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Transformation: the Role of ARSOF

SOF VISION 2020

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From the Commandant



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As the United States military attempts to transform its forces into the most effective organization possible for the future, the Objective Force, no soldiers offer more to that force than Army special-operations forces, or ARSOF.

On future battlefields, ARSOF will provide Army and joint-force commanders a force capable of performing full-spectrum unconventional operations. By working with and through indigenous or surrogate forces, ARSOF can wage unconventional warfare to shape the operational environment or to compel adversaries to divert their forces from the primary area of operations. Special Forces, or SF, provide training, from the individual level through the battalion level, that can assist foreign militaries and indigenous groups in developing their war-fighting capabilities.

When the U.S. Army assists friendly nations' efforts in internal defense and development, or IDAD, ARSOF can function as an invaluable combat multiplier. Soldiers in SF; Civil Affairs, or CA; and Psychological Operations, or PSYOP, can integrate their operations with the operations of other elements of the U.S. government, of foreign governments, of nongovernment organizations and private volunteer organizations, and of host-nation national systems.

During the 2002 Army Transformation war game, Vigilant Warrior, which included a major regional contingency and several smaller-scale contingencies, ARSOF participated in all scenarios. From the evaluations of the scenarios, one common lesson emerged: ARSOF are a key component of the Objective Force. It is more important now than ever before that ARSOF be better integrated into both joint and Army war-fighting doctrine. Furthermore, ARSOF must continue to integrate evolving doctrine, tactics and techniques, and new technologies into ARSOF training programs.

ARSOF must also continue to train adap-

tive, mature and intelligent soldiers. Leader development and specialized training remain key in maintaining a quality force that is capable of meeting the challenges of future war-fighting.

While language skills and cultural awareness are important to ARSOF, the ability to effectively teach warrior skills is paramount. ARSOF are capable of building other nations' armies because they have mastered basic and advanced warrior skills and because they are able to teach those skills to others. Skills in basic marksmanship, patrolling, raids, ambushes, movements to contact, and offensive and defensive operations are also critical to SF. Furthermore, much of the training that SF will provide in foreign environments will focus on operations in urban terrain. The Special Forces Advanced Urban Combat Course, or SFAUCC, is designed to enhance the survival skills of SF teams. SFAUCC will continue to progress, and in the future, SF soldiers will integrate SFAUCC into the training they provide to foreign armies.

Major General William G. Boykin

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

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Transformation: Roles and Missions for ARSOF

by Lieutenant Colonel Adrian Erckenbrack

Since the end of the Cold War, policymakers, military strategists and historians have struggled to predict the future roles and missions of the United States military.

Every four years, in the *Quadrennial Defense Review*, or *QDR*, the Department of Defense, or DoD, attempts to peer into the future and to describe the threats and scenarios that lie ahead. One particular paragraph of the 2001 *QDR* should be emphasized as a result of the events of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. After noting a "changed security environment," the *QDR* states, "An assessment of the global security environment involves a great deal of uncertainty about the potential sources of military threats, the conduct of war in the future, and the form that threats and attacks against the nation will take."[1]

Photo by Gerry J. Gilmore

The attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, served notice that asymmetric warfare is no longer a problem of the future.

Although the uncertainty remains, there is an emerging consensus among military strategists that the attacks of Sept. 11 served notice to DoD that the asymmetric warfare predicted for the future has arrived. More importantly, the attacks highlight the fact that even as DoD was developing a comprehensive description of the missions that the U.S. military will have to perform in countering the asymmetric threat, the nature of warfare was changing rapidly.

Despite the flux and the uncertainty of predicting and preparing for future threats, certainties do exist. One of those is that in order to remain relevant, special-operations forces, or SOF, must base any decisions regarding their future roles and missions on a clear understanding of SOF's organizational nature. SOF must also understand the way that SOF organizations may best leverage their critical strengths of adaptability, competency and maturity in a global environment that appears to be becoming more and more asymmetrical.

Whether SOF remain the premier fighting force and retain their relevance in the future environment will depend in large part on how accurately the SOF leadership envisions the future and identifies the roles and missions for which SOF should prepare. This article will seek to describe future economic, social and military factors that will affect the global security environment. It

File photo

Military police escort a detainee at the Guantanamo Bay naval station. Revising the definition of an "act of war" will affect the legal rights and privileges that the U.S. will accord to terrorists.

will also suggest ways of leveraging SOF's characteristics in that environment. It is the author's hope that this article will stimulate thinking about the role that SOF must play if they are to remain relevant.

Vision of the future

Future warfare may involve waging war against entities that have no army and no defined geographic borders but which are nevertheless capable of inflicting a great loss of human life. Terrorist organizations represent only one example of such entities. Combating these kinds of entities will require a different mindset and, in some cases, either different means or different ways of applying existing means. SOF must understand that many aspects of the security environment are changing, and that many of the changes have military implications.

Definitions

Among the changes that have military implications are changes in definitions. On the surface, definitions may seem insignificant, but they are of paramount importance in understanding SOF's role in increasingly asymmetric military activities.

• The U.S. definition of an "act of war" will be revised to include activities heretofore defined as "criminal." The revised definition will be significant, because terrorism and other asymmetric threats are now considered crimes, not acts of war, and our legal system accords rights and privileges to criminals that it does not accord to our enemies at war.

Defining terrorism and other asymmetric threats as acts of war will allow us to use the full spectrum of DoD activities, including psychological operations and deception, to counter asymmetric threats. Deploying an armor or infantry brigade to search for a terrorist organization embedded in an urban area might not be as effective as employing psychological and cultural "weapons." Through the application of those weapons, units of infantry, armor or Army special-operations forces, or ARSOF, may be able to identify and destroy the enemy. In such cases, the timing and the synchronization of the psychological and cultural weapons will be crucial in achieving success.

• The conventional definition of a weapon of mass destruction, or WMD, is currently limited to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive agents. Ultimately, the U.S. will expand its definition of WMD. Weapons will be identified as WMDs based upon their *effect*, not upon their *method*, and WMDs will include effects-based weapons, such as cyber threats and psychological threats.

The psychological impact of using commercial airliners in the Sept. 11 terrorist attack (which is estimated to have caused billions of dollars in damages) exceeded the psychological impact that would have been

produced had the terrorists used conventional weapons of an equally destructive capability. Is a cyber attack truly less damaging than one that employs large explosive devices? Even if a cyber attack produced no loss of life or physical destruction, it could ultimately cause the collapse of a segment of our economy, one of our critical strengths if not our strategic center of gravity.

It seems clear that cyber and psychological weapons, if measured by their *effects,* and not by the body count that they produce, have the potential of producing widespread destruction and should be identified as WMD. To counter the resulting

Photo by Scott Reed

Advances in technology make it possible for the U.S. to employ small numbers of personnel in tracking and targeting the enemy.

expansion of the WMD threat, the U.S. military will need to reorganize some part of its infrastructure to perform asymmetric attack.

• We must expect the U.S. to maintain its dominance as a global economic, military and political superpower. Because of that dominance, the U.S. will become the lightning rod for the resentment of many disaffected or disenfranchised nation-states, organizations and people who perceive that they are being denied their fair share of prosperity, resources and influence. As global economic, environmental and political stresses increase, the population of the world's disaffected and disenfranchised will increase by multitudes. The U.S. can expect a corresponding increase in the number and in the types of military operations that will be required to counter the activities of a growing number of disaffected nation-states and non-state entities.

• The nation-state will lose its monopoly on waging war. The loss of that monopoly will be of paramount importance: Our national-security capabilities are designed for operations within a nation-state framework, and we have great difficulty exercising those capabilities outside that framework. If DoD is to ensure our national security, we will have to bolster our capability to counter terrorism, transnational threats, asymmetric threats, and other forms of influence and coercion directed at various U.S. critical weaknesses. With the possible exception of the Marine Corps and SOF, American military forces are still not optimally organized to take full advantage of new geopolitical realities and advances in information technology.[2]

• Asymmetric threats to U.S. economic, military and political viability will attain equal status with conventional threats. In some cases, the effects of asymmetric attacks will exceed the effects of conventional weapons. The Sept. 11 terrorist attacks had a disproportionate effect on the economic and psychological well-being of the U.S. The explosions of the hijacked airliners achieved a far greater impact than the terrorists could have achieved had they used a conventional weapon of equal destructive capability.

• Advances in technology will accelerate the proliferation of conventional WMDs, and WMD technology will evolve at a faster rate than will the ability of the U.S. military bureaucracy to control access to it. We must expect that entities that would do the U.S. harm will have access to WMD technology and to WMD information, and that they will translate that information into the knowledge needed to produce conventional WMDs. We must develop appropriate countermeasures, including a range of pre-emptive counterproliferation activities and forces.

• Technology will give the U.S. an unprecedented ability to employ relatively small numbers of personnel and equipment in the surveillance, tracking, rapid engagement and destruction of enemy forces on the conventional battlefield. With

further refinements, technology will allow selected personnel to track and identify targets by fusing imagery, signals intelligence, and input from other sensors. Fusing the information *between sensors*, instead of assembling it at a central command-and-control location, will significantly increase the speed at which targets can be identified, targeted and destroyed. This capability will become "real" when a critical mass of sensors is networked.

Ultimately, the U.S. will develop a system that will allow sensor-to-sensor fusion and communication; that will select targets and destruction platforms based upon variables such as priority, weather, terrain and the likelihood of successful attack; and that will provide options to the precision-engagement teams located throughout the battlespace. One implication of our advancing technology is that a small number of personnel, located far from the intended target and protected by a number of personal and collective systems, will be able to bring a disproportionately large amount of destruction to the battlefield. Another implication is that future adversaries will seek alternative methods and means of engaging the U.S., in the hope of finding an environment in which our sensors, targeting means and munitions will be placed at a disadvantage.

• Finally, SOF, because of their adaptability, ingenuity, maturity and organizational size (smaller organizations are more capable of rapid change), will remain the force of choice in a future environment characterized by a diffuse enemy, an ambiguous enemy command-and-control process, and an expanded array of enemy capabilities and methods of employment.

Implications for ARSOF

Even as the environment is changing, the first imperative, from the DoD perspective, is that ARSOF remain a relevant force in any future conflict environment. To remain relevant, ARSOF must assess the future environment and then develop the plans and doctrinal structure necessary so that the force can acquire the requisite skills for that environment.

By analyzing descriptions of the potential operating environment and by applying the SOF imperatives — understand the environment, engage the threat discriminately, apply capabilities indirectly, develop multiple options, and anticipate and control psychological effects — we can begin to identify potential ARSOF roles and missions that may be relevant in the future. Potential ARSOF missions include urban operations, asymmetric attack, precision engagement, sustained direct action and unconventional warfare.

Urban operations

In a paradoxical way, U.S. advantages in technology may improve our potential enemies' ability to survive. By 2015, more than

U.S. Army file photo

SOF will need to develop tactics, techniques and procedures for identifying, tracking and destroying enemy forces in urban environments.

File photo

Even though transformation will improve the timeliness and the detail of intelligence, humans will still be needed to identify targets and certify their destruction.

half the world's population will be living in cities.[3] The ability of U.S. forces to identify targets, track them and destroy them with precision munitions, in all weather conditions, may drive many of our future adversaries into urban areas where they will be surrounded by thousands of noncombatants and by religious and health-care structures. In such a situation, the U.S. would not target enemy combatants using traditional means. ARSOF will have to counter the enemy's ability to hide by developing tactics, techniques and procedures (either unilaterally or in concert with other interagency assets), for identifying, tracking and destroying enemy personnel and equipment in urban environments.

Asymmetric attack

Asymmetric attack offers ARSOF the greatest challenge as well as the greatest potential reward. Asymmetric attack presents the greatest challenge because it is most unlike the warrior ethos — which emphasizes putting men and bullets on target. Asymmetric attack offers the greatest potential benefit through an insightful application of "soft skills." Those skills will allow ARSOF to identify the enemy even in what will often be an ambiguous operating environment. Applying soft skills and asymmetric techniques at the beginning of an engagement will not only help ARSOF identify potential enemy targets, it will also help ARSOF limit collateral damage in an urban environment. Potential methods of asymmetric attack include:

- Exploiting informational, organizational, philosophical and religious vulnerabilities in order to force enemy targets either to expose themselves or to mass together. Once exposed or massed, the enemy can be targeted and destroyed.
- Exploiting informational, organizational, philosophical and religious vulnerabilities in order to hinder the enemy's ability to react in a timely, accurate and effective manner. The effect can either defeat the enemy before he gets to the battlefield or, at the very least, it can allow SOF to complete the mission with far fewer casualties.

Precision engagement

A critically important revolution in military affairs is one that forms a "system of systems," in which many systems are linked together. Retired Admiral William A. Owens states, "The near future holds the prospect of viewing a large battlefield 24 hours a day, in real time, through all weather, with great clarity."[4] As we mentioned earlier, the U.S. will ultimately develop a system that will allow sensor-to-sensor fusion and communication; that will select targets and destruction platforms based upon variables such as priority, weather, terrain and likelihood of successful attack; and that will provide options to precision-engagement teams located throughout the battlespace.

The concept of sensor fusion breaks with the traditional concept of sensor-system integration because it does not link multitudes of sensors to multiple human "information choke points." Instead, the sensors are linked to the weapons systems. As future precision-engagement teams identify targets, they will feed the target characteristics into the system, and the system will provide attack alternatives.

While many may assume that future operations will enjoy perfect access to perfect information, we should remember that it is the nature of war to inject uncertainty and confusion. At best, transformation will improve the timeliness and the detail of intelligence, but a state of perfect intelligence

will likely never exist. The human component will still be required to participate in the identification of targets and in the certification of target destruction. That need has been repeatedly verified in Bosnia, in Kosovo and, more recently, in Afghanistan.

ARSOF, because of their training and their experience in high-risk environments, are ideally suited to serve as the human component of precision-engagement operations. They must remain a crucial element, if not the lead element, in the system of systems. To be effectively integrated into the precision-engagement concept, ARSOF should be working now with the Information Exploitation Office of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency[5] and with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence, which has oversight of concept development for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, or ISR. If ARSOF are to be active participants in the mission and doctrine that eventually evolve, ARSOF representatives must be involved with these DoD agencies and civilian companies that are developing the ISR concept.

Precision sensor placement, a subset of precision engagement, will offer the U.S. a means of exploiting its technological advantage. Through the precision placement of acoustic and optic sensors, ARSOF will be able to deny enemies sanctuary by providing a persistent means of surveillance and tracking. In addition to offering a potential counter to the enemy's urban battlefield, the sensor technology will also be useful in other environments, such as jungles and dense forests, that provide cover to enemy movement.

Sustained direct action

ARSOF's emphasis in sustained direct action should be on conducting self-supported SOF operations that are designed for the counterproliferation of WMDs in a hostile environment. Counterproliferation operations will need to focus on ballistic and cruise missiles and on conventional WMDs. To accomplish these operations, ARSOF must have the ability to conduct unaided, deep operations for extended periods of time. To perform these missions, ARSOF will likely work in close coordination with other interagency assets. The ARSOF language program will be a critical enabler of sustained direct action. The Army has made much effort to improve the ARSOF language program, but it must do more.

Unconventional warfare

Unconventional warfare, or UW, supports the ARSOF role of global scouts, through which ARSOF provide ground truth to the commander of the joint task force. Global scouts may be more effectively leveraged in the future to defeat improved enemy means

File photo

The use of U.S. Special Forces to train indigenous forces will probably receive increased emphasis in the future.

and methods of anti-access and anti-denial. Because it will be used to defeat enemy anti-access and anti-denial activities, UW, a legacy mission for U.S. Army Special Forces, will likely receive increased emphasis in the future. In Afghanistan, the accomplishments of an indigenous force, assisted by U.S. ARSOF and U.S. technology, have reduced the number of American forces that are required for operations there.

