Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School



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From the Commandant

United States Army special-operations forces, or ARSOF, more than any other segment of the military population, recognize the importance of the human terrain in military operations. On any given day, we have approximately 800 Special Forces soldiers deployed to as many as 40 countries. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units also face a similar operations tempo. Because of the nature of ARSOF missions, our soldiers may be required to perform a variety of tasks during deployments. They may have to train host-country soldiers, communicate information to the host-country population, or assist the host-country government in restoring essential services.

Our interactions with foreign populations have reinforced the importance of human rights. In fact, the U.S. Special Operations Command has issued policy directives mandating that SOF promote democracy and human rights during all overseas training and that they report any human-rights violations committed by the foreign forces with whom they are working. For years we have demonstrated the role of the military in a democratic society.

In addition, the Leahy Amendment prohibits the U.S. from providing training to any foreign unit that has been found guilty of human-rights violations, and the amendment requires that the Department of State verify that foreign units have clean records before we can provide training to them.

In recognition of the importance of human rights, the Army Special Forces Command conducts a predeployment training program to ensure that SF Command soldiers are aware of the human-rights situation in the country to which they are deploying. The program also ensures that deploying SF soldiers will provide their host-nation counterparts with training in human rights and in the law of war.

But human rights involves more than legislation and directives. As Colonel Rhudy Barnes points out in this issue, the law itself cannot resolve all human-rights issues. Our soldiers may encounter situations that will require them to make moral decisions, and those decisions must reflect the soldiers' organizational and personal values. In addition, our soldiers must be guided not only by the moral compass provided by the Army values and by the SF values, but also by the moral courage to do what is right — a quality that we begin assessing during Special Forces Assessment and Selection and continue to assess throughout the entire SF training pipeline.

There is a practical as well as a moral reason for doing what is right: Legitimacy is the center of gravity in operations other than war, and our forces must be perceived as fair and just by the host nation as well as by the U.S. By demonstrating that our actions support the best interests of both the host nation and the U.S., our forces can establish public support and achieve success in the advisory and foreign-training missions that will become increasingly important in the future.



Major General William G. Boykin

PB 80–01–2

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Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

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Features

Departments

Human Rights and Legitimacy in the Foreign Training Mission

by Colonel Rudolph C. Barnes Jr.

What do human rights have to do with the military mission? Human rights are civilian rights, but they have an important connection to peacetime military missions — especially the foreign training mission of Army special-operations forces, or ARSOF. The violation of human rights can turn an otherwise successful training mission into a political disaster.

Human rights are derivatives of those inalienable rights referred to in the Declaration of Independence: the rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. These rights are enshrined in our Constitution, and the protection of the Constitution is what justifies the existence of the United States military and shapes its legitimacy. Officers in the U.S. military are sworn to support and defend the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic. The U.S. national-security strategy goes a step further, requiring that the U.S. military promote democracy and human rights overseas in all peacetime-engagement missions.

Human rights are derivatives of those inalienable rights referred to in the Declaration of Independence: the rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. These rights are enshrined in our Constitution, and the protection of the Constitution is what justifies the existence of the United States military and shapes its legitimacy.

But the military's relationship to human rights is a two-edged sword. While the military is the last line of defense against forces that threaten human rights, it can also represent the greatest threat to those rights. By definition, only a government can violate human rights, and human-rights violations are usually committed by a government's military or police forces. We need only recall the use of the military in the oppressive totalitarian regimes of the Cold War era to realize the contemporary relevance of the issue.

Even in emerging democracies, the military is by its very nature an authoritarian regime within a democratic society — a regime that, with its monopoly of lethal force, is capable of extinguishing democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Unless human rights are enforced by the rule of law, democracy is no more than rule by the majority, and that rule can be ruthless. When it comes to the subject of protecting human rights, some see the military as the fox guarding the hen house, but that's the way it must be in societies that maintain a strong military. And that is all the more reason why members of the military should respect human rights and remain alert to any human-rights violations by foreign forces whom they train.

For ARSOF who are operating overseas,

Photo by Jon Creese

Because ARSOF train foreign military and police forces, they are held accountable in the eyes of the public for the actions of the foreign security forces whom they train.

the issue of human rights has far-reaching implications. With a primary mission of training foreign military and police forces, ARSOF are held accountable in the eyes of the public, not only for their own actions, but also for the actions of the foreign security forces whom they train. It may not seem fair, but that's the way it works. Witness the continuing controversy over the actions of Latin American military officers who were trained at the U.S. Army School of the Americas in Fort Benning, Ga. Some of those officers were later implicated in human-rights abuses. Defending the policies of the school, General Barry R. McCaffrey, then commander in chief of the U.S. Southern Command, warned all officers that the Medina standard of accountability applies to human-rights violations: "If a captain, colonel, or general knows of a human-rights violation or war crime and takes no action, then he or she will be held criminally liable. That's what we teach everyone here at the School of the Americas."[1]

In spite of the efforts of General McCaffrey and others to emphasize human rights, the School of the Americas closed Dec. 15, 2000, after having trained more than 60,000 foreign military personnel during its 50 years of operation. The outgoing Secretary of the Army, Louis Caldera, who was a guest speaker at the closing, defended the school: "Let me say very clearly that any soldier in Latin America who had even the most remote connection with the School of the Americas, who has ever committed a human-rights violation, did so in spite of the training he received at the School of the Americas and not because of it." Following the closing, the Department of Defense Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, or WHISC, opened at Fort Benning Jan. 17, 2001.[2]

For ARSOF, the issue of human rights is at the heart of the mission to train foreign security forces outside the U.S.[3] To minimize the risk of human-rights abuses, Congress has placed certain restrictions on foreign training missions. These congressional restrictions have prompted the U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, and the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC, to issue policy directives emphasizing that their personnel are to promote democracy and human rights during overseas training missions, and that they are to report any violations

of human rights committed by foreign forces. These policy directives have also mandated that personnel receive additional training in human rights, both in the schoolhouse and at the operational level, whenever training teams are to be deployed.[4]

The political orientation of the policy directives is a reminder that ARSOF are unique among U.S. military forces. ARSOF must be more than warriors — they must be diplomat-warriors in order to fulfill their mission responsibilities overseas. In the contemporary strategic environment of engagement, ARSOF represent the capability to bridge the formidable gap between diplomacy and conventional military capabilities. When training military forces in emerging democracies overseas, ARSOF must not only provide effective training but also promote democracy and human rights and exemplify the role of the military in a democratic society: "A core task of our National Security Strategy is to promote respect and dignity of individuals. In addition to serving as first-hand examples of the role of the military in a democratic society, special-operations forces also demonstrate, both through the training they impart and by their own actions, the respect for human relations that is a cornerstone of our policies abroad."[5]

Legitimacy depends upon the delicate balance between might and right, and it is based on the public's perception that military operations are conducted in conformity with prevailing concepts of applicable law, values and culture.

The role of examplar is a daunting one, but it is necessary because of a complex mix of legal and political issues and the potential for culture clash in the ambiguous and politically sensitive environments of peacetime military operations, which are known in military parlance as operations other than war, or OOTW. To ensure mission success in such unforgiving environments, USASOC policy now requires that all ARSOF soldiers receive predeployment training from Army legal advisers in human-rights awareness and in human-rights reporting requirements, so that they will be able to identify and properly report human-rights violations. ARSOF soldiers receive their initial instruction on human rights issues at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School when they attend entry-level courses for Special Forces, or SF; Civil Affairs, or CA; and Psychological Operations, or PSYOP.[6]

The new command emphasis on promoting democracy and human rights overseas reflects the long-standing primacy of legitimacy as an operational imperative for ARSOF. The protection of human rights is the foundation of the concept of legitimacy, and legitimacy is the first of the six doctrinal principles of OOTW. The other principles are objective, unity of effort, restraint, perseverance and security. These six principles evolved from the low-intensity conflict, or LIC, imperatives that were developed for ARSOF in the 1980s. Those imperatives were later modified and integrated into doctrine for conventional military operations. The LIC imperatives remain guidelines for mission success in OOTW.[7]

Legitimacy and human rights

Legitimacy is an operational concept that rests on human rights. Legitimacy gives a government and its military forces the moral authority to act. The legitimacy of the U.S. military can be undermined by human-rights violations committed by its members or by the members of the forces it trains. Legitimacy depends upon the delicate balance between might and right, and it is based on the public's perception that military operations are conducted in conformity with prevailing concepts of applicable law, values and culture.

Law provides the standards and the enforcement mechanisms for human rights. In the military, the law applicable to operations is referred to as operational law, or OPLAW. Without enforceable standards, human rights are meaningless. But there

is a lack of clear OPLAW standards for fundamental human rights in peacetime, and that complicates the issues of legitimacy in military missions overseas. In addition, the legal standards for human rights in wartime are different from those in peacetime.

The law of armed conflict, or LOAC, is the OPLAW standard for human rights in times of international armed conflict. LOAC makes a distinction between combatants, who are lawful targets for offensive lethal force, and noncombatants (including civilians and prisoners of war) who are not lawful targets. But LOAC is not obligatory in OOTW, which by definition are not wartime operations. In the ambiguous environment of OOTW, the distinction between combatants and noncombatants is often a difficult one to make.[8]

Civilian protection law, or CPL, is the peacetime standard of OPLAW for the protection of human rights. CPL includes those fundamental human rights recognized under international law and under U.S. domestic law and policy, as well as under applicable host-nation law. CPL also applies certain LOAC standards to peacetime operational environments by analogy.

International-law standards of CPL include the charters of the United Nations and the Organization of American States, or OAS, while U.S. domestic law includes statutes such as those applicable to security assistance and joint combined exchange training missions. By way of policy, the U.S. State Department has adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a standard for human rights.[9]

Before any ARSOF can deploy to train foreign forces, statutory law and command policy now require written clearance from the State Department verifying that there is no evidence that the personnel to be trained have committed gross human-rights violations. A further requirement, and the one most relevant to deployed ARSOF, is that any evidence of gross violations of human rights must be reported. But what are gross violations of human rights? Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions provides one list of definitions, which is set forth in AR 12-15, para 13-3, p. 10:

(1) Violence to life and person — in particular, murder, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture.

(2) Taking of hostages.

(3) Outrages upon personal dignity — in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.

(4) Passing of sentences and carrying out executions without previous judgment by a regularly constituted court that affords all the judicial guarantees recognized as indispensable by civilized people.

Photo by Lorenzo A. Sam

A soldier from the 9th PSYOP Battalion hands out mine-awareness flyers to civilians in Kosovo. ARSOF soldiers in SF, CA and PSYOP receive human-rights instruction during their entry-level training.

Another list of definitions is set forth in the security-assistance law in the U.S. Code of Laws at 22 U.S.C.A. 2304(d)(1):

(1) Torture.

(2) Cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

(3) Prolonged arbitrary detention with-

out charges or trial.

(4) Abduction and clandestine detention.

(5) Other flagrant denial of a person's right to life, liberty or security.

The Leahy Amendment, enacted as Section 8098 of the Defense Department Appropriations Act for FY 2000, directs that there will be no funding for the training of foreign security forces if the Secretary of Defense has received credible information from the State Department that the unit to be trained has committed a gross violation of human rights. But the amendment is of little help for those in the field, because it leaves gross violations of human rights undefined.

To clarify the issue, the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate at USASOC has compiled a list of offenses that USASOC considers to be gross violations of human rights:

- Genocide.
- Murder, or causing the disappearance of individuals, including extra-judicial executions.
- Torture; mutilation; or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.
- Slavery or slave trade, including the trafficking of women or children for prostitution.
- Prolonged arbitrary detention.
- Kidnapping or taking civilians hostage.
- Other flagrant denial of a person's right to life, liberty or security.

Terms such as "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment" and "Other flagrant denial of … liberty or security" leave much room for interpretation. And if the lists above are not inclusive enough, USSOCOM policy goes a step further and requires that not only *gross* violations, but *any* violation of internationally recognized human rights be reported.

Where do we find those internationally recognized human rights referred to in USSOCOM policy? In addition to those cited above in the U.S. Code of Laws, there are human-rights treaties and policies that govern ARSOF operations. Beyond the Geneva Conventions, which are primarily applicable to wartime (with the exception

U.S. soldiers assist citizens of a village in Kosovo in uncovering a mass grave. Policies of USSOCOM and USASOC demand that all violations of human rights be reported.

Photo by Daniel Ernst

of Common Article 3, referred to above), the most important treaties relating to human rights are the U.N. charter and the OAS charter. Subscribers to these charters pledge not only to promote the universal observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms but also to take joint and separate action to achieve those purposes. But the charters do not define human rights or fundamental freedoms with sufficient clarity to make them practical standards for peacetime military operations.[10]

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its regional counterpart, the American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man, are not treaties, but they were adopted by both the U.N. and the OAS to promote respect for human rights. Although these declarations do not have the force and the effect of law, the State Department has embraced as national policy the language in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that defines human rights in the context of promoting democracy. Language from the Declaration is often found in command directives that regulate peacetime military operations.[11]

Given the broad scope of human rights circumscribed by USSOCOM policy, the standards cannot be reduced to specific rules, as are rules of engagement. The legal standards for human rights must be interpreted in the context of national policy that promotes democracy and human rights through the rule of law, taking into account the realities of the operational environment. The burden of reducing the policies and the law referred to above into operational standards falls upon ARSOF commanders, and they will need help from their JAG officers. But the law will not resolve all human-rights issues. The lack of specificity in standards makes it critical that ARSOF have values that will enable them to do what is right, and that they share their values with those they train.

Values are normative principles that provide the motivation and the context for decision-making. While laws provide specific standards, the ambiguous and unforgiving environment of OOTW will always require moral decisions. Human-rights issues usually require moral choices that are largely determined by a person's values, and for the purposes of this article, those values will be classified either as institutional or personal. Such values are shaped primarily by one's culture and religion.

Institutional values are collective in nature, based on principles common to one's society. The principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law are so ingrained in the American cultural consciousness that they influence our value judgments. Those four principles of the just-war tradition — military necessity, discrimination, proportionality and the avoidance of unnecessary suffering — are derived from Christian theology. The four principles underlie the age-old premise that civilians should be spared the ravages of war because they are not actively engaged in it.[12]

The law will not resolve all human-rights issues. The lack of specificity in standards makes it critical that ARSOF have values that will enable them to do what is right, and that they share their values with those they train.

Personal values, or virtues, are unique to the individual and are also dependent upon one's cultural and religious background. In the U.S. Army, those values have been defined as duty, integrity, loyalty, selfless service, personal courage, respect and honor. But those values can mean different things to different people. Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, for example, put duty and loyalty to the mission ahead of duty to the law. A more likely conflict can arise between authoritarian military values and more libertarian civilian values, and such a conflict can influence one's perception of human rights. Any conflict in values can threaten legitimacy, so ARSOF soldiers must find a common ground with their foreign counterparts regarding democratic values that respect human rights.

One way ARSOF can avoid conflicts of values is to embrace the altruism of the golden rule, which is consistent with Army values. According to General Dennis J.

Reimer, "Leaders of competence and character live these values. We must build and maintain an Army where people do what is right; where we treat each other as we would want to be treated; and where everyone can truly be all they can be."[13]

General McCaffrey extended General Reimer's logic to civil-military relations. To demonstrate that the promotion of human rights is entirely consistent with military values, he cited the contrasting policies of Generals William T. Sherman and Robert E. Lee during the War Between the States: "Winning a war is a reasonably easy proposition. It involves energy, courage, violence and organization. Winning the peace is a far more difficult thing to do. General Sherman's actions, his barbarity and cruelty, created a hundred years of bitterness in the American South, some aspects of which endure today. General Lee, on the other hand, consistently espoused values [treating civilians and their property with respect] which were not and are not a military weakness." General McCaffrey translated that bit of U.S. history and the golden rule into advice for Latin American officers: "It is not always understood that soldiers treat civilians, prisoners and other people's property as they themselves are treated. So if we treat our own soldiers with dignity under the rule of law, with some sense of compassion, then they are much more likely to act in a similar fashion toward the civilian population."[14]

In a democracy, civilians typically value individual (human) rights over the more collective goals of the state. Within the military culture, the need to focus on collective goals reverses the priority of values, making the potential for culture clash between military personnel and civilians very real.

