Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

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From the Commandant

For nearly 15 years, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School has been home to the Army's Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape, or SERE, Course. SERE was designed in the 1980s to train soldiers to survive captivity and to return home with honor. Although our training facilities and training methods have changed, SERE's objective remains that of preparing soldiers for the situations they will face if they are captured.

At the recent change-of-command ceremony of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Lieutenant General Doug Brown, the new USASOC commanding general, pledged that whenever the nation calls, Army special-operations forces will answer, "Trained and ready."

Those three words, "trained and ready," represent an enormous responsibility and an unrelenting examination of our missions, our training and our manpower.

The Army itself is taking steps necessary to ensure that it will be trained and ready for the demands of the 21st century. The three major phases of the Transformation Army are designed to provide a force that will be responsive to the demands of the 21st-century security environment.

It is important to note that in its transformation, the Army will become more agile, more deployable, more versatile and more survivable — in other words, more SOF-like. But if the Army becomes more SOF-like, what will SOF's role be? To answer that, we must find our relevance in the Army of today and of the future.

To that end, the SOF community is examining its roles, its training, and its manpower requirements. Special Forces, in particular, has recently been discussing its core values and core purpose in order to determine its true nature and its basic strengths. By examining our roles, we can determine the voids that only SOF will be able to fill in the future. It is likely that our roles and missions will change somewhat in time, but our core values will be preserved.

We are restructuring the Special Warfare Center and School to meet the requirements of today's force and to meet the anticipated requirements of the Transformation Army. We are also reassessing our training to determine whether we are maintaining the warrior focus. Future training in the "Q-Course" will emphasize small-unit tactics and weapons proficiency. Our basic focus must be on producing the best warriors possible.

The next issue of *Special Warfare* will provide details of some of our anticipated changes. As we initiate other changes, we will continue to provide details in this publication. Our goal is not only to design and train the most effective special-operations force for the future, but to keep the current force informed of where we are headed.



Major General William G. Boykin

PB 80–00–3

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Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission is to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examination of established doctrine and new ideas.

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Features

Departments

SERE: Training Soldiers to Survive

by Major Blaine Miller

The goal of the United States Army's training in survival, evasion, resistance and escape, or SERE, is to teach personnel how to survive if they become separated from their unit; to evade a hostile force and make their way back to friendly forces; and to avoid capture. In the event that soldiers are captured, SERE training will have prepared them to resist the enemy's attempts at exploitation, to escape from captivity and to return home with honor.

Photo by Kirk Wyckoff

Level-C SERE training is designed for personnel who operate behind enemy lines and who face a high risk of capture, such as this Special Forces soldier (right) photographed during Operation Urgent Fury.

Department of Defense Directive 1300.7, *Training and Education Measures Necessary to Support Code of Conduct*, establishes three levels of SERE training: A, B and C.

Level A. Level-A SERE training is initial-entry training that is included in the program of instruction during basic training and during all entry-level courses of instruction for officers.

Level B. Level-B SERE training is designed for officers and enlisted personnel who operate (or who could potentially operate) near enemy lines. Unit-level instruction in Level-B SERE is accomplished using a training support packet, or TSP, that contains 16 standardized lesson plans that support training in 38 tasks.

Level C. Level-C SERE training is designed for personnel whose wartime position, military occupational specialty, or assignment entails a high risk of capture, and whose position, rank or seniority would make them targets for stronger-than-average exploitation efforts by a captor. Personnel who operate in enemy-controlled areas, such as Special Forces, Pathfinders, selected aviators, flight-crew members and members of Ranger battalions, should receive Level-C training.

Level-C SERE training is conducted by the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Company A, 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group. Company A is one of four advanced-skills companies within the 2nd Battalion. Because nearly 70 percent of Company A's instructor positions are allotted to its two SERE detachments (the Field Training Detachment and the Resistance Training Detachment), the company is commonly referred to as the "SERE Company" or as the "SERE School." Company A is the only Army unit that is authorized to conduct Level-C SERE training.

History

The Army's Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape Course traces its roots to the Vietnam conflict. On Oct. 29, 1963, Captain Rocky Versace, First Lieutenant Nick

SERE Class Composition (FY 00)

Class	SF Pipeline		SF Groups			160th SOAR		75th Ranger	Other		Class
Number	18A	CMF	18A	180A	CMF	Pilots	Crew	Regiment	Pilots	Others	Total
1	14	29	–	–	1	–	–	–	1	1	**46**
2	–	–	1	–	16	2	10	12	1	7	**49**
3	15	32	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	**48**
4	23	6	–	–	3	–	4	2	1	6	**45**
5	–	–	1	8	9	3	4	2	5	14	**46**
6	–	11	–	–	3	–	–	–	22	7	**43**
7	1	4	1	3	–	1	8	3	19	8	**48**
8	–	–	–	–	4	13	15	3	2	9	**46**
9	2	38	–	–	1	–	–	–	6	1	**48**
10	–	47	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	**48**
11	14	30	–	–	–	–	1	1	–	2	**48**
12	2	–	–	–	13	1	–	9	3	20	**48**
13	14	33	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	1	**49**
14	5	37	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	4	**47**
15	2	2	–	10	9	–	4	4	3	16	**50**
16	10	24	–	–	4	–	1	–	1	4	**44**
17	–	–	–	–	9	3	4	6	1	18	**41**
18	12	34	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	2	**49**
19	3	12	–	–	2	1	4	1	–	23	**46**
Total	**117**	**339**	**3**	**21**	**77**	**24**	**55**	**43**	**66**	**144**	**889**

Rowe and Master Sergeant Dan Pitzer were captured in South Vietnam after an intense fire fight. All three endured hardships as captives of the Viet Cong. Versace was eventually executed for his staunch resistance to communist indoctrination. Pitzer was freed after four years.

Rowe remained a prisoner for more than five years. In late December 1968, the Viet Cong, frustrated by Rowe's refusal to accept communist ideology and weary of his continued attempts to escape, scheduled his execution. As Rowe was being transferred for execution, he took advantage of the distraction caused by a sudden overflight of U.S. helicopters and struck down his guard. Still keen to his surroundings after 62 months of captivity, Rowe ran into a clearing, where he was spotted by the helicopters. He was rescued and quickly repatriated.

Rowe left the Army in 1974 and wrote a book about his POW experiences, *Five Years to Freedom*. When the Army Special Forces School recognized the need for a SERE program, Rowe was the first choice as the person to design the course and to establish its operation. He was recalled to active duty in 1981 and was given the mission of developing and running the SERE program.

First SERE Course

Guided by his own POW experiences, Rowe developed the SERE Level-C Course. Since its first iteration in March 1986, the course's intent has remained unchanged: To train personnel to survive if separated from their unit; to evade in a hostile environment and to make their way back to friendly lines; to resist enemy attempts at exploitation; to plan for an escape; and most importantly, to return home with honor.

Under Rowe's leadership, the SERE Department of the Special Warfare Center not only taught the SERE Course, it

A student in an early SERE class practices survival fishing during the survival-and-evasion field training exercise.