During a period of uncertainty and rapid change, such as the one we are experiencing today, field exercises can be especially beneficial.[6] ARSOF field exercises could be effective whether conducted unilaterally or in combination with current Army Transformation exercises. ARSOF should also be integrated into transformational experiments, war gaming and simulations at the joint, service and regional-command levels. ARSOF should also consider integrating war gaming and simulations with Army efforts that are associated with the Interim Brigade Combat Teams.

Conclusion

President George W. Bush recently said, "Moments of national opportunity are either seized or lost, and the consequences reach across the decades. Now comes the time of testing. Our measure is taken not only by what we have and use, but also by what we build and leave behind, and nothing this generation could ever build will matter more than the means to defend our nation and extend our freedom and peace."[7]

DoD has chosen transformation as the means by which to fashion the military of the future. SOF transformation initiatives must include more than just the successful fielding of the CV-22 and the Advanced Seal Delivery System. SOF must also focus on developing transformational concepts that will enable them to remain on the leading edge of relevance and capability. SOF must lead the way to a revolution in warfare. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld stated it best: "A revolution in military affairs is about more than building new high-tech weapons — although this is certainly part of it. It is also about new ways of thinking and new ways of fighting."[8] The consequences of a lack of SOF vision or innovative thinking regarding transformational concepts are foretold in a SOF truth: "Competent [and relevant] special-operations forces cannot be created after emergencies occur."

Lieutenant Colonel Adrian Erckenbrack is serving as a special assistant to the Secretary of Defense in legislative affairs. His previous assignments include congressional fellow; senior plans officer for J-34, Deputy Directorate for Operations, Combatting Terrorism; company commander, Company A, 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group; chief of the SF Branch, Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate, Total Army Personnel Command; detachment commander with the 5th SF Group; and company commander (provincial) with the Syrian 9th Armored Division during Operation Desert Storm. Lieutenant Colonel Erckenbrack holds bachelor's degrees in biology and chemistry from Eastern Washington University in Cheney, Wash. He is a 1997 CGSC graduate of the Naval War College, where he received a master's degree in strategic studies. While attending the Naval War College, he also served as a White House intern. Lieutenant Colonel Erckenbrack was the U.S. Army Special Operations Command 1992 recipient of the MacArthur Leadership Award.

Notes:

[1] Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, 30 September 2001, 3.

[2] Foreign Policy Research Institute, e-notes: "The coming transformation of the U.S. military," Michael P. Noonan, 4 February 2002.

[3] "Global Trends 2015": A dialogue with nongovernmental experts about the future growth in mega cities, December 2000.

[4] Admiral William A. Owens, comments during the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research Conference, March 1996.

[5] John Markoff, "Chief takes over new agency to thwart attacks on US," *New York Times*, 13 February 2002, A27.

[6] Testimony by Andrew Krepinevich, executive director for the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 9 April 2002.

[7] Remarks by President George W. Bush at The Citadel, 11 December 2001.

[8] Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2002, 21.

The Special Forces Training Pipeline: Responding to Operational Challenges

Necessity is the mother of invention, and the current operations tempo and demand for more Special Forces, or SF, soldiers to fill the operational force has required the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, the proponent for SF training, to modify the SF training pipeline to meet the demand.

Even though SWCS trainers were eager to retain the training events and philosophies of the Special Forces Qualification Course, or SFQC, that had succeeded in the past, they faced a challenge. As a result of Operation Enduring Freedom and other current operations, SWCS must train more SF soldiers to the same high standard as before. To meet the challenge, SWCS has developed a more aggressive accession program and a more finely tuned training process.

The SF training pipeline is taught in six phases: Phase 1 is Special Forces Assessment and Selection, or SFAS; Phase 2 is the small-unit training portion; Phase 3 is the SF MOS training portion; Phase 4 is the collective training portion (centered around the Robin Sage field exercise); Phase 5 is language training; and Phase 6 is the Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape Course. The 1st Special Warfare Training Group's 1st Battalion is responsible for Phases 1, 2, 4 and 6; the 4th Battalion is responsible for Phase 3; and the 3rd Battalion is responsible for Phase 5.

Initial accessions

In order to meet the challenge of recruiting more enlisted soldiers for SF, SWCS has begun implementing the initial accessions program, or IAP, after approximately 18 months of discussion, design and testing. IAP allows the Army to recruit individuals "off the street" for eventual assignment as SF NCOs. These young men, classified as 18Xs, will receive at least 24 months of continuous training designed to prepare them as either SF weapons sergeants (18B) or SF engineer sergeants (18C).

The qualifications for IAP recruitment are intimidating. The requirements that the IAP recruit must meet are higher than those required of an in-service enlisted SF applicant. The prospective 18X soldier must:

- Enlist for 60 months as an 18X and attend Infantry one-station unit training, or OSUT.
- Be male and under the age of 30 at the time of enlistment.
- Be a high-school graduate or possess a GED certificate.
- Attain a general-technical, or GT, score of at least 110.
- Score at least 85 on the Defense Language Aptitude Battery, or DLAB, or receive a rating of 1/1 on the Defense Language Proficiency Test.

- Score at least 229 on the Army Physical Fitness Test.

To date, the typical IAP recruit fits the following profile:

- Average age: 21.8 years.
- Average GT score: 121.5.
- Average DLAB score: 103.
- Average education level: 13 years (19 percent are college graduates).

The goals of IAP recruitment are aggressive — 600 contracts per year. Each recruit is eligible for a $10,000 or $12,000 bonus, depending upon whether he signs a five- or six-year contract. The bonus is payable upon the 18X's completion of SFAS. If the 18X doesn't complete the SFQC, he will not retain the bonus and will be reassigned as an infantryman (although the current bonus for an 11B infantryman is the same as for an 18X). If the current rate of 18X recruitment continues, SF should meet its fiscal year 2003 goal by the end of the second quarter.

Although the revised training process of the SFQC is structurally similar to the pipeline known to many SF veterans, it does include small, critical adjustments to some of the training events, especially in Phases 2 and 4.

The 18X training pipeline begins with 14 weeks of Infantry OSUT, followed by airborne school. The soldier then makes a permanent-change-of-station move to Fort Bragg for the first phase of the Special Operations Preparation Course, or SOPC 1. SOPC 1 is one of the most emotionally draining phases of the new recruit's training. The four-week course concentrates on the 18X's character development, regimental indoctrination and academic preparation for the first phase of SFQC: the 24-day SFAS. SOPC 1 also prepares the recruit for the rigorous training in physical fitness and land navigation that he will receive during SFAS.

After he completes SOPC 1, the recruit begins his formal SF pipeline training by attending SFAS. If, at the end of SFAS, the 18X is selected for further SF training, he will attend the Primary Leadership Development Course/Basic NCO Course taught by the SWCS NCO Academy. Conducted at Camp Mackall, N.C. (approximately 40 miles west of Fort Bragg), to put the trainee in a "live-in" environment, the 23-day curriculum uses classroom instruction to teach Army-common tasks at skill levels 2 and 3. Those tasks are not taught at any other point in the SF training pipeline.

Following the PLDC training, the 18X attends SOPC 2, a two-week course that prepares him for the training in small-unit tactics that he will receive during Phase 2 of the SFQC. The 18X who completes the PLDC training and Phase 2 of the SFQC will be recognized as a PLDC graduate. Then the 18X will advance to Phase 3 of the SFQC.

So far, IAP has been successful: IAP students are succeeding in SFAS and in Phase 2 of the SFQC at a rate equal to or higher than the rate of in-service SF recruits. But for IAP to be successful in the long run, SF must retain the IAP soldiers beyond their initial enlistment obligation. The SF groups must prepare for the challenge of retaining the first-term enlistees who participate in the IAP.

SFQC revisions

In refining the training process, SWCS has maintained its focus on providing the highest-quality training possible for future SF soldiers. Although the revised training process of the SFQC is structurally similar to the pipeline known to many SF veterans, it does include small, critical adjustments to some of the training events, especially in Phases 2 and 4.

Phase 2, also conducted at Camp Mackall, consists of 46 days of training in basic combat patrolling techniques and light-infantry tactics. To maintain Phase 2's focus on small-unit tactics, the 1st Special Warfare Training Group has moved the land-navigation exercise (and its culmination, the STAR exam) to Phase 1. A few of the days saved in Phase 2 by moving the land-navigation training have been shifted to Phase 4 and will be used to provide SFQC students with an introduction to close-air support. But the majority of the time saved will remain in Phase 2 and will be

devoted to teaching the basic skills — shoot, move and communicate — that are critical to the success and the survival of SF warriors.

Marksmanship and live-fire training remain integral to Phase 2. They are unwaiverable prerequisites for continuation in the SF training pipeline. During Phase 2, soldiers perform live-fire and maneuver at both the squad and the platoon level, receive training in military operations on urbanized terrain, and must qualify with the M-9 pistol and the M-4 carbine.

In Phase 3 of the SFQC, SWCS has made a variety of revisions. After much thought and discussion, SWCS removed Advanced International Morse Code from the program of instruction for the SF communications sergeant (18E). Because the world, especially our culture, is becoming more dependent on advanced technology, SF trainers were eager to find training time during which they could implement instruction on computer applications.

Future adaptations in the Phase 3 curricula will include the addition of instruction on the construction of SF base camps for the SF engineer sergeant (18C). SWCS also plans to change the requirement that SF medical-sergeant students (18D) earn their paramedic certification from the National Registry. Training for 18D will continue to certify students as paramedics, but SWCS will broaden its acceptance of certifying authorities to include state registries and the U.S. Special Operations Command, as well as the National Registry.

Phase 4, the collective-training segment of the SFQC, continues to be centered on the field exercise that has remained a constant through time — Robin Sage. Today's Phase 4 students gain an advantage over their predecessors by participating in a four-day unconventional-warfare practical exercise immediately prior to Robin Sage. The practical exercise, conducted at Camp Mackall, replaces the previous direct-action-mission planning exercise and includes classes in negotiations and in cross-cultural communication. The new exercise provides students with an opportunity to practice adaptive thinking before they deploy with their first SF A-detachment into "Pineland" for Robin Sage.

SWCS has modified the scenario of Robin Sage to make the exercise more compatible with both today's operational environment and current threats. Major changes have also been made in the scenario orders and the training products that students receive during the SFQC. Students now begin receiving information about Pineland, its people, its politics and its problems during Phase 2. They continue to receive intelligence reports, news clips and videotaped updates throughout Phase 3 and during the initial stages of Phase 4. The revised products focus students on the long-term dynamics of unconventional warfare.

The innovations are expected to encourage the flow of information and intelligence and to prevent the "fire hose" effect — the information overload that occurred during the first two weeks of the earlier Phase 4. The changes represent an attempt to ensure better comprehension and more effective mission planning during the Robin Sage isolation segment as well as during the subsequent execution segment of Robin Sage, which takes place in Pineland.

Because of the United States' war on terrorism, SWCS's challenge to increase the productivity and the effectiveness of the SF training pipeline has become even more urgent. The leaders and trainers of the 1st Special Warfare Training Group have responded to the challenge with a comprehensive approach to training. The SF training pipeline, while maintaining the historical SF models and ideology, has evolved into a streamlined and focused program that will train experienced and novice soldiers alike to the same high standard. The revisions to the SF training pipeline have been developed in response to the national need. They represent a reaction to the operational demands that have shepherded SWCS training philosophies into the 21st century.

This article was prepared by members of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's 1st Special Warfare Training Group and by members of the Training Development Division of SWCS's Directorate of Training and Doctrine.

Operational Net Assessment: Implications and Opportunities for SOF

by Lieutenant Colonel William Fleser, U.S. Army (ret.)

Few soldiers in special-operations forces, or SOF, look forward to becoming staff officers. But sooner or later, almost every A-team leader, SEAL-team leader, or special-operations pilot ends up being one, and many will work as staff officers at the unified-command level. The joint environment, which is always dynamic, is changing every day because of the current push toward the hard-to-define goal of military transformation.

Transformation, directed by the Secretary of Defense of the United States, is the U.S. military's self-analysis and resulting corrective measures designed to ensure that our military forces will be prepared to conduct what the Department of Defense, or DoD, calls "rapid decisive operations," or RDO, by 2015.

DoD foresees that in the operational environment of 2015, the conventional forces of all the services will be more "SOF-like" (lighter, faster, more precise, coherently joint, and politically astute). Although SOF-like is not a term that conventional forces would likely choose, it nevertheless seems to be an accurate description. The well-prepared staff officer who understands the operating concepts and the forces available will have an advantage in the competitive environment of the future.

Tomorrow's SOF staff officer will face the task of integrating and planning SOF operations in that environment. This article is intended to help alleviate some of the challenges of SOF integration by introducing future special-operations staff officers to one of the transformational concepts of the U.S. Joint Forces Command, or USJFCOM: operational net assessment, or ONA. This article will define ONA and demonstrate its potential for optimizing the employment of SOF across the conflict spectrum.

ONA can be part of the answer to the difficult question: How can DoD transform and improve the overall U.S. military capability?[1] Understanding that ONA is both a process and a product is central to understanding two other concepts, RDO and effects-based operations, or EBO.

Although this is not an article about transformation, some discussion of the concepts for future joint operations is necessary in order to provide context. To understand where ONA "fits," we will need to define RDO and EBO, with the qualification that both concepts are still under development and refinement by USJFCOM. Knowing how to use ONA will help future SOF planners allocate the right mix of forces, capabilities and assets for achieving full-spectrum dominance.

RDO (as opposed to today's linear, sequential operations) is the integrating concept behind DoD's vision of future operations, *Joint Vision 2020*. RDO is a means by which the U.S. can achieve rapid victory by attacking an enemy's coherence and his ability to fight. RDO refers to the synchronous application of the full range of our

Figure 1 – Operational Net Assessment

- A "system-of-systems" analysis of an adversary's war-making capability (political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information).
- Identifies critical nodes and linkages in the adversary's system-of-systems.
- Examines the adversary's "systems" and identifies options for exploiting critical nodes and vulnerabilities through the application of diplomatic, information, military and economic means.
- Creates an effects-to-task linkage.

national capabilities in timely and effects-based operations. RDO employs the joint force's asymmetric advantages in knowledge, precision and mobility against critical enemy functions to create maximum shock, defeating not only the enemy's ability to fight but also his will to fight.[2]

Integral to RDO is the concept of EBO. EBO focus on achieving specific effects on an adversary's key nodes and vulnerabilities.[3] Like RDO, EBO focus not on the destruction of specific targets, but on the effects that military (and other) operations have on the adversary. In essence, EBO are effects-centric, vs. target-centric.

It is often easier to explain the EBO concept by providing negative examples: During Operation Allied Force, the air campaign against Serbia in 1999, one of the missions was to destroy the bridges over the Danube in downtown Belgrade. When the bridges were destroyed, the mission's measure of performance (accuracy of the weapons) was 100 percent; however, the mission's measure of *effectiveness* was, at best, questionable.

Destroying the Danube bridges contributed little or nothing to achieving the stated objective of the air campaign: deterring Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. But the destruction of the bridges did harden the will of the Serbian people against NATO. One can make the argument that Serbian Premier Slobodan Milosevic's center of gravity was the support of the Serbian people — the fact that his downfall resulted from a grass-roots uprising bears this argument out. But if popular support was Milosevic's center of gravity, then bombing the bridges was in fact counterproductive, because it alienated the Serbian people from NATO and made achieving the strategic objective that much more difficult. EBO, which make use of ONA for their analyses, seek to avoid unintended and unproductive consequences such as those above by focusing military and other elements of national power on the achievement of a discrete set of desired effects.