Generals Reimer and McCaffrey remind us that human rights have little meaning without a basic respect for the dignity of all human beings, a respect that must be based on strongly held values most often derived from religious beliefs. Where there is no tradition to support humanitarian values such as the golden rule, the protection of human rights and military legitimacy is in jeopardy.

A *culture* is a value system that is unique to a people, and like the values that make it up, a culture is largely the product of a nation's political and religious heritage. ARSOF conduct training in countries whose cultures may contrast sharply with U.S. culture. For that reason, ARSOF soldiers must possess the skills of a diplomat: they must be sensitive to the culture of the operational area; they must have language skills; and they must have a strong area orientation. Without those skills, ARSOF are doomed to a culture clash that will threaten their mission and their promotion of human rights and legitimacy.[15]

Promoting the national values of democracy and human rights through the rule of law, as well as promoting the role of the military in a democratic society, presents another dimension of cultural clash. As mentioned earlier, the military is essentially an authoritarian regime within a democratic society. In a democracy, civilians typically value individual (human) rights over the more collective goals of the state. Within the military culture, the need to focus on collective goals reverses the priority of values, making the potential for culture clash between military personnel and civilians very real. The potential is especially high in emerging democracies where there has been a long history of authoritarian rule. Where there is little or no democratic tradition in a nation's culture, civil-military relations are likely to be poor, and human rights are likely to be at risk, since few in the military could be expected to understand the danger that an authoritarian military culture would pose to the libertarian principles of a democratic society.[16]

Against the backdrop of cultural differences and potential culture clash, ARSOF soldiers must undertake the formidable task of establishing a relationship of trust and confidence with their indigenous military counterparts. It is one thing to train a foreign soldier in military skills, even a soldier who has different values and speaks a different language. But it is quite another

United Nations photo

Where there is little or no democratic tradition in a nation's culture, human rights are likely to be at risk.

thing to convince that soldier, who probably grew up under an authoritarian regime, that he must embrace the concepts of democracy, human rights and the rule of law in order to ensure healthy civil-military relations. But those three concepts are necessary for political stability in emerging democracies, and for that reason, emphasizing the concepts is a mission requirement for U.S. training overseas.

Adding the reporting of human-rights violations to the already formidable mission requirements for foreign training may appear to create a "mission impossible." The ARSOF trainer may see the reporting requirement as a threat to the trust and confidence he has established with the indigenous forces. But in reality, the reporting requirements are not a threat to the mission; instead, they are a safeguard against the conversion of an otherwise successful training mission into an embarrassing public-relations disaster. Besides, human-rights accountability should help the foreign military force become more professional, and it should improve the host country's civil-military relations. Military professionalism, when coupled with civilian control, is the best defense against the misuse of military power and the loss of legitimacy that invariably follows.[17]

Public support and the media

In OOTW, public support is both a requirement and a measure of legitimacy. Legitimacy, which is a prerequisite for mission success, requires the support of two publics — one in the U.S. and the other in the operational area — and in both arenas, public perceptions of military legitimacy are shaped by the media.[18]

Human-rights violations are of major interest to the media, and the media will expose and exploit them. In peacetime, Congress serves as a barometer of the public's opinion of military operations, and Congress holds the military's purse strings. ARSOF must understand that any appearance of impropriety on their part or

on the part of the forces they train can adversely affect mission success and can possibly cause national embarrassment. Even so, the media is not the enemy. Freedom of the press is protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; that freedom is a cornerstone of the democracy and of the respect for human rights that are promoted by U.S. foreign policy. To the extent that the media reports the truth, the media represents the public's right to know, which is an essential element of legitimacy.

The recent closing of the School of the Americas is an example of the media's use of human-rights violations to influence public opinion and to discredit the legitimacy of a military training program. During the summer of 2001, the national news media were reporting on two nuns who had been arrested and convicted for protesting against human-rights violations committed by foreign military officers trained at Fort Benning, Ga. ARSOF can expect the same kind of media scrutiny of their foreign training missions. If there are human-rights abuses, we can expect media exploitation and a negative public reaction, followed by potentially disastrous political consequences. The best way to avoid converting a military success into a political defeat is to ensure that human-rights training is a mission priority and that any human-rights violations are immediately reported to the proper authorities.

Summary

The concept of legitimacy is at the core of the USASOC command policy that ARSOF will promote democracy and human rights through the rule of law and that ARSOF will report violations of human rights during foreign training missions. Legitimacy has long been recognized as a special-operations imperative, and more recently, it has been established as a principle of OOTW. As diplomat-warriors, ARSOF soldiers must understand the requirements of legitimacy so that they can promote

The public's right to know is an essential element of legitimacy, but media reporting of human-rights violations can influence public opinion and discredit the legitimacy of military training programs.

Photo by Linda D. Kozaryn

democracy and human rights in the ambiguous, politically sensitive and unforgiving situations of the contemporary strategic environment.

The reporting requirements of the law are important, but there is more to legitimacy than compliance with the law. Values incorporating the altruism of the golden rule must be coupled with an understanding of the role of the military in a democratic society. Civil-military relations and human rights are the essential ingredients for legitimacy in OOTW, and legitimacy is an essential ingredient for success in the ARSOF foreign training mission. ✂

Colonel Rudolph C. Barnes Jr. served on active duty as assistant staff judge advocate for the JFK Center for Special Warfare, and subsequently as group judge advocate and Civil Affairs legal officer for Special Action Force-Asia (1st Special Forces Group and 97th Civil Affairs Group). As an Army Reservist, he has served as the legal officer of the 360th CA Brigade; as command judge advocate (IMA) of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School; and as the staff judge advocate for the Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command. Colonel Barnes has served on a number of deployments, most recently as a Civil Affairs officer accompanying the North Carolina National Guard to Moldova as part of the Partnership for Peace. He has written numerous articles on operational law and Civil Affairs, and he is the author of Military Legitimacy: Might and Right in the New Millennium *(London: Frank Cass, 1996). Colonel Barnes is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College and of the Army War College. He holds a BA from the Citadel, as well as an MPA and a JD from the University of South Carolina. Colonel Barnes teaches military law and justice in the Army ROTC Department at the University of South Carolina; practices law in Prosperity, S.C.; and serves as pastor of Saint John United Methodist Church in Columbia, S.C.*

Notes:

1 Keynote address of General Barry R. McCaffrey at the U.S. Army School of the Americas, Fort Benning, Ga., 10 August 1994, cited in Barnes, *Military Legitimacy: Might and Right in the New Millennium* (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 96 (hereinafter cited as *Military Legitimacy*).

2 *Soldiers, The Official U.S. Army Magazine*, February 2001, 10.

3 Promoting human rights is not new for U.S. Army Special Forces. See Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey F. Addicott, "Special Forces and the Promotion of Human Rights," *Special Warfare* (December 1996), 30.

4 See USSOCOM Memorandum, Subject: Human Rights Policy, 8 June 1999, and USSOCOM Memorandum, Subject: Human Rights Policy, 25 May 2000 (hereinafter cited as USSOCOM HR Policy); also USASOC Human Rights Policy or Precedent, Subject: USASOC Human Rights Policy, 25 May 2000 (hereinafter cited as USASOC HR Policy).

5 USSOCOM HR Policy, 2 and reference a.; and USASOC HR Policy, para 3.a.

6 USASOC HR Policy, paras 4.b. and d.

7 The six principles of OOTW and their evolution from the LIC imperatives are discussed in Barnes, "Military Legitimacy in OOTW: Civilians as Mission Priorities," *Special Warfare* (Fall 1999), 32 (hereinafter cited as "Civilians as Mission Priorities").

8 See *Military Legitimacy*, supra note 1, chapter 1 and 91, 92.

9 Civilian protection law is covered in chapter 7 of *The Operational Law Handbook* (Charlottesville, Va.; International and Operational Law Department, The U.S. Army Judge Advocate General's School [JA422 2000]). Human rights is the subject of chapter 6 of the OPLAW handbook. On the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, see USSOCOM HR Policy, para 4.b.

10 See *Military Legitimacy*, supra note 1, at 94, 95.

11 *Ibid*.

12 See *Military Legitimacy*, supra note 1, at 66-68.

13 See "Civilians as Mission Priorities," supra note 7, 34, 35 and end note 9.

14 See reference to keynote address of General McCaffrey, supra note 1, also cited in *Military Legitimacy*, 28, end note 55.

15 See "Civilians as Mission Priorities," supra note 7, 35.

16 See *Military Legitimacy*, supra note 1, at 144-45.

17 *Ibid*.

18 For a discussion of public support as it relates to military legitimacy, see "Civilians as Mission Priorities," supra note 7, 35-37.

Advisory Missions: SF-Command Training Supports Human Rights

by Staff Sergeant Amanda Glenn

It is not uncommon to turn on the television or to open a newspaper and learn of atrocities carried out by one group of people against another.

In Colombia, the Central Directorate of the Judicial Police announced that 25,660 murders had occurred during the year 2000. According to the Human Rights Ombudsman's office in Colombia, 509 massacres (a massacre is defined as an action in which three or more people are killed in a single location) were reported in 1999, with 2,262 people killed. Twenty of those incidents were attributed to the Colombian public-security forces.

Photo by David D. Underwood Jr.

Soldiers from the 3rd SF Group prepare Senegalese soldiers for participation in Operation Focus Relief II, a peace-enforcement exercise conducted in Senegal.

On May 8, 2000, in Freetown, Sierra Leone, rebels of the Revolutionary United Front, or RUF, shot and killed at least 20 demonstrators. In May and June of 2000, there were reports that a gunship had killed 27 people and wounded 50 in three towns in Sierra Leone. According to the Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, in 2000, the West Side Boys and RUF rebels committed numerous executions, abductions, mutilations and rapes. The rebel forces abducted civilians, missionaries, aid workers from nongovernmental agencies, and United Nations personnel; ambushed humanitarian-relief convoys; raided refugee sites and extorted or stole food.

When U. S. Army Special Forces soldiers deploy to countries around the globe, they sometimes return with firsthand knowledge of human-rights violations. Knowing this, the U.S. Army Special Forces Command takes precautions to ensure that SF soldiers are trained to recognize and to prevent human-rights violations.

"The Special Forces motto is *De Oppresso Liber*, which means to free the oppressed," explained Lieutenant Colonel William Hudson Jr., staff judge advocate of the SF Command. "The motto reflects our concern for the inherent dignity of man. If you don't have fundamental human rights, you are ignoring the inherent dignity that should be afforded to all mankind. Special

Photo by Jonathan Withington

Captain David Scott of the 3rd SF Group discusses human-rights issues with a Nigerian soldier.

Forces soldiers have been trained to cross the language, cultural and societal boundaries, and their expertise makes them ideally suited to train other countries on human rights."

Hudson said that since the inception of the SF Command in November 1990, SF soldiers have received training on human rights prior to their deployments, and they have incorporated human-rights awareness into the training they provide to foreign military units.

It wasn't until the passage of the 1996 Leahy Amendment, however, that human-rights issues were pushed to the forefront of America's consciousness and the SF Command's training became more formalized. Sponsored by Senator Patrick Leahy, the amendment limits the training and the military aid that the U.S. can provide to countries that have been proven to have committed human-rights violations. The scope of the amendment, which was originally designed to apply to military counternarcotics missions, was expanded in 1997 to cover all missions.

"On the large scale of reducing human-rights violations, the Leahy Amendment may be the strongest tool out there," said Captain David T. Scott, judge advocate for the 3rd SF Group. "Everyone knows about the Leahy Amendment, and everyone who wants aid or training from the United States knows that we'll stop everything if there are human rights violations going on."

Under the Leahy Amendment, before SF soldiers receive deployment orders to train a foreign military unit, the U. S. Department of State "vets," or screens the foreign unit and each of its soldiers. If the unit isn't vetted, SF soldiers cannot train its soldiers.

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For example, during a recent deployment to Nigeria, SF soldiers had to stop their training sessions when a number of Nigerian combat-support soldiers whose names were not on the original training roster

U.S. Army photo

Human-rights training is now an integral part of the tactical instruction that SF soldiers provide to soldiers in other countries.

showed up for training. The new arrivals had not been vetted; therefore their names had to be submitted to the U.S. Department of State for screening. The Nigerian unit commander elected not to resume training until all the soldiers could participate. Once vetting was completed 15 days later, the training resumed.

Today, the human-rights training that SF soldiers receive has been expanded, standardized and made part of every aspect of their training mission, said Hudson.

Before any deployment, SF soldiers receive area-specific human-rights training that covers basic law and the basic principles of human rights. … The training also defines specifically what soldiers are required to do if they witness human-rights violations.

"If you asked a whole [SF] company what they would do if they were to see a human-rights violation, they would tell you they'd report it. They know what the Leahy Amendment is, and if they see violations, they stop training. Our guys have real-world practical [experience] in dealing with human rights and the laws of war. … They can work it into any training. … It's how we do business," Scott explained.

Before any deployment, SF soldiers receive area-specific human-rights training that covers basic law and the basic principles of human rights, including freedom from killing, rape, torture, kidnapping, arbitrary arrest, unnecessary destruction of property, excessive force, severe and degrading mistreatment; and the right to free expression and assembly. The training also defines specifically what soldiers are required to do if they witness human-rights violations.

"When I started working in Colombia, there wasn't much emphasis placed on [teaching human rights], but we still did it. We just didn't have everyone talking about it. We've been talking to people about human rights and doing the right thing since I've been in Special Forces. This isn't new," said Sergeant Major Christopher Zets of the 7th SF Group.

In addition, the SF Command's Office of the Staff Judge Advocate prepares human-

rights training packets for distribution in countries or areas where soldiers deploy. The packets contain documents that govern human rights, such as the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights," prepared by the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights; reference materials prepared by the U.N., by the White House and by the State Department; and recent human-rights press clippings. The exportable package also includes copies of materials from the human-rights training that the SF soldiers receive, as well as presentations that the SF soldiers will give to the host-country soldiers.

As part of their host-country instruction, SF soldiers distribute human-rights cards that list the principles of human rights, including issuing and obeying lawful orders; reporting human-rights violations to the proper authorities; and respecting individual integrity and human dignity. On the reverse side of the cards, there are quotations from the NCO Creed that are designed to instill pride. "If we can instill the pride of soldiering in someone, I think it instills more of a sense of professionalism," Hudson said. The cards are translated into the languages (including Portuguese, Creole, Korean, Persian Farsi, Russian and Spanish) of the countries to which SF soldiers deploy. As the need arises, the SF Command will translate cards into the languages of other countries as well.

In designing the training that host-nation soldiers will receive, the SF Command seeks to emphasize the country's existing human-rights policy. "Each nation … has adopted aspects of fundamental human rights. We try not to give [soldiers] our view, but what their country has adopted," Hudson said.

When SF soldiers deploy, they provide classroom training on human rights and on the law of war. In Colombia, explained Captain Jeffery Lippert, group judge advocate for the 7th SF Group, SF soldiers use a slide show and a videotape presentation — in Spanish — that takes the Colombian army soldiers through a scenario demonstrating the right way to handle prisoners of war.

In some countries, Lippert said, the soldiers have experienced or witnessed human-rights violations, but they have never been the beneficiaries of human-rights protection. "We try to show them the way the system is supposed to work. … Part of the training we provide is teaching them what human rights are, why they need to be protected and what the benefits of enforcing them are."

SF soldiers also provide practical instruction. "In Colombia, they do situational training exercises where the training may not be particularly devoted to human rights, but there is role-playing where they have to react to a human-rights situation," said Lippert.

As part of their host-country instruction, SF soldiers distribute human-rights cards that list the principles of human rights, including issuing and obeying lawful orders; reporting human-rights violations to the proper authorities; and respecting individual integrity and human dignity. On the reverse side of the cards, there are quotations from the NCO Creed that are designed to instill pride.

"Especially in Colombia, human-rights training is an integral part of everything we do for two reasons. One, it's the right thing to do, and two, it's critical for U.S. foreign policy that these guys understand the implications of any humans-rights situation," said Zets. "Our soldiers reinforce or emphasize human rights throughout training. When we do a patrol or come upon a practice target or run a training roadblock, our guys are there to make sure human-rights training is reinforced."