File photo

became the proponent for all SERE training throughout the Army. With funding from the Department of the Army, the SERE Department deployed mobile training teams to unit locations to validate unit Level-B training or, if necessary, to provide Level-B training.

In April 1985, the SERE Department introduced an additional course, the Individual Terrorism Awareness Course, or INTAC. INTAC was designed to teach antiterrorist-related subjects to personnel prior to their deployment to medium- and high-threat areas. In July 1986, in an effort to minimize the vulnerability of U.S. units to terrorist attacks overseas, the department added a third course, the Antiterrorism Instructor Qualification Course, or AIQC. Selected personnel attend AIQC in order to become qualified to present antiterrorism training to individuals and units that are scheduled for deployment overseas.

In 1990, Company E of the 2nd Battalion assumed responsibility for conducting the SERE Course. Company E established a subordinate detachment, the Antiterrorism Training Detachment, to teach INTAC and AIQC. In 1996, Company E was re-flagged as Company A, and in 1998, the company added the Advanced Special Operations Training Detachment. Each year, Company A trains more than 1,500 service members and other DoD personnel in its SERE, antiterrorism and advanced special-operations training courses.

Level-C SERE training

The Army's Level-C SERE training is conducted at Camp Mackall, N.C., approximately 35 miles southwest of Fort Bragg. Camp Mackall is also the training site for Special Forces Assessment and Selection and for the Special Forces Qualification Course. The Camp Mackall SERE training facility is one of only four facilities within the Department of Defense that are authorized to conduct Level-C SERE training. The Navy has facilities at Brunswick, Maine, and at North Island, Calif.; the Air Force has a facility at Fairchild AFB, Wash.

The cadre of the Army's SERE Course are among the finest training instructors within DoD. While the majority are SF NCOs, there are also SF retirees (Department of the Army civilians); NCOs from other Army branches such as Military Intelligence (interrogators), Infantry (Rangers), Signal (audiovisual technicians); and NCOs from the U.S. Marine Corps.

The Army's 19-day SERE Course is the longest SERE course taught within DoD. All training is conducted in support of DoD Directive 1300.7, *Training and Education Measures Necessary to Support the Code of Conduct, 23 December 1998*. Students

include personnel from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and other government agencies. The course is taught in three phases: academic instruction; a survival-and-evasion field training exercise, or FTX; and a resistance exercise.

Academic instruction. Academic instruction consists of 10 days of classroom training at Camp Mackall's Rowe Training Facility, and practical instruction at the Little Muddy Training Site. All academic instruction is reinforced by practical application at some point during SERE training.

Survival and Evasion FTX. During the five-day survival-and-evasion FTX, student teams evade through a nine-mile corridor of woods and dense vegetation. Pursued by tracker dogs and by soldiers playing the role of the opposing force, the student teams must be careful to avoid contact with the local populace. During the FTX, the students must also forage for food and water. When the student teams reach their destination, they must complete a series of survival tasks that measure how much they learned during the academic phase.

Resistance exercise. The third phase of SERE training is taught in the unique Resistance Training Laboratory, or RTL. The RTL — a mock prisoner-of-war camp — offers what is quite possibly the most challenging training that the students will ever experience. The four days spent in the RTL test students' individual and collective abilities to resist enemy attempts at exploitation. Students learn quickly that they must work together as a team in order to survive captivity.

During the last day of the resistance exercise, students receive individual and collective debriefings from the RTL cadre. The purpose of the debriefings is to give students an understanding of how well they performed while in captivity. During the debriefings, the students learn how they might have reacted differently in certain situations, so that if they are ever held captive, they will have a better chance of resisting and of returning home with honor.

The SERE Course culminates with a graduation ceremony, during which a member of the Fayetteville, N.C., chapter of the American Ex-Prisoners of War recounts his real-life POW experiences. The Fayetteville chapter has supported the SERE program since 1985, when Dan Pitzer, then a civilian SERE instructor, first invited chapter members to attend a graduation ceremony. In July 1999, the commanding general of the Special Warfare Center and School affirmed the chapter's former POWs as lifelong members in the brotherhood and lineage of the Special Warfare Center and School.

SFQC pipeline

In 1998, the commanding general of the Army Special Operations Command directed that each graduate of the Special Forces Qualification Course complete Level-C SERE training and basic language training prior to being assigned to a Special Forces group. To overcome the instructor shortage created by the increased number of SERE students, the Special Warfare Center and School developed and executed the SERE Ramp-up Initiative. Under this initiative, 15 contract instructors were hired in order to meet the increase in SERE student throughput. Contract-instructor qualifications are identical to those required of TDA instructors. Accordingly, every SERE class during fiscal year 2000 trained to its maximum capacity. ✂

Major Blaine Miller is the commander of Company A, 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group. His previous assignments include rifle platoon leader, antitank platoon leader and company executive officer in the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division; Assistant S3 (Plans & Exercises), 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division; SF detachment commander in the 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group; chief of theater operations in DCSOPS, USASOC; and G3, USAJFKSWCS. Major Miller holds bachelor's and master's degrees from Shippensburg State University, Shippensburg, Penn.

Assessment of Humans Experiencing Uncontrollable Stress: The SERE Course

by Dr. C.A. Morgan III and Major Gary Hazlett

Physical and psychological stress are unavoidable in military operations, yet the negative effects of stress can make it difficult or impossible for individuals or teams to operate effectively. Stress is an essential element of warfare, and individual responses to combat-related stress have often been the determining factor between victory and defeat on the battlefield.

File photo

Army training, such as the SERE Course, is designed to be rigorous and realistic in its stress intensity.

Having recognized the effects of stress, the U.S. military designs its training scenarios to be both rigorous and realistic in their stress intensity. Rigorous training improves a person's ability to perform on the battlefield, and exposure to realistic levels of stress can protect or "inoculate" a person from some of the negative effects of operational stress.

The concept of stress inoculation is very much like the concept of preventing a particular disease through vaccination: When stress inoculation occurs, an individual's performance will likely be better the next time he is stressed. Like immunization, which occurs only when the vaccine is given in the proper dosage, stress inoculation occurs only when the stress intensity is at the optimal level – high enough to activate a person's psychological and biological systems, but low enough so as not to overwhelm them. If the stress level is not high enough, inoculation will not occur; if the stress level is too high, stress sensitization will occur, and the individual will probably perform less effectively when he is stressed again.

Research goals

Because stress and its effects on human performance are particularly important in military operations, the authors proposed a line of research that has three goals:

- To determine whether training programs being conducted at Fort Bragg, N.C., could provide a reasonable platform for studying human performance under high stress.
- To see if the performance of students undergoing training could be studied in a manner that would allow the evaluation of the training program; i.e., could we demonstrate stress inoculation occurring in the students?
- To determine whether the data gained from the research could be useful in developing interventions (in training, selection, nutrition, etc.) that could enhance the readiness of soldiers and improve their performance in real-world operations.

Over the past several years, with the assistance of funding from the Veterans Administration's National Centers for the Study of Post-traumatic Stress Disorders

Average Cortisol Levels



NOTE: Unit of measurement is nanomoles per liter (nmol/l).