ONA is also a decision-making tool for the regional combatant commander, or RCC, and it has direct application to the joint-force commander, or JFC, and his supporting components. ONA is unique because it is not an intelligence product. Although it begins with intelligence and information-gathering, ONA will, in the end, provide the JFC with a menu of effects and their probable outcomes, along with a parallel analyses of the strategic, operational and tactical actions and assets that will be required for the achievement of those effects.

The ONA process is summarized in Figure 1.[4] ONA is a continuous process of analysis that begins before a crisis occurs and continues through crisis and conflict to resolution. ONA is a system-of-systems analysis that focuses on a probable adversary's war-making capability in terms of the adversary's political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information

capabilities, or PMESI[2].

Anyone who has attended the Special Forces Qualification Course can recall the target system analysis that is conducted during the demolitions phase. Students analyze a respective node on the basis of criticality, accessibility, recoverability, vulnerability, effect and recognizability, or CARVER. ONA does for operational analysis what CARVER does for target analysis. ONA is the CARVER thought process applied to a bigger problem, such as a country, a region or an international entity (e.g., an transnational terrorist group). ONA looks at the potential adversary as a system of systems and identifies critical nodes within those systems. For instance, influencing or interdicting one key player could disrupt an adversary's decision-making capability. By linking leadership nodes to economic, political, military and other systems, ONA can refine its analysis to identify not only who the target is but also the best method of influencing them.

Consider a real-world example: In the summer of 2000, the U.S. decided that it should make some form of response to the ongoing insurgency in Sierra Leone. Because there was no direct U.S. national interest in that region, the U.S. began a train-and-equip program, Operation Focus Relief, to improve the military capability of selected African nations to conduct counterinsurgency operations. Nigeria was the first nation selected for the program.

Focus Relief, sanctioned and directed by the Clinton administration, required the deployment of mobile training teams, or MTTs, from the 3rd Special Forces Group. The first MTTs deployed in August 2000. Almost from the outset, certain Nigerian military leaders were strongly opposed to Focus Relief. Throughout the initial operation, the MTTs encountered numerous distracters, including direct opposition from some members of the Nigerian high command and an information-operations campaign that was designed to discredit Focus Relief in the eyes of not only the Nigerian people but also the Nigerian military. Although the operation continued and finally succeeded, the outcome of the initial operation was often in doubt because of organized opposition within the Nigerian high command.[5]

While Nigeria has never been assessed as an "adversary," the U.S. European Com-

Figure 2 – Operational Net Assessment



Figure 3 – Operational Net Assessment



mand, or EUCOM, nevertheless has established contingency plans for dealing with numerous crises in Nigeria — from noncombatant-evacuation operations to humanitarian disaster relief. Had an ONA been developed in support of Operation Focus Relief, the analysis would have identified the key members of the Nigerian military who would probably oppose a U.S. action, particularly a unilateral action. In fact, the survey teams that EUCOM and the 3rd SF Group had sent in early to lay out the plan identified military members who were likely to oppose the operation. The survey teams also projected the impact that the opposition could have on the operation.

But no one ever asked what the U.S. could do about the opponents, or what diplomatic, informational, military or economic assets were available for mitigating the effects of the opposition. That is the ONA's function: to identify key nodes; to give the commander a list of political, informational, military and economic options for attacking, destroying, degrading or neutralizing a particular node; and to assess the possible effect of each of those options. In the case of Focus Relief, mitigation came not from military actions, but from steady pressure on the Nigerian political leadership to effect a change in the military leadership.[6]

The Focus Relief example illustrates three points that may be obvious to the SOF planner but which are difficult for many other military planners to understand. First, effects are often achievable by indirect, asymmetric means. Second, the application of resources and assets for achieving the desired effects will often require coordination with other government agencies and multinational partners. Third, the most relevant knowledge for dealing with a regional problem comes from people who have been to the region. SOF's contributions to theater-engagement programs (now called theater-security cooperation) are well-known. In the future, SOF engagement activities will have greater relevance if they are focused on specific information requirements and on preparation of the battlespace for potential crises. One tool that can help focus SOF engagement is ONA.

In current engagement planning, planners often find that a high percentage of the information relevant to a given country or project has been filed away in an after-action review or in the Special Operations Debriefing and Retrieval System. In contrast, ONA will provide an immediate source of information; SOF planners at the RCC level will be able to factor engagement information directly into their operational planning.

The ONA can add immediate, lasting relevance to SOF peacetime-engagement activities. There is often no substitute for putting boots on the ground, and future operations similar to Focus Relief will be able to use SOF engagement for collecting

Figure 4 – Operational Net Assessment

- A decision aid and planning tool for the JTF components and the RCC.
- A part of the information requirements of the JTF commander and his staff. Diminished utility if not used with other products; e.g., JIPB, ETF and assessments.
- Complementary product. Not redundant or competing: Differs from JIPB in timing, product and scope; does not contain sufficient detail to supplant target folder.
- Collaborative production; continual updates – dynamic product.

information that will be critical to the development of ONAs.

Such specific design and targeting will require a higher level of focus in engagement planning, and SOF teams will inevitably be tasked to conduct missions in geographic areas (and with host-nation units) that they would not normally seek out for training purposes. Events like joint-combined exchange training, or JCETs, would take on new relevance if developing an ONA were part of the engagement plan, but unless we want to completely rewrite the rules on JCETs, the SOF mission-essential task list should remain the primary focus of the training.

With the foregoing discussion in mind, let's re-examine precrisis ONA development with an eye toward the role that SOF could play (Figure 2).

• Step 1: In planning for a crisis, the RCC, in collaboration with the interagency community and with the military components, develops the commander's intent and a list of potential PMESI^2 effects. In this step, SOF's role would be limited to planning: SOF planners would provide input on the effects of unconventional and asymmetrical operations.

• Step 2: During the second step, intelligence planners and operational planners perform a system-of-systems analysis to identify the adversary's key vulnerabilities. The analysis identifies critical nodes within separate PMESI^2 systems. It is important to note that the nodal analysis does not assign actions against the critical nodes. SOF's role would remain limited to planning; however, planners would factor SOF engagement activities into the analysis, and they might propose additional, focused engagement events.

• Step 3: Once the nodal analysis is "mature" (ONA is never *complete* — it is a dynamic process that continues after hostilities begin), the ONA begins to incorporate actions directed at specific key nodes. ONA is an operational product, because it goes beyond joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace, or JIPB, to identify the actions that will be required in order to achieve the desired effects. The ONA product is intended to become a menu or a playbook that the RCC can use for crisis resolution. Step 3 links PMESI^2 effects with diplomatic, informational, military or economic actions. Further development of the ONA will refine the analysis to include specific assets for employment (Figure 3).

Opportunities for SOF planners

ONA's potential impact on SOF planning is subtle but significant. By analyzing a potential adversary's key nodes and linkages before a crisis occurs, ONA can give SOF planners an early opportunity to integrate SOF capabilities into the plans for joint operations. Early integration of SOF planning through ONA will necessitate focused engagement to shape the battle-

space and will make it possible to apply SOF assets asymmetrically. ONA will afford SOF planners the opportunity to develop SOF-supported courses of action that use SOF-unique capabilities to achieve desired effects. When a joint force is formed to provide a military response to a crisis, SOF will no longer be restricted to merely supporting the requirements of the other components of the joint force. ONA's focus on outcomes rather than on target-destruction is one reason why the ONA concept should be studied and adopted by the SOF community. The ONA process can optimize the employment of high-demand, low-density assets such as SOF.

To the SOF planner, ONA offers a process and a product that will focus the allocation of low-density SOF assets and that will finally allow critical SOF assets to be allocated only to the missions most critical to the RCC. ONA will give renewed relevance to SOF engagement, because ONA requires current information and insight that, in most cases, only SOF boots-on-the-ground engagement can accomplish. And ONA is a process through which asymmetrical and unconventional military options can be explored, analyzed and, if necessary, implemented by the future joint-force commander.

ONA is not a cure for all the problems of integrating SOF into joint warfare. In fact, ONA is not yet ready for prime time, and USJFCOM will continue to develop and refine ONA through its joint-experimentation program. But ONA is a step in the right direction. Other planning process tools, such as intelligence preparation of the battlefield and the military decision-making process, were developed and refined during the Cold War to provide a framework for analysis and decision-making on what was essentially a linear, industrial-age battlefield. ONA, with its CARVER-like analysis of the adversary, can provide future SOF planners with a means of demonstrating how the application of the right SOF asset, at the right time and place, can achieve the right effect on the non-contiguous battlefield of the future.

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Notes:

[1] DoD news briefing, "Special briefing on Defense transformation," by retired General James P. McCarthy, U.S. Air Force, 12 June 2001.

[2] USCINCJFCOM command brief, June 2001.

[3] USJFCOM J9 concept paper, "JFHQ Structure and Process," par. 5.1, 3 July 2001.

[4] "Operational Net Assessment," briefing to CINC, USJFCOM, by Tom Schmidt, 18 June 2001.

[5] Andrew Maykuth, "Nigerian Army Balks at U.S. Military Training," *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, 15 November 2000.

[6] "What's Behind Nigeria's Military Shakeup?" STRATFOR.com, 2 May 2001.

Effects of Operations: Psychological Determinants of Blitzkrieg Success

by Major Angela Maria Lungu

In 1940, the German army's swift offensive, the blitzkrieg, toppled France in slightly more than a week. Yet when the Germans employed the blitzkrieg against the Russians one year later, they were defeated. Why did the same strategy work so well in one situation and so disastrously in another? The answer may provide insight for battles and wars yet to come.

Napoleon once remarked, "There are only two powers in the world ... the sword and the spirit. In the long run, the sword is always defeated by the spirit."[1] Several political and military factors that appear to have influenced both the success and the failure of the blitzkrieg rest upon a psychological foundation: the spirit vs. the sword. Specifically, three determinants can be isolated as primary reasons for the different outcomes: (1) popular will, (2) unity of leadership, and (3) German bias and arrogance. From these determinants follow the causes of the blitzkrieg's success in France and its failure in the Soviet Union.

Popular will

The first determinant, popular will, originates mainly in the people of a nation. Low popular support in France for continued war contrasted sharply with the high level of popular support for war in the Soviet Union. The reason for the contrast may have been the difference in the peoples' perceptions of

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An elderly French couple visit their former home following the withdrawal of German forces during World War I. France's suffering during the war left the French people reluctant to enter into another conflict.

the value of the war's objective compared to the costs involved in achieving it.

Prior to the war, France, like England, relied on appeasement to curb German aggressiveness. But France was drawn unwillingly into war as a result of its security guarantees to Poland. Germany, for its part, went to war with France because of territorial aspirations — Germany desired Alsace-Lorraine and French colonies.

On the other hand, Germany sought to win an ideological victory over the Soviet Union by eliminating the communist state from the European scene. Early during the war, Hitler said, "Basically, it is a question of cutting the giant cake [the Soviet Union] in such a way that we can first conquer it; second rule it; and third exploit it."[2] Achievement of Germany's goal would require the extermination and enslavement of the Slavic people in order to create "lebensraum," or living space, for the German people. Thus, Russia's very survival was threatened by Germany, and because the Russians had far more at risk than the French, France and Russia had quite different objectives.

But the difference in objective does not fully explain the difference in the two countries' popular will. Understanding the underlying social and economic conditions can help clarify the reasons for the gap. When World War I ended in 1918, the French were left with 1.5 million dead. A poll taken in France soon after World War I noted a "decided lack of enthusiasm in rallying to the flag" and a "bewildered national mind."[3] Twenty-two years later, that war-weariness remained, creating a French popular and political (but not military) reluctance either to enter into a conflict or to continue a conflict once it had begun. Finally, German treatment of French citizens (excepting Jews and Gypsies) in 1940 did not incite hatred among the French or popular support for France to continue the war against Germany.

Conditions in the Soviet Union were a different matter. Throughout history, Russia has doggedly persevered when fighting a war that threatens the existence of the Russian state — for example, during Peter the Great's wars against Sweden and during Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812. Additionally, although the Russian economy suffered from the same interwar depression as the French economy, the Soviets did not experience the pre-war resistance to rearmament. The Soviets recognized that they would have to modernize their military equipment before they could defend Russia against a potential adversary. But by their own estimate, they would not have been able to match the German war economy until 1943.

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A Sudeten woman reluctantly salutes as German forces occupy the Sudetenland in October 1938. Britain and France, hoping to appease Germany, agreed to allow Germany to take the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia.

An important aspect of the difference in popular will was the impact of Nazi Germany's race policies on Slavic society. The Germans viewed the Slavs as an inferior race tainted by Bolshevik and Jewish blood. The Germans' subsequent brutal treatment of all Soviet nationalities squandered any opportunity that the Germans might have had to exploit one of the most critical structural flaws of the Soviet Union: its significant ethnic fragmentation.[4]

In fact, "to the astonishment of the Germans themselves,"[5] they were initially regarded as liberators and potential allies by the inhabitants of many of the non-Russian territories. During Germany's initial advance, for example, reports indicated that more than 90 percent of Ukrainians exhibited "a friendly disposition and hope-

Heinrich Himmler (wearing eyeglasses), the leader of the German SS, visits a German POW camp in Russia. Clearing actions of the SS Einsatzgruppen units helped turn the Russian populace against the Germans.

National Archives

ful expectations"[6] because of repressive Soviet measures designed to erase Ukrainian nationalist feelings and identity. But the harsh treatment of the Ukrainians by the German forces ensured that this Russian political vulnerability could not be successfully exploited. The unifying power of a common enemy who was determined to exterminate or enslave the society was a critical factor influencing popular will.

"The outcome of such [German] treatment was predictable. The initial good will of the population turned into resentment, and the willingness for cooperation changed into open hostility or, at best, indifference. … As German abuses became more widespread and well known, the opportunities for practical collaboration with the occupation force by native auxiliaries and local militia waned. … The partisan movement, both pro-Soviet and nationalist, intensified and exerted a major disruptive influence on the war effort and administration. A less obvious but no less significant consequence … was the measurable stiffening of the Red Army's combat morale as German abuses were cleverly exploited by Soviet propaganda."[7]

The unchecked "clearing" actions of the German police units and SS Einsatzgruppen, during which they executed many Russians as communists or Jews, even though there was no proof that the victims had either Communist Party affiliation or Jewish blood, hurt the German cause immensely. Continued pilfering and illegal requisitioning by German troops (especially the security units) did nothing to improve the situation.[8]

Together, the Russian societal/economic conditions and the German practices provided the fuel necessary to raise popular support for the war effort, both within the Red Army and within the Soviet Union, to a much higher level than was evident in France. In fact, Russian popular support for the war was a critical factor in Germany's failure on the eastern front.

Unity of leadership

The second determinant was the level of the unity of leadership within both France and the Soviet Union. In France, a lack of close alignment between the government and the military caused significant French political and military errors that allowed the blitzkrieg to succeed. In the Soviet Union, a close alignment of the government and the military prevented German success.

Several political and military factors contributed to the crisis of French leadership. There was significant conflict between the French military and the French administration regarding appeasement policies toward Germany. There was also a political civil war in France at the time that blinded French government leaders to all but internal developments. The main focus of the French conservatives was to elicit military contributions from France's allies at a minimal cost to France, and to diligently pursue a Franco-German alignment that would avoid war. The French socialists, on the other hand, were intent on stirring up revolutionary agitation.