There are several phases to SF's training of Colombian soldiers, according to Master Sergeant Chuck Jarrell, who served as a team sergeant in the 7th SF Group for two years. During the first phase, Colombian soldiers attend a humans-rights lecture that complements the training they have already received from their government. In

phase two, SF soldiers integrate human-rights situations into the training for the Colombian soldiers – similar to the method that the U. S. Army uses to conduct common-task training.

"We integrate scenarios like dealing with captured enemy soldiers, and we use police and religious leaders to make training more realistic. The interest from host-nation soldiers is there. … They really enjoy the training. It makes them think about what they are doing. … Colombia has an extensive human-rights training program with some very stringent rules. … The Colombian soldiers have been exposed to everything we teach; we're just reinforcing what they already know. They have more faith in it and in us because they hear the same thing from us that they do from their government," said Jarrell.

With SF deployments continuing at a rate of 800 soldiers deployed on 61 missions in 40 countries on any given day, human-relations training continues to be at the forefront of SF missions.

"In countries that don't have standardized training, we research all treaties they've signed that include human-rights guarantees. … And when we teach, we can refer to those. Again, we always try to take their policies and reiterate or refer to them," Scott said.

Zets said he has been in and out of Colombia since 1985; Jarrell worked with the first Colombian Counternarcotics Initiative in 1999. Both said that the guerrillas — not the host-nation soldiers — commit the majority of the human-rights violations.

"After a few weeks of training, [the soldiers] get used to us," Jarrell said. "We live with them; we eat with them. When they get comfortable, they accept us as one of them. They talk to us about everything from their families to their experiences. If the offenses were being committed, that's when you'd expect to hear something. It's just not there."

With the worldwide attention placed on human rights, SF soldiers strive to ensure that the units they train will employ human-rights principles in all situations, but there is no guarantee, Hudson said.

Remains of four civilians discovered in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995. Human-rights abuses receive worldwide attention, and human-rights awareness is at the forefront of SF training.

Photo by Kristie Jefferies

International and military laws prohibit SF soldiers from becoming involved in the internal conflicts or in the counternarcotics operations of the countries whose soldiers they train. After SF soldiers redeploy, Hudson said, they rely on reports from the U.S. embassy, the State Department and, sometimes, the media to determine whether their training is working.

One issue that SF soldiers face in providing sustainment training is that many host-nation militaries use conscripted soldiers, and although they try to retain soldiers in order to have a professional force, turnover is still a problem. "To combat that, we focus a lot of training on the leaders, who will stay in the army," Hudson said.

Hudson said the SF Command is aware of several truths about human-rights violations:

- Gross violations of human rights are never tolerated by the public.
- Repeated violations of human rights will never shorten a conflict.
- Soldiers who have been found guilty of human-rights violations must be punished, or similar violations will follow.
- The chain of command must constantly train its soldiers in human-rights awareness.

With SF deployments continuing at a rate of 800 soldiers deployed on 61 missions in 40 countries on any given day, human-relations training continues to be at the forefront of SF missions. SF soldiers who train with foreign nations help to raise human-rights awareness at the grassroots level. It's not just another task or directive to them; it's their way of life. Whether they are in a foreign nation to train host-nation soldiers or to perform a real-world mission, SF soldiers live by their motto, *De Oppresso Liber*.

Staff Sergeant Amanda Glenn is an Army journalist assigned to the Public Affairs Office of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

SF Advisers in El Salvador: The Attack on El Paraiso

by Sergeant First Class John Terzian

During the 1980s, a guerrilla war raged in the Central American country of El Salvador. Marxist rebels, known as the Farabundo Marti para Liberacion Nacional, or FMLN, attempted to topple the country's democratically elected government and to replace it with their own.

Photo by Nelson Mumma Jr.

In June 1998, SF soldiers began receiving decorations for their service in El Salvador. SF soldiers served in El Salvador from 1981 to 1992.

In the United States, there was little public support for introducing U.S. ground troops into the conflict, but the U.S. did respond to El Salvador's request for help by providing arms and training to the El Salvadoran Armed Forces, or ESAF. Congress approved the deployment of 55 Special Forces soldiers to serve as trainers and advisers.

For nearly a decade, the SF advisers trained, lived, fought and, in some cases, died alongside their Salvadoran army counterparts. Serving without high-tech weapons and with limited resources, the SF advisers relied on the most useful weapon in the counterinsurgency inventory: an intricate knowledge of insurgency itself. Their knowledge was coupled with the powerful rapport that they had established with the members of the Salvadoran military. Although limited in number, the SF advisers were instrumental in turning the tide of the war, and in the early 1990s, after years of near revolution, the FMLN signed a peace treaty. The conscripted army of El Salvador had achieved victory over a well-supported and fully organized guerrilla movement.

The victory met with little fanfare, and when SF's advisory mission in El Salvador was over, it became an obscure page in SF history. Not until 1998, years after the FMLN had been defeated, did Congress approve combat awards for the SF advisers, recognizing them for their part in turning back the tide of Central American communism.

During typical operations, advisory duty often bordered on the routine. There were times, however, when a motivated guerrilla enemy was close enough to touch. Hundreds of SF personnel served in El Salvador, and there are hundreds of individual accounts. The account that follows is not unique, nor is it the most intense combat action to occur in El Salvador.

Staff Sergeant Michael Roth of the 7th Special Forces Group volunteered for advisory duty in El Salvador in 1988. The highly sought-after duty provided an opportunity for an SF soldier to perform one of his most difficult missions: counterinsurgency. The insurgency in El Salvador was a textbook case: The movement had a fully developed underground, auxiliary and guerrilla



The ESAF 4th Brigade headquarters (inset) was located southwest of El Paraiso, in the Salvadoran department of Chalatenango.

army. It was no secret that the movement was supported by the then-Marxist government of Nicaragua, or that the movement's cadre had been trained in such places as the Soviet Union, Cuba and Vietnam. Through its systematic indoctrination of the hinterlands and its coordinated attacks against the military, the FMLN was well on its way to accomplishing its stated objective: overthrowing the Salvadoran government.

With neighboring Nicaragua serving as a constant reminder of a communist victory, the ESAF soon found itself immersed in a guerrilla war of its own, the nature of which forced the ESAF to fight reactively. "I think that the best a counterinsurgency force can hope for is to fight the insurgents to a standstill," Roth said. "Make them realize that they can't win by force of arms, and that integration into the political process is the only way to effect change."

Photo courtesy Michael Roth

Major James Parker (left) and Staff Sergeant Michael Roth in front of their bunker on Sept. 13, 1988.

During their tours, Roth and Major James Parker were assigned as advisers to the ESAF's 4th Infantry Brigade, which was headquartered about a kilometer southwest of El Paraiso, in the Salvadoran department of Chalatenango. While Roth trained ESAF rifle platoons, Parker advised the brigade commander and his staff. The 4th Brigade had four companies committed to securing bridges, towns and main roads. Even so, the brigade's lines of communication to the capital of San Salvador came under frequent attack. The brigade was connected to the U.S. MILGROUP in San Salvador by radio links, and resupply was conducted by helicopter. The brigade's Special Forces company was the only company committed to conducting offensive operations against the guerrillas.

The brigade headquarters was a camp encircled with a double barbed-wire fence and improvised minefields consisting of mortar rounds rigged with trip wires. Bunkers, 105 mm howitzers, and 81 mm mortars provided protective fires. At any one time, there were about 200 troops on the camp itself. That the 4th Brigade had been the target of several attacks said much about the guerrillas' audacity.

The ESAF, about 53,000 strong, was composed mostly of 16- to 18-year-old males. Some of the ESAF's members were drafted off the street, given basic training, and then sent directly to their assigned

Photo courtesy Michael Roth

Salvadoran recruits training on the M-79 grenade launcher in La Union, El Salvador in 1988.

units. Roth and the Salvadoran army trainers worked with the troops for two weeks at a time at the brigade headquarters. The troops received training in mortar gunnery, light-infantry tactics, counterinsurgency and NCO development. Live ammunition was used during the training, and the troops conducted patrols in the vicinity of the brigade's base camp. Training culminated with soldiers performing all-night patrols and setting up ambushes along trails frequented by the guerrillas.

The terrain around El Paraiso was harsh: Volcanic rock and deforested hills made even foot movement on the trails a laboriously slow affair — traveling only one kilometer could take three hours. Movement off the trails was next to impossible. Roth taught the troops to conduct trail movement with heavily armed platoon-sized patrols. He was not permitted to accompany combat patrols if they were to travel more than five kilometers from the camp during the day or more than two kilometers at night, but it was seldom necessary to venture very far to find guerrillas.

The FMLN had more than 1,000 armed guerrillas active in Chalatenango. In some villages, the guerrillas walked about openly, displaying their weapons and conducting propaganda sessions that often lasted for hours. At night the guerrillas rallied into company-size elements and carried out bold attacks against the ESAF. Their operations were fairly successful. The year before Roth arrived in El Paraiso, the brigade headquarters had come under a massive guerrilla assault from the north. More than 80 Salvadoran soldiers and an SF adviser had been killed.

Information concerning the FMLN's activity around El Paraiso came in regularly. Many times it was provided by local peasants, indicating that the Marxist indoctrination was not as successful as the FMLN wanted everyone to believe. On more than one occasion, information about guerrilla activity came from angry girlfriends or wives of FMLN members.

On Sept. 12, 1988, a report came in to the brigade headquarters that about 30 guerrillas had been spotted a few miles north of the base camp. The size of the unit and the fact that it was moving in daylight alarmed the acting brigade commander, and he increased the base-camp security. Roth had planned to send a patrol out that night, but his platoon was placed on the perimeter instead. After a

standard meal of corn tortillas, rice and beans, Roth turned in for the night.

At about 1 a.m., Roth woke to a long burst of automatic-weapons fire. "Perimeter-security troops would recon by fire during darkness," Roth said, "but the shooting became too heavy for this to be the case. First, there was a lot of small-arms fire, then the explosions started." Roth always slept in his fatigues, and it took little time for him to don his boots and his load-bearing equipment. He secured his CAR-15 and then moved carefully down the hallway to Parker's door. After exchanging identity authentication, the two advisers moved outside.

Mortar rounds, rockets and small-arms fire were falling steadily into the camp. Roth and Parker noticed their bodyguard taking cover in a nearby ditch. They crawled to him and then slid into their assigned bunker. Roth and Parker assessed the situation: The heaviest fire was coming from the high ground north of the camp's officers club. The perimeter guards returned fire from their bunkers. One of the ESAF's 81 mm mortars also returned fire, but it fell silent after firing three rounds.

During previous attacks, the guerrillas had cut the power lines that fed the camp and then destroyed the camp's generator. Then, under cover of darkness, they had infiltrated the camp perimeter and attacked pre-selected targets. To avoid fratricide, the ESAF troops had learned to remain in their fighting positions and to treat anyone moving in the darkness as an enemy. The Salvadorans had also begun protecting their generator with a brick bunker.

On this occasion, the guerrillas, true to their modus operandi, selected the generator as one of their first targets. Having already cut the power lines to the camp earlier in the day, the guerrillas tried for about 45 minutes to destroy the generator with gunfire and rocket-propelled grenades, or RPGs. But this time, the brick bunker held. Finally, the attackers destroyed the camp's unprotected transformer. As the lights died, the guerrillas began to slip across the camp.

Roth and Parker took up firing positions inside their bunker. They waited anxiously for the camp mortars to launch illumination rounds, but they waited in vain. Although there were four 40 mm illumination rounds in the bunker, the M-79 grenade launcher that was needed to launch them was still in Parker's room. Roth crawled out of the bunker to retrieve it. After returning to the entrance of the bunker, he fired the first round from the grenade launcher. The flare illuminated a guerrilla RPG team that was moving nearby. Parker fired at the guerrillas with his CAR-15 until the flare went out. When Roth launched the second flare, there was no more movement in that area.

Propaganda leaflets distributed by the FMLN in the El Paraiso area.

But there was plenty of movement elsewhere. Roth could see flashes on the Loma Alpha hilltop that lay inside the camp perimeter. The ESAF had a 50-caliber machine gun and a 106 mm recoilless rifle on the hilltop. Roth thought that he saw mortar rounds exploding there, but it was actually the guerrillas throwing explosives into the ESAF positions on Loma Alpha.

Roth launched his third flare as a rocket exploded near the bunker. The enemy bar-

rage intensified, and Roth fired his final round. When the round burned out, darkness took over again. Somewhere overhead, Roth could hear a Salvadoran AC-47 gunship, but the aircraft dropped no illumination. Using the radio inside the bunker, Roth and Parker tried to contact the gunship. But after several failed attempts, they decided to use the commo equipment in Parker's room. There, they got through to the gunship and requested fire support.

When they returned to the bunker, the guerrilla attack was gaining momentum. A rocket passed overhead and exploded; another rocket followed it. Parker sighted on the RPG flash, and when the guerrillas fired again, he returned fire. The AC-47 finally got into the fight, firing on the guerrilla positions with a 20 mm cannon. The gunship also began dropping flares, providing badly needed illumination.

An RPG round landed so close to Roth and Parker's bunker that the explosion flattened both men against the wall. … With their flares expended and the gunship gone, the Americans defended their bunker in darkness.

The guerrillas were vulnerable to air attack, and they would normally make a hasty withdrawal when gunships appeared. But the attack on El Paraiso dragged on for four hours. An ammo storage area inside the barracks was hit, and as it burned, 106 mm recoilless rifle ammo began to cook off, adding to the chaos. The AC-47 gunship continued to fire on enemy positions. "We went back and forth to Major Parker's room three or four times that night," Roth said. "I pulled security while he made commo with the gunship." The AC-47 dropped illumination until its flares were expended. Shortly thereafter, it left the fight, but by then, the enemy mortar and RPG fire had diminished. Roth noticed that a spotter plane and a UH-1M helicopter had replaced the AC-47 and that the UH-1M was firing rockets into guerrilla positions outside the perimeter fence.

Although the enemy mortar fire had diminished, it was far from being neutralized. An RPG round landed so close to Roth and Parker's bunker that the explosion flattened both men against the wall. A nearby building was hit and began to burn. More 106 mm ammunition cooked off in the fires, adding more ground-shaking explosions. With their flares expended and the gunship gone, the Americans defended their bunker in darkness. They had no way of knowing whether the enemy was being repelled from the defensive positions inside the outer perimeter wire. The UH-1M was soon out of ammunition, and it, too, faded into the night.

As the helicopter departed, the Americans crawled to the tactical operations center to get an update on the situation. There they found an ESAF captain organizing a counterattack on guerrillas who were in the motor-pool area of the camp. Roth and Parker also learned that reinforcements were on the way from Chalatenango and from the ESAF parachute battalion in San Salvador. The paratroopers were coming by helicopter and would arrive soon. Because the ESAF forces seemed to be getting the camp under control, the SF advisers recommended placing the paratroopers in blocking positions outside the camp in order to catch the guerrillas as they withdrew. After checking on personnel in the intelligence building, Roth and Parker returned to their bunker.

As dawn approached, the incoming fire dwindled. Sporadic mortar and rocket fire continued to hit the camp, and there were numerous secondary explosions from the burning buildings. But now, Roth could hear trucks moving wounded ESAF soldiers to the infirmary. The Americans stayed in position until the sky began to lighten. By then the weapons fire, both incoming and outgoing, had all but ceased. The troops began shouting back and forth as they attempted to reorganize.

Suddenly, a ferocious firefight broke out inside the perimeter. Several of the guerrillas had remained inside the fence and were trying to escape before sunrise. The shooting lasted for several minutes and finally tapered off.

Roth took a quick survey of the aftermath in the light of day. In the infirmary, the more seriously wounded soldiers were being pre-

pared for evacuation to San Salvador. The dead were being consolidated near the troop pool. Roth saw that several buildings were completely destroyed, as was the truck that had been assigned to the American advisers. Three bunkers appeared to have been destroyed. But the true nature of the battle wasn't evident to Roth until he saw the conditions on the Loma Alpha hilltop.

Loma Alpha had been occupied by a squad-sized ESAF element. Besides the 50-caliber machine gun and the 106 mm recoilless rifle on the hilltop, there was an 81 mm mortar position at Loma Alpha's base. The guerrillas had attacked Loma Alpha early in the engagement by hurling improvised satchel charges at the defenders of the mortar position.