Average Testosterone Levels



NOTE: Unit of measurement is nanograms per deciliter (ng/dl).

and the U.S. Army Medical Research and Material Command, the authors developed a line of research. That research was conducted in collaboration with the Yale University Medical School; the National Center for the Study of Post-traumatic Stress Disorders in the VA Hospital at New Haven, Conn.; and the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg. This line of research is still on-going. It has received the approval and support of Lieutenant General William Tangney, Major General Kenneth Bowra, Major General William G. boykin and many others, including Colonel James Velky, Colonel Edwin Anderson, Colonel Mark Boyatt, Lieutenant Colonel Al Aycock, and Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Cairns. The authors are the study's principal investigators.

Stress response

Stress inoculation and stress sensitization have been widely studied in animals, and as a result, researchers have been able to identify patterns in hormone levels that are associated with effective or ineffective responses to stress. Effective responses are those in which the levels of certain hormones and chemical transmitters in the nervous system change rapidly in response to stress and return quickly to resting levels once the stress has been removed. Ineffective responses are those in which the hormones and chemical transmitters become abnormally elevated for extended periods, become depleted, or do not return to resting levels once the stress has been removed.

Although the stress-response patterns observed in animals appear to be applicable to humans as well, there have been few studies conducted on human stress responses under conditions that approximate the stress intensity of combat operations. In considering a study of the biological factors that contribute to the stress resilience of soldiers, the authors found that the Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape, or SERE, Course, taught at Fort Bragg's JFK Special Warfare Center and School, provides an excellent opportunity for studying soldiers before, during and after exposure to high-intensity stress. The data presented in this article are based on saliva samples from more than 200 stu-

Levels of Adrenaline During SERE



NOTE: Unit of measurement is nanograms per milliliter (ng/ml).

Levels of Neuropeptide-Y During SERE



NOTE: Unit of measurement is nanograms per milliliter (ng/ml).

dents who participated in SERE training from the classroom phase through the practical exercise at the end of the course.

Hormones

The human body produces a number of hormones and chemical transmitters that are known to be affected by stress. This article will discuss only four: cortisol, testosterone, adrenaline and neuropeptide-Y.

• *Cortisol*, one of the most frequently studied stress hormones, prepares the body for stress. Cortisol increases a person's level of anxiety and alertness. By increasing the metabolism of carbohydrates, cortisol also increases the amount of blood sugar available to the body's cells.

• *Testosterone* helps the body to maintain secondary sex characteristics and plays an important role in the body's ability to repair tissues. It helps the body's immune system to work properly, and it helps protect against the effects of stress.

• *Adrenaline* is released quickly when a person is under stress. It enhances alertness, increases blood pressure, and aids in the formation of threat-related memories.

• *Neuropeptide-Y*, or NPY, is produced by the same glands that produce adrenaline. NPY enhances the body's production of adrenaline and works to counter the effects of stress: It decreases anxiety and enhances the mental functions of attention and memory.

In addition to studying hormones, researchers looked for symptoms of dissociation caused by SERE stress. Dissociation refers to changes in a person's perception — of his body, of his environment or of the passage of time — when he is under great stress. For example, the person may perceive himself to be outside his body, watching events as if he were a spectator. Because dissociation experiences are common among persons exposed to extremely high levels of stress, the researchers sought to determine whether dissociation could be related to the stress hormones released or inhibited during SERE training.

Results

As shown in the charts on page 7, SERE stress caused significant changes in students' hormone levels. Recorded changes in cortisol levels were some of the greatest ever documented in humans. In some cases, the changes noted among the

trainees were greater than the changes noted in patients undergoing heart surgery. The upper chart on page 7 shows the average cortisol levels measured in SERE students compared to levels recorded in previous studies involving patients about to undergo major surgery, soldiers in Army Ranger training, pilots performing military flight operations, and novice skydivers making their first jump.

Changes in testosterone levels were similarly remarkable: In some cases, testosterone dropped from normal levels to castration levels within eight hours. The lower chart on page 7 compares the average testosterone measure of SERE students to the average level of civilians, to the average level of pilots performing in-flight refueling operations, to the average level of a group of combat medics during MEDEVAC operations in Vietnam, and to the level at which a male is considered to become functionally sterile.

The data gathered demonstrated fairly conclusively that the SERE Course reliably generates significant stress responses in participants and that their hormonal changes could be reliably measured without negatively affecting the conduct of training.

SERE stress also triggered the release of adrenaline and NPY; in fact, this study is the first to demonstrate that acute psychological stress can trigger the release of NPY. Students who had high levels of adrenaline and NPY also demonstrated better performance during the SERE Course. These findings indicate that what we have been measuring does, in fact, have an association to actual performance under stress.

Different responses

For the authors, the most interesting finding has been the observed difference between the biological profiles of Special Forces soldiers and those of non-SF soldiers. Data show that SF soldiers had higher levels of adrenaline and NPY during SERE stress than non-SF soldiers did (charts on pages 8 and 9). Twenty-four hours after the stress had stopped, the adrenaline and the NPY of SF soldiers had returned to their normal resting levels, whereas in non-SF soldiers, both hormones were *depleted*.

Levels of Dissociation During SERE



NOTE: The chart represents student scores from a survey of dissociation symptoms.

The chart on page 9 shows that the SF soldiers produced substantially more NPY during the stress phase than non-SF soldiers did. Theoretically, an individual who produces more NPY while under stress is more likely to be calm and to think effectively in a stressful situation. This theory is consistent with our observations of actual performance in the SERE Course. Data indicate that SF soldiers were back to their starting point faster than other soldiers, suggesting a more rapid overall recovery and quicker readiness to effectively meet additional challenges. Overall, the SF soldiers in SERE have demonstrated a biological profile that is consistent with what one would expect of persons who are "cool under fire."

Animal research on stress-toughening predicts that "stress hardy" individuals will respond to stress by producing higher levels of adrenaline and lower levels of cortisol. The responses of SF soldiers are consistent with that prediction.

From a biological perspective, SF soldiers seem to be more stress-inoculated than other students in the study. It is important to remember that these comparisons are being made primarily among personnel serving in special units (Special Forces, Army Rangers, Army SOF aviators and crews, recon Marines, and members of long-range surveillance units). All of those who attend SERE training are considered to be drawn from an upper level of all members of the military. That the profiles of SF soldiers should be so markedly different from those of the other students is an exceptional finding.

Dissociation

Symptoms of dissociation are common among SERE students. As was true with the changes in hormone levels, there was a large difference in the dissociation experiences of SF soldiers and non-SF soldiers (see chart on page 10). Dissociation scores were significantly lower in SF soldiers (the SF mean score was 10; the non-SF mean score was 21). Analysis of the data showed that dissociation levels were directly related to the amount of NPY that a person released during stress. Dissociation in some instances is probably adaptive, as in the cases of persons who need to continue to function despite pain or discomfort (e.g., soldiers who sustain wounds under fire, or endurance athletes). However, too much dissociation could lead an individual to make perceptual errors about his surroundings, leading to errors in judgment and performance. In the case of SERE training, higher dissociation levels appear to be associated with greater levels of anxiety and lower levels of performance.

