisioned employment date as advisers.

If these requirements are not met, it will likely result in advisers functioning more like liaison officers, who can provide some degree of ground truth about a situation but wield little or no real influence in shaping the environment in support of U.S. objectives. Historically, it has been exactly this type of result that has fueled the misconception that advisory efforts are of marginal value and thereby not worthy of significant resources or attention from military professionals. **SW**

> **" If the adviser possesses language skills, achieving rapport will be easier and faster."**

NOTES:

[1] Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 31-20-3, *Foreign Internal Defense Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces*, I-5.

[2] Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 31-20-3, *Foreign Internal Defense Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces*, I-1.

[3] Jeffery J. Clarke, *Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965-1973* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center for Military History), 237, 511.

[4] William Westmoreland, *A Soldier's Report* (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday Press, 1976), 294.

[5] Clarke, 61; and Stephen T. Hosmer, *The Army's Role in Counterinsurgency and Insurgency* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1990), 18.

[6] From the author's experience serving as an adviser and training Special Forces officers, in order to train an individual to be an adviser requires at least three to six months without language training, and an additional six to 12 months with language training.

Lieutenant Colonel Mark Grdovic *is the director of the President's Emergency Operations Center, White House Military Office. He was formerly chief of the Special Forces Doctrine Branch, SF Doctrine Division, in the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Directorate of Training and Doctrine. His other SF assignments include service with the 1st Battalion, 10th SF Group, as S1 and as commander of SF detachments 016 and 032; small-group instructor for the officer portion of the Special Forces Qualification Course; company commander and S3, 3rd Battalion, 10th SF Group; and commander, Company A, 4th Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group. Lieutenant Colonel Grdovic holds a bachelor's degree from New York University and a master's degree from King's College London.*

Enlisted

149 SF NCOs selected for E8

The 2007 master sergeant promotion-selection board selected 149 SF sergeants first class for promotion, yielding a selection rate of 13 percent. Below is a summary of feedback from the selection panel regarding the SF candidates' records:

A minimum of 36 months' detachment service was critical for promotion. Soldiers who had three or more years of service in senior detachment positions and then moved to positions as instructors at the Special Warfare Center and School; observer-controllers at the Joint Readiness Training Center; or to staff positions at the company, battalion or group levels were looked at favorably. Advanced-skill qualifications, high scores on the Army Physical Fitness Test, and high ratings on the Defense Language Proficiency Test were looked at favorably. Extended periods away from the operational force were looked at unfavorably. A number of candidates' records were incomplete or not validated. For additional information, call SGM Jeff Bare at DSN 239-7594 or (910) 432-7594, or send e-mail to: barej@soc.mil.

SF ANCOC includes DL module

The SF Advanced NCO Course is now composed of a distance-learning module followed by a three-week resident phase at Fort Bragg. The resident phase will be conducted 16 times yearly to give SF NCOs more flexibility in completing their professional-development training.

PO NCOs should prepare for promotion boards

In order to prepare for next year's master sergeant promotion-selection board, Psychological Operations NCOs need to be aware of the fiscal year 2008 board's comments regarding the records of PO candidates.

The majority of CMF 37 packets the board reviewed reflected superior performance, but the board recommended that raters' bullet comments on the NCO evaluation reports be more descriptive. CMF 37 NCOs need to pursue civilian education, maintain a high degree of physical fitness and refine their language and cultural skills. They should also ensure that DA photos and Enlisted Record Briefs are up-to-date.

Board identifies CA promotion enhancers

The FY 2008 master sergeant promotion-selection board identified three areas in which CA NCOs can improve their chances for promotion to master sergeant:

Training and education. CMF 38 Soldiers and their commands need to place more emphasis on training in cultural awareness, language skill and airborne qualification.

Utilization. After completing two years as a CAT-A team sergeant and one year on the staff of a CA battalion or brigade, NCOs need to expand their promotion potential by taking jobs outside the brigade.

Board preparation. NCOs need to pay close attention to the preparation of their military personnel files for the board.

Warrant Officer

SF WO applications now require last five NCOERs

In November, the U.S. Army Recruiting Command established a requirement that all application packets from Soldiers seeking accession as active-duty SF warrant officers include the Soldier's last five NCO evaluation reports.

That requirement does not change the SF proponent's requirement for the inclusion of NCOERs that establish that the applicant has at least 36 months rated time on an SF detachment. The accession requirements for SF warrant officers can be found at the USAREC Web page: http://www.usarec.army.mil/hq/warrant/.

Warrant officers get peer assistance through WONET

The Warrant Officer Net, or WONET, is a professional forum designed to help develop the Army's warrant-officer corps. Through WONET, warrant officers can share thoughts, ideas, experiences, knowledge and lessons learned, and they can seek assistance from mentors, subject-matter experts and peers. The forum provides insights to questions about WO issues, branch-specific WO issues or even specific MOS-related questions. WONET is the forum where you find solutions from your peers.

WONET's highest priority is to support the warrant officer in the field. Interested Soldiers can join the forum at: https://wonet.bcks.army.mil.

Officer

Updated DA Pam 600-3 to be republished

The updated DA Pam 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, published in November 2007 is being republished to remove incorrect developmental-model information.

The update contains changes that affect Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations officers and SF warrant officers.

This is the first version of DA Pam 600-3 to address Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations as branches.

FY 2008 major promotion-selection board to convene

The 2008 major promotion-selection board will convene April 8, 2008, to consider eligible active-duty captains for promotion to the rank of major.