Roth found the mortar position disheveled and bloody. The ESAF troops had been literally blown from their positions by the satchel charges and by the RPGs. Roth later learned that a Salvadoran instructor had prevented the mortar position from being overrun by throwing fragmentation grenades at the attackers. The attackers had responded by throwing demolition charges at him, all the while accusing him of not fighting "fair" because he was using grenades. The contest for the mortar position ended with the attackers pulling back and firing rifles, machine guns and RPGs.

But the guerrillas had managed to overrun the hilltop itself. Roth counted five dead Salvadorans, and the area was littered with unexploded charges and guerrilla propaganda. The guerrillas had controlled the hilltop for at least an hour — long enough for them to have turned the machine gun and the recoilless rifle on the camp below and to have caused far more damage than they had.

Roth soon discovered why the guerrillas had not opened fire on the camp: The 106 mm recoilless rifle — a devastating weapon capable of punching through the wall of any bunker on the camp — had not been fired. The guerrillas had not been able to find the trigger, which is located on the side of the weapon and doesn't look like a trigger at all.

Just as guerrilla ignorance had kept the recoilless rifle from being used on the camp, the Salvadoran army's neglect had kept the 50-caliber machine gun from becoming a guerrilla weapon. Early in his tour with the ESAF, Roth had discovered that the troops rarely set the headspace and the timing of the 50-caliber machine guns. Although Roth repeatedly explained the concept, the troops could not seem to grasp its importance.

Photo courtesy Michael Roth

The 50-caliber machine gun that was turned unsuccessfully on the camp from the Loma Alpha hilltop. The unexploded demolition charge is visible.

The headspace and the timing of the 50-caliber machine gun at the top of Loma Alpha had also not been set. The guerrillas had turned the gun on the camp and had tried to fire it again and again; ejected rounds lay all around the gun. After the gun failed to fire, the guerrillas had attempted to destroy it with a demolition charge. That, too, failed. "The charge had an anti-handling device on it," Roth explained. "It was removed by an

Photo courtesy Michael Roth

The interior of one of the barracks destroyed by secondary explosions from burning ammunition.

[explosive ordnance disposal] corporal, the same guy who defended the mortar position." As Roth surveyed the damage on Loma Alpha, he realized that the attack could have turned out much differently.

It would take several days to piece together the guerrilla attack on the 4th Brigade. Friendly casualties were significant, although not staggering. Seventeen Salvadoran soldiers had been killed; more than 30 had been wounded; and one had been captured. Eleven guerrillas were confirmed dead — five bodies were found inside the perimeter, and six more were later found in shallow graves a few kilometers north of the 4th Brigade's headquarters (These were probably killed by the ESAF airborne troops waiting outside the camp). Body parts and blood-soaked bandages found outside the perimeter suggested that the enemy losses were much higher than 11.

Roth and Parker later learned that the attack had commenced when a Salvadoran officer driving along the perimeter of the camp encountered a guerrilla element that had already penetrated the minefields and the outer fence. The officer was killed when he and two other soldiers engaged the guerrillas. From that point on, the Salvadorans had assumed a defensive posture and fought through the night.

The guerrillas had attacked the camp with what was estimated to be a 175-man element. The guerrillas, equipped with mortars, RPGs, explosives and small arms, had penetrated the perimeter in three locations. The guerrillas had managed to suppress the ESAF mortar and 105 mm howitzer positions, effectively taking them out of action for the duration of the battle. The generator, the U.S. trainer building, and the command bunkers had also been targeted. In all, about 100 guerrillas had penetrated the compound. They had been supported by at least six 81 mm mortars, which Parker believed were set up south of the compound. The day after the attack, civilians reported seeing 10 canoes heading south across the Cerron Grande Reservoir. The guerrillas may have used the canoes to transport the heavy mortars and so speed up their escape. As it was, ESAF soldiers pursued the guerrillas and killed four stragglers.

The guerrillas had planned the operation well; they had had sufficient command and control during the attack, and they were able to make good use of their mortars and rockets in support positions. They had also breached the fence and the minefields with little difficulty. Both Roth and Parker suspected that someone within the camp had

provided intelligence to the guerrillas concerning the locations of key obstacles and facilities. A detailed map found on the body of a dead guerrilla bolstered their suspicion.

But even though the guerrillas had penetrated the defenses, they had run into trouble while attempting to exploit the breach. They had taken the high ground of Loma Alpha, but they couldn't operate the heavy weapons located there. It had taken them at least 30 minutes to cut the power and another four hours to attack their targets and to withdraw. As a result of that delay, the air force gunships were able to arrive in time to play a key role in repelling the attack.

For their part, the Salvadorans had learned much from prior engagements with the guerrillas. Their well-rehearsed defense plan minimized confusion during the heat of battle, even when communications between troops and commanders were limited.

The ESAF, however, had not completed its preparations: Transformers were unprotected; minefields were mostly improvised; and because the mortars and howitzers had insufficient protection, they were either destroyed or suppressed early in the fight.

Not surprisingly, the FMLN touted the El Paraiso attack as an unqualified success. The FMLN's propaganda continued to claim success, but in the end, the people of El Salvador — the audience the guerrillas needed to win over — didn't believe the propaganda. In the hinterlands and in the small villages of the north, the people saw firsthand what the rebels stood for. They knew the outcomes of the numerous combat actions. The people had been forced at gunpoint to hear about the wonders of Marxism. The presence of American Special Forces was well-known among friends and enemies alike, and the FMLN's propaganda could not override SF's unspoken message.

Roth himself didn't realize the extent of his own influence on the ESAF until after the battle. "I was walking around after the attack and a lot of the soldiers came up to me saying things like, 'Thank God you're still alive and unhurt.' I couldn't figure out why they were so worried about me when 17 of their buddies had just been killed and lots more wounded. When I asked one of the soldiers about it, he told me, 'This is our war. We have to be here. You don't.' They talked a lot about the SF adviser who was killed the year before, how much they liked him and his instruction. I never realized how much his death had hurt them, or how much they respected him for dying in a firefight alongside of them, until that day."

That powerful respect would outlast the FMLN. Each time an SF adviser accompanied the Salvadoran conscripts on a patrol or gave them instruction, rapport and credibility grew. Nothing spoke louder to the Salvadorans.

Postscript: Staff Sergeant Michael Roth completed his tour in El Salvador in 1988. While serving as an instructor in the Special Forces Qualification Course, Roth used the attack on El Paraiso as a training tool for future SF soldiers. He is currently a CW2 assigned to an A-detachment in the 7th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, N.C.

Major James Parker completed his El Salvador tour in 1989. He has since served in several SF positions, including commander of the 7th SF Group. Today, he is a brigadier general and is director of the intelligence and information operations center at the U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill AFB, Fla.

Sergeant First Class John Terzian is assigned to the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Co. A, 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group. He is an instructor in the Advanced Special Operations Techniques Course. Terzian served on an A-detachment in the 3rd SF Group from 1991-2001, and he served in Operation Restore Democracy (Haiti) and in Operation Joint Forge (Bosnia). Before joining SF, Terzian served with the 82nd Airborne Division, where he was an Infantry squad leader and a jumpmaster during Operation Just Cause. Terzian is a graduate of Ranger School, the Advanced Special Operations Techniques Course, and the SF Advanced NCO Course. He holds an associate's degree in foreign language from Monterey Peninsula College, Monterey, Calif.

‘Devils & Beasts’

Japanese PSYOP Posters from World War II

The images on these pages are photographs of propaganda posters that were produced by the Japanese during World War II. The posters depict alleged Allied atrocities and human-rights abuses committed against Japanese, Filipino and Indian civilians and soldiers. With their strong anti-Western theme, the posters may have been targeted at Japanese and Filipino soldiers and the populations of Japanese-occupied

Above: Caricatures of Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt feast on the bones of their victims. The poster warns: “Their true character is that of devils and beasts.”

Right: Filipino soldiers tied to bamboo trees with their hands behind their backs. According to the poster, the soldiers were used as human shields to cover the retreat of American troops from Bataan.

Left: Japanese troops discover the mass graves of Filipinos. The poster says that Americans used the Filipinos as forced labor and then executed them.

Middle: Wounded Filipino soldiers are forced into trenches by American soldiers and then left unattended.

Bottom: The poster depicts African scouts being forced to serve on the front lines by the "British beasts."

countries.

The images are part of a series of 15 color photographs that were donated to the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's archives in February 2001 by veterans of the 650th Engineer Topographic Battalion of World War II. Technical Sergeant Bennie Hensen, a member of the battalion's Company B, discovered the posters in September 1945 at a former Japanese training academy

near Kyoto, while the 650th was serving in the Allied occupation of Japan.

The archives maintain historical records and artifacts to record the history of special operations and to support the instruction provided at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School.

Advisers and Advising in the 21st Century

by Major Paul Marks

During the recent congressional debate over President Bill Clinton's request for $1.3 billion dollars to aid Colombia's war on drugs, senior officials and policy-makers carefully avoided the word "adviser," apparently out of fear that the mere mention of the word would jeopardize the fate of the aid package.

That attitude reflects the historical baggage that the United States military and the U.S. government still carry from the Vietnam War. Ironically, the advisory effort in Vietnam was one of the war's success stories, even though the recipients of the advice, in the end, were unable to heed it. The purpose of this article is to show that the word "adviser" needs a revival if the U.S. hopes to face the threats of the 21st century in an efficient and cost-effective manner.

Cold War advisers

Advisers were a critical part of U.S. military activities during the Cold War. It was also during the Cold War that American advisory efforts developed a reputation that ranged from the naive to the criminal. Popular novels based on the 1950s exploits of Edward Lansdale (a U.S. Air Force officer seconded to the Central Intelligence Agency for much of his career), including *The Ugly American*, *The Quiet American*, and the French *Le mal Jaune* (*Yellow Fever*), influenced the reputation of U.S. military advisers. The books' association of the CIA with U.S. military advisory efforts, along with the "secret war" in Laos and the Phoenix Program in Vietnam, led many (both in and out of the military) to believe that advising is primarily a special or covert operation.

In 1969, the murder of a suspected North Vietnamese double agent motivated Daniel Ellsberg, a former reserve Marine adviser who had worked for Lansdale in Vietnam, to leak the *Pentagon Papers*, which revealed much of the inner workings of the ways the U.S. government had mixed advisory efforts with special operations since the late 1940s.[1] And in Cambodia from 1970 to 1975, an American materiel-equipment delivery team often violated the 1970 Cooper-Church Amendment by providing advice to Cambodian forces while monitoring the end-use of donated equipment from the Military Assistance Program. Senator Frank Church then pushed for the 1976 Arms Export Control Act, which placed additional restrictions on when and how security assistance, including advice, could be provided.[2]

In the 1990s, the special-operations community shifted its emphasis away from FID and into coalition-warfare support, direct action, special reconnaissance and counterterrorism. As a result of the shift, the concept of advising … has almost ceased to exist.

Edward Lansdale was both a proponent and a critic of early U.S. advisory efforts in Vietnam. During the transition between the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, Lansdale wrote an assessment of the advisory effort in Vietnam, which Defense Secretary-select Robert McNamara provided to President-elect Kennedy.[3] Lansdale's assessment criticized the

work of the 900 American advisers in Vietnam as "lacking in focus, purpose, or courage. Worst of all, they lacked understanding of either insurgency or nation building."[4] Lansdale believed that fewer advisers, given greater responsibility and authority, would have a greater chance of success. Although Kennedy liked the concept of counterinsurgency and immediately ordered the Army to focus on it, he refused to believe that less could be better, and in 1961, he increased the number of advisers from 900 to 3,200.

One lesson that we should have learned from Vietnam is that the war should have remained an advisory effort, even if ultimately we might have failed. In the words of a former adviser, General Volney Warner: "In retrospect, I'm absolutely convinced that we lost the war wrong. We should have fought that war in an advisory mode and remained in that mode. When the South Vietnamese failed to come up and meet the mark at the advisory level, then we never should have committed U.S. forces. We should have failed at the advisory effort and withdrawn."[8]

The end of the war brought a decline in the use of advisers until Congress authorized that advisers be used in El Salvador in the 1980s. Army Special Forces continued to train for advisory duty, but in the Army and in the Department of Defense, or DoD, the imperative to improve on the lessons learned in Vietnam was gone. The few existing doctrinal publications that pertained to advisory duty were gradually retired.

When the Reagan administration decided to send advisers to assist El Salvador in its counterinsurgency in the 1980s, Congress limited the number of advisers to 55. That restriction allowed a handful of specialists to craft an advisory effort that adroitly placed political, economic and social objectives before military objectives. A former commander of the U.S. Southern Command highlighted the efficacy of a relatively small number of advisers in either a counterinsurgency or a foreign-internal-defense, or FID, effort when he said, in the context of El Salvador, "You don't need a lot of people to fight these wars."[9]

Photo by Gary Ell

A Salvadoran soldier on guard duty. The success of the U.S. advisory mission in El Salvador vindicated post-Vietnam doctrine on FID, but the advisers' roles were not fully captured in joint doctrine.

That conclusion, however, depends upon a number of conditions, including the quality of the advisers. Advisory duty requires people of unique talents, and at least one study on El Salvador lamented that the right people were not being recruited or ordered into advisory duty.[10] The success in El Salvador vindicated post-Vietnam doctrine of FID, but the roles and the responsibilities of the advisers themselves were never fully captured in joint doctrine or in Army doctrine outside that of Special Forces.

Furthermore, in the 1990s, the special-operations community shifted its emphasis away from FID and into coalition-warfare support, direct action, special reconnaissance and counterterrorism. As a result of the shift, the concept of advising — "Influencing the host nation military institutions to support a democratic process can only be done with the long-term presence of U.S. military personnel working alongside host nation forces," as described in FM 31-20-3, *Foreign Internal Defense Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces* (20 September 1994)[11] — has almost ceased to exist.[12] Even military assistance and advisory groups are restricted by DoD regulations to providing advice only if it does not interfere with managing the sale of American defense articles and services.[13]

21st-century imperatives

Today's security environment presents a range of opportunities to promote stability, democracy and the

rule of law before a country (or a group within a country) falls victim to the destructive effects of insurgency, civil war, ethnic strife, separatism, drug trafficking, environmental exploitation or anarchy. And for those countries that have managed to survive such internal conflicts, the opportunity exists for the U.S. to help them recover. Philosophically, we must start by embracing the idea that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. On paper, we have done this: The White House's most recent *National Security Strategy* begins with a quote from Franklin D. Roosevelt's final inaugural address: "We have learned that we cannot live alone at peace. We have learned that our own well-being is dependent on the well-being of other nations far away. We have learned to be citizens of the world, members of the human community."[14]

Secretary of Defense William Cohen expressed similar sentiments in 1997: "Today, there are some who would have us pull back from the world, forgetting the central lesson of this century: that when America neglects the problems of the world, the world often brings its problems to America's doorstep."[15] The *National Military Strategy* goes so far as to state that in the immediate post-Cold War era, "We have an unprecedented opportunity to shape the future security environment."[16]

But are we shaping a future security environment that will guarantee the safety of our children and grandchildren? The *National Military Strategy* claims, "Our strategic approach uses all appropriate instruments of national power to influence the actions of other states and nonstate actors, exert global leadership, and remain the preferred security partner for the community of states that share our interests."[17]

Are we using all appropriate tools within the military instrument of national power? In 1999, the Joint Chiefs of Staff began requiring regional commanders in chief, or CINCs, to submit theater engagement plans that explain how they plan to implement their strategy, goals and objectives. Yet the author is not aware of any studies that correlate peacetime-engagement activities with the actions of other states and nonstate actors. In fact, our peacetime-engagement activities are, in general, characterized by a lack of vision, a lack of resources, an overemphasis on force-protection, and a near total reliance on short-term events that contribute very little to a host nation's capabilities.