Overall, data from the study indicate that something very right has been going on for some years now in the processes of SF selection and training. The end product of the SF pipeline is a soldier who is biologically and psychologically different. These differences all point in the direction of higher stress tolerance and a greater capacity for functioning effectively under high stress. It is worth noting that the authors have compared their data on SF soldiers to data on a variety of military personnel in multiple settings (including Army and Navy SERE programs, the Combat Diver Qualification Course, and the special-operations selection program of an allied country). The same findings have been noted over and over: SF soldiers show better responses to biological and psychological stress. As far as the measures used in our studies indicate, at least, SF soldiers are unique.

Effects on immunity

Another implication of the study — as evidenced by the increases in cortisol levels and by the reductions in testosterone levels — is that the body's immune system and its memory process are affected by high stress. It has been shown that high levels of cortisol and low levels of testosterone can suppress the functioning of the immune system. High levels of cortisol are also known to affect specific areas of the brain that are directly involved in memory formation. Thus, the study provides information about the ways that operational stress might affect soldiers' physical resilience, their resistance to illness and their cognitive abili-

ties. The next planned phase of our research will look more specifically at the functioning of the immune system and the processes of learning and memory in soldiers under high-stress training conditions.

Potential benefits

How can this research potentially benefit the military community? We have some clues about ways to enhance soldiers' stress tolerance and to consequently improve the maintenance of their overall health. Research with animals has shown that certain nutritional supplements are stress-protective. In studies, animals that received certain supplements prior to stress exposure performed better under stress and recovered more rapidly once the stress was removed.

Many of these nutritional supplements are not considered experimental — they are available over the counter. It is possible that these supplements, if included in soldiers' survival rations, could protect soldiers against the effects of acute operational stress. On the basis of current data from the study, we would predict that if soldiers were to receive certain supplements, they would have lower levels of cortisol, higher levels of testosterone and enhanced performance during SERE. If we could demonstrate that nutritional supplements do offer protection against the stress encountered in SERE training or in similar training, we would have good reason to believe that nutritional supplements might help protect military personnel in real-world operations. Our goal for the upcoming year is to test this possibility.

Authors' note: We would like to thank the SERE cadre and all the SERE students who participated in the study. Without the feedback and involvement of all who participated, we would not have been able to design or to conduct the study, nor could the study have had operational relevance. Special thanks to CW3 G. Seideman, the SERE training staff, retired Colonel Gary Greenfield, Major Jeff Stolrow, Colonel Larry Lewis, Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Cairns, Colonel Edwin Anderson and Major General Kenneth Bowra.

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Army Values

Respect

Nick Rowe

Nick Rowe graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1960. After attending the U.S. Army Unconventional Warfare School at Fort Bragg, N.C., in 1962, he deployed to the Republic of Vietnam, where he served as executive officer for Special Forces A-Detachment A-23. On Oct. 29, 1963, Viet Cong forces captured First Lieutenant Rowe and his comrades following an intense firefight. Rowe's captors found him to be an uncooperative prisoner. "Rowe was appraised as stubborn. It was the student-type stubbornness. That means he was sneaky and very smart," noted a Viet Cong defector who had once interrogated Rowe. Kept in confinement for five years, Rowe endured both physical and mental torture until December 1968, when his fourth escape attempt succeeded. Rowe left the Army in 1974, but he returned to active duty at Fort Bragg in 1981 to develop and operate a new course: Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape. Rowe designed the course to teach soldiers to survive, to evade capture and to plan an escape. But more importantly, he sought to teach them the lessons he had learned in captivity: to endure enemy attempts at exploitation and to uphold the spirit of the Code of Conduct. Although Nick Rowe was assassinated in the Philippines in 1989, his legacy lives on in the SERE Course. Nick Rowe made it possible for soldiers to survive captivity while retaining their self-respect as well as the respect of their peers and of their countrymen.

Nick Rowe

Photo by Jason Brady

Plebe to POW: Jim DeVane's World War II Odyssey

by Dr. C.H. Briscoe

In the spring of 1943, Citadel plebe James Dickson DeVane III could not have imagined the challenges he would face during the next 18 months. DeVane, a native of Fayetteville, N.C., was about to embark on an odyssey that would take him from plebe to Army recruit to infantryman to prisoner of war.

Draft calls and early graduations for The Citadel's classes of 1943 and 1944 had cut the Corps of Cadets in half. DeVane was also facing the draft, but a three-month deferment allowed him to complete his plebe year. He passed the entrance exams for the Army Specialist Training Program, or ASTP, which allowed soldiers to attend classes at selected universities.

In July 1943, DeVane was inducted into the Army. After a physical exam, inoculations and uniform issue at Fort Bragg, N.C., he traveled to Fort Benning, Ga., for basic infantry training. Because DeVane was



Jim DeVane as a plebe at the Citadel (right) and as a student in the Army Specialist Training Program (below).

experienced in drill and ceremonies, he was made a platoon sergeant in the 1st Battalion, 6th ASTP Regiment. After enduring basic training in the summer heat of Georgia, DeVane, like most of his comrades, declined the chance to attend Officer Candidate School in order to remain in the ASTP. He reported to the University of Mississippi in December 1943.

Life at Ole Miss

Campus life for the ASTP privates was as regimented as cadet life had been at The Citadel. They rose each morning to the reveille bugle, took calisthenics before breakfast, attended classes in uniform, studied during "call to quarters," and went to bed at "taps." Still, they were able to take advantage of the social opportunities made plentiful by the war. "While it was a pleasant relief from cadet life and basic training, I felt like we were living in the eye of a storm," DeVane said.

The idyllic situation at Ole Miss proved to be short-lived when in mid-March 1944, the needs of the Army changed. DeVane's entire ASTP contingent was shipped to Camp McCain, Miss., to rebuild units of the 94th Infantry Division that had been riddled by personnel levies. DeVane joined Company I, 3rd Battalion, 302nd Infantry Regiment, in the Holly Springs National Forest for squad and platoon maneuvers. There he tested for the Army's new Expert Infantryman Badge. As one of three soldiers in his company to earn the award, DeVane received an additional $5 per month; however, the weekend testing caused him to lose his Ole Miss girlfriend.

Normandy

By early August 1944, DeVane and other members of the 302nd were scrambling ashore at Utah Beach in Normandy. Allied forces moving inland during the Normandy invasion had bypassed some German units. The 94th Division's first mission was to prevent the breakout of more than 50,000 German soldiers who were defending the French seaports of Lorient and St. Nazaire on the Atlantic coast. Protected by heavy coastal artillery, these ports sheltered Adolf Hitler's southern U-boat fleet. The 3rd Battalion, 302nd Infantry, went into the line on Sept. 16, 1944, with the French resistance, and remained there for 65 consecutive days. When snow covered the landscape and their olive-drab uniforms proved to be too conspicuous, the patrolling infantrymen used "liberated" sheets and tablecloths for camouflage. During this time, DeVane was appointed assistant squad leader and was promoted to sergeant. The 19-year-old soldier found that leadership changed his social relationships: "I was no longer one of the boys. I was now a boss and responsible for my buddies' well-being," DeVane recalled.