As a result of the devastating losses of World War I, there was a reactionary mentality among both the conservatives and the socialists. The French Parliament thus blocked or slowed the military's attempts to rearm, to modernize, or to increase the defense budget, thereby crippling many of the military's attempts to develop an effective defense against a German aggressor.

Moreover, despite the aggressive and ambitious Nazi party's accession to power in Germany and growing evidence of a clandestine German military buildup, the French military entities responsible for the defense of France were busy fighting among themselves. As a result, the French did not have a military leader or a body specifically responsible with coordinating military activities for national defense until just before World War II began,[9] and none of the key French defense organizations was convened until after the signing of the German-Soviet nonaggression pact.[10] Thus, the French government lacked coherent political ambition as well as an ability to unite its turbulent society.

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Soviet Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov (seated at desk) signs the German-Soviet nonaggression pact Aug. 23, 1939.

In sharp contrast to France, the Soviet Union possessed a strong and authoritarian leadership that was able to unite the military and political goals. Because of Stalin's leadership style and his purges of the generals (1936-38), which had effectively decimated the Soviet professional military leadership, the government was highly centralized and coercive, minimizing any threat of civil-military conflicts and ensuring a unity of leadership. Aggressively maintaining control of the military, the government levied stiff sentences for treason against military leaders whose forces were captured or defeated.[11]

Another aspect of the centralized Soviet leadership was the role of partisan warfare in defeating the blitzkrieg. Because the German army was thinly spread across the overwhelming expanse of the eastern front, the German advance bypassed a great number of Red Army units. These elements, still armed and still retaining some semblance of their military organization, contained Red Army officers and political commissars, "who were often part or the entire staff of units that had been ordered to set up partisan organizations when cut off."[12]

By mid-July 1941, the Soviets had attempted to set up and sustain a centrally directed irregular movement, and the head of the armed forces' political system had issued strict orders to intensify political agitation and propaganda that would exploit German brutality.[13] By Aug. 3, 1941, Soviet partisans had won control of almost the entire area behind the German Fourth Panzer Group by carrying out sabotage on

German troops battle Russian forces in 1941. German commanders faced stronger resistance from the Russians than they had anticipated.

National Archives

the rail net, slowing German advances and forcing German commanders to recognize that they were facing stronger resistance than they had initially thought.[14] Russian successes were carefully integrated into the Soviet propaganda strategy, providing support to Red Army units.

The Soviets also prevented the exploitation of the occupied territories through "raids on economic installations and personnel and through a general terror campaign waged among the natives." Communist party agitators were directed to work with the partisans "to drive a wedge between the people and the enemy, undermine the enemy's control, and shorten his stay on Russian soil."[15]

The difference between the French resistance and the Soviets' centrally coordinated and controlled use of partisans is stark. This example also underlines the importance of popular support and of a united government that is free of civil-military problems. Of note, too, is the Soviet use of terror to induce popular support, although its use forced the populace to choose the lesser of two evils. As a former Soviet official captured by the Germans noted:

"We have badly mistreated our people; in fact, so bad that it was almost impossible to treat them worse. You Germans have managed to do that. In the long term, the people will choose between two tyrants the one who speaks their own language. Therefore, we will win the war."[16]

An examination of German leadership during the operations in France and in Russia also reveals a telling difference in the levels of unity. During the attack on France, Hitler and the German general staff enjoyed a good civil-military relationship, resulting in a military strategy that supported government policies. This was not the situation by the winter of 1941-42, however, when Hitler had strained the civil-military balance to its limits. Assuming control of the armed forces, Hitler planned each operation personally, not only usurping the role of his general staff, but also disregarding his general staff's advice, and he placed his ideological policies outside any cohesive military strategy that might have supported them. Thus, the importance of unity of leadership and of balanced civil-military relations on all sides was a critical determinant.

German bias, arrogance

The third and final determinant was German bias and arrogance, which led to other military and political causes of German success and failure. The great expanse of the eastern front and the relatively small German force (proportionately smaller than the force the Germans had used to attack France), the lack of adequate troop replacements and supplies, and the reductions in military materiél all led to Germany's failure in the Soviet Union. Better German tac-

tics and strategy, ready resources, and a cooperative enemy had been largely responsible for Germany's success in France. Many of the differences between the success in France and the failure in Russia were the result of German assessments that were based on biases and arrogance.

In France, the Germans viewed their enemy as civilized Europeans. While the Germans were not kind to the defeated French, neither were they as harsh as they were toward the Russians. Ignoring the opportunity to exploit the ethnic vulnerabilities in the Soviet Union, the Germans regarded Soviet citizens of all ethnic groups (with some exceptions), as *untermenschen* (subhumans) who needed to be exterminated or enslaved. That bias affected the Germans' opinion of Russian combat capabilities and critically influenced German military planning.

In France, the Germans, given their relatively high estimate of the French military capability, allocated appropriate forces and ensured that ready reserves were available from the Rhineland. On the eastern front, estimates of the Russians' inferior military capabilities led the Germans to use a fraction of the forces that they had used in France, despite their need to cover a greater amount of territory.

After Germany's success in France, Hitler boasted that a Russian campaign would be like "a child's game in a sandbox."[17] Moreover, the overconfident Germans estimated that it would take no more than three months to defeat the Russian forces.[18] That arrogance led the Germans to make fatal miscalculations regarding the need for supplies and reserves. Because of subsequent reductions in Germany's production of materiél, those miscalculations proved to be insurmountable. Had they not fallen victim to overconfidence, the Germans might have better allocated their forces and planned for a longer campaign, and they might have started the campaign four weeks earlier.[19]

Most importantly, the Germans missed a critical opportunity to exploit anti-Soviet sentiments in the non-Russian sectors of the country. The substantial resources that would have been available to the Germans in the Ukraine, for example, might well have allowed them to establish a defensive line farther east and then wait for the Soviets to come to them. It is interesting to note that initially, more than one million non-Russian Soviet citizens provided almost one-fourth of the German manpower along the eastern front, and their numbers allowed the Germans to succeed as long as they did.[20]

Conclusions

Three determinants — popular will, unity of leadership, and German bias and arrogance — formed a psychological foundation that influenced the outcome of the blitzkrieg both in France and in the Soviet Union. The lack of French popular support; fragmented French leadership and poor French civil-military relations; and a lower level of German arrogance toward France contributed to Germany's success in France. Strong Russian popular support; comprehensive and centralized Soviet leadership; and German arrogance that led to critical miscalculations made it impossible for the Germans to succeed in Russia.

Hitler, by disregarding the advice of his general staff, by supplanting his general staff's planning and advisory role, and by insisting on his own political and economic objectives, caused a breakdown in Germany's civil-military relations. That breakdown, combined with the other factors listed above, ensured the failure of the blitzkrieg on the eastern front. Thus, the three determinants provide a framework for explaining the two very different outcomes of blitzkrieg, and a comparison of the two campaigns demonstrates the relative importance of what Napoleon called the "spirit" in achieving victory over the sword.

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Notes:

[1] Alistair Horne, *To Lose a Battle: France, 1940* (London: Penguin Books, 1988), 74.

[2] "Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal," Nuremberg, 1949, Document 221 (Bormann protocol of 16 July 1941, conference between Hitler and top German officials on the future of the occupied Eastern territories), 86-94, as quoted in Alex Alexiev, *Soviet Nationalities in German Wartime Strategy, 1941-1945* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1982), 3.

[3] Samuel M. Osgood, *The Fall of France, 1940: Causes and Responsibilities* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1972), vii.

[4] Alexiev, 34.

[5] General Wladyslaw Anders, *Hitler's Defeat in Russia* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953), 205.

[6] Alexiev, 10.

[7] Alexiev, 17.

[8] Wi Stab Sued Bericht, 16.X.4 1, as quoted in Edgar M. Howell, *The Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941-1944* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), 72.

[9] Except for a brief period in 1932, they had no minister of national defense until 1936, nor did they create a chief of the general staff of national defense until 1938. Robert Allan Doughty, *The Seeds of Disaster* (Hamdon, Conn.: Archon Books, 1985), 114-15.

[10] Paul Reynaud, as contained in Osgood, 43.

[11] In fact, Stalin himself, fearing arrest and thinking only of France's recent defeat, disappeared to his *dacha* for several days at the beginning of the German attack, and returned to his headquarters only after Politburo members came to request his leadership and presence. According to Sergei Khruschev, his father (Nikita) told him that Stalin was in a morose and pessimistic mood for days afterward, and was often found sitting on his bed, dejected. Stalin also avoided signing military orders until 1943, leaving it to his subordinates so that he might avoid being held personally liable for issuing an order that might have resulted in the loss of the Motherland (personal conversation between author and Sergei Khruschev, 21 September 2000).

[12] "Halder's Journal," op. cit., VI, p. 208; Pugatslov Interrogation Meldung 23, Einsatzgruppe B, 12. VII.41. 62/4, as quoted in Howell, 43.

[13] Order 81,15 July 1941 (signed by Mechlis) in Anl. 11a, 29.VII.41. KTB, AOK 18, 13787/20, as quoted in Howell, 46.

[14] Streckenzustandskarte, Stand vom 22. VI.-16.IX.41. H 14/570; Lage Ost, 3 August 1941, as quoted in Howell, 50-51, 67.

[15] Howell, 82.

[16] Alexiev, 17.

[17] As quoted in Prof. Thomas G. Mahnken, "Europe: Innovation and War" (Newport, R.I.: Lecture, U.S. Naval War College, 21 September 2000).

[18] Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridbam, eds., *Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945* (New York: The Viking Press, 1974), 595.

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[20] Alexiev, 33.

As I Remember It: The SF/Golf Ball Analogy

by Major General Sidney Shachnow, U.S. Army (ret.)

Out of sheer curiosity, I once cut open a golf ball to see how it was constructed. It was made up of three components: a rubber-ball core; a rubber string wound around the core; and a thin, dimpled, white outside cover. Several days later, I used the composition of the golf ball as an analogy in explaining the training of Special Forces soldiers. A number of "old timers" still remember the golf-ball story, although it is now a dozen years old.

Rubber ball

The first component, the rubber ball, symbolizes the Special Forces volunteer. Traditionally, he is a seasoned, responsible soldier who is highly qualified in a particular skill. He is healthy, is in excellent physical condition, and has already demonstrated a capacity to learn — after all, we are talking about an NCO or a captain.

The officer, as a rule, has graduated from college, has completed his basic and advanced courses, and has established himself in his branch. Many volunteers are already airborne-qualified and have attended Ranger School.

During Special Forces Assessment and Selection, or SFAS, the cadre of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, assisted by technical personnel, will assess the volunteer to determine whether he has the proper motivation, character and temperament for serving on an SF operational detachment.

Surprisingly, many volunteers are not selected to continue SF training. That does not mean that they are poor soldiers; it means that through a subjective evaluation, the SF proponent has determined that they are not the right people to serve in this unique unit. The volunteer who is selected during SFAS is an SF candidate, but he is not yet SF.

Rubber-string winding

The second component, the rubber-string winding, is analogous to the Special Forces Qualification Course, or SFQC. The emphasis of SFQC is on the five SF MOSs. The course also further develops the soldier's warrior traits and prepares him for assignment to an SF operational detachment. After what seems to them like an endless period of time, the candidates who complete the SFQC attend the Regimental Supper, don their coveted berets in a memorable but simple ceremony, listen to a speaker who frequently qualifies as a cure for insomnia, and consume a reasonable meal. The next day, during the graduation ceremony, each SFQC graduate walks across the stage, receives a diploma, and listens to another speaker (several hours later, no one can remember what the speaker said).

At this point, are the soldiers SF-qualified? My response, regarding the vast majority of

those soldiers, is "not yet." The reason for that response is that their training still has not adequately addressed the critical skills that distinguish SF-qualified individuals from other outstanding soldiers (such as Rangers and members of the airborne divisions). Yes, all of the graduates are tactically and technically proficient, but most of them still lack some critical SF ingredients.

Outside cover

The 336 dimples in the surface of the outside cover of a golf ball impart a backspin that permits the ball to stay airborne twice as long as a smooth ball hit with the same force. The cover distinguishes the golf ball from all other balls. So it is with the third component of SF training — once armed with it, soldiers are truly SF. The third component has three elements: regional orientation, language proficiency and interpersonal skills. All three elements are critical to SF qualification, to SF's ability to serve as a force multiplier, and to SF's ability to work effectively with and through indigenous forces. A working knowledge of these elements will allow us to paint the landscape of our operational area.

A fully qualified SF soldier is bilingual. There can be no compromise on the language requirement. It is ironic that we have always provided incentive pay for a host of skills that are not mission-critical, but we have neglected language incentives until recently, and we are now applying those incentives inadequately.

• *Regional orientation*. Because each SF unit is focused on a specific region of the world, the soldiers who are about to join an SF unit must have some knowledge about their unit's region. Their regional knowledge should include geography — not merely the knowledge of place names, but a working knowledge of the region's climate, topography, drainage, natural vegetation, soils and minerals.

But regional knowledge is not limited to a region's physical foundations. SF soldiers must also develop an appreciation for the region's culture and society. In some areas of the world, religion is so pervasive that it practically *is* the culture. In such areas, government, law, food restrictions, family life, art and economic activity all fall under the prescription of religious teaching. As we have seen in recent times, cultures that are in the process of expanding are frequently stronger than those cultures with which they come into contact. Typically, the weaker cultures change substantially as a result of that contact. Perhaps the most widespread example of that process is the "Westernizing" of certain areas of the world, and Islam's resistance to the change. SF soldiers should also understand the political dynamics affecting the people who live in the region.

• *Language*. Since SF's inception, there has been an appreciation for the importance of language training in the SF community. Language training consumes a considerable amount of time and money. Language proficiency is a perishable skill that requires constant maintenance.

Simply put, a fully qualified SF soldier is bilingual. There can be no compromise on the language requirement. It is ironic that we have always provided incentive pay for a host of skills that are not mission-critical, but we have neglected language incentives until recently, and we are now applying those incentives inadequately. Maintaining language proficiency is a responsibility that must be shared by the institution, the unit and the individual.

• *Interpersonal skills*. The SF soldier's mastery of interpersonal skills is critical to the achievement of effective SF operations. Unfortunately, the meaning of "interpersonal skills" is not always clear. Simply put, they are "people skills," such as empathy, graciousness and the ability to read a social situation. We enhance relationships by understanding our feelings, empathizing with the feelings of others, and controlling our emotions. Interpersonal skills also include negotiation, the back-and-forth communication designed for reaching an

agreement when two sides have some opposing interests. Principled negotiation is an all-purpose strategy that SF soldiers must learn. Understanding negotiation techniques and developing negotiation skills are critical to the success of one's career and personal life.

SF soldiers must also have the abilities to persuade and to teach. SF uses those skills frequently — more frequently, in fact, than we use our weapons. Finally, it has been estimated that as much as 70 percent of all communication is nonverbal. When there is a conflict between what one says and what one's body language reveals, the nonverbal communication is more accurate. However, there are cultural nuances in nonverbal communication, and the person unschooled in those nuances often misinterprets what he sees. It is therefore crucial that SF soldiers study and recognize cultural and environmental differences.

Only when the soldier has a thorough knowledge of the third component can he be called SF-qualified. FM 3-05.20 (FM 31-20), *Special Forces Operational Techniques*, essentially states that in Chapter 1. However, despite the fact that that requirement has been established in doctrine, it still requires implementation and sustainment.