That is not to say that those activities should be scrapped, but rather that they should complement an in-country program that supports our national interests. History has shown that to be successful in assisting a troubled state, an assisting country must demonstrate three qualities: presence, persistence and patience. If those qualities are missing, as they were when the U.S. abandoned Cambodia five years after Congress legislatively limited our assistance effort in 1970, the consequences can be disastrous: In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge took power and slaughtered 1.7 million Cambodians. For demonstrating presence, persistence and patience, an appropriate tool of foreign policy and of the military instrument of national power is the military adviser.

The key in determining whether providing military advisers would be appropriate is to identify countries in which preventive action can make a difference, as it can in the following categories:[18]

• *Transitioned democracies whose continued development of a professional military will contribute to regional security*. This could refer to most eastern European states and to countries such as Thailand and Mexico. U.S. objectives that would be supportable by an advisory effort include assisting in formulating strategic plans and policy; developing and executing modernization

Photo by Jonathan Withington

SF soldiers help train soldiers in Thailand. The key in determining whether providing military advisers would be appropriate is to identify countries in which preventive action can make a difference.

and professionalization requirements; enhancing interoperability with U.S. and regional forces; and executing a theater-engagement plan designed to assist weaker allies in the region in traditional defense matters and in countering transnational threats such as drug trafficking and illicit environmental exploitation.

• *Democratic regimes that are under duress from internal forces*. "Internal forces" could include insurgency, drug trafficking, ethnic warfare, corruption, human-rights abuses, and environmental exploitation. This category could include large countries such as Colombia, Russia and India, and smaller nations such as Sri Lanka, Nepal, the Philippines and Cambodia. The key is to select countries that have sufficient political legitimacy to ensure that our intervention would be welcome. Ideally, we would begin by assisting countries that have not yet developed serious problems, *but that could develop them*.

• *Countries that aspire to achieve a democratic transition, even though they may have faltered, in part, because of external or transnational sources of instability*. A prime example of this category is Indonesia. If we had agreed 10 years ago to provide advisers to the Indonesian armed forces, our influence might have prevented the human-rights violations and threats to constitutional authority that have occurred there recently. Our primary challenge in providing assistance to countries in this category is to garner the domestic American political will to assist a country that has faltered. Providing assistance is not an easy choice, but when we assist a country that has the potential for progress, we are investing in the future.

• *Areas in which nonstate actors or "hosts" (vs. "host nation") require our support*. Nonstate actors could be insurgencies or separatist groups that have legitimate reasons for wanting to replace, or to split away from, illegitimate regimes. Our involvement could run the gamut from providing peacetime strategy to providing wartime tactical advice on conventional military operations. Other nonstate actors could include international and nongovernmental organizations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Food Program, and large relief agencies such as CARE. These organizations often engage in programs that directly support U.S. interests in an area or region.

Photo by Bronco A. Suzuki

Major Avery Penn, 404th CA Battalion, listens to Tony Land (center) of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees during a meeting to plan solutions for the refugee problem in Macedonia.

• *Countries in which larger U.S. geostrategic interests are at stake*. This category is the most problematic, because in its countries, advisers could be placed in complex and demanding situations, including those in which the U.S. may not always succeed. Perhaps the most common situation would grow out of negotiated settlements between belligerents. Advisers could play a role similar to that of a United Nations observer; they could be assigned to one or both of the belligerents, or they could become part of a peacekeeping mission. U.S. objectives in such situations should be limited to conflict resolution and mediation.

The categories listed above are examples meant only to provoke thought and to raise the issue of whether the U.S. is considering all available options as it tries to achieve its foreign-policy objectives. Many of our advisory efforts will be interagency operations, and we may find ourselves working side-by-side with members of the U.S. Agency for International Development, the State Department or even the Commerce Department.

21st-century missions

The most important advisory positions should be those that assist the host in planning and

implementing a national military strategy that supports the national interests and the national security strategies of both the U.S. and the host. That type of assistance requires working at the operational level of the host's military organization. The most common tasks will include identifying friendly, enemy or threat centers of gravity, strategic and operational objectives, decisive points, culminating points, and measures of effectiveness.

Unless strategic, operational and tactical tasks are synchronized first, there will be no point in fielding functional advisers. Historically, communist military advisers have grasped that concept better than we have. When the Soviet Union dispatched an advisory team to assist Chiang Kai-shek's newly-formed Nationalist Army in 1925, it chose General Vasilii Blucher (known in China as Galin or Galen) to lead 20 officers (including an admiral, six other generals, and five colonels) who provided advice in the areas of strategy, artillery, communications and logistics.[20]

Similarly, when Mao Zedong dispatched a 79-man military advisory group to assist the Viet Minh in 1950, the group focused on strategy and operations. It is worth noting that Mao personally briefed the senior leaders of this advisory team before they deployed, and that their mission ended only after the Vietnamese defeated the French at Dien Bien Phu.[21]

Advisers will assist the host in writing and executing campaign plans, including theater engagement plans, if appropriate. Functional advisers also will play a critical role in the future, advising their hosts in logistics, communications, intelligence, automation, and comprehensive information management. Simple yet robust systems that can merge many of those capabilities will enable our allies to use technology in order to gain an advantage over their opponents.

Advisers must be active and aggressive, but defeating the threat(s) may require a decade or more. Thus patience and commitment become equally important. Advisers are not merely mentors: Our purpose in spending our time and money in a foreign country is to advance the combined national interests of the U.S. and the host country. If a host country invites us in, it must agree to follow our advice to the greatest extent possible. Our advisers should identify talented individuals in the host's organization and actively recommend that those individuals be promoted within their hierarchy.

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Organizations, procedures

Although a CINC can use operations and maintenance funding to deploy advisers, the preferred method is to use existing security-assistance procedures as well as Foreign Military Financing, or FMF, grant credits allocated by Congress. FMF credits would provide necessary funds to those nations and entities that cannot afford the cost of a Foreign Military Sales purchase. Although the costs of deploying advisers are minor compared to the costs of an intervention, convincing Congress to allocate FMF credits will require a paradigm shift, beginning with the ambassador and the CINC and extending upward through the Department of State, or DoS, and DoD. Those two agencies, with the support of the president, must convince Congress that an advisory effort is worth the investment.

Using FMF credits, the in-country security-assistance organization — working through the ambassador and the CINC and using the appropriate planning documents of both chains of command — initiates a Foreign Military Sales, or FMS, case for the host nation or the entity to "purchase" the adviser's services.[23] Our assistance to the Saudi Arabian National Guard is an example of this type of effort, except that Saudi Arabia is a cash customer.

Posting one adviser to a Third World country or to a developing country costs approximately $150,000 per year. (Depending on the security situation, an adviser's family may locate in a nearby country.) A typical 12-man advisory team could be as inexpensive as $1.8 million per year. Placing such teams in 30 troubled countries would thus cost $54 million — an amount comparable to the annual budget for international military education and training, or IMET. In some cases, a host nation may rather have advisers than a robust IMET program, and to that end, DoS and DoD could request that

Congress transfer a portion of the IMET budget to FMF credits. The same amount of IMET funds that would pay for a half-dozen officers to receive professional military education in the U.S. could pay for an instructor from the U.S. to train hundreds of host-nation officers in their own institutions.

Another funding consideration related to our advisory efforts will be the need to determine the extent to which other funding for the host nation will be forthcoming from the U.S. It is pointless to advise a host-nation force on a specific capability if acquiring that capability is not within the host-nation's means. The ideal advisory effort would prepare the host nation to operate within its means or with a modicum of U.S. funding. Self-sufficiency should be one of the objectives of our advisory effort. To the greatest extent possible, we should share the costs of our advisory efforts with our allies who would benefit from our success.

In terms of command and control, advisers work for the chief of the security-assistance organization, or SAO, who works for the CINC but is under the ambassador's local control. Determining whether the CINC or the ambassador is in charge can be handled in two ways. First, the objectives that the advisory effort has been designed to achieve should be spelled out in the CINC's theater engagement plan and in the embassy's mission-performance plan. The objectives in the plans should be identical and, ideally, detailed down to the individual advisory positions.

Second, the mission and the nature of the threat should determine who is in charge. If the primary threat facing the target country is internal, and if the adviser is operating exclusively inside the country's boundaries, the ambassador would be in charge. If the threat is transnational or if the adviser is advising an insurgency, the CINC would be in charge. In any case, the relationship should be clarified in a memorandum of agreement. Just as military operations have supporting and supported CINCs, interagency FID campaigns should have supporting and supported agencies. For instance, DoS and DoD (through the CINC) could both serve as supporting agencies for the U.S. Agency for International Development.

The ideal adviser would be a full-time, dedicated officer or senior NCO who would serve for at least one year, but preferably three or four, and who would return for subsequent assignments in the same country or region. He or she might have taken foreign-language training, but language training would not be a necessity.[24] In many cases, functional expertise in an area that the host requires is more important than intercultural knowledge.

In terms of force protection, the chain of command must accept the fact that an adviser may have to be placed in harm's way in order to be effective. No areas should be off-limits, and the judgment of the adviser, with respect to his own security, must be trusted.

Hypothetical effort

What would an advisory effort look like, and how would we measure its effectiveness? Let us examine a hypothetical situation: a kingdom that elected a coalition government in July of 1998. During testimony before Congress, the deputy assistant secretary of state of the regional bureau stated that the election process had been peaceful, orderly and free of intimidation. The election results indicated that the people had voted freely. Turnout had been greater than 90 percent, and six out of 10 voters had chosen a party other than the one in power. But because the opposition had split the vote, the old regime maintains its grip on power. The same hypothetical congressional testimony also pointed out human-rights abuses committed by security forces, including

Photo by David D. Underwood, Jr.

A U.S. Special Forces captain explains SF operations terminology to staff officers of the Senegalese army. Patience and commitment are important attributes of successful advisers.

more than 100 unresolved and uninvestigated extra-judicial killings dating back to factional political fighting several years ago.

The kingdom's armed forces consist of a 100,000-man amalgamation of four former enemies: the former communist regime, which is now the elected government; former insurgent units that had surrendered and were integrated into the national army in recent years; former republican forces that had fought against the regime as insurgents for 10 years; and former royalist forces that also had opposed the government for a decade, with U.S. support. The most powerful group within the military are the officers who are loyal to the old regime party. These officers remain politicized; many are members of the ruling party. Many of the generals are members of the ruling party's central committee, and many are loyal to the prime minister rather than to the constitution or to the king.

The annual budget of the armed forces is $250 million, or 40 percent of the woefully inadequate national budget of $628 million. The military services are administratively joint, and they share a administration system. Operationally, the chiefs of the services report to a commander in chief who reports to the minister of defense. In addition to the kingdom's army, navy and air force, there is a French-trained and -equipped national police force, the gendarmerie. As in France, the gendarmerie is part of the ministry of defense but performs civil duties. In reality, the gendarmerie are thugs who have been implicated in drug running and extortion. In the armed forces, a private's monthly salary is $18 and 22.5 kilograms of rice. Typically, a private receives his rice, but his pay may be late by 1-3 months. A general officer officially receives $40 per month, but his special allowances vary between $500 and $1,000. In order to survive, most officers run private businesses, some legitimate and some criminal. New lieutenants come from a small military academy. There is one small, barely functioning school for NCOs. There is a three-month staff-college course that is mandatory for all majors and colonels. There are less than one dozen computers in the entire military. All administrative actions for the 100,000-man force are processed using pencil and paper. There is not one fax machine. The kingdom has had no IMET program and no military contacts with the U.S. for several years. Approximately one dozen officers are trained in France every year, and a smaller number are trained in Indonesia, Malaysia, and more recently, in China.

Photo by Jim Hampshire

An important function of any advisory mission is to provide human-rights training. Such training can help prevent abuses, build military professionalism and promote internal stability.

The kingdom has no external threats, although there are constant and often substantiated cases of encroachments from its eastern and western neighbors. Each of the neighbors has six times the kingdom's population. There is no longer an insurgency. Banditry is minimal, but illegal logging and fishing pose a significant problem. The kingdom is on a list of countries that the U.S. says have a substantial drug-trafficking problem, but the kingdom has received several presidential waivers. The kingdom's road network is abysmal. The malnutrition rate among children is among the highest in the world, and life expectancy is less than 50 years. One out of every 254 people has stepped on a mine. The HIV rate among the military is between 4 percent and 8 percent.

Based on the consensus of the country team and the CINC, an advisory team is formed that will focus on professionalization, standardization, training, downsizing and civil-military relations. Because of both the nature of the

threats and the kingdom's geographic location, the kingdom also requires a capable navy. The advisory team would be composed of the following:

1. *Colonel or lieutenant colonel*. Serves as the team leader and as the adviser to the kingdom's joint staff on national security strategy, national military strategy, defense reorganization, and professionalization. Also serves as an adjunct professor to the kingdom's armed forces staff college and command and general staff college.

2. *Lieutenant colonel or major*. Serves as an adviser to the joint staff and the training bureau on training reorganization and on theater-engagement activities. Also serves as an adjunct professor to the kingdom's armed forces staff college and the command and general staff college.

3. *Lieutenant colonel or major*. Serves as the senior adviser to the joint staff on reorganization, demobilization, downsizing, budget reform, pay-system reform and automation.

4. *Captain, warrant officer or NCO*. Serves as an adviser on reorganization, demobilization, downsizing, budget reform, pay-system reform and automation.

5. *Major, captain, warrant officer or NCO*. Serves as an adviser to the engineer command on civil-engineering, road-building and demining.

6. *Major or captain*. Serves as an adviser to the health command on medical training, especially basic preventive medicine.

7. *Navy lieutenant commander or lieutenant*. Serves as the senior adviser to the navy on coastal patrolling, drug interdiction and environmental protection.

8. *Navy lieutenant commander, lieutenant or petty officer*. Serves as an adviser to the navy on the patrolling of inland waterways.

9. *Major, captain or NCO*. Serves as an adviser to the deputy chief of the general staff for Civil Affairs on the reintegration of former insurgent units into the armed forces. Plays a critical role in integrating military civic action with the activities of nongovernment organizations and independent organizations. Augmented by active-duty Civil Affairs personnel and by Army Reserve CA personnel who are on temporary duty.

10. *Major or captain*. Serves as the legal adviser to the judge advocate general of the military. Assists in writing a military code, getting it passed into law, reforming the military court system, and training military lawyers. Serves as an adjunct professor at military schools, teaching classes in human-rights, the law of land warfare and military law.

There is an intangible benefit in placing an American serviceman among a group of foreigners who are working toward a common cause. A military adviser represents the values of the U.S. Constitution in a way that an ordinary citizen, retired military or not, cannot.

The advisory team should deploy to the kingdom with a five-year mandate. At the end of five years, the technical-functional advisers, such as the engineer, medical and naval personnel, might be withdrawn. The effectiveness of the team would be measured by the following criteria:

• Professionalization and depoliticization, as indicated by the number of officers who no longer belong to political parties, who no longer serve in the national assembly, and who no longer serve on the central committee of political parties.

• Improvement in the human-rights situation and in the rule of law, as evidenced by the prosecutions of military human-rights violators and by the military's full cooperation with civil authorities.

• Demobilization to a practical and manageable level of no more than 50,000 troops.

• Training enhanced through the formation of an armed forces staff college that teaches courses of professional military education for colonels and general officers. The staff college should become a command and general staff college for captains and majors. The kingdom should make maximum use of exchange assignments to military schools in neighboring countries.

• Administrative activities reformed by automation. Pay should be deposited automatically and on time in soldiers' bank accounts.

• Health care improved to the point that basic medical care is available to all soldiers, and that soldiers understand and employ simple preventive measures such as mosquito nets, hand-washing and condoms.

• The navy plays an active role in policing illegal fishing and in interdicting drug traffickers.

• The engineer command is dedicated to horizontal construction and demining. The priority of effort should go to constructing and rehabilitating secondary roads that will connect the most remote and poorest areas of the country – historically the base areas for insurgents — to the main roads.