Ardennes

Allied reverses during the Battle of the Bulge prompted a rapid shift of the 94th to an area south of the Ardennes. By nightfall of New Year's Day, 1945, DeVane and his comrades were riding the rails in French "40 and 8" boxcars (so named because they could hold 40 men or eight horses) to the Saar-Moselle triangle. En route, the 302nd was diverted to reinforce the 28th Infantry Division, which had been badly mauled in the Bulge. The 302nd made the final leg of the trip in open trucks, pelted by snow and freezing rain. "We suffered horribly in the numbing cold. The trucks' steel flooring literally sucked the warmth out of our feet, and our woolen gloves provided little protection in the subzero weather. Frostbite was unavoidable," DeVane remembered.

"Combat patrols with the 28th Division were jeep-mounted affairs along the roads connecting platoon strong points. The jeeps had .50 caliber machine guns, and we car-

Campus life for the ASTP privates was as regimented as cadet life had been at The Citadel. They rose each morning to the reveille bugle, took calisthenics before breakfast, attended classes in uniform, studied during 'call to quarters,' and went to bed at 'taps.'

Americans captured by the Germans during the Ardennes breakthrough in 1944 move to a POW-collection point.

National Archives

ried a Browning automatic rifle and Thompson submachine guns. Bundled up to combat the freezing cold in an open jeep, I didn't feel much like a 'Desert Rat' harassing Erwin Rommel's *Afrika Korps*," DeVane said. Consistently outgunned, the patrols used the jeep-mounted machine guns to help them break contact with the Germans; then they scurried for cover and called in artillery. Following one very harrowing night patrol, DeVane returned to the billets (an old insane asylum) only to be surprised by what he called "a man-like figure" that materialized out of the snowy, pitch-black darkness. "I guess my senses were heightened by a combination of things: fatigue, the asylum's spookiness, the shadows accentuated by artillery flashes, and the keening of the inmates. When I blasted that stone gargoyle all to hell, it sure woke everybody up."

In mid-January 1945, the 302nd joined the rest of the 94th Division in the Saar-Moselle triangle. By then, the 94th had penetrated the Germans' main defensive line, and Wehrmacht infantry counterattacks had been stopped by artillery. The 302nd immediately replaced the 376th Infantry on the line. During the 94th Division's five months in Europe, none of its forces had faced a concerted armor attack. That distinction was destined to fall to the 302nd.

Berg salient

Company I was to guard the Berg salient that extended east into the second line of the German defenses. DeVane's platoon (the second platoon), led by newly arrived Lieutenant William J. Doherty, was to maintain the salient by defending Berg's

ancient castle (*Schloss* Berg) and five damaged houses. On the night of Jan. 19, while the rest of the company occupied Wies, located a kilometer to the rear, guides from the 376th led the second platoon into Berg, where the frozen bodies of German soldiers killed earlier could be seen in the houses and scattered about in the street partially covered by snow.

The relief was accomplished without incident. The third squad (led by Staff Sergeant Wally Helburg and DeVane) and the second squad (led by Staff Sergeant Thomas W. Fontaine) moved into the houses that the 376th had occupied, manning the enemy fighting positions just as the 376th had done. The first squad, along with the attached heavy machine guns and the platoon's only bazooka, remained in *Schloss* Berg with Doherty. The nearest American unit to the second platoon was Company K, located in Nennig, 600 meters to the south. Although the division G2 had expected a *Panzer* attack, attachments to counter the armor threat were conspicuously absent in the 3/302nd sector.

German assaults

Before dawn the next morning, following a heavy artillery barrage, the German *11th Panzers* (the Ghost Division) launched simultaneous attacks against Company K, Company L, and the Berg salient. The Germans succeeded in slipping by the companies' defensive positions, breaching the 3/302nd front in five places. Intense German artillery, rocket, mortar and machine-gun fire damaged U.S. communications wire and nullified attempts to bring up reinforcements to block the penetration.

Five German *Panther* tanks loaded with infantry focused on Berg and Nennig. It took the combined efforts of U.S. bazooka teams and artillery to break up the German assault. The second platoon had only sporadic radio contact with the company headquarters in Wies, and Doherty had no communications with either of his two squads located 250 meters away in the houses of Berg. Those squads could only take cover as the battle raged around them. DeVane called their predicament "a typical isolated outpost situation."

By nightfall, the platoon defending Berg was in bad shape. The platoon's lone bazooka gunner had been killed attempting to keep the *Panthers* at bay. German artillery and mortar barrages and tank fire had smashed the walls of the houses. Troops, huddled around charcoal stoves in the dark cellars, pulled their helmets down and plugged their ears. DeVane's half-squad crowded into a reinforced machine-gun emplacement with the German dead. Although a volunteer had managed to make it back to Wies, two company patrols sent to re-establish contact and to bring ammunition had been driven back with heavy losses. Still, the Germans did not press their advantage.

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The lull in the storm ended the next evening, Jan. 21, when an intense artillery barrage hammered Berg, the *Schloss* and north Nennig, signaling another German attempt to destroy the salient. As the artillery fire shifted farther back to Wies and Besch, a column of German tanks and half-tracks bulging with *panzergrenadiers* bypassed Berg and its *Schloss* to concentrate on Nennig.

Watching the maneuver from a second-floor window, Helburg and DeVane discussed the precariousness of their situation. Having lost two men from his squad, Helburg felt that withdrawal was inevitable, especially when two tanks and a platoon of German infantry moved into Berg. Although the Americans had been spotted by a squad of Germans, the enemy chose not to engage that night; they simply

occupied an empty house between the two American squads. Still, DeVane knew that an attack was imminent, so he told his men to eat their rations because they would have to pull out fast.

By early morning on Jan. 22, the Germans, fighting house-to-house, had managed to maneuver three tanks into Nennig, effectively isolating DeVane's platoon in Berg. Doherty sent a runner down from the *Schloss* to tell DeVane that the German tanks would open fire unless the platoon surrendered.

Capture

Given five minutes, DeVane stuffed his men's personal letters and rifle trigger housings into the stove. As his men moved outside, the young sergeant booby-trapped their bedding with hand grenades. Once he was outside, DeVane cursed himself for his rash act, fearing that it might prompt a POW massacre similar to the one at Malmédy in the Ardennes. Meanwhile, DeVane learned that one of his men had left his overcoat behind. Fortunately, an agitated German lieutenant, who was firing his *Schmeisser* sub-machine gun to cow the Americans, allowed DeVane to retrieve the overcoat. Upon re-entering the house, a relieved DeVane quickly replaced the pins in the grenades and retrieved the overcoat.

Unlike the POW camps depicted in movies like* Stalag 17, The Great Escape *and* Von Ryan's Express*, Stalag XII-A had no effective POW chain of command to maintain order, to punish thievery, or to discourage collaboration. … 'We evolved into rabble,' DeVane said. 'Each of us fought for a fair share of the essentials to survive — water, food, clothing, blankets and fuel.'

After ordering the Americans to drop their pistol belts, canteens and helmets, the Germans searched their new prisoners, taking their wristwatches and rings. Then they marched DeVane and his fellow POWs around numerous minefields to the *11th Panzer* prisoner-collection point at *Schloss* Bubingen.