A legitimate question is, "Who is responsible for ensuring that SF training is accomplished? The SF proponent, SWCS, is responsible for stating clearly what SF candidates must learn and for providing the training-support materials necessary to accomplish that end. The proponent also identifies the skills that SF soldiers must master through operational assignments, individual self-study or self-development.

In meeting those responsibilities, the proponent defines the life-cycle model that will be followed. Major factors that influence the effectiveness and the success of institutional training are the proponent's accuracy in determining the duties required for a particular career and the proponent's effectiveness in setting the corresponding training standards. Our performance in institutional training has been spotty; although there are good explanations why, there is no excuse.

The contemporary conflict, at whatever level, is essentially a "social conflict." The emphasis has shifted toward social, political and psychological factors, rather than military factors. This does not mean that military violence is being discarded, but rather that the use of violence will be complementary rather than controlling. Striking a proper balance of all three components will allow SF soldiers to operate effectively and to understand and master their complex environment. The balance of the three components is ultimately what makes SF unique.

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Civil-Military Marriage Counseling: Can This Union Be Saved?

by Adam B. Siegel

Since the early 1990s, a plethora of international interventions — from Somalia to East Timor to Afghanistan — have forced civilian and military actors to unite in what have proved to be unhappy marriages. Cross-cultural misunderstandings and tensions within these civil-military shotgun marriages have led many on both sides to long for a divorce. Unfortunately, because civil-military operations are today's — and likely tomorrow's — reality, the international community isn't a no-fault state!

As in many difficult marriages, each side of the civil-military union has wanted (if not sought to force) the other side to conform to its desires and expectations. In some ways, lessons-learned processes and multiorganizational conferences represent marriage-counseling sessions for civil-military peace operations. These counseling sessions, like those for a committed, but troubled, marriage, continue seemingly without end, with the same issues reappearing time after time, unchanged.

Unlike marriage counseling, the civil-military sessions do not always involve the same actors, nor, perhaps more importantly, do they involve a counselor who can help each side hear the other and translate the actors' meanings. Perhaps because of these differences, fundamental misunderstandings still dominate perceptions and attitudes on both sides of the civil-military union. Those misunderstandings (or failure to reach broad understandings) often undermine relations on the ground, making effective cooperation and coordination all the more difficult.

On the civilian side, it is not uncommon to hear humanitarian workers comment, with surprise, on the decency of the military personnel whom they encounter. Some civilians express seeming disbelief that military officers could be loving spouses and parents. (Some Civil Affairs officers carry packs of their family photos on deployments in order to build relationships with other workers.)

This article will focus on the military aspect of the relationship to show several commonly held military views of civilian organizations that can undermine cooperation in the operational environment. The following are some commonly held — if strongly stated — views that the author has heard expressed in operations from Haiti to Bosnia to Albania, in multiple conferences and from many nations' military personnel:

- The military is organized and structured; civilian organizations are not.
- Military personnel are dedicated and hard-working; civilians put in office hours.
- The military is resource-poor; civilian organizations are resource-rich.
- Military personnel cost less; civilians are expensive.

As with many stereotypes, each of the four views has some grounding in truth,

A U.S. Air Force colonel assigned to Joint Task Force Shining Hope gives a briefing on helicopter delivery of relief supplies. Military rank, organization and uniforms are often confusing to civilian agencies.

Photo by Adam B. Siegel

but none of them will stand close scrutiny. In addition, if we are proud of our own organization, we have a natural tendency to assume a superiority over other organizations — i.e., to emphasize our own strengths while exaggerating others' weaknesses. This tendency contributes to the cultural misunderstandings that dog civil-military operations.

The following discussions will examine the four stereotypes through real-world examples drawn mainly from the operations of NATO's Implementation Force, or IFOR, and Stabilization Force, or SFOR, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or BiH, in 1996 and 1997. Each discussion will show the misunderstanding and suggest ways of fostering better relations and, perhaps, better results from civil-military partnerships.

Organization

One common complaint from military personnel about civilian organizations is that civilians are disorganized, making it nearly impossible to work with them. Military personnel believe that the civilians have no one in charge, and they contrast the perceived civilian dysfunctional organization to the clear military chain of command.

During NATO's first year of operations in BiH, this stereotype did not reflect the reality of military operations. Consider the following characteristics of military operations at that point:

- IFOR contained military forces from more than 30 nations (the forces spoke many primary languages).
- Many of those nations had multiple services involved.
- The divisions, brigades and battalions across the force employed different organizations, procedures and operational approaches.
- The personnel and units of those commands rotated frequently, in different patterns and across national lines.
- Many military forces on the ground were not part of the NATO force. Those forces included national support elements, a legacy U.N. force, and Swiss military forces who were working with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

While military personnel may have managed to navigate this maze, civilian personnel (even those who could distinguish a sergeant from a general) had reason to be confused.

Emergency evacuations represented perhaps the most significant potential military support to civilian organizations. On the ground, however, NATO did not establish a standard operating procedure for such an evacuation until well into 1997 — more than 18 months after NATO operations had begun in BiH. Until that time, every unit had used a different set of procedures for conducting an evacuation.

The Italian Brigade in Sarajevo, for example, wanted to have detailed information — such as a list showing which cars (with license-plate numbers) would be carrying which people (with passport information) in the event of an evacuation. The Spanish Brigade's staff viewed the situation differently: "We know which international civilians are working here. Only those whom we don't know will have to be screened." A civilian who might have driven throughout BiH — passing through the sectors of several divisions and brigades in a single day — would have had a very difficult time navigating the differing rules on the evacuation issue.

No organizational chart can easily describe the complex interrelationships between hundreds of civilian agencies regarding a myriad of issues. … There is no 'one' person in charge. Thus, … military personnel find it confusing to seek structure analogous to military command among civilian agencies — that structure simply doesn't exist.

As another example, civil-military cooperation centers, or CIMICs, existed at the brigade, division, corps and IFOR levels. Civilian organizations were often confused as to which level they should consult about different issues.

In addition, more than one officer has suggested that multinational peace operations do not operate by "command and control," but by "coordination and consultation." The lieutenant general who commanded the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps reportedly described the situation as follows: "I thought I knew all types of command and control that existed (OPCOM, OPCON, TACON, etc.), but my division commanders have managed to teach me three that I did not know. When I want my French division commander to do something that he disagrees with, he has the tendency to remind me that he is under 'OP NON.' My American division commander is a bit more blunt and asserts, 'OP NOWAY.' My fellow Brit is the height of courtesy and simply tells me 'OP YOURS!' " Thus, in Bosnia, military C^2, rather than representing the traditional "command and control," might have been better defined as "convince and cajole."

Truth be told, military structures are — by definition — more organized than the structures of the large number of civilian agencies that work in post-conflict environments. Most military structures develop organizational charts, and those charts provide important information — at least to those who have been initiated into military culture.

But no organizational chart can easily describe the complex interrelationships between hundreds of civilian agencies regarding a myriad of issues — from psychological counseling to vote monitoring to re-establishing sewer services. There is no "one" person in charge. Thus, there is a reason why military personnel find it confusing to seek structure analogous to military command among civilian agencies — that structure simply doesn't exist. In Bosnia and elsewhere, however, the military clarity of command may have existed only on paper. At any rate, for those outside the NATO military organization who attempted to learn how to work with the military, the process was confusing.

Dedication

In mid-December 1996, the new NATO command staff met with members of a U.N. office in Sarajevo. The meeting led to a mutually-agreed-upon plan of action. At the end of the meeting, the head of the U.N. agency said that the action plan could not start until after the New Year, because he would be taking a two-week vacation to go fishing in Florida. After the meeting, a NATO general who was leaving the room remarked to a staff officer, "How dare he go on vacation, the lazy bastard! We're ready to do this now, and it shouldn't have to wait." It wasn't exactly a subdued remark, and, as intended, the U.N. agency head heard it.

Evidently lost to the general was the

basic difference between the nature of his deployment and the nature of the civilian's career. The general had just arrived — anxious to achieve great things — for a six-month tour (during which he would be eligible for weeks of leave). The U.N. agency head had also recently arrived — not from a home base where he had a nice house in which his wife was waiting at the end of each day, but from another post-conflict environment. In fact, during the previous seven years, the U.N. agency head had seen his wife less than two months out of each year, as he moved about between such "soft" duty sites as Afghanistan, Angola and Mozambique.

The military view that civilians are lazy because they go out to dinner, go away for the weekend or take a vacation is one that emerges almost without exception in post-conflict operations. The perception is evidence of a failure to understand that military personnel deploy for a limited period as individuals, while civilians might remain in a post-conflict environment indefinitely — it becomes, in essence, their home.

Most military deployments are of limited duration — a year is typically viewed as an extremely long period. For most forces in BiH, tours ran between four and six months. Civilians, however, typically sign up for a longer duration. Civilian employees, with the exception of emergency teams, typically consider a year to be the minimum commitment. In addition, many careerists, like the U.N. agency chief discussed above, move from one crisis to another — and they may take their vacations at times that their military colleagues consider inappropriate. Thus, while military personnel deploy far from their families and work crisis hours, civilians in theater frequently are at their "home base"; therefore, they may perform their work during "home-base" hours.

Resources

In the post-conflict operational environment, military elements often look with envy at the wealth of resources that lie at the disposal of civilian organizations. Military staffs hear about billions of dollars of civilian aid money and dream of how they could spend that money more effectively. Soldiers look longingly at brand-new Range Rovers and compare them to their beaten-up "old" vehicles.

Photo by Adam B. Siegel

The camp of U.S. Marines who were providing security for Camp Hope in southern Albania. Civilian organizations do not have the tents, weapons, vehicles and aircraft that allow military forces to deploy rapidly and provide security.

An Austrian Army helicopter loaded with U.S. MREs for delivery to Kosovar-Albanian refugees in 1999. While the military may envy the luxury of Range Rovers, civilians envy helicopters and transport aircraft.

Photo by Adam B. Siegel

Sarajevo in the spring of 1997 provides a different perspective. The SFOR headquarters at that time numbered between 800 and 1,400 people (depending on one's counting style). With the exception of the International Police Task Force, or IPTF, which is a paramilitary force, the SFOR headquarters alone employed more personnel than any other international organization in theater. In fact, again with the exception of the IPTF, the SFOR headquarters (let alone the more than 30,000-strong total SFOR force) was about 10 times larger than the next largest international contingent in BiH. Not surprisingly, the SFOR headquarters personnel worked long hours, and quite a few positions were staffed 24 hours a day, seven days a week. In terms of personnel — perhaps the most valuable asset — SFOR swamped the other international organizations.

In terms of the assets and infrastructure needed for providing communications, transportation, engineering, medical treatment and other support, SFOR had a similarly lopsided advantage over other international organizations. While a new Range Rover might look great and, from our personal perspective, might seem to be a true luxury, a Range Rover costs far less than the typical military armored vehicle, helicopter or airplane — all of which the military force typically possesses in some quantity (along with the mechanics to maintain them).

In fact, each side of the civil-military relationship tends to see the other as more fortunate. From the civilian standpoint, the military seems quite resource-rich, with its helicopters, large numbers of vehicles, transport aircraft, robust communications and computing equipment. From the military perspective, civilian agencies seem resource-rich because they have aid money to disperse — and, after all, dispensing money is the role of many civilian organizations.

When an imbalance favors the military, many military personnel fail to notice it. When the imbalance lies in numbers of personnel, it contributes even further to the perception that civilians are not hard workers. Few civilian organizations have the ability to man positions in a headquarters around the clock. Thus, when someone from an NGO has to travel (for whatever reason) or goes to dinner on a Friday night, there might not be anyone in the office to answer the phone. Too often, military staff members fail to understand that there may be a valid reason why there is no one to answer the office phone in a civilian aid agency late on a Friday evening.

Cost

Military personnel are often shocked — and express jealousy — about the salaries paid to personnel of international organizations. In Bosnia, military personnel of almost all nations involved made envious

and sarcastic comments about the tax-free $80,000 (U.S.) salaries of the members of the IPTF. Military critics also noted that the per diem paid to IPTF personnel — $100 (U.S.) — was far more than was required for a more-than-reasonable life in BiH, where the average income is close to $10 (U.S.) a day. For more than 99 percent of the world's population, $100 a day is an enviable income.

When military personnel express envy over the cost of civilian personnel, they do so, almost without exception, before placing that cost into a wider context than individual income. The problem lies in assessing cost: Should we consider salary only, or should we consider total remuneration? Should we figure the cost of the individual, or should we consider the cost of the system? Who is paying the costs that we are trying to assess?

If one pursues the concept of "total-cost accounting" (trying to capture the cost of the entire system), then the cost of military personnel skyrockets. Total-cost accounting would include the cost of training and education, recruiting, retirement and all other expenses that are associated with getting a soldier to the front. At its extreme, the accounting would also include all equipment costs — from the cost of a rifle to the cost of the military transport aircraft used to deploy the soldier to the cost of the national technical means of providing intelligence support. Those costs add up.

With salary and per diem, each IPTF officer was paid about $120,000 per year, and each provided his own housing, food and other upkeep. In order to get a full year of on-the-ground policing from an IPTF officer, the international community might have paid for 15 months (counting leave, training and turnover time) of the officer's time, or $150,000. That price came with no residual costs such as retirement. If we estimate that the support, recruitment, supplies, travel and administration costs for each officer was approximately $100,000 each year, then the IPTF officer cost roughly $250,000 per year.

In computing the costs of military personnel in the same situation, it might be appropriate to consider an individual with roughly the same amount of experience as that generally required for a policeman in a peace operation: a minimum of seven to 10 years of service. That individual would be an NCO earning about $2,500 per month. If we add that NCO's housing, retirement, medical care and other benefits, the cost could easily double — to $5,000 per month, or $60,000 per year. In comparison to the $120,000 to $250,000 annual cost for police, $60,000 still looks cheap.

At a minimum, however, the U.S. military requires three soldiers to maintain one soldier on the ground — another $180,000 per year. In actuality, the 3:1 ratio is quite conservative. Some calculate that the U.S. tail-to-tooth ratio is 11:1 (including training, recruitment, administrative costs, supply, etc.). If we calculate the amount using the 11:1 ratio, the cost of a soldier rises from $60,000 to $600,000-$700,000 — or more than twice the total cost of the IPTF policeman, even without considering the far greater costs of equipping and supplying military personnel. Furthermore, while military per diem is minimal, the military provides the serviceman with food, housing, laundry, post, and many other services — all of which cost real money and real resources.

Returning to the challenge of assessing cost, the salaries of the IPTF and other civilian workers look great in comparison to a military paycheck, but for those who have to pay the check, the military's costs don't compare so favorably. For the American taxpayer, the cost of international personnel is cut-

If one pursues the concept of 'total-cost accounting' (trying to capture the cost of the entire system), then the cost of military personnel skyrockets. Total-cost accounting would include the cost of training and education, recruiting, retirement and all other expenses that are associated with getting a soldier to the front. … Those costs add up.

rate compared to the deployment of U.S. military personnel. If an IPTF policeman on the ground costs about $250,000 a year, then the U.S. taxpayer will pay about $65,000 of that cost. Putting one U.S. service member on the ground next to that policeman might cost $1 million or more. For the American taxpayer, the policeman begins to look like a real bargain.

Cost is clearly not the sole or even the principal determinant of value, but military members who look longingly at IPTF salaries and think they are outrageous fail to view those salaries in the context of what it would cost a nation to deploy military personnel on a peace operation. In that context, civilian salaries seem far less outrageous.

Conclusion

Not all military personnel believe the stereotypes of civilians discussed in this article — far from it. However, enough of them do view civilian agencies through those prisms to create tension in the formation of civil-military partnerships.