Candidates should screen their military personnel files for the following: up-to-date DA photos, awards on uniform that match the Officer Record Brief and Official Military Personnel Folder, correct duty titles, complete lists of overseas deployments and combat tours, no gaps in Officer Evaluation Reports, and a physical performed within the last five years.

Eligible officers should monitor MILPER messages for changes and should also maintain contact with their assignment officer at the Army Human Resources Command.

Senior Service College Board to meet in April

The 2008 Senior Service College Selection Board will meet April 1-25. Eligible lieutenant colonels should prepare their files for the SSC board and monitor MILPER messages for changes and updates.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND STRATEGY:
FROM WORLD WAR II TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM



DETAILS

By James D. Kiras
London and New York:
Routledge, 2006.
ISBN: 0-415-70212-7.
230 pages.

Reviewed by:
Dr. J. Paul de B. Taillon
adjunct professor
Royal Military College of Canada

In theoretical terms, special operations and their strategic impact as the fourth dimension of warfare have not been well-understood. Dr. James Kiras, assistant professor at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., has addressed this gap for the benefit of the members of the profession of arms and students of warfare.

As the title suggests, Kiras ventures into the domain of strategic theory as it relates to the role of special-operations forces, or SOF. The strategic role of special-operations forces is frequently poorly understood, and this book demonstrates, through case studies, how SOF can be employed to strategic effect, especially through the use of attritional operations at the strategic level.

There is a dearth of strategic literature on this subject, and Kiras provides a timely and relevant study that is both academically sound and intellectually provocative. He walks the reader through his analysis, underlining the fact that military and academic communities have ignored or have not fully understood the strategic relevance and impact of SOF and their operations.

According to Kiras, this failure to fully comprehend the impact and import of special operations within the context of the strategic realm has been responsible, in some cases, for the misuse of these strategic assets.

To illustrate, Kiras presents a well-founded argument about the nature of strategy and special operations, commencing with the sabotage of the Norsk Hydro plant near the town of Vemork, Norway, better known as the Telemark Raid, which, as the author notes, "had all the hallmarks of a quintessential special operation." That strategic raid was intended to destroy the Third Reich's atomic-bomb program, but it failed, as five months later, the Norsk hydro plant resumed heavy-water production.

In light of that operation, Kiras suggests that the basis for an effective special-operations campaign is not so much the ability of SOF to conduct direct-action operations, but rather the way SOF perform in the overall campaign being conducted. More specifically, he says, the question to be asked is how SOF operations and performance are related to strategically influencing the enemy's moral and material attrition, in coordination and conjunction with conventional forces.

Kiras notes that military writers have embellished and, in some cases, overstated the outcomes and strategic effect of special operations. He points out the linkages between special operations and strategy, while underlining the incongruous reality that, despite the panoply of books published each year regarding SOF, "the strategic aspects of the subject are barely mentioned." Rather than ignoring or overstating their strategic purpose, Kiras argues, "Special operations should be defined according to their intended effect: improving conventional performance."

This point may be viewed by some as counter-intuitive, given the increased responsibilities placed on the special-operations community for the Global War on Terrorism. Moreover, Kiras persuasively argues that great strategic effects are generated when SOF operates in conjunction with conventional forces in campaigns, and not in the conduct of isolated raids. He offers a definition for special operations that is employed throughout this book: "Unconventional actions against enemy vulnerabilities is a sustained campaign, undertaken by specially designated units, to enable conventional operations and/or resolve economically political-military problems at the operational or strategic level that are difficult or impossible to accomplish with conventional forces alone."

The author outlines a num-

ber of special operations, such as the daring seizure of the Belgian fortress of Eben Emael on May 10, 1940, and argues that the strategic impact of such operations diminishes dramatically upon closer scrutiny.

Kiras adroitly points out that a subsequent British raid on St. Nazaire on March 28, 1942, was announced as a strategic success because of the fact that the daring initiative destroyed the "vital" port facility. However, upon reflection, the essential issue pertaining to the strategic effectiveness of this audacious initiative has yet to be fully explored.

Indeed, when the raid was given the go-ahead by the Allied leadership, the German Navy no longer required those dock facilities, nor did the raid diminish the threat of the battleship Tirpitz during the period.

For this writer, the essence of Kiras's study is that it details special operations conducted before and after the June 6, 1944, invasion of France by the Special Air Service Brigade, examining the tactical and strategic issues that drove the employment of that unit, as well as the impetus regarding how it was to be committed.

From a personal perspective, this section was most intriguing, yet frustrating, as one comes to the realization that even at this late stage of the war, Allied senior commanders did not fully appreciate the "strategic significance" of the force. It appears that after nearly five years of conflict, many SOF assets continued to be regarded by many seniors as an elite tactical asset and, in turn, were not coordinated sufficiently to garner the strategic results that could have been achieved had they been well-coordinated and properly employed. This legacy, to a degree, remains with us to this day.

The book makes an important and substantial contribution to the field of special operations. The arguments that Kiras puts forward are supported by well-documented examples that provide readers with much food for thought and a basis for analyzing contemporary special operations and the strategy of employing them.

This book alone should spark further academic ventures into that rarely entered area. *Special Operations and Strategy* is an academically solid effort and a successful attempt at dealing with an intellectually difficult issue. It should be read by those interested in understanding the strategic realm of special operations. **SW**

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