There, DeVane's group joined 50-70 other Americans from various units of the 94th Division. They were subjected to half-hearted interrogations by German "intelligence officers," who were basically English-speaking civilians in ill-fitting Wehrmacht uniforms. Still, the Germans knew more about the American tactical situation than the POWs did. "Nobody ever showed us where we were or explained what was going on," DeVane said. "We were told that we were facing *Volkssturm* homeguard units. No one said anything about fighting *Panzers* — our only antitank weapons were a single bazooka and rifle grenades."

After the interrogations, the wounded POWs received medical treatment, and cooks in a German army field kitchen doled out potato-and-ham soup and a slice of bread to each prisoner. Then, the Germans marched the 100-man group north in a snowstorm. Ironically, during his four weeks of training in England, DeVane had missed the class on what to do if captured. DeVane described himself as "dispirited, grief-stricken, guilty, yet somewhat relieved by no longer being responsible for my men … mentally numb." Survival became paramount. The guards shot anyone that fell out. After we were lost in snowstorms for several days, the *Volkssturm* guards finally got us to Mainz for shipment to *Stalag XII-A* at Limburg."

Stalag XII-A

By the spring of 1945, *Stalag XII-A*, which was originally created to house POWs from the Normandy invasion, was serving as a transit camp. The officers, sergeants and lower-ranking enlisted soldiers were held in separate groups. *Stalags* rarely had medical facilities, and when the wounded prisoners were moved to German hospitals, DeVane lost contact with anyone from his unit. Newcomers ripped the patches from their uniforms in

an attempt to become inconspicuous. "While I was grateful to be alive, it was like being in suspended animation. The world outside the camp was reality. We could only watch what was going on," DeVane said.

Throughout DeVane's captivity at *Stalag XII-A* (February-March 1945), the Germans conducted random roll calls and barracks searches, and the guards indiscriminately shot into the rafter spaces to discourage escape. At night, guard dogs roamed loose between the buildings and fences.

German discipline was severe, and DeVane likened his stay at *Stalag XII-A* to slavery: "Life and death was determined by the Germans." DeVane discovered this when he attacked an American collaborator who was bullying a sick POW on work detail. Before DeVane knew what was happening, the German guards had him and the infirm POW against a wall to be shot. Fearful that he would be hanged by the other POWs if the two were executed, the collaborator convinced the guards to relent. Shaken, the 20-year-old DeVane resolved to disappear into the masses and never again to stick his neck out during captivity.

Camp life

Unlike the POW camps depicted in movies like *Stalag 17*, *The Great Escape* and *Von Ryan's Express*, *Stalag XII-A* had no effective POW chain of command to maintain order, to punish thievery, or to discourage collaboration. In the enlisted camp, a popularly elected "man of confidence" was supposed to adjudicate grievances, maintain order and distribute Red Cross parcels. This was not the case, according to DeVane. The only organization was the eight-man bread group, which daily rotated the equitable division of *Kriegsbrot* (a wood-flour-based black bread that was moldy on the outside, but edible inside). "We evolved into rabble," DeVane said. "Each of us fought for a fair share of the essentials to survive —


March 26, 1945.

Dear Mr. Devane.

I am just in receipt of your letter of March 21st regarding Jr.

WESTERN UNION

Although the initial War Department telegram listed DeVane as "Missing, presumed dead," his company commander wrote the family to assure them that DeVane was a prisoner.



The hand-drawn map that DeVane kept in his boot at Stalag X-B. *His time at* Stalag X-B *represented one of the few times when he knew exactly where he was.*

water, food, clothing, blankets and fuel. Trust had to be earned. Most prisoners had only one — at best two — buddies. Collaborators who sought better food, clothing and treatment were avoided." The Protestant and Catholic services performed by a British Army chaplain were the only semblance of normalcy.

Staying healthy was a daily challenge for the prisoners. Housed in large, unheated buildings with straw on the floor, 80-100 prisoners shared a latrine and a washroom. Every morning, drinking water was provided and latrine buckets were emptied. Only regular personal hygiene kept the endemic body lice under control. Each morning, conscientious POWs stripped naked in the cold and painstakingly crushed the parasites that had collected on their bodies. Next, the POWs checked their underarm and crotch areas, scraping away the bright yellow eggs of the vermin. Then they meticulously searched their blankets and every piece of their clothing before dressing. Throughout the process, the POWs stayed alert for drifting thieves. Dysentery, brought on by a diet of ersatz coffee; soup made from spoiled sauerkraut, potatoes and sugar beets; and *Kriegsbrot,* killed prisoners daily. The only "home remedy" treatment for dysentery was charred bread and boiled water.

While DeVane was incommunicado in *Stalag XII-A,* his father sought more information than the standard War Department telegram that had announced his son's status as "missing in action, presumed dead." He contacted his congressman and wrote directly to the I Company commander, Captain Robert Edwards. Edwards replied that he was reasonably certain that DeVane was a prisoner of war. Shortly after, DeVane's parents received a second telegram with the new status, "missing in action, presumed captured."

'A living hell'

After American forces crossed the Rhine at Remagen in March 1945, the Germans began moving the POWs by train from *Stalag XII-A* north to *Stalag X-B*, near Bremen. DeVane described the trip as "a living

hell." Rations for the entire journey consisted of half a loaf of dark bread and a can of sweetened condensed milk for every two prisoners. Packed 60 to a boxcar, the men alternated sitting and standing, and they shared a single "slops bucket."

Ironically, Allied air superiority made the train ride even more difficult: POWs were never allowed out of the cars; most rail movement was at night; and during the day, the train was hid in tunnels. The constant smoke from the locomotive burned the prisoners' eyes and made breathing difficult. Temperatures dropped so low that the prisoners' body heat caused moisture to form on the metal bolts of the boxcar doors, and the doors froze shut.

In Frankfurt, during a bombing raid by the U.S. 8th Air Force, the train was stranded in the rail yard without a locomotive. As bombs carpeted the rail-yard area, the guards abandoned the train to seek shelter. The prisoners were trapped. Explosions rocked the boxcars for 15 minutes, but miraculously, not one of the prisoners was injured. When the train finally reached Bremen, the guards threw the boxcar doors open, and the exhausted prisoners spilled out, collapsing on the tracks. Between three and five dead POWs were left behind in each boxcar, but the Germans kept no records of the dead.

Stalag X-B

Stalag X-B was actually two camps: the POW camp, which contained a large number of British prisoners who had been captured in 1940; and a civilian camp, which housed Jews, gypsies, other minorities, and German dissidents. Although contact between the camps was forbidden, the POWs managed to smuggle food and clothing into the civilian camp. "We could see how bad it was over there. Those people were really suffering. We had it good compared to them," said DeVane.

DeVane received his first Red Cross package at *Stalag X-B*. Cigarettes from the parcels soon became his trading material. Prisoners used leftover tins from the parcels to fashion ingenious "Kriegie stoves," and the more intrepid POWs made stills for brewing "raisin jack" and "potato skin moonshine." The stoves and stills were fired by wood splinters that the prisoners shaved from the rafters of their barracks. "Only the barest supports remained. A heavy snow would have brought the roof down around our ears," said DeVane. To offset the benefit of the Red Cross parcels, *Stalag X-B* had ferocious bedbugs that compounded the misery of lice infestation.