Again, stereotypes often do have a basis — however tenuous — in reality. When it comes to the four perceptions discussed herein, the author has personally encountered civilians who were more interested in their bottles of champagne than in their mission; who were more concerned with paperwork and turf battles than they were in achieving objectives; who worked seven-hour days while the military personnel alongside them worked 15+ hours a day; and who spent money seemingly without considering whether their programs would produce a positive impact.

Alongside these experiences, the author can place encounters with military personnel who had no initiative; who lacked knowledge about their responsibilities; who were more concerned with counting bureaucratic coup than with finding the most effective multiorganizational approach; who scheduled trips into combat zones in order to maximize their tax-free benefits; and who were more interested in their per-diem reimbursements than in their mission accomplishment. But on both sides, such nightmares are the exception. As a rule, international people — military and civilian — who enter post-conflict zones are dedicated and are making personal sacrifices to be there.

In post-conflict peace operations, cultural sensitivity matters. Cultural sensitivity relates not only to the local population, but also to our partner agencies. Civil-military partnerships will work better in peace operations if civilians make an effort to better understand military culture and organization. They will also work better if military personnel from all services and from all involved nations make an effort to better understand the culture and the nature of their civilian partners. To date, all too often the actors on both sides have failed to make those efforts.

Amid the tensions and the pressures of complex international operations, such efforts are difficult to make. But without an understanding of their companion's nature, each partner in the civil-military marriage may chafe under the yoke and long for an end of the union. Unfortunately, that union cannot be terminated without seriously undermining the potential for success in future international interventions.

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Kachin Rangers: Allied Guerrillas in World War II Burma

by Dr. C.H. Briscoe

Early in 1942, the outlook for the Allies was grim in the China-Burma-India theater, or CBI. The Japanese navy had driven the British navy from the Java Sea, Singapore had fallen in February, and the Japanese were simultaneously attacking the Dutch East Indies (to seize the oil refineries and rubber plantations) and Burma (to block the British land connection to China).

Because the Burma Road was the only Allied land bridge to China, General Chiang Kai-shek had sent the Chinese Expeditionary Force to Burma in mid-January 1942 to help Great Britain stop the Japanese offensive there. United States Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson chose Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell to head U.S. forces in the CBI theater and to keep the Chinese fighting.

However, by the time Stilwell arrived in Burma in March 1942, the Japanese had already captured Rangoon and were advancing north along the railway toward Mandalay and Myitkyina. An unexpected Japanese flank attack out of Thailand crushed the 1st Burmese Division at Yenangyuang and permitted the Japanese to concentrate their forces. They destroyed the 55th Chinese Division at Loilemis and blocked any attempts by Allied forces to escape to China via the Burma Road.

Having only two options — walking out of Burma and into India, or becoming a prisoner of war — the newly-arrived American commander concentrated on saving his U.S. military staff and a group of American, British, Chinese, and Indian civilians and Burmese nurses — about 100 people. The 60-year-old Stilwell spent the first 19 days of May 1942 leading his entourage some 200 miles from Wuntho to Imphal, India, following dirt roads, rafting rivers, and climbing the forest trails across the eastern razorback mountains of India.

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General Joseph W. Stilwell and General Sun Li-Jen, commander of the Chinese 38th Division.

Although Stilwell escaped the Japanese, the critical Burma link in the Allied theater had been lost. India was Great Britain's last bastion in Asia. Ramgarh in India's Bihar province became the major training ground for Allied forces in the CBI theater. Anxious to get back into the fight, but facing a demoralized British army and the awesome task of building another Chinese force, Stilwell prepared for the future by

building a supply road to Ledo to support an invasion of Burma.

Newly formed Chinese infantry divisions were flown across "the Hump" to be trained at Ramgarh by an American cadre for service with the British 14th Army. The British

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A convoy drives over the Burma Road. The Burma Road, 750 miles long, ran from Lashio, Burma, to Kunming, China — a distance of 300 miles by air.

provided barracks, food and silver rupees to pay the Chinese troops, while the Americans furnished radios, rifles and machine guns, artillery, tanks, trucks and instructors. In addition to teaching infantry, tank, and artillery tactics, the American soldiers changed truck tires and loaded pack mules.

During the Chinese train-up and the British reconstitution of forces, hill tribes in northern Burma who refused to be subjugated — predominantly the Kachins, but also the Karens, the Chins, the Kukis and the Nagas — had been fighting a guerrilla war against the Japanese occupation forces. Other Burmese tribes, the Burmese and the Shans, welcomed the Japanese and openly collaborated with the Japanese secret police (*Kempei)* against the minority hill tribes. The Allies supported the guerrillas from Fort Hertz, the only remaining Allied base in Burma that had an airfield. The three regiments of guerrillas — the Karen Rifles, the Kachin Rifles, and the Kachin Levies — were natural jungle-fighting units, but they lacked the tactical training and the modern equipment that were needed to effectively battle Japan's mechanized infantry and armor.

It took Major General Orde Wingate to show that the Japanese army could be beaten and to rekindle an offensive spirit among the Allies in India. Wingate had led a force of 80 British soldiers and 1,000 Ethiopians and Sudanese across 600 miles of desert to restore Emperor Haile Selassie to his throne in Addis Ababa in 1941. In April 1942, Wingate arrived in India to organize guerrilla levies against the Japanese in Burma. But rather than use the Kachin resistance, Wingate chose to lead a long-range penetration group, composed of British regulars and colonial units, behind Japanese lines to exploit the vulnerabilities of the occupation force with unconventional warfare.

Wingate's force, the 77th Indian Infantry Brigade, the "Chindits," was formed from the 13th Battalion, King's Liverpool Regiment; the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Ghurka Rifles; the 2nd Battalion, Burma Rifles; and the 142nd Commando. After extensive training at Ramgarh, the 3,000 Chindits moved more than 200 miles behind Japanese lines in Burma. Relying solely on air assets for resupply and medical evacuation, the Chindits ambushed Japanese patrols, attacked outposts and supply depots, destroyed bridges and repeatedly cut the Myitkyina railroad for more than three months. Afterward, they dispersed into small groups that either returned to India or escaped to China.

Fewer than half the raiders returned — malnutrition, combat fatigue, disease, death and wounds had thinned their ranks. Lieu-

tenant General William J. Slim, commander of the British 14th Army, criticized Wingate's effort as an expensive failure, but Winston Churchill praised Wingate's genius and brought him to the Quebec Conference in August of 1943. There, Wingate proposed a second, larger Chindit expedition and suggested that the U.S. Office of Strategic Services, or OSS, expand its guerrilla-warfare activities into Burma.

The existing resistance of the Kachins and other hill tribes dovetailed perfectly with the British plan to support small units operating behind Japanese lines (the plan was called "Guerrilla Forces — Plan V"). In August 1943, a British V-Force team flew to Fort Hertz to reconstitute the Kachin Levies. Stilwell also diverted to Fort Hertz eight officers and 40 sergeants (radiomen, cryptographers and medics) from the American soldiers who had been assigned to train the Chinese infantry divisions. From that remote outpost, they were to expand the partisan war in Burma by advising and supporting the Kachins in conducting guerrilla warfare behind Japanese lines.

The V-Force recruited the hill tribesmen and trained them to collect intelligence; to provide early warnings of air attacks; to recover downed Allied aircrews; to conduct ambushes, reconnaissance and flank patrols; and to scout for conventional forces. To complement their experience as infantrymen, the V-Force advisers had acquired skills in language, medicine, demolition, radio and cryptology. They transmitted coded messages to relay their daily intelligence reports and to request air resupply and medical evacuation. British units operated from Ledo north to Fort Hertz, from Kohima to Chindwin, and in the mountains west of Imphal. American teams worked south to Myitkyina, sending their reports to Ledo and to Tagap-Ga, their forward logistics base.

The successes of the V-Force Kachin Rangers and the Kachin Levies, as well as Stilwell's failure to garner support from the Chinese and from the British army for a conventional offensive against Burma, led Stilwell to expand his guerrilla operations. He directed OSS Detachment 101 to establish its headquarters in Assam, in northeastern India. Det 101's assignment was to plan and conduct operations against the roads and the railroad into Myitkyina, in order to deny the Japanese the use of the Myitkyina airfield. Det 101 would coordinate its operations directly with the British. Det 101's Lieutenant Colonel Carl Eifler was given a free hand in directing sabotage and guerrilla operations. All Stilwell wanted to hear was "booms from the Burmese jungle." By November 1943, at his base in the Naga Hills of northern Assam, Eifler was preparing the first group of Allied agents for Burma.

By the end of 1943, Det 101 had established six Kachin operating bases behind

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American soldiers supervise the issuing of rifles and ammunition to new Kachin recruits.

Kachin radio operators at work. The Kachins proved to be adept at continuous-wave radio communications — most of the operators could send and receive 25-45 words per minute.



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the lines in northern Burma: three east of the Irrawaddy River and three west of it. Each base commander recruited and trained small Kachin elements for his personal protection, for internal defense, and for conducting limited operations — principally sabotage and small ambushes. The guerrilla forces were uniformed and equipped with air-supplied M-2 .30-cal. carbines, submachine guns (.45-cal. Thompson and 9 mm Marlin), .30-cal. light machine guns, ammunition and demolitions. Japanese arms and equipment in northern Burma were a decade behind the times, and the superior firepower of the guerrilla units was key to their success. Each Kachin camp had an intelligence officer, usually an American officer, whose principal duties were to interrogate captured enemy soldiers or agents, debrief guerrilla patrols, and direct operations of the better-educated Kachins (those schooled by Christian missionaries), who acted as low-level intelligence agents reporting information by runners or via bamboo-container message drops.

Det 101 recruited potential agents from the Kachin and Karen guerrillas. The candidates slipped through Japanese lines to reach the airfield at Fort Hertz, from which they were flown to Assam for three to five months of intensive intelligence and communications training. The Kachins proved to be particularly adept at continuous-wave radio communications — most were able to send and receive 25-45 words per minute. While most returned to their former bases, a few parachuted into new areas to organize independent operations and to collect and report weather data to the 10th AF Weather Service. This data was critical to air resupply and daily "over the Hump" C-46 and C-47 transport missions to China.

Despite reports of successful guerrilla operations and the volume of intelligence coming from the field, Stilwell remained skeptical about Det 101's effectiveness until Det 101's Major Ray Peers flew two Kachin leaders to Stilwell's headquarters. When the Kachins told Stilwell how many Japanese they had killed in various ambushes and raids, he asked for proof, thinking that 200 miles behind enemy lines, they could have spent little time counting Japanese dead and wounded. The two Kachin leaders were unperturbed. They unhooked bamboo tubes from their belts and dumped the contents of the tubes on Stilwell's field desk. When asked what the contents were, the Kachins replied: "Japanese ears. Divide by two and that is how many we have killed." In the Burmese hill tribes, ears taken in combat denoted a warrior's courage. It was suffi-

cient proof for Stilwell. But after the Kachins departed, Peers received a lecture on the *Rules of Land Warfare.* It took months to convince the Kachins that body counts would suffice.

Stilwell's opinion of special operations rose. He had to admire Det 101 and the Kachins, because unlike the British and Chinese forces, they were fighting the Japanese and providing valuable intelligence. In the late summer of 1943, Stilwell approved plans for the fall-winter offensive of 1943-44, a three-pronged drive into Burma.

Stilwell would launch the first prong, the north Burma campaign, in late December, in an attempt to seize the airfield and the rail terminus at Myitkyina before the spring monsoons. Success would seal the winter campaign with a victory, put Stilwell halfway to China, and break the Japanese blockade. Stilwell would lead the 22nd and 38th Chinese Divisions, two of the three Chinese divisions training at Ramgarh. The Chinese divisions would be supported by Merrill's Marauders and the British and American Kachin elements. By abandoning fixed supply lines and making his force dependent on air resupply, Stilwell hoped to eliminate the possibility of retreat by the untested Chinese troops. Stilwell planned to push the force 200 miles through jungle, through swamp and over mountains to conquer an entrenched, desperate enemy. Fearing that the Chinese might falter without an American vanguard, Stilwell put Merrill's Marauders in the lead.

The second prong would be a second division-sized Chindit expedition led by Wingate in central Burma, far to the south of Stilwell's force. The Chindits, with the support of the 1st Air Commando, led by Colonels Philip Cochran and Robert Allison, were to launch a glider-borne assault into three landing zones. The third prong would consist of a drive by the 14th British Army into central Burma behind the Chindits.

On the map, the Allied campaign for northern Burma wriggled tortuously from one unpronounceable name to another, but on the ground, the soldiers faced rain, heat, mud, sickness, snakes, snipers and ambushes. In February, the Marauders wheeled about on the eastern flank of the main Chinese advance, moving through the jungle to attack each Japanese defensive position from the rear. The Kachin Levies at Fort Hertz guarded the rear of the advance as Stilwell's main force descended southward. Some 3,000 Kachin Rangers of Det 101 assisted the Marauder battalions.

Lieutenant James L. Tilly's detachment of Kachin Rangers scouted for the 1st Marauder Battalion and provided its flank guard. Captain Vincent Curl's 300 Kachin Rangers scouted for the 2nd and 3rd Marauder battalions, guarded their eastern flanks, ambushed Japanese patrols and destroyed retreating Japanese forces. During the march, the Kachin Rangers also rescued two downed pilots from the 1st Air Commando.

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Americans and Kachins unpack supplies dropped near Tagap-Ga, Burma, in August 1943.

The presence of native jungle fighters instilled confidence among the Marauders. Lieutenant Charlton Ogburn Jr. declared, "Often we had a Kachin patrol with us, and we never, if possible, moved without Kachin guides. The Kachin Rangers not only knew the country and the trails, but they also knew better than anyone, except the enemy, where the Japanese outposts were located. Waylaying Japanese in their artful ambushes, they made us think of a Robin Hood version of the Boy Scouts, clad (when in uniform) in green shirts and

shorts. Some of the warriors could not have been more than 12 years old. While most carried the highly lethal burp guns (Thompson and Marlin submachine guns) slung around their necks, some carried ancient muzzle-loading, fowling pieces." All the Kachins also carried their traditional machete-like short swords, called *dahs*.

In April, when his Chinese division commanders stalled (blaming their failure to destroy the Japanese 18th Division on bad weather and combat delays), Stilwell took a desperate risk. On April 21, keeping the two Chinese divisions directed toward the Mogaung Valley to assault Kamaing, Stilwell launched a separate strike force of 1,400 Americans, 4,000 Chinese, and 600 Kachins across the Kumon mountains to seize the Myitkyina airstrip in a lightning push.

On April 25, the 5307th split into three assault columns: the 1st Marauder Battalion with Kachin Rangers leading the Chinese 150th Infantry Regiment; the 3rd Marauder Battalion with Kachin Rangers leading the Chinese 88th Infantry Regiment; and a smaller third force, composed of the 2nd Marauder Battalion (which was at 50-percent strength), 300 Kachin Rangers, and a battery of 75 mm pack howitzers. The force was to preserve radio silence until it was within a 48-hour march of Myitkyina. Then, it was to radio a code word to alert the 10th USAAF to fly reinforcements into the secure airstrip.

The Kachins believed that the steep Kumon mountain range could not be crossed by pack animals in wet weather, but Stilwell was determined that the strike force would try. At Arang, one of the Kachin guides suggested that they follow an old, unused track over the mountains. Greased with mud, the trail proved all but impassable. The soldiers of the Myitkyina strike force pulled clambering mules and, at times, crawled upward on their hands and knees, covering only 4-5 miles a day.