Conclusion

Critics of any effort to expand the role of the U.S. military overseas, in particular through the provision of advisers, will range from

ideological opponents who believe the U.S. has no business interfering in the internal affairs of other nations, to supporters of the concept who will question its feasibility on practical grounds such as budget and personnel constraints. In the first camp, there will also be those who are skeptical of the ability of a small number of individuals to make a difference. In the second camp, there will be those who support the concept but who prefer security assistance without advisers or, if advisers are necessary, advocate hiring contractors.[25]

Despite the arguments against advisers, there is an intangible benefit in placing an American serviceman among a group of foreigners who are working toward a common cause. A military adviser represents the values of the U.S. Constitution in a way that an ordinary citizen, retired military or not, cannot. Granted, he risks becoming a target, but he also demonstrates American commitment and resolve. He not only provides advice, he also demonstrates that the U.S. is willing to define "global engagement" and "forward presence" by sending a soldier, sailor, airman or Marine forward. By his presence, the adviser demonstrates that our values are worth putting an American at the pointy end of the spear.[26]

Advisory efforts benefit the U.S., as well. In addition to enhancing national security by helping others achieve a more stable, secure and democratic environment, advisers serve as the eyes and ears of the U.S. That does not mean that advisers should be used as spies; however, an analysis of ground truth from the point of view of uniformed "strategic scouts" may be critical to those who need to make informed decisions in Washington.

The response to the isolationist argument is simple: An ounce of prevention is worth (and cheaper than) a pound of cure. Surely risking $1 million today to save $100 million, or $1 billion tomorrow — not to mention the potential loss of life in a contingency operation — is worth the price. We should not underestimate our abilities to steer people in the right direction. We must build friendships. We must stand witness to the value of a politically neutral, professional military. We cannot expect people of other countries to believe in human rights and to value life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness if they perceive that we are getting wealthy while they decay.

United Nations photo

International organizations like the U.N. may be engaged in programs that support U.S. interests.

We may not see immediate results from our advisory efforts. In fact, it may take a decade for a country to find its way back to a democratic path or to completely halt the production and export of narcotics. Presence, persistence and patience are key.

From the bookshelves of military history to the halls of Congress, the role of advisers has been both glorified and pilloried. In the 21st century, this neglected aspect of the military instrument of national power will become a vital component of not only the national military strategy but also of a coordinated interagency national security strategy.

Advisers will not only be experts only in counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and other "counter-" and "anti-" disciplines, they will also be strategists and humanitarian-assistance officers. They will be able to advise a democratic country (or a country aspiring to become democratic) on the role of the military; on the importance of human rights and the rule of law; on the importance of both a national-security strategy and a national military strategy; on campaign plans and theater-engagement plans; and on planning and conducting operations. Functional experts in the fields of logistics, communications, information operations, professionalization, modernization, and even downsizing will help the U.S. and our allies to become true citizens of the world and members of the human community.

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Major Marks is a 1986 graduate of the United States Military Academy and a 1988 graduate of the University of London, where he completed a master's degree in Chinese politics as a George C. Marshall scholar. He is a recent graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Notes:

[1] Jeff Stein, *A Murder In Vietnam* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 13.

[2] The Cooper-Church Amendment is an excellent example of the unintended consequences of Congress legislating national security policy. By permitting only equipment support to the Lon Nol regime, the law afforded the Khmer Rouge sufficient operational space to eventually win and then kill 1.7 million fellow Cambodians.

[3] Cecil Currey, *Edward Lansdale, The Unquiet American* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1988), 224. Accompanying the report was an appendix on a community that under the leadership of a Catholic priest had organized its people to fight the Viet Cong. President Kennedy placed a personal call to Lansdale to recommend that he publish that part of the report. Lansdale thought the call was a prank. Ultimately the *Saturday Evening Post* published the article anonymously under the title: "The Report the President Wanted Published" (Currey, 225).

[4] Currey, *Lansdale*, 224.

[8] General Volney F. Warner, Oral History Transcript, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, 1983. U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Penn., cited in H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam* (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), 197.

[9] Lieutenant Colonels A.J. Bacevich, James Hallums, Richard White and Thomas Young, *American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador*, for the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (Washington D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1988), 16.

[10] Bacevich, et al., 16-17; and Peter M. Dawkins, "The United States Army and the 'Other War' in Vietnam: A Study of the Complexity of Implementing Organizational Change" (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1979), cited in Andrew Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1986), 207-8.

[11] Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 31-20-3 *Foreign Internal Defense Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces* (20 September 1994), I-1.

[12] Sam C. Sarkesian, *Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era: Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1993) decries this trend toward Spetsnaz-type missions. An example of the shift can be seen in Susan L. Marquis, *Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1997), which makes no mention of the use of SOF as advisers. The U.S. Special Operations Command's compact disc *Special Operations Forces Reference Manual*, Version 2.1 (January 1998), contains only two references to advising foreign forces, and both of those are in the section on the role of Air Force SOF in a foreign-internal-defense environment.

[13] Department of Defense Regulation 5105.38-M, *Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM)* (30 December 1998), para 3002.C.11.d.(2). Security-assistance office is the generic term for organizations that have names such as Military Assistance Group, Military Advisory Group, Office of Defense Cooperation, or Office of Defense Programs.

[14] The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (December 1999), iii.

[15] Office of the Secretary of Defense, *The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region* (1998), 4.

[16] Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy* (1997), 6.

[17] *National Military Strategy* (1997), 6.

[18] I adapted two and one-half of these cases from a discussion on the policy imperatives of troubled states contained in *Strategic Assessment 1999* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 1999), 238.

[20] C. Martin Wilbur, "Military Separatism and the Process of Reunification under the Nationalist Regime, 1922-1937," in Ping-ti and Tang Tsou, eds., *China in Crisis*, vol 1, book 1 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), 203-35.

[21] Qiang Zhai, "Transplanting the Chinese Model: Chinese Military Advisors and the First Vietnam War, 1950-1954, *The Journal of Military History* 57 (October 1993), 693-95, 714.

[23] Department of Defense Regulation 5105.38-M, *Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM)* (30 December 1998), paragraph 30002.C.11.d.(1).

[24] Knowing a host nation's native language can do wonders for both communication and building rapport, but a talented individual can get by with an interpreter. Edward Lansdale had no affinity for foreign languages, and he went out of his way to highlight ways by which the lack of language skills could be overcome (Currey, 6). In more and more countries, senior military officers speak English. Computer software that can perform the majority of document translation for even obscure languages is proliferating quickly.

[25] Thomas K. Adams, "The New Mercenaries and the Privatization of Conflict," *Parameters* (Summer 1999), 103-16.

[26] Lansdale believed strongly in this point; see Currey, 263.

The State of SF, PSYOP and CA Personnel

by Lieutenant Colonel Dan Adelstein

Army special-operations forces, or ARSOF, face significant challenges as our nation continues to evolve its post-Cold War defense strategy and the Army embarks on one of the greatest transformations in its history. The success of ARSOF, as in the past, will depend upon its human capital. Today, the state of ARSOF personnel is generally sound. Nevertheless, the force confronts current and future challenges in developing and maintaining a properly sized force that will have the necessary quality and professional development.

The U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, is the designated personnel proponent for Special Forces, or SF; Psychological Operations, or PSYOP; and Civil Affairs, or CA. In this role, SWCS is charged by regulation with developing plans, programs and policies that will maximize the potential of the SF and CA branches; of Functional Area 39, or FA 39 (PSYOP and Civil Affairs); of the SF warrant-officer military occupational specialty, or MOS; and of the SF, PSYOP and CA enlisted career-management fields, or CMFs.

Personnel-proponent functions for Army Rangers and Army Special Operations Aviation are performed by the U.S. Army Infantry Center and the U.S. Army Aviation Center, respectively. This article presents a snapshot of those ARSOF populations for which SWCS is the personnel proponent.

Overview

Active- and reserve-component soldiers in SF, PSYOP and CA make up about 1 percent of the Army's enlisted force and about 3 percent of the Army's officer force. Roughly 55 percent of SF, PSYOP and CA personnel are members of the Army's reserve component, or RC.

SF, PSYOP and CA units in the active component, or AC, are located at six installations within the continental United States and are forward-based in every theater. Major RC units (SF groups, PSYOP groups and CA commands) are located in 36 states.

SF Branch

As of April 2001, SF Branch had roughly the number of officers projected under the Army's Officer Personnel Management System XXI, or OPMS XXI. However, the branch was overstrength in the grade of colonel (138 percent filled), while it was short in the grades of captain (83 percent filled) and lieutenant colonel (78 percent filled). By the end of fiscal year 2001, the branch's overstrength of colonels will have been reduced by the career-field designation, or CFD, of colonels in year groups 1975-79.

Major parameters indicate that SF

Branch is sound. Its retention rate for captains is among the highest in the Army. To date, all SF promotable captains who have requested CFD into SF Branch have had their request approved. SF officers have also been allowed to CFD into functional areas, or FAs, based mainly upon their preferences. All SF majors have had the opportunity to serve in branch-qualifying assignments an average of 24 months. Promotion rates for SF Branch continue to equal or exceed the Army's average.

SWCS and the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC, have developed the following officer-related initiatives:

- An increased recruiting mission for FY 2001.
- A three-year active-duty service obligation for graduates of the SF Detachment Officer Qualification Course.
- Ensuring that SF captains continue to have the opportunity to serve in 24-month branch-qualifying assignments.
- Developing intermediate-level education, or ILE, for SF majors, in conjunction with the Army's emerging plans for resident education for all majors.

One area of concern for the SF Branch is the lack of parity under OPMS XXI's command category "Training and Strategic Support," or TSS. To state the concern simply: Compared to their peers in other combat-arms branches, SF lieutenant colonels who have been selected for a command position have a relatively low probability of being assigned a tactical or TSS command. Conversely, they have a disproportionately high probability of being assigned an institutional (garrison or recruiting) command.

The effects of SF's low participation in the tactical- and TSS-command categories are negative. Command availability in these categories will decline further as larger year groups enter the zone of consideration. Thus, an even higher percentage of the command billets filled by SF officers will be institutional. While USASOC and the proponent recognize the importance of the Army's allocating institutional commands to SF, they are also committed to ensuring that SF officers have *proportionate* participation in institutional commands.

The question is, how can the Army increase SF's participation in the tactical- and TSS-command categories? While the number of SF tactical commands is fixed, SWCS believes that the Army could allocate additional TSS commands. Commands such as basic-training battalions would provide excellent professional development for SF officers. The issue is not career progression. Recent SF Branch promotion rates to colonel have been good, and SF lieutenant colonels from all command categories have been highly competitive for promotion. As this article goes to press, the issue remains unresolved.

SF warrant officers

The inventory of AC SF warrant officers (MOS 180A) grew from 80 percent of authorizations in FY 1996 to 97 percent of authorizations in FY 2000. In FY 2001, the inventory stands at 92 percent of authorizations. The reduction resulted from an increase in the number of retirement-eligible CW3s. The proponent projects that the MOS will drop to 88.5 percent of authorizations in FY 2002.

To date, all SF promotable captains who have requested CFD into SF Branch have had their request approved. SF officers have also been allowed to CFD into functional areas, or FAs, based mainly upon their preferences.

The warrant-officer MOS is filled in grades W1 and W2; it has a surplus in grade W3; and it has shortages in grades W4 and W5. One reason for these imbalances is that SF warrant officers are members of a relatively new MOS, and they will require time to grow into the higher grades.

Complicating the shortages is the relatively late accession point for new SF warrants: about 12 years' time in service. That leaves only about eight years of warrant-officer service before the soldier is eligible for retirement. Because the AC 180A MOS

has an increasing retirement-eligible population, SWCS and the U.S. Army Recruiting Command, or USAREC, would like to increase the number of volunteers for warrant-officer training.

The Army National Guard also faces a shortage of SF warrant officers — in fact, this is the greatest personnel shortage in ARSOF. In April 2001, despite a significant increase in the number of ARNG 180As since 1994, less than half of the ARNG's 180A authorizations were filled.

SWCS is planning three initiatives to increase the 180A strength in the ARNG:

• Employ distance-learning instruction for some of the lessons in the Warrant Officer Basic Course, or WOBC. WOBC's length (19 weeks) is a major impediment to ARNG 180A recruiting. Use of distance learning will reduce the course length for AC and RC students.

Because FA 39 offers its officers command opportunities, it functions as a de facto branch and has been a popular FA choice. … Recently, the Army has begun allocating colonel-level institutional commands to FA 39, and SWCS has requested two lieutenant colonel-level institutional commands for FA 39, as well.

• Study the feasibility of an RC version of the 180A WOBC that would reduce the length of continuous resident training time.

• Allow selected ARNG SF officers, mostly captains, to become SF warrant officers after they have completed additional training at Fort Bragg.

Recent promotion rates for the AC 180A force have equaled or exceeded the Army's average, and recruiting for the force is meeting requirements. Still, major parameters indicate that the 180A MOS is "amber."

SF NCOs

The inventory of NCOs in CMF 18, Special Forces, remains a concern in FY 2001. As of January 2001, the CMF had filled only 88 percent of its authorizations. While CMF 18 experienced shortages in every MOS, the greatest shortages were in 18D, SF medical sergeant (82 percent filled), and in 18E, SF communications sergeant (85 percent filled). Many SF A-detachments were short one or two soldiers in each of those critical MOSs. MOS shortages compelled the U.S. Army SF Command to man only five of the six A-detachments authorized in each SF company.

CMF 18 recruiting efforts during FY 2000 were successful. USAREC recruited the 1,800 volunteers required by the FY 2000 recruiting mission, but it will take considerable time for those soldiers to graduate from the Special Forces Qualification Course, or SFQC. In fact, the length of time required to produce a CMF 18 soldier — from recruitment through graduation from the Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape, or SERE, Course — is a major factor that affects the fill of the CMF. The accession steps are:

- Recruitment and placement on orders for Special Forces Assessment and Selection, or SFAS: 12 weeks.
- SFAS (Phase 1 of SFQC): three weeks.
- Completion of tour in assigned unit: variable length.
- Airborne training (if required): three weeks.
- Primary Leadership Development Course (if required): four weeks.
- SFQC Phases 2, 3 and 4: 26-59 weeks (depending on the MOS).
- Language training (Phase 5 of SFQC): 16-24 weeks.
- SERE Course (Phase 6 of SFQC): three weeks.

Thus it can take up to 27 months (not counting the soldier's post-SFAS time in his assigned unit) to produce an SF NCO. SWCS is working to reduce the average time that a soldier must serve in his parent unit after he has attended SFAS. Changes in the prerequisites for security clearances, and Department of Army waivers of the requirements for time on-station have hastened the arrival of SFQC candidates.

SWCS is taking several other initiatives to fill CMF 18:

• Modifying SFAS to increase land-navigation training.

• Imposing a 24-month service-remaining requirement for SFQC graduates. The requirement begins upon completion of SF training (including language training and SERE).

• Sustaining a prior-service accession program to attract former active-Army CMF 18 NCOs back into the active component.

• Gaining Army approval for an SF enlistment option that would allow an enlistee to volunteer for SF "up front," although he would still be required to attain the rank of specialist before he could attend SFAS. This is being offered as USAREC's Recruiting Option 70.

To improve the manning of CMF 18, the Army has established the following reenlistment bonuses:

BEAR	SRB
18B: 1A/1B	18B: 1A/1B/1C
18C: 1A/1B	18C: 1A/1B/1C
18D: 2A/2B/1C	18D: 2A/2B/1C
18E: 2A/2B/1C	18E: 2A/2B/1C
	18F: 1C

Retention and promotions also pose significant challenges for CMF 18. SWCS projects that a major portion of the CMF will become retirement-eligible between now and FY 2004. As a result, gains from the SFQC during FYs 2001-04 may be lower than the number of losses. Fortunately, CMF 18 should experience a gradual increase in its inventory beginning in FY 2005, and the CMF should eventually achieve its required operating inventory.

To mitigate the impact of the FY 2001-04 retirement "bubble," SWCS strongly supports a financial incentive for retirement-eligible NCOs who agree to stay in SF until they have reached their retention-control points. Although the program has been authorized by Congress, the funding and MOS requirements remain unresolved.

While the CMF's promotion rates to sergeant first class exceed the Army's average, promotion rates to master sergeant and sergeant major have recently lagged behind the Army's average. The reason is that the ample inventory of SF master sergeants and sergeants major leaves relatively few vacancies to be filled. To provide additional master-sergeant positions, SWCS is seeking the designation of additional SF positions in ROTC.

SF minority content

A major concern for SF is its low minority content. In FY 2000, SF's minority content (officer and enlisted) was 17.1 percent. By contrast, the Infantry Branch's officer and enlisted minority content was 27.8 percent. The Army's overall minority content was 42 percent.