There was little entertainment in the new camp. In *Stalag XII-A*, a group of "old timers" had provided weekly performances with a bass fiddle and some beaten-up guitars. *Stalag X-B* had only a harmonica player, whose most memorable tune was "Silver-Haired Daddy of Mine." The Red Cross parcels contained paperbacks, but these had to be read quickly — all had waiting lists. The British prisoners had a secret radio, and as the BBC reported the progress of the war, the prisoners carefully marked Allied advances on hand-drawn maps. DeVane kept a map hidden inside his boot. The time at *Stalag X-B* represented one of the few times during the war that DeVane knew exactly where he was. As might be expected, POW morale rose with the number of allied victories and the growing proximity of friendly forces. Forced indoors when U.S. planes flew overhead, the POWs taunted the guards by cheering loudly.

Prisoners used leftover tins from the parcels to fashion ingenious 'Kriegie stoves,' and the more intrepid POWs made stills for brewing 'raisin jack' and 'potato skin moonshine.' The stoves and stills were fired by wood splinters that the prisoners shaved from the rafters of their barracks.

Movement

When British and Russian forces drew close to *Stalag X-B* in April 1945, the POWs at *Stalag X-B* were alerted for movement: The camp was needed to house

more civilians. "That's when the machine guns began firing all night on the other side of the camp," DeVane said. "As we were marching to our next camp, *Marlag X-C*, an endless line of civilians was being herded into *Stalag X-B.* I remember a tall, well-dressed young man about my age who walked defiantly erect as we moved by, carrying our Red Cross parcels, Kriegie stoves, and tattered belongings."

The movement to nearby *Marlag X-C* was almost disastrous for the POWs. "Some American fighter planes spotted us on the road," DeVane said. "The guards fled into the adjoining fields. The only thing we could do was to stand fast in the middle of the road and hope that the pilots recognized us as POWs. Just when we thought we were goners, the fighters suddenly broke off their strafing run, waggled their wings and flew away. We were still shaking when the German guards returned to hurry us along."


PRISONER OF WAR
FIELD POST CARD.

FOR ADDRESS ONLY.

The address only to be written on this side. If anything else is added, the card will be destroyed.

TO

Upon his release from captivity, DeVane sent this postcard to his family. Check boxes on the reverse indicated that he had been liberated and was in good health.

Marlag X-C

Although the Allies had overrun 47 of 78 POW camps and hospitals by April 1945, nearly 65,000 American POWs still remained in German hands. At *Marlag X-C,* more than 25,000 American, British and Indian prisoners were either crammed into buildings, living in makeshift tents, or scattered about in the open. Security deteriorated as the population grew. "With freedom so close at hand, everyone became focused on survival. The word was passed: 'Stay put, don't try to escape. The British are coming.' Each of us had a few trusted friends, and we looked out for one another. That was it. At night we heard the distant firing of machine guns in *Stalag X-B* right up to the end." DeVane recalled.

Two days before the British armored forces arrived at *Marlag X-C*, the *Volkssturm* guards abandoned their posts. The camp became a "no man's land" as German *Panzer* forces used it to shield their withdrawal. The POWs guarded the camp's perimeter fence to protect themselves against the refugees and displaced persons who were fleeing west to escape the approaching Russian forces.

Liberation

When the British arrived on April 28, they came prepared to repatriate the Allied prisoners expeditiously. Truck convoys shuttled jubilant POWs to rear areas while doctors, nurses and medics treated the sick and injured. Back in the rear area, the former prisoners were given their choice of British uniforms, and the cooks apologized for having only beef stew to serve. Afterward, DeVane, wearing a British battle jacket and a blue French garrison cap, climbed aboard a British *Lancaster* bomber for a flight to Brussels. He was accompanied by Staff Sergeant Herbert D. "Pop" Barrineau, a 38-year-old veteran of the 28th Division. At the Belgian repatriation camp, DeVane, Barrineau and their companions were deloused with DDT, given hot showers, powdered with disinfectant, issued new clothes and fed again. In Brussels, DeVane and Barrineau treated themselves to a haircut, a shave and a home-cooked meal. Each man had lost more than 40 pounds.

The next morning, DeVane and Barrineau were given a choice: Take a plane to England to rejoin the American forces, or catch the train to Camp Lucky Strike, near Le Havre, France. Because Le Havre seemed to offer the fastest way home, the two opted for the train.

At Camp Lucky Strike, the former POWs mailed preprinted postcards to their families. On the cards, the two checked the appropriate blocks, indicating that they had been liberated and that they were in good health. DeVane and Barrineau shipped out the next morning on the *Marine Panther*. Because there were only 400 soldiers on the ship, technical sergeants (E6) and below were assigned KP duties. Wearing no rank, DeVane and Barrineau proclaimed themselves to be master sergeants. After "life in the bag," cold salt-water showers, community latrines, canvas bunks and three meals a day seemed wonderful. DeVane and Barrineau were on their way home, and for them, the war was truly over.

Newly promoted Staff Sergeant Jim DeVane was reunited with his family in late May 1945. He completed his World War II service at the War Department in Washington, D.C. At his mustering-out, DeVane was given an extra $105 in compensation for having received inadequate food during his captivity ($1 for each day). Using the GI Bill, DeVane returned to The Citadel as a veteran student and earned his bachelor's degree. He then joined the U.S. Public Health Service. DeVane also served in the Army Reserve, and in 1956, he served as the first adjutant of the 300th Special Forces Group. Captain James D. DeVane III retired from the Army Reserve in 1974.

Dr. C.H. Briscoe became the U.S. Army Special Operations Command historian in July 2000.

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One-Zero Conference: SOG Veterans Share Recon Lessons Learned

On April 25, 2000, 24 of the most respected combat veterans of the Vietnam War came together at Fort Bragg's JFK Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, to share their unique combat experiences with today's Special Forces soldiers.

The veterans were former recon-team leaders with the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam Studies and Observation Group, or MACV SOG. SOG operated in secrecy for eight years during the Vietnam War. Only recently were its records declassified. SOG soldiers accounted for the majority of the SF Medals of Honor earned in Vietnam, as well as for a high percentage of the SF killed, wounded and missing in action.

SOG's principal mission was cross-border reconnaissance. Called "one zeros" because one-zero was their radio call sign, the recon team leaders led reconnaissance patrols deep into enemy-controlled territory.

The purpose of bringing the former SOG soldiers together was to document their lessons learned in combat in the hope that their experiences will assist current and future SF reconnaissance teams.

Recon training

In 1987, SWCS developed a program of instruction, or POI, for what was then called "strategic reconnaissance." The course was conducted twice at SWCS and then discontinued. (Later, at Fort Benning, Ga., the POI became the basis for the Long-Range Surveillance Course.) Since the late 1980s, the POI has remained unused, and the SF doctrinal definition of reconnaissance has shifted from strategic reconnaissance to "special reconnaissance," or SR.