The force lost half its pack animals. With each lost mule went 200 pounds of supplies. Colonel Henry L. Kinnison Jr., commander of the 3rd Marauder Battalion, and several of his men died of mite typhus. When the 2nd and 3rd battalions stopped to wait for rations, Colonel Charles N. Hunter's 1st Battalion team forged ahead, with the Kachins leading. When the only scout who knew the trail was bitten by a poisonous viper, the medics applied a tourniquet close to the bite and sucked most of the poison from the wound. Strapped aboard Hunter's horse, the Kachin managed to guide the Marauder task force behind the Japanese lines undetected.

On May 14, Hunter sent the 48-hour

A British Army officer and Kachin guides march with members of the 5307th in Burma.

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alert code to Stilwell. The Kachin scouts had slipped into Myitkyina, discovered no evidence that the Japanese were on increased alert, and reported that the airstrip was lightly guarded. The 1st Marauder Battalion attacked the ferry terminal on the Irawaddy River as the 150th Chinese Regiment seized the airfield to open the way for air-landed reinforcements. General Lord Mountbatten attributed the undetected crossing of the Kumon mountain range to Stilwell's bold leadership; he attributed the capture of the Myitkyina airstrip to the courage and endurance of the American, Chinese and Kachin troops.

The next day, however, the Chinese made a double envelopment of Myitkyina that turned into a debacle. During the attack, the two Chinese regiments inflicted such heavy casualties on each other that they had to be withdrawn. The setback gave the Japanese time to reinforce the town's defenses. As the monsoons descended in earnest on northern Burma (bringing 175 inches of rain), the lightly-held airfield was hit by heavy Japanese counterattacks and artillery barrages almost daily. The battle for the town of Myitkyina dragged on, consuming June and July before it finally ended in early August 1944.

By then, Det 101 had shifted most of its elements 100 miles south. There Det 101 was directing more than 100 intelligence operations and had more than 350 agents in the field. As the 14th British Army began its drive into central Burma (the third prong of the attack), Det 101 units were attacking Japanese lines of communication as far south as Toungoo.

However, between the Myitkyina-Mandalay-Rangoon railway and the 14th British Army lay a 250-mile gap that contained a series of parallel north-south corridors. Those corridors provided natural approaches to the Ledo Road. The Kachin Rangers protected the gap, fending off several major Japanese probes there. Orders called for the Kachin Rangers to withdraw and inactivate once the 14th British Army had captured Lashio and Mandalay, but heavy fighting in southern China ended those plans. The bulk of the Chinese and American forces in Burma were flown to China.

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Pack mules could carry 200 pounds of supplies. Soldiers in the Myitkyina task force at times had to pull the mules up hills.

Lieutenant General Dan Sultan, Stilwell's successor, directed Detachment 101 to use the Kachin Rangers to mop up the southern Shan States and to seize the Taunggyi-Kengtung road, a Japanese escape route to Thailand. The Kachins were tired and a long way from home, but 1,500 of them volunteered for the mission; the remainder were given transportation home. Using the Kachin Rangers as a nucleus, Det 101 organized a 3,000-man guerrilla force of Kachin, Karen, Ghurka, Shan, Chinese, and Burmese forces into four line battalions.

The Japanese were not ready to be "mopped-up" by four battalions of guerrillas who were trying to fight conventionally behind the lines. As a result, some of the bloodiest fighting for the Kachins took place during those final months. Although the Det 101 guerrillas killed more than 1,200 Japanese, they suffered more casual-

ties (including 300 killed in action) during those final months than during any other period in the war.

Before the mission in the Shan States, some of the Kachin Rangers had already been reassigned to support the newest long-range penetration force, the 5332nd Provisional Brigade, known as the Mars Task Force. When Merrill's Marauders were deactivated Aug. 10, 1944, seven days after the capture of Myitkyina, the Mars Task Force, commanded by Brigadier General John P. Miley, assumed its mission for long-range penetration operations in Burma. The Kachin Rangers fought with the task force at Bhamo and Lashio, the terminus of the Burma Road.

Before OSS Detachment 101 was inactivated July 12, 1945, Lieutenant Colonel Ray Peers conducted a formal "mustering out" of the Kachin Rangers during their victory celebration in Simlumkaba. Blue-ribboned CMA medals (Citation for Military Assistance) and silver bars with Det 101's lightning logo and "Burma Campaign" engraved on them were presented to all Kachin Rangers. Those Kachins who had "endured the cruelest tests of battle" were awarded captured Japanese samurai swords and sniper rifles.

An excerpt from Detachment 101's Presidential Unit Citation, awarded for the unit's capture of strategic Japanese strong points of Lawsawk, Pangtara and Loilem in Burma's Central Shan States from May 8 to June 15, 1945, characterizes the warrior ethos of the Kachin Rangers: "American officers and men recruited, organized, and trained 3,200 Burmese natives entirely within enemy territory. They successfully conducted a coordinated four-battalion offensive against important strategic objectives defended by more than 10,000 battle-seasoned Japanese troops. Locally known as 'Kachin Rangers,' Detachment 101 and its Kachin troops became a ruthless striking force, continually on the offensive against the veteran Japanese 18th and 56th divisions. Throughout the offensive, Kachin Rangers were equipped with nothing heavier than mortars. They relied only on air-dropped supplies and by alternating frontal attacks with guerrilla tactics, the Kachin Rangers maintained constant contact with the enemy and persistently cut him down and demoralized him."

Although they were cited officially only by the Americans, the Kachins were heavily involved in the heterogenous China-Burma-India theater. They fought as levies with the British from Fort Hertz; supported Wingate's two Chindit expeditions; fought, collected intelligence, reported weather and rescued downed Allied aircrews for OSS Detachment 101; fought with Merrill's Marauders and the Chinese, and fought with the Mars Task Force.

Recent Army special-operations lessons learned from Afghanistan reveal some commonalities with lessons learned by the Kachin Rangers:

• The relationships established by ethnic Kachins with missionaries and with British officials in the colonial administration were similar to those built by government agencies with exiled minority group leaders in Afghanistan.

• Air resupply, critical for equipping and resupplying guerrilla forces in enemy territory in the mid-1940s, was equally important in Afghanistan in 2002.

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A Kachin Ranger proudly displays the CMA medal he received for his service against the Japanese.

• Technical training of indigenous troops continues to be extremely difficult in areas in which illiteracy is high. Almost all Kachin and Karen radio operators who achieved a send-and-receive rate of 25-45 words per minute in 1943 had received some education from missionaries.

• Advising and training guerrilla forces continues to be a valuable mission. Indigenous peoples are the best sources of local intelligence and information; and if properly trained, they can assist with the rescue of downed aviators.

• In 1943, language was as much an obstacle to communicating with and training indigenous groups as it is today.

• Respect of culture, customs and social structure were as critical in Burma during World War II as they are in Afghanistan today.

• The Western world's *Law of Land Warfare* continues to be difficult to explain to partisans from other cultures.

• Guerrilla elements operate best in areas with which they are most familiar; Kachins tasked to fight Japanese in the southern Shan States faced the same problems that Allied conventional forces encountered — uncooperative and suspicious locals, a lack of familiarity with the terrain, traditional ethnic hostility between groups, different languages and different customs.

• Ethnic-group boundaries, while not marked on maps, are recognized by the different groups, whether in Afghanistan today or in Burma in 1944.

• The American cause is not necessarily the guerrilla cause, nor is it the reason that ethnic groups band together against a common enemy.

• Finally, an OSS Washington staff officer reported that the Kachin Rangers were the "most trigger happy group of armed men I have ever seen, [but] we still kept them loaded down with all the extra ammunition we could find because they were fighting."

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The Last Battle: The Mayaguez Incident and the End of the Vietnam War; by Ralph Wetterhahn; reviewed by BG Richard Comer; September, 68-69.
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Vietnam and American Doctrine for Small Wars; by Wray R. Johnson; reviewed by Dr. David Bradford; December, 52-53.

Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

SDAP level 2 approved for PSYOP detachment

The Fiscal Year 2002 ARSOF Functional Review yielded several victories for ARSOF. The most notable victory for Psychological Operations (37F) was the approval of special-duty-assignment pay, or SDAP, level 2 for Tactical PSYOP Detachment (Ranger) 940, effective Oct. 1, 2002. Eligibility for SDAP is determined by a soldier's position and his qualifications. All enlisted PSYOP positions approved for SDAP are NCO positions (E5 and above) that are coded "V" (airborne Ranger). Currently, SDAP level 2 is $110 per month; it is scheduled to increase to $150 at the beginning of fiscal year 2004. For more information regarding SDAP payment procedures, soldiers should refer to MILPER Message 02-249, Part Two.

SWCS conducting new SF intel sergeant course

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School conducted the pilot course for the newly revamped 13-week Special Forces Intelligence Sergeant Course Sept. 9-Dec. 13, 2002. In the future, SWCS will conduct three classes of the course each year, with 40 students in each class. Active- and reserve-component SF enlisted personnel may attend the course if they hold the rank of staff sergeant or higher, have a validated need for the training, and have been nominated by their chain of command. SF warrant-officer candidates must also attend the course before they attend the SF Warrant Officer Basic Course.

The new course is designed to produce a competent SF intelligence sergeant, MOS 18F. It is different from the previous Assistant Operations Sergeant Course. The assistant-operations-sergeant function was an integral part of the previous 18F duty description. SF soldiers who complete the new course will automatically be reclassified as 18F. Soldiers who completed the SF Advanced NCO Course, or SF ANCOC, prior to Sept. 9, 2002, and who are eligible to reclassify to 18F may reclassify until further notice. Soldiers who attend SF ANCOC after Sept. 9, even though they will still receive operations-and-intelligence training in SF ANCOC, will not be eligible to reclassify to 18F until they have completed the SF Intelligence Sergeant Course. SF ANCOC is not a prerequisite for the new 18F course. Allowing SF soldiers to attend the 18F course earlier in their careers will bring more stability to the intelligence position on SF detachments. SF ANCOC will be considered additional skill-level-4 institutional training for the 18F MOS.

The revamped 18F course includes training in airborne operations; collection and processing of conventional and unconventional intelligence; advanced special-operations techniques; force protection (Level II); target analysis; analytical skills and emerging analytical techniques; the intelligence cycle; evasion and recovery; intelligence preparation of the battlefield (conventional and unconventional); interagency operations; fingerprinting; intelligence architecture; photography; digital intelligence systems; biometric identification systems; and a rural field-training exercise.

Officer Career Notes

SWCS, USASOC, DA pursue SF warrant-officer initiatives

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Special Operations Proponency Office, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and the Department of the Army continue to pursue initiatives to assist in the recruiting and retention of Special Forces warrant officers.

Short-term

- NCOs who become SF warrant officers will be able to retain their special-duty assignment pay as a part of "save pay." This action is expected to be approved soon.
- SOPO has requested that DA allow SF sergeants first class who become SF warrant officers to be promoted to CWO 2 when they complete the SF Warrant Officer Basic Course. This initiative, if approved, is anticipated to last until FY 2005.

Long-term

- SOPO has requested that DA revise the warrant-officer pay scales so that an NCO who becomes a warrant officer will not have to rely on save pay. DA is not expected to take action on this initiative until FY 2005.
- SOPO has requested that DA approve a warrant-officer accession bonus for NCOs who become SF warrant officers. DA is considering the proposal and is expected to approve it for implementation in FY 2004.
- SOPO has requested a critical-skills retention bonus for CWO 3s and CWO 4s in MOS 180A. DA has requested more data to support SOPO's projected losses.
- SOPO has requested that designated SF warrant officers below the rank of CWO 5 be allowed to serve 24 years of warrant-officer service. The Warrant Officer Management Act requires that warrant officers below the grade of CWO 5 retire when they reach 24 years of warrant-officer service or 30 years of active federal service, whichever occurs first. DA opposes this initiative, even though 451 warrant officers will be affected by the current policy between FYs 2003 and 2013.

FA 39 promotions, SSC selection, CFDs favorable

- The overall 2002 FA 39 selection rate for promotion to major was satisfactory. FA 39's above-the-zone and below-the-zone selection rates were higher than those of the operations career field, or OPCF. FA 39's promotion-zone selection rate was only slightly lower than that of OPCF.
- The 2002 FA 39 selection rate for senior service college was comparable to that of the operations career field, or OPCF. OPCF's average was 7.8 percent, and FA 39's average was 7.1.
- Twenty-six officers career-field designated, or CFD'd, into FA 39 in fiscal year 2002, an increase over the number for FY 2001. Of the 26 officers, eight are FA 39Bs, nine are FA 39Cs, and nine are FA 39Xs. An FA 39X officer is one who has CFD'd into FA 39 without having acquired any FA 39 training or utilization. Of the nine FA 39Xs, six have earned a master's degree or have demonstrated a foreign-language capability.

SF officers should submit CFD preference statement

The results from recent career-field designation, or CFD, boards have confirmed that it is important for Special Forces officers to submit career-field-preference statements. SF officers who do not submit a preference statement are not likely to be retained in CF 18. SF officers are in high demand for functional-area assignments, and those who request a functional area will probably receive their first choice. In any given SF officer year group, between 52 and 55 officers will be retained in the operations career field, or OPCF. SF officers who are approaching CFD selection and wish to remain in Army special-operations forces, even if they are not retained in the OPCF, are strongly advised to fill out a CFD preference statement for the SF Branch. ARSOF is seeking greater representation in the operations-support, information-operations and institutional-support career fields.

SWCS phasing out CA Officer Advanced Course

The commander of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School has approved the transition plan and the timelines for phasing out the Civil Affairs Officer Advanced Course, or CAOAC. The CAOAC will be phased out during FY 2003 and replaced by the Civil Affairs Qualification Course, or CAQC. The cutoff date for enrollment in Phase I (nonresident) of the CAOAC was Sept. 30, 2002. SWCS will offer three classes of the CAOAC Phase II (resident) during FY 2003; they are intended for USAR officers who need to complete an advanced course.

The first class of CAQC will begin in January 2003. There are two completion options for the CAQC:

- Phase I (nonresident), followed by the two-week Phase II (resident). Students must complete both phases within one year.
- Four-week resident attendance (all active-component/active-guard-and-reserve officers and selected NCOs will attend this option).

Army Reserve officers who attend the CAQC will not receive credit for an advanced course. Officers must be graduates of their basic branch's advanced course or captain's career course before they can attend the CAQC. Beginning in FY 2004, the CAQC will be the only branch- or FA-producing school for active- and reserve-component Civil Affairs officers.

CAQC is designed for:

- Active-component officers who are FA-designated to Civil Affairs.
- Active-component NCOs who are assigned to the 96th CA Battalion. The NCOs will receive the skill-qualification identifier "D" when they complete the CAQC.
- Army Reserve officers who are assigned to a Civil Affairs unit or position. These officers will be awarded Branch 38A when they complete the CAQC.
- Active-guard-and-reserve officers who are assigned to a Civil Affairs position.
- Select Army Reserve NCOs. They must be graduates of their MOS's ANCOC, not simply the MOS-producing school.

For more information, telephone Major Chuck Munguia, Special Operations Proponency Office, at DSN 239-6406 or commercial (910) 432-6406; or Major Scott Webber, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, at DSN 236-2518 or commercial (910) 396-2518.

Foreign SOF

Paris counterterrorism program takes new emphasis

The Paris Prosecutor's Office plans to make major changes to its current counterterrorism program during 2003 to better adapt to current terrorist activity and organization. The existing program was formulated in 1986 when widespread bombings were the principal threat. Citing a profound change in the threat, Paris law-enforcement officials say that there are new areas that require emphasis. These areas include the need to attack crime associated with terrorism, such as drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime. The new counterterrorism program will more directly target the financial and logistical base of terrorist groups and take into account the prominent role of mobile, distributed Islamic extremist groups that are not associated with specific states. Although the full extent of the program's changes has not been revealed, changes will include personnel increases, new approaches to the sharing of information by participating offices, and the examination of ways to address the problem of inadequate legislation. Police and gendarmerie components, as well as investigative judges, are among those who will be affected by the changes.