SWCS and USAREC have developed five initiatives to increase the recruiting of minority soldiers into SF:

- Use minority role models to conduct ROTC campus visits.
- Use minority role models to conduct branch orientations and demonstrations at ROTC basic and advanced camps.
- Ensure minority content in SF recruiting materials.
- Develop active partnership programs with high-school JROTC departments.
- Continue visits by USAREC recruiters to combat-support and combat-service-support units. Such units have a disproportionately high minority content.

One purpose of recruiting a higher number of minority soldiers is to enlarge the pool of potential SF volunteers. Another purpose is to build a force that demonstrates the opportunities for distinguished military service that our country affords its citizens, regardless of their race or ethnic background. Such a force would convey a powerful message to SF's diverse international audience.

Functional Area 39

Under OPMS XXI, FA 39 is one of only two functional areas in the Operations Career Field (the other is FA 90, Multifunctional Logistician). Because FA 39 offers its officers command opportunities, it functions as a de facto branch, and it has been a popular FA choice. FA 39 is composed of two areas of concentration: FA 39B (PSYOP officer) and FA 39C (CA officer). Recently, the Army has begun allocating colonel-level institutional commands to FA 39, and SWCS has requested two lieutenant

colonel-level institutional commands for FA 39, as well.

FA 39 lacks a sufficient number of trained captains. The shortage of captains, particularly in the AC, results from the previously long FA 39 training time: 30 months. Many captains whose training lasted 30 months were very senior or even promotable by the time they reported to their first FA 39 assignment. To help solve the problem, SWCS has modified the FA 39 training program to allow new FA 39 captains to enter the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion or the 4th PSYOP Group after having completed 11 months of initial training (the Civil Affairs Course or the PSYOP Officer Course; the Regional Studies Course; and language training). This change will help alleviate the shortage of captains and will allow new FA 39 officers to gain experience in their career field *before* they submit their request to CFD.

One purpose of recruiting a higher number of minority soldiers is to enlarge the pool of potential SF volunteers. Another purpose is to build a force that demonstrates the opportunities for distinguished military service that our country affords its citizens, regardless of their race or ethnic background. Such a force would convey a powerful message to SF's diverse international audience.

As part of the Army's evolving program for the ILE of majors, SWCS is developing the FA 39 portion of the ILE initiative. SWCS envisions that the program will consist of:

- The future Army military-education-level 4 common-core curriculum.
- Completion of an advanced degree at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif.
- Two months of language-enhancement training at the Defense Language Institute.

The FA 39 major would then serve 12-24 months in an FA-qualifying assignment. The proposed program would require about 18 months of resident schooling.

PSYOP officer. FA 39B is short of personnel, both in the AC and in the RC. In the AC, FA 39B has enough field-grade officers to fill its critical positions, but it is short in the grade of captain. The shorter FA 39 training program for captains will reduce institutional training time and allow FA 39B to increase the manning of its captains' billets. In the RC, FA 39B is challenged to fill all of its billets with qualified officers.

CA officer. FA 39C is short of personnel in the grades of captain and lieutenant colonel, but like FA 39B, it has enough field-grade officers to fill its critical positions. As with FA 39B, FA 39C's captain shortage will be alleviated by the reduced length of FA 39 initial training.

Officers in FA 39C are eligible for command of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion; the 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, SWCS; and the Army-forces battalion of Joint Task Force-Bravo in Honduras. The latter two battalions are coded 39A and can be commanded by either a 39C or a 39B officer.

CMF 37

After years of having had one of the most severe shortages among the ARSOF MOSs, the AC component of CMF 37, enlisted PSYOP specialist, is now filled. Its RC counterpart, however, continues to face difficulty in filling its ranks with soldiers who are qualified for their duty MOS. In April 2001, only 59 percent of the RC CMF 37 positions were filled by soldiers who had achieved duty-MOS qualification, or DMOSQ. The greatest shortage occurred at the grade of E5. In order to increase the number of junior enlisted soldiers who have achieved DMOSQ, SWCS will double the number of students in PSYOP AIT by the end of 2002.

CA Branch

A major concern for the Army Reserve's CA Branch is the lack of CA-qualified officers to fill its ranks. In April 2001, only 73 percent of CA Branch's positions were filled by CA-qualified officers.

In the past, CA Branch's promotion rates to major and to lieutenant colonel have exceeded the average for the U.S. Army Reserve, or USAR, but the branch's promotion rates to colonel have been below the USAR's average. Partly because of those low selection rates, and partly because 55 of the branch's 59 colonels (93 percent) are projected to reach their mandatory retirement dates by the end of FY 2003, the branch is concerned about its future inventory of colonels. As a short-term fix, USASOC, in conjunction with the Department of the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, plans to hold position-vacancy promotion boards in order to promote CA Branch lieutenant colonels into branch positions that require colonels.

Two other developments promise long-term solutions: First, the requirement for additional CA colonels will bring about higher promotion and selection rates through the regular annual USAR promotion boards. Second, USASOC's reduction of the tenure of CA battalion commanders from 36 to 24 months will produce a greater number of CA lieutenant colonels with battalion-command experience, making them more competitive for promotion to colonel.

CMF 38

Like the Civil Affairs Branch, CMF 38, enlisted CA specialist, is part of the Army Reserve and faces a major challenge in filling its ranks with qualified personnel. In April 2001, only 70 percent of the CMF's positions were filled by MOS-qualified soldiers. Heightening this challenge are pending force-structure changes that will significantly increase CMF 38's manpower requirements between FYs 2001 and 2005. In an effort to boost DMOSQ at skill-level one (which was only 77 percent in April 2001), SWCS plans to have tripled the number of AIT students by FY 2002.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the SF, PSYOP and CA populations continue their robust development that began during the 1980s. Despite a multitude of challenges, the future looks positive as SWCS, in its role as a personnel proponent, continues to support both the integration of ARSOF into Army transformation and the development of ARSOF for the 21st century.

Lieutenant Colonel Dan Adelstein is assigned to the Department of the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. He was formerly director of the Special Operations Proponency Office at the U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School. Commissioned as an Infantry officer, Adelstein served as a rifle-platoon leader with Company C, 4-9th Infantry in Alaska, and as commander of Company C, 2-4th Infantry in Germany. His SF assignments include detachment commander, ODA 573; and commander, Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th SF Group. Adelstein holds a bachelor's degree from the U.S. Military Academy and a master's degree in history from Ball State University.

Foreign SOF

Mexico arrests members of terrorist groups

The Mexican president's national-security adviser, Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, announced in late May 2001 that the Mexican government is taking steps to end the presence of Spanish and Islamic terrorist groups in Mexico. According to Aguilar, the Basque Fatherland and Liberty Party, or ETA, and Islamic terrorist groups had sought refuge in Mexico. In its efforts to dismantle these groups, the Mexican government has already arrested 20 ETA members. Mexico is concerned that these groups will establish, or have already established, contacts with Mexican armed organizations that could lead to terrorist acts within Mexico. Aguilar also stated that the groups had first established a presence in northern Mexico, but that they are now moving to the south, possibly an indication that the terrorists intend to exacerbate troubles with some of the armed organizations in southern states like Guerrero, Oaxaca and Chiapas. Although Aguilar did not specifically mention Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shi'ite terrorist organization, Hezbollah responded quickly, denying that it has any bases in Mexico, thereby raising suspicions that it does. Underscoring the potential for additional complications in Mexico's south, the Federal Judicial Police in Guerrero State were attacked in late May 2001 by the Jose Maria Morelos y Pavon Guerrilla Coordinating Group, which comprises the People's Villist Army, the People's Revolutionary Armed Forces and the 28 June Justice Command. One policeman was wounded during the attack.

Italian Carabinieri integrated into armed forces

In 2000, the Italian government designated the large paramilitary Carabinieri force as the fourth branch of the Italian armed forces (the other branches are the army, navy and air force). The designation drew criticism from other Italian police organizations who fear that abuses will occur if police information is used by the Italian Ministry of Defense. The document, "2001 — New Forces for a New Century," recently released by the Italian defense ministry, succinctly outlines the role of the Carabinieri as part of the armed forces. The document, citing the requirement for effective command and control in the modern Italian military establishment, states, "The Carabinieri is the force that acts in the gray areas, where war has ceased, but peace has not yet begun. In the operational area, they manage a series of emergencies that extend from the criminal, to public order, to paramilitary confrontation." In fact, Carabinieri elements have been operating as part of the Kosovo Peacekeeping Force for some time. As part of their duty in Kosovo, they have been performing law-and-order functions and engaging in weapons searches and seizures.

Piracy prompts renewed countermeasures

Growing recognition of piracy as a security problem has prompted increased multinational attention. According to the International Maritime Organization — which has been advocating greater regional cooperation — the Malacca Strait, South China Sea, the eastern Indian Ocean,

the western and central-western African coast, and Latin American coastal areas are especially vulnerable to pirate attacks. In 2000, there were 471 acts of piracy, representing a 150-percent increase over 1999 levels. Of the 471 acts of piracy, 257 occurred in Southeast Asian waters (reportedly 112 of those in the Strait of Malacca). In Indonesia, what has been termed an "explosion" in piracy has evidently resulted in the firing of the commodore who had commanded Indonesia's Western Fleet Sea Security Task Force. Japan has also become increasingly concerned in recent months. In 2000, pirates attacked 32 Japanese ships. As a consequence, in July 2001, Japan began deploying an armed patrol boat of 3,000-5,000 tons to Southeast Asian areas (primarily the Malacca Strait region) four times a year to participate in joint exercises with other nations. Japan may also send coast-guard aircraft and helicopters. Japanese coast-guard members armed with automatic rifles will descend from the helicopters to inspect what the Japanese term "suspicious ships."

Bulgarian special-ops modify training

The Bulgarian General Staff concluded recently that there were increasing possibilities that Albanian armed groups (which are being pursued by Macedonian forces) might penetrate Bulgarian territory. In addition, the Bulgarian Army's special-operations force responded to a requirement to deal with the Bulgarian legs of arms-trafficking routes. In order to be better prepared for dealing with incidents and threats, the special-operations force has reportedly modified its training approaches. Rather than focusing on operations in enemy rear areas, Bulgarian airborne, reconnaissance and assault, and psychological-warfare elements are undergoing specialized training to learn how to neutralize terrorists. As part of their training, the Bulgarian forces recently conducted a "secret" exercise designed to destroy armed groups. The exercise was held near the Macedonian border.

Exercises highlight special-ops forces of PRC, Taiwan

Activities of the special-operations forces of both the People's Republic of China and Taiwan were highlighted in May and June, months that were marked by military exercises on both sides of the Strait of Taiwan. An article in the Shanghai newspaper *Jiefang Ribao* discussed the history and the development of the PRC's special forces. The initial special-forces groupings of the Red Army (1927-46) — said to be equipped simply with "one rope and one knife" and trained to "strike, kick, and run a long distance" — were referred to as "reconnaissance infantry" or "reconnaissance teams operating in the enemy's rear." The article took note of the Red Army's "elite handgun team" and the "armed work team operating in the enemy's rear" who operated against the Japanese during World War II. Chinese special-operations forces operated against the U.S. in North Korea, destroying bridges and attempting to disrupt U.S. operations. According to the article, however, special forces of "true significance in China" were not developed until the 1980s. Re-equipping and training of the PRC forces were undertaken to prepare them to operate in a variety of reconnaissance and direct-action missions hundreds and thousands of kilometers away. Because of their unique organization and training, the army, navy and air-force special-operations units were characterized as "three mini armed forces" that by virtue of their training and high readiness were able to deploy rapidly. Also in May and June, Taiwan's main special-operations unit, the 862nd Brigade, participated in an exercise in a mountainous region of central Taiwan. The exercise was "mainly designed to test the special-operations forces' combat skills, including infiltration in

forest areas and the blasting of mock radar stations in mainland China's southeastern coastal regions," and it included a broad range of additional general and specialized training. During the exercise, the Taiwanese forces conducted a 300-km march through mountainous areas before reaching a designated training site. Such training is judged essential in the face of what has been termed "mainland China's intensified military threat against Taiwan."

Indian army exercise shows value of special-ops

In May 2001, the Indian Army conducted a corps-level exercise that it said highlighted the value of "judicious, timely and bold use of the special forces to cripple the enemy's war-waging capabilities and keep him bogged down in his own backyard." The army also judged the exercise useful for evaluating the use of special-operations forces in "future conventional wars [that might be] fought against a nuclear backdrop." During the exercise, helicopters and fixed-wing transport aircraft inserted Indian special-operations units into enemy territory, where they performed target-identification and intelligence-collection tasks. According to media reports, the exercise suggested that special-operations activities need to be elevated from the level of a tactical resource to that of a strategic asset that is integrated into the overall intelligence-gathering system. Its targets could then include "nuclear warhead stores, missiles and the road-and-communications infrastructure."

Mexican navy establishes counterdrug ROE

Media reporting indicates that the Mexican navy has established detailed rules of engagement, or ROE, regarding the use of armed force against suspected narcotraffickers and other lawbreakers at sea. The ROE apply to surface craft, the Marine reaction forces usually on board the surface craft, and accompanying aviation elements operating in territorial waters. The ROE were prompted by the scope of drug trafficking, illegal fishing, alien smuggling, piracy off Mexican shores, and by the dangers posed to naval personnel attempting to stop vessels at sea. Incidents at sea in which lawbreakers used firearms have endangered Mexican naval personnel. The ROE stress the need to adhere to all legal guidelines and to undertake a phased series of measures designed to halt a suspected vessel. These measures range from radio communications, audio warnings and lights, to buzzing ships with helicopters, and firing warning shots into the water. If a vessel is reported to have engaged in illicit activities and does not halt after these measures have been used, naval personnel may use disabling fire. Reaction forces operating under the orders of the commander may board apprehended vessels and may defend themselves through the "proportional" use of firearms.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. of the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

Health-care slots to open in 96th CA Battalion

The 96th Civil Affairs Battalion has a new authorization for 91W health-care specialists in grades E6 and E7. The slots will be open to NCOs who have completed the Special Operations Combat Medic Course, airborne training and the Preventive Medicine Specialist Course. The battalion will begin filling the slots during the first quarter of fiscal year 2002. For additional information, telephone the Special Operations Proponency Office at DSN 239-6406 or commercial (910) 432-6406.

Shortage SF MOSs have greater promotion potential

The increasing population of eligible SF personnel, coupled with a stable force structure, has caused SF promotion rates for grades E7 through E9 to decline over the last five years. The number of SF NCOs in certain grades is increasing because most SF NCOs remain in the Army until they complete 20 years of service. The challenge for these NCOs, given that they are members of a highly qualified candidate pool, is to identify innovative means of enhancing their competitive edge for promotion. Promotion trends indicate that SF soldiers who possess more than one CMF 18 MOS have a greater chance of being promoted. Those who are interested in increasing their promotion opportunities should consider reclassifying into one of the shortage CMF 18 MOSs:

18F, SF Assistant Operations and Intelligence NCO: SF is experiencing a shortage of 18F NCOs, especially in the 1st, 5th and 10th SF groups. The 18F-qualified personnel are generated from other CMF 18 MOSs. Completion of SF ANCOC and receiving the subsequent "F1" additional skill identifier is the NCO's first requirement in the process of reclassifying into 18F. After an NCO completes ANCOC, he can be placed into an 18F duty position, and his unit can submit DA Form 4187, requesting that he be reclassified into 18F. The SF/PSYOP Enlisted Branch at PERSCOM will reclassify, at a unit's request, personnel into 18F from other currently overstrength 18-series MOSs. 18Ds and 18Es will not be allowed to reclassify into 18F. Once reclassified into 18F, a soldier may request reclassification back into his original CMF 18 MOS. SWCS is examining the feasibility of re-establishing a POI-based curriculum that would be the sole source for 18F qualification.

18D, SF Medical NCO; and 18E, SF Communications NCO: 18B and 18C SF NCOs who volunteer to reclassify into 18D or 18E will not be allowed to reclassify back into their original CMF 18 MOS. CMF 18 NCOs who volunteer for reclassification into 18D or 18E must return to SWCS to validate their new MOS by completing the appropriate portion of the SFQC. For the 18D, the MOS phase is 12 months long; for the 18E, it is eight months long.

SF NCOs who are interested in reclassifying into a shortage CMF 18 MOS should notify their chain of command and then telephone SFC Eric Nordin in the SF/PSYOP Enlisted Branch at DSN 221-6129, or e-mail Ronald.Nordin@hoffman.army.mil.

Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

Tenets for success as an SF warrant officer

Success for SF warrant officers is based upon making sound decisions, achieving consistent high productivity and possessing good timing. Good leaders are more than the result of natural ability — they are also the products of education, exposure and opportunity. To become good leaders, warrant officers must apply themselves fully from the date of their appointment, in all environments and in all their positions. Individual responsibility and commitment cannot be overemphasized. Minimum standards are established for underachievers; successful WOs will exceed those standards. When given a task, even without receiving guidance, WOs should complete the task in a timely manner, using the resources available.

The tenets for success as an SF warrant officer can be summed up in three words: performance, experience and education:

• *Performance.* Good performance is the number-one factor in determining the value and the utility of a warrant officer, regardless of his assignment or rank. Performance serves as a character reference. It indicates potential, it measures creditability and reliability, and it is used by Army promotion boards as a basis for comparing a soldier to his peers.

• *Experience*. A warrant officer should have experience at all levels, with maximum exposure at the operational level. A young warrant officer who jumps into a high-level staff position too early should consider the adverse effect that the move may have on his career. As the WO gains experience, greater responsibilities should come through promotions and progressive duty assignments. Accepting assignments to other posts and to overseas locations will further broaden a WO's experience. The 180A life cycle outlines career progression as follows:

WO1-CW3	Detachment level	5-8 years
CW3	Company level (SWC/JRTC)	2-4 years
CW3-CW4	Battalion level (USASFC/USASOC/Joint Theater)	2-4 years
CW4-CW5	Group level and above (USASOC/USSOCOM/Joint Theater)	Remainder of career

• *Education*. College credits and college degrees are the discriminators that separate WOs who are recommended for immediate promotion from those who are recommended for promotion along with their contemporaries. In the future, a college degree may be the norm. Soldiers should attend career-enhancing military courses and other career-development courses as time and resources allow. If you don't request the training, you won't get it. Once selected for training, soldiers should attend as scheduled. Cancellations cause disruptions in scheduling and result in a loss of funding when seats can't be filled at the last minute. In the end, training cancellations hurt soldiers by putting them behind their contemporaries.

As a final bit of advice, remember three activities — shoot, move and com-

municate — as they apply to SF warrant officers:

• *Shoot.* Reach all of the performance goals you can. Start at the bottom and work your way up to whatever your limitations may be. Do all that you can in each position, and do your best.

• *Move.* Accept OCONUS assignments if and when they become available. Seek advancement at your present duty location, and assume greater responsibility in various jobs at other CONUS locations. Remaining in one location too long, without advancement, may be detrimental.

• *Communicate.* Outline your career goals to your chain of command and to your senior warrant-officer adviser, and keep them informed of your progress. Request schools, assignments and job opportunities in advance — don't wait until the train is leaving the station to try to get on board. Ask for help if you need it — that's why your senior warrant-officer adviser is there. For additional information, telephone CW5 Thom Edinger or CW5 Walt Edwards, SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office, at DSN 239-1879 or commercial (910) 432-1879.

LTC command selections for FA 39 below Army average

The Department of the Army released the FY 2001 lieutenant-colonel command selections April 26, 2001. The Army's overall selection rate was 15.8 percent. The FA 39 selection rate was 7.1 percent. FA 39 has requested that the Army award additional institutional commands to FA 39 so that command opportunities and the command-selection rate for FA 39 will increase.

Update

7th SF Group welcomes new commander

Colonel Peter J. Dillon took command of the 7th Special Forces Group from Colonel Salvatore F. Cambria June 21, in a ceremony at Fort Bragg's Dick Meadows Field.

Brigadier General Frank J. Toney Jr., commander of the U. S. Army Special Forces Command, welcomed Dillon and his family. "I have served with Pete Dillon before. … I can assure the soldiers of 7th SF Group that Pete Dillon will continue to lead [the group] to its standard of excellence."

Addressing his remarks to the men of the 7th SF Group, Dillon said, "Your reputation for excellence is well-noted and widely respected. It is my honor to join your ranks today. The 7th SF Group will face many challenges in the future, and we will achieve every success."

Cambria's next assignment will be with the U. S. Special Operations Command at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Fla. — *SSG Amanda Glenn, USASOC PAO*

SWCS offers CD-ROM 'Train the Trainer' materials

In the past, the Special Warfare Center and School's Department of Education has received numerous requests from units outside SWCS for the lesson plans and the slide presentations used in the Instructor Training Course, or ITC. The majority of the requesting units have been SF A-detachments that were deploying OCONUS to train host-nation cadre.

Photo by Amanda Glenn

BG Frank Toney (right) presents the colors of the 7th SF Group to COL Peter J. Dillon.

To meet the identified training requirement, the Department of Education has developed a CD-ROM, titled "Train-the-Trainer," specifically for A-detachments.

The ITC is designed to train platform instructors for SWCS, and the ITC course lesson material required extensive modification for any other use.

The CD-ROM, which is now available, contains a variety of materials, including lesson plans, slide presentations and a student handbook. Although the CD-ROM is by no means a substitute for ITC, it is adequate for deploying units and for personnel who conduct in-house professional-development instructor training.

The Train the Trainer CD-ROM includes instruction on the principles of learning; objectives and testing; techniques of instruction; methods of instruction; cross-cultural communication; and teaching through interpreters. To obtain a copy of the CD-ROM, telephone the Department of Education at DSN 239-6616 or commercial (910) 432-6616; or fax requests to DSN 239-8302, or commercial (910) 432-8302.

1st Special Warfare Training Group changes command

The 1st Special Warfare Training Group changed commanders June 15 in a ceremony at Fort Bragg's Bull Simons Plaza.

Colonel Charles A. King assumed command of the training group from Colonel Edwin W. Anderson Jr. Major General William G. Boykin, commander of the U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School, hosted the ceremony.

"We've got a command team coming in that couldn't be more suited and more qualified," Boykin said. "Charlie King has had experience in two of our operational groups; he also commanded a battalion here in the SWTG. He is a man with extraordinary depth and a lot of capabilities. … His reputation proceeds him as being a man with very high character and high standards."

"I'm grateful for the opportunity to serve as the commander of the Special Warfare Training Group," King said. "What more could a soldier ask for than to lead this splendid group of soldiers and civilians, cadre and students of the SWTG. … They all wish to be here and they all wish to be challenged."

King, a native of Washington,

D.C., enlisted in the Army in 1977 and served as an Infantry soldier in the 101st Airborne Division. He attended Officer Candidate School in 1978 and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Infantry. King joined Special Forces in 1979 and commanded an A-detachment in the 5th SF Group.

Following his first SF assignment, King returned to the Infantry Branch and served as a company commander and as a battalion operations officer in the Berlin Brigade. He returned to SF in 1986 and has served as a Special Forces officer ever since. King commanded the 1st Battalion of the 1st Special Warfare Training Group from 1995 to 1997.

Anderson will continue to serve with SWCS as director of training and doctrine.

The 1st Special Warfare Training Group trains members of the U. S. armed services, employees of the Department of Defense, and foreign military personnel in more than 75 special-operations courses. — *SSG Amanda Glenn, USASOC PAO*

New publication describes PSYOP equipment

The U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School recently released USAJFKSWCS Pub 525-5-16, *Psychological Operations Equipment Types, Specifications, and Capabilities*. This publication describes PSYOP-unique equipment that is organic to and operated by Army PSYOP units, the Air Force Special Operations Command, and the Navy's Fleet Information Warfare Center, or FIWC. The publication provides a short description of major PSYOP systems and equipment; the systems' capabilities and requirements; and technical data.

Pub 525-5-16 is divided into four sections. Section one includes equipment currently being used by PSYOP forces. Section two illustrates new equipment that is scheduled for delivery to Army PSYOP units by FY 2003. Section three provides an overview of the capabilities of the PSYOP-unique equipment of the sister services (including the Air Force's 193rd Special Operations Wing and the Navy's FIWC). Section four shows the location of major PSYOP development, production, dissemination and distribution systems on the modern battlefield.

Both PSYOP and non-PSYOP personnel can use the information in Pub 525-5-16 to better plan and integrate PSYOP into military operations, and to develop time-phased force-deployment data. The publication can be found on the Army Special Operations Command Web site (https://asociweb.soc.mil) under ARSOF Doctrine and Training Library/Psychological Operations.

Leonard assumes command of SOSCOM

Colonel Kevin A. Leonard assumed command of the U.S. Army Special Operations Support Command, or SOSCOM, from Colonel Yves J. Fontaine in a ceremony held at Fort Bragg's Dick Meadows Field June 15.

Leonard was previously the Army Special Operations Command's deputy chief of staff for logistics. His military service includes tours at Fort Riley, Kan., and Fort Sill, Okla.; two tours in Germany; a tour in Alaska; and a deployment to Bosnia during Operation Joint Endeavor.

A native of Kansas City, Kan., Leonard received his commission after having earned a degree in sociology from Emporia State University in May 1979. He also has earned a master's in business administration from Oklahoma City University and a master's in military art and science from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

Fontaine, who had commanded SOSCOM since January 1999, replaced Leonard as the USASOC deputy chief of staff for logistics.

SOSCOM is made up of the 528th Support Battalion, the 112th Signal Battalion, the Materiel Management Center and five forward-support special-operations theater-support elements. — *Barbara Ashley, USASOC PAO*

160th SOAR to celebrate 20th anniversary

The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment will celebrate its 20th anniversary Oct. 12-13, 2001, at Fort Campbell, Ky.

Activities that are being planned include an air-operations symposium for senior personnel of the 160th; a regimental social; and, for all ranks and all current and former members of the regiment, an air-operations history symposium (World War II and Korea); a 160th SOAR update briefing; an open-house tour of the 160th's facilities; and static displays of the regiment's equipment. For additional information, visit the "Night Stalkers" Web site (www.nightstalkers.com).

Book Reviews

Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam. *By H.R. McMaster. New York: HarperCollins Publishing, 1997. ISBN: 0-06-092908-1 (paperback). 446 pages. $15*.

In *Dereliction of Duty*, H.R. McMaster has produced the finest volume on the political beginnings of the Vietnam War that has been written to date. His brilliant work benefits from the recently declassified papers and documents of Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Vietnam War era.

McMaster tells a profoundly sorrowful tale of political expediency and duplicity, of arrogance and ignorance, and of bureaucratic folly and shameful opportunism at the expense of American combat soldiers. From his point of view, the entire national-security system failed. According to McMaster, President Johnson was concerned with his role in the domestic-policy arena and failed to focus his attentions on the Vietnam War and to establish an attainable and realistic objective.

Robert McNamara, McMaster says, was simply opportunistic and arrogant. He felt his first loyalty was to the president and not to the American soldiers he callously threw into the "meat grinder" that was Vietnam. Moreover, McNamara never trusted the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and he ignored and patronized them



shamelessly. In addition, McNamara was in love with statistical analysis and believed that wars could be run more efficiently through the quantification of "body count."

McMaster also criticizes the joint chiefs of the day for their failures. Although many of them knew that the Vietnam War could not be won given the political limitations imposed by Johnson and McNamara, none resigned. McMaster singles out former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and Ambassador to Vietnam General Maxwell Taylor as one of the architects of a military campaign in Vietnam that violated the first principle of war: objective.

McMaster, an Army officer, is a former history instructor at West Point. *Dereliction of Duty*, his doctoral dissertation at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, is exhaustively researched and extremely well-written. His analysis is trenchant and penetrating, and his organization and choice of supporting data are superb. *Dereliction of Duty* is "must" reading for all students of political-military history.

LTC Robert B. Adolph, Jr.
U.S. Army (ret.)
Sana'a, Yemen

America and Guerrilla Warfare. *By Anthony James Joes. Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 2000. ISBN: 0-8131-2181-7. 432 pages. $30*.

In *America and Guerrilla Warfare*, Anthony James Joes proposes that the end of the Cold War, with its communist-supported "wars of national liberation," did not mean the end of guerrilla war, and that recent history has shown that guerrilla war is a continuing phenomenon.

Joes uses American history to disprove a thesis that he believes is commonly accepted by academics and by U.S. policy-makers: that the U.S. is incapable of effectively conducting either a guerrilla campaign or a counterguerrilla campaign. In the book's introduction, Joes warns that the U.S. will almost inevitably become involved in guerrilla conflict, and he charges that it is not only the armed forces, but also the political class, the electorate and the media who are not prepared for it. We who are in the special-operations community, and who are watching the current debate on

military reform, might find the author's fears to be well-founded.

Joes considers nine historical case studies: two in which U.S. soldiers were guerrillas (the American Revolution and the Civil War), three in which U.S. soldiers were the primary combat force in a counterguerrilla campaign (Philippines-1898, Nicaragua-1912 and Vietnam), three in which U.S. forces supported another country's counterguerrilla war in a primarily noncombat role (Greece, Philippines-1950 and El Salvador) and one in which the U.S. supported a guerrilla movement abroad (Afghanistan). Joes concludes that, with the notable exception of Vietnam, the U.S. historically has been successful in achieving its policy objectives when conducting, supporting or opposing guerrilla war. Therefore, the theory that the U.S. is incapable is in error, and the post-Vietnam success in El Salvador suggests that Americans have learned from their mistakes.

It is curious that Joes devotes more than 15 percent of the book to what is, essentially, a guerrilla war that wasn't: the Confederate opposition during the Civil War. Joes does briefly consider John Mosby's activities in Northern Virginia and William Quantrill's in Missouri. But most of the Civil War chapter is an interesting digression into the reasons why the Confederacy did not pursue guerrilla war after Appomattox. The reader may find this topic stimulating and well-presented, but as support for Joes' thesis on the American experience with guerrilla war, the Civil War case study is ambiguous and irrelevant.

Joes' final chapter is the best part of the book. Rather than providing a laundry list of do's and don'ts for success in waging or countering guerrilla war — which would be, at best, an oversimplification and, at worst, a dangerous policy error — Joes gives two excellent bits of advice to military practitioners and to Washington policy-makers.

First, given U.S. value structures, media dynamics and political realities, we should avoid a counterguerrilla war that involves direct confrontation between U.S. combat troops and insurgents.

Second, a successful counterguerrilla campaign must focus on limiting bloodshed by providing peaceful means of effecting change and by insisting on ethically sound behavior on the part of all counterguerrilla forces. Joes develops this second point further: We must recognize that military victory in fighting insurgency is fleeting. Real victory lies in achieving an enduring peace.

This peace can be achieved only through a political settlement that is acceptable to a broad portion of the given polity. The more destruction, bloodshed and societal disruption caused by the conduct of the war, the more difficult it will be to reach a political solution and sustainable peace. Bloodshed can be limited by isolating the guerrillas from the rest of the population.

It is also important that the counterinsurgents promote peaceful avenues that will effect real change. If peaceful alternatives are available, armed struggle quickly loses its appeal. However, most important is the "right conduct" of the counterguerrilla forces, or as Joes phrases it, "the centrality of rectitude."



Incidents of unnecessary destruction and acts of violence carried out by forces of a threatened regime have been shown to galvanize formerly neutral or even sympathetic populations into ardent supporters of the insurgency. Trampling on the innocent to punish the guilty serves only to create recruits and sympathy for the guerrillas. Such callous action also provides today's international media with gruesome headlines that will affect international and U.S. domestic public opinion. Unjust treatment of noncombatants must be avoided through the appropriate training of our forces and by demanding that all counterguerrilla forces, particularly U.S. participants, strictly adhere to ethical norms of behavior.

For those in the special-operations community, this book is well worth reading. As I watch from Moscow the particularly brutal and short-sighted manner in which the Russian Federation is conducting its counterguerrilla war in Chechnya, I cannot but be dismayed by Joes' prognosis for the prospects of peaceful settlement in the North Caucasus. Perhaps the Russian Ministry of Defense could benefit from reading Joes' book.

LTC Chris Tone
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Special Warfare

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