Mexican guerrilla groups remain active

While the Mexican guerrilla group EZLN is not itself expected to be a source of much guerrilla violence, Mexican specialists remain concerned about the Revolutionary People's Army, the Revolutionary Army of the Insurgent People, and a few other groups that have remained active not only in southern states such as Guerrero and Oaxaca, but in a number of other states as well. The groups are financed through criminal activity — predominantly kidnapings and robberies — and they may be in the process of reorganizing.

Basque terrorists maintain presence in Latin America

The Basque terrorist group Fatherland and Liberty Party, whose name in Basque is abbreviated ETA, continues to maintain cells and activities far beyond the borders of Spain and France. ETA has reportedly made efforts to strengthen its "commando" groupings in several areas of Spain. According to recent European estimates, there are approximately 500 ETA members worldwide. Despite its small numbers, the ETA has carried out a substantial number of terrorist actions in Spain and France. It is estimated that more than 150 ETA members reside in Latin America. About 100 of these are in Mexico; several dozen are in Venezuela; there are handfuls in Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Uruguay and Argentina; and more than a dozen are believed to be in Cuba. Activities abroad seem mainly focused on raising money for ETA operations and for recruiting. In most of the Latin American countries where they have a presence, the ETA members conduct money-laundering operations and collect "revolutionary taxes" from the Basque residents there. By one report, ETA raises $10 million dollars annually. Mexico recently expelled a member of ETA's Vizcaya Commando to Spain, where he appears to have taken part in many terrorist attacks and to have caused 16 deaths.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. of the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Update

SWCS to host 2003 SF Branch Week

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School, in conjunction with the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, will host the 2003 Special Forces Branch Week June 24-27.

Activities will consist of a golf tournament, June 24; the annual SF Branch Conference, June 25-26; and the SF Ball, June 27. The theme of the 2003 SF Branch Conference will be "Building the Special Forces Objective Force."

To obtain registration forms or more information, visit the SF Branch Week Web site: http://www.soc.mil /swcs/sfweek.htm.

CA soldiers receive medals for Afghanistan service

Army Reserve soldiers from the 489th Civil Affairs Battalion, Knoxville, Tenn., received awards for their service in Afghanistan during a ceremony held at Fort Bragg Dec. 3.

The special-operations soldiers received 83 awards, including 21 Bronze Star Medals, 51 Joint Service Commendation Medals and 11 Joint Service Achievement Medals, for their efforts in rebuilding Afghanistan during a nine-month deployment that ended Nov. 25.

The mission of the 489th in Afghanistan was to rebuild the country's infrastructure. The unit's projects included building schools, roads, wells, dams and clinics.

Lieutenant Colonel Roland DeMarcellus, commander of the 489th, said that the work his soldiers accomplished as a team was more important than the activities that earned the soldiers' individual awards.

Photo by Jennifer J. Eidson

Soldiers of the 489th CA Battalion receive awards for their service in Afghanistan.

"Most of this ceremony will focus on individual awards," DeMarcellus said. "The ceremony should focus on you as a unit, because it is as a unit that you have earned your place in history."

DeMarcellus said that the impression his soldiers left on Afghanistan could not have been produced by any other soldiers. "America's mission then was to secure … victory, and to do that (it) turned to one battalion — the 489th Civil Affairs Battalion. … No battalion had a greater impact on the history of Afghanistan over this period, or more importantly, (on) the lives of the Afghan people."

"These fine young men and women who stand before you here today took a message to Afghanistan," said Major General Herbert L. Altshuler, commander of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command. "(They) looked the people of Afghanistan in the eye and told them, 'We are Americans. We represent the greatest country on this earth and we have come here to help you rebuild your country.' " — *PFC Jennifer J. Eidson, USASOC PAO*

SWCS NCO plans 2003 fund-raising march

In September 2002, Sergeant First Class Julio C. Ramirez, a Special Forces NCO, and three friends completed a 400-mile walk around the perimeter of Puerto Rico to raise money for firefighters who risked their lives during the attack on the World Trade Center.

In 2003, Ramirez, a training evaluator at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, plans to repeat the walk and hopes to increase the number of participants and the amount of money they can raise.

During the first march, Ramirez and his companions, Sergeant First Class Larry W. Hemingway (also assigned to SWCS), Vilma Fortis and Mark Person, began their trek Sept. 1 and walked 40 miles a day. Each night the four camped out or stayed in hurricane shelters along the route, rising early each day to continue the march. They finished the march at El Morro Castle in San Juan on Sept. 11 at 8:46 a.m., the precise moment the World Trade Center was struck the year before.

Ramirez, who has been in the Army since 1985, said he felt an obligation to organize the march in recognition of the firefighters. "The proudest day of my life was when I

visited "ground zero" [in November 2001] and was stopped by at least a dozen people who wanted to talk to me because I was in my Army uniform. That was when the seed of this idea was planted."

This year the marchers plan to begin hiking Aug. 31 and again finish at 8:46 a.m. Sept. 11. The City of San Juan, which Ramirez says hopes to make the march an annual event, plans to hold a ceremony to remember the victims of the World Trade Center attacks.

Ramirez and seven others (four other SF soldiers from SWCS and three civilians, including Ramirez's wife, Coco) plan to march this year. The group is looking for other hikers who are willing to undertake the 400-mile walk. "Through this walk around Puerto Rico, we hope to raise money that is desperately needed to buy equipment and keep the fire-fighting units prepared for emergency situations," Ramirez said.

Donations for the march can be made to the "Cinco de Mayo 10K" fund (account number 431967253) at the Fort Bragg Credit Union; PO Box 70240, Fort Bragg, NC 28307. All donations will go to the fire departments of New York City; Cameron, N.C.; and Ceiba, Puerto Rico, Ramirez said. For more information, telephone Ramirez at (910) 867-6319, or send e-mail to cincodemayo10@aol.com.

SWCS staffing PSYOP TTP manual

The Psychological Operations Division of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Directorate of Training and Doctrine, or DOTD, is staffing the initial draft of Field Manual 3-05.301 (FM 33-1-1), *Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP)*, for review by PSYOP commanders, staff officers and soldiers of every skill level.

The initial draft has been produced on CD-ROM to facilitate the review process. The CD-ROM also contains examples of the official review format and instructions for forwarding comments to SWCS. Copies of the CD-ROM were distributed to PSYOP units during the Worldwide PSYOP Conference in Raleigh, N.C., Nov. 21-24, 2002.

The publication can also be accessed from the DOTD home page on the USASOC internal web, by clicking the link to the ARSOF Doctrine and Training Library. The draft manual will also be available soon through Army Knowledge Online.

Distribution of the initial draft of FM 3-05.301 is restricted to personnel of the U.S. Department of Defense. Reproductions are authorized by local commanders only, and then only for the express purpose of performing an official review. The content of the initial draft of FM 3-05.301 is not yet approved; FM 33-1-1 remains the current doctrine.

For more information, telephone Stephen Childs at DSN 239-7257, commercial (910) 432-7257, or send e-mail to childs@soc.mil.

SWCS to begin external evaluations in 2003

In 2003, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Department of Quality Assurance, or DQA, will begin conducting a different type of evaluation on field Army special-operations units.

The difference is that the evaluators will not assess the performance of the units themselves, but rather the performance of SWCS graduates in the field.

Using observation, interviews and questionnaires, DQA will obtain information from field units; combat training centers, or CTCs; and the Center for Army Lessons Learned. Because of resource constraints, DQA will also gather information using "distance evaluation" techniques, such as the Internet, e-mail and video teleconferencing.

DQA's eight military evaluators and four civilian instructional systems specialists will assess the feedback from active- and reserve-component units to determine the the competency of graduates, the effectiveness of the SWCS training that the graduates received, and the utility of that training.

DQA evaluators will observe field units during CTC rotations, exercises and missions. They will interview individuals and small groups at units' home station. To obtain surveys, the Army Training and Doctrine Command plans to field an automated survey generator system called AUTOGEN. Developed with the assistance of the Army Research Institute, AUTOGEN, once fielded, will allow DQA to evaluate the skills acquired by SWCS students. DQA will accomplish the evaluation by assessing surveys completed by SWCS graduates and their supervisors.

During the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2002, DQA evaluators began developing interviews and training on AUTOGEN. They also began coordinating upcoming visits with units. During the first quarter of FY 2003, DQA began conducting interviews with ARSOF units based at Fort Bragg — a technique that allows evaluators to validate interviews before "going on the road." DQA has conducted two evaluations to date.

During the remainder of FY 2003, DQA will visit other Fort Bragg ARSOF units and all SF groups not headquartered at Fort Bragg. DQA hopes to observe a CTC rotation during the third quarter of FY 2003. By the end of FY 2003, DQA plans to have visited each active SF Group, PSYOP group and Civil Affairs battalion.

For more information, telephone SFC Larry Hemingway at DSN 236-0270 or commercial (910) 396-0270; or send e-mail to hemingwl@soc.mil.

Book Reviews

Special Warfare

Vietnam and American Doctrine for Small Wars. *By Wray R. Johnson. Bangkok, Thailand: White Lotus Press, 2001. ISBN 974-7534-50-9. 334 pages. $19.50 (through http://thailine.com/lotus).*

The long and costly involvement of the United States armed forces in Vietnam did nothing to revolutionize the art, science or doctrine of unconventional warfare. Now some 30 years after the end of the Southeast Asia debacle, Wray Johnson provides a critical and dispassionate re-examination of how conventional and traditional military principles and organizations, coupled with the formulation of "new" methods of fighting unconventional wars, led to the unacceptable outcome of the Vietnam War.

Furthermore, Johnson offers a primer for understanding the long process of knowing who, what, when and why men turn to unconventional warfare. During the Vietnam War, as now, there was a grim truth that had to be faced — unconventional warfare will not be won cheaply, quickly or with force-on-force doctrine.

Because the U. S. military tends to retire its officers and NCOs after 30 or fewer years of service, it is safe to say there are virtually no "Vietnam experienced" warfighters remaining on active duty. Thankfully, Johnson's book, a scholarly achievement in every sense of the word, addresses most dimensions of the evolution of U. S. military doctrine for countering guerrillas, terrorists and other irregular forces in "small wars."



Johnson, a lieutenant colonel whose entire Air Force career has been in special operations (a rarity in the Air Force), illuminates his work with references to scholarly studies and with insights gained from military and civilians who were directly engaged either in fighting or in planning our small wars.

The book provides a finely shaded, deeply intelligent, and superbly fair assessment of the special and regular forces of the U. S. military whose "no more Vietnams syndrome" has shadowed the U.S. military throughout the often tortuous path from the Cold War doctrine of nuclear deterrence to the current Bush doctrine of "transformation." The assessment is not pretty, and some of the doctrinal issues that military strategists have formulated, or have attempted to formulate, are even less pretty.

Doctrine, according to Johnson, is to all but a few elite military analysts "gosh-awful boring." There are no medals or promotions to be won by sitting in a room analyzing thousands of words of doctrine — the strands that form the essence of why Americans fight the way they do. So doctrine is neglected until the military is again called upon to secure the nation.

Now that terror/guerrilla/insurgent/shadow warfare is upon us again, American military leaders should read this doctrinal primer on thinking about warfare unconventionally. One can only hope that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld read this book and then canceled the Crusader weapon system so that the billions of dollars saved could be poured into the restructuring, rethinking, retraining and re-equipping of the forces who *know* how to fight and who understand unconventional conflict.

Johnson shrewdly devotes a good deal of his book to getting the definitions of terrorism, insurgency, guerrilla, counterinsurgency, military operations other than war, etc., right. Furthermore, he provides a historical analysis of the way these terms can be subverted by political machinations as they are worked into and out of U.S. Army (and Joint Staff) publications, especially FM 100-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*. As Johnson so accurately states, "Doctrine reflects the times in which it is written."

In the uncompromising reality of 21st-century warfare, our nation now faces an enemy that will not be deterred. Few seem to understand that terrorist attacks are nothing more than another, albeit unpalatable, tactic in guerrilla warfare, just

as they are another tactic, also unpalatable, in conventional warfare. Terrorist attacks against U.S. targets can be slowed with proper internal homeland-security measures, but until the U.S. formulates such security measures, we are going to pay a grisly price.

In Vietnam, we had to be prepared for every eventuality. Today, the requirement is no different. Johnson's description of what should come first, the doctrine or the fighting organization's structure, is as relevant today as the discussions that were held 45 years ago when pentatomic divisions were introduced to coincide with NSC-68's policy on nuclear warfare. Interestingly, as Johnson's book is gaining popularity, the U.S. Marine Corps has announced the formation of its own special-forces units for combating terrorists.

One inevitable doctrinal outcome of America's involvement in Vietnam that should be carried into the new battles being fought globally is that the enemy must be killed or disarmed. Why? Because just as the Viet Minh were too committed to be effectively discouraged from violence, so are the followers of Bin Laden too committed to be effectively discouraged from destroying the Western world. To date, not one of them has stepped forward to claim the $25 million by betraying Bin Laden to American authorities, and apparently there is no shortage of people who are willing to strap on explosives or fly suicide missions into areas crowded with innocent civilians.

Are we willing to heed the lessons outlined in Johnson's book and learn from them, or, 30 years from now, will there be a need for someone to write the sequel to Johnson's book and title it, *al-qaeda and American Doctrine for Small Wars*?

Dr. David Bradford
Director, Shadow Warfare Study Center
Merritt Island, Fla.



Palace Walk. *By Naguib Mahfouz. New York: Anchor Books, 1991. ISBN 0-385-26466-6 (paperback). 498 pages. $14.*

Palace Walk (*Bayn al-qasrayn* in Arabic) is the 1990 English translation of a 1956 work by Naguib Mahfouz. It is the foremost of more than 30 novels written by Mahfouz, who was born in Cairo in 1911 and who won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1988.

Palace Walk is the first volume of *The Cairo Trilogy*, which follows a middle-class Arab family for three generations. A historical novel, *Palace Walk* is based upon the author's personal experience of growing up in a changing Egypt.

Set in Cairo at the end of World War I, *Palace Walk* offers insight into urban Arab family life. It follows the lives of the members of the household of merchant al-Sayyid Ahmad Abd al-Jawad. The tradition-bound father is reserved and tyrannical at home, but when he is away from home at night, he is a libertine — drinking and womanizing. Confined to the house, the wife is submissive and accepting. The five children live in fear of their father.

Mahfouz's novel explores Arab precepts of family, honor and shame. The characters face universal human issues, and the book shows their individual choices against the backdrop of their Islamic religion. *Palace Walk* gives human context to customary Islamic beliefs and values, such as arranged marriages, obedience, the Jinn (similar to spirits or gremlins), and venerated Muslim saints. The book also examines the Egyptian concept of freedom, at both the individual and the national levels.

The characters are caught up in the rise of Arab nationalism and in the eviction of the British protectorate after World War I. The street-level Egyptian reaction to the occupying English and Australian soldiers is relevant to present-day events and military operations.

Mahfouz masterfully takes the reader onto Cairo streets and into the home of al-Sayyid Ahmad. Many of the same political, social and historical forces that affect the lives of Mahfouz's characters are still at work in the Middle East today. *Palace Walk* is recommended reading for anyone who seeks an understanding of the Arab world.

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Special Warfare

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