In January 2000, Major General Kenneth Bowra, then the SWCS commanding general, was concerned that many of the reconnaissance lessons learned during the Vietnam War were being lost. He tasked two SWCS activities — the deputy chief of staff for operations and the Directorate of Training and Doctrine — to organize the One-Zero Conference.

The first day of the conference included a historical overview of MACV SOG by John Plaster, a former one-zero and the author of two books on MACV SOG; a videotape presentation about the origins of SOG's Project Delta (with an interview with then-Major Charles Beckwith); a representation of a "common" SOG operation, by Ken McMullin, the former one-zero of recon team Nevada; a briefing by the Army Special Forces Command on the latest technology available to SF soldiers; an overview of the methods that the 1st Battalion, 7th SF Group, employs today in conducting SR; and a POW/MIA briefing by a representative of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

On the second day of the conference, the one-zeros organized into six working groups: mission planning and intelligence preparation of the battlefield, or IPB; infiltration and exfiltration; small-unit tactics; medical;

weapons and optics; and communications. Each group was led by a subject-matter expert, or SME, from the 1st Special Warfare Training Group. The SME of each group presented an overview of the current SF methods for conducting SR; solicited information from the SOG veterans on the reconnaissance methods they used; compared their methods to the 1987 strategic-reconnaissance POI; and determined what improvements could be made. Each SME had approximately eight hours in which to capture and record all of the lessons learned.

On the third day, the working groups reconvened and reviewed the lessons recorded on the previous day. Afterward, the working groups prepared backbriefs for the SWCS assistant commandant. The essential points of the groups' backbriefs were:

Mission Prep and IPB

• The pre-mission planning conducted by today's SF is more detailed than that conducted by SOG team leaders. Current IPB methods constitute a more organized way of predicting enemy actions.

• The planning time for SOG recon missions was generally much shorter, but SOG mission plans included an aerial recon.

• SOG team leaders had absolute authority in making decisions concerning the tactics, training, weapons and personnel of the teams. They also developed the concept of the operation, chose the infiltration method and landing zone/pickup zone, and made decisions on the ground once the mission was under way.

• SOG team leaders balanced the importance of mission success with the importance of survival. One-zeros were selected on the basis of their experience and skill, not their rank.

• SOG missions depended upon air support, and planning made use of extensive air assets. Teams operated so far behind enemy lines that artillery support was not a planning consideration.

• SOG planning always incorporated deception, and teams used deception whenever possible.

Infil/exfil

• Close air support, or CAS, was the primary fire support for SOG recon teams —

Photo courtesy JFK Special Warfare Museum

Because SOG operated far behind enemy lines, its missions depended upon helicopters and other forms of air support.

Special Forces soldiers learn to operate and to maintain a variety of U.S. and foreign weapons.

File photo

as it is for SF recon teams today. The basic CAS methods have not changed, although teams can now expect to control the fire from the ground, instead of having it controlled from the air by an observer.

Small-unit tactics:

• There are training shortfalls in surveillance and in reconnaissance fieldcraft.

• All recon tasks related to small-unit tactics should be re-evaluated.

Medical

• SF medical training should emphasize the need for all members of SF A-detachments to have trauma-management skills (e.g., airway management, hemorrhage control, IV therapy, shock control and drug administration) in the field or in a low-profile environment.

• Specific missions may require additional medical cross-training, but recon and SR missions generally have the same implied medical tasks that other SF missions have.

• Medical common tasks should include the application of a tourniquet as a primary method of hemorrhage control in an austere environment.

• SF medical training should discontinue instruction related to death and dying. Grief-management is not an inherent problem for mature, well-trained SF soldiers. The one-zeros dealt with grief in their own way. Camaraderie and peer pressure lessen the effects of psychological stresses.

Weapons and optics:

• Weapons must be tailored to the mission.

• Multiple weapon systems must be available to each detachment.

• Soldiers should train with ammunition that has dual applications (e.g., 40 mm, high-explosive, tracer).

• Units should provide more ammunition for training.

• Soldiers should train with force-protection weapons.

• Navigation training should emphasize terrain association.

• Soldiers should understand the strategic environment and the joint special-operations area, or JSOA, and they should perform an in-depth terrain analysis of the JSOA.

• Teams should always plan a secondary mission.

• Soldiers should understand the advantages of loading tracers with ball ammunition.

• Soldiers should perform weapons

maintenance only when it is needed.

• Soldiers should be familiar with host-nation weapons, and host-nation or indigenous personnel should be proficient with U.S. weapons and communications equipment.

• Soldiers should train with reaction forces. The reaction force should be heavy (i.e., platoon- or company-sized with mobility assets).

Communication

• Communications planning is vital to mission accomplishment.

• It is important to practice simplicity — complicated plans and equipment frequently fail. SOF should procure simple, easy-to-use, reliable commo gear.

• The complexity of new equipment tends to make operators less proficient.

• New equipment should prompt changes in planning, because each piece of equipment has its own strengths and limitations.

• The pace of fielding may make it difficult to achieve unit proficiency.

• The probability of crisis communications make it essential that all A-detachment members be cross-trained in communications. Take into account the time and the resources needed to fully cross-train all members. In the past, all detachment members knew Morse Code; now, only 18Es do.

• SF needs to define the commo training requirements that will be met by SWCS and by the SF groups.

• SF needs simple, multifunction radios. After 30 years, SF still requires multiple radios that increase the rucksack weight.

• Detachments should have multiple encrypting, frequency-hopping capabilities.

• It is difficult to communicate while moving.

• The SF groups lack common communications procedures.

• The requirements of SR vary with the theater, the SF group, the operational plan and the mission. Coordinate theater SR requirements through the SF group in order to guide planning and tactics, techniques and procedures.

• Preparation for SR is accomplished primarily through unit training that is based on a mission analysis.

• Although new equipment allows longer, more frequent commo, short, infrequent commo helps to counter direction-finding equipment. Teams should develop tactics, techniques and procedures for minimizing their time on the air.

• New commo equipment allows headquarters to have more direct control of a team, but there is a risk that micro-management will constrain the team's initiative and decision-making ability. SF should develop procedures that will protect the detachment from higher intervention.

• Sensor-to-shooter links require not only speed, but also a close situational awareness — a common operational picture — from the detachment through the joint task force to the joint forces air-component commander.

• Except for special-mission units, current forces lack dedicated aircraft and dedicated positions in the Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center and in the Airborne Warning and Control System. Having the support of an operator in the air proved crucial to SOG's mission success. An operator overhead furnishes more urgent support than staff personnel located in a distant headquarters would.

• The special-operations liaison element and the special-operations command-and-control element should be sustained.

As a group, the one-zeros agreed on the following points:

• Not everyone is cut out to conduct recon.

• A soldier should not be penalized if he lacks the aptitude for recon.

• Recon must be practiced at every opportunity.

• Resources must be made available to recon teams, and distractors must be minimized.

• The loyalty required for the recon mission must work down the chain as well as up — senior officers must trust the judgment of the man on the ground.

This article was prepared by members of the SWCS Special Forces Training and Doctrine Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine.

Current Challenges and Possible Roles for Army Reserve PSYOP Forces

by Lieutenant Colonels Jack C. Guy and Steven Collins

During the last 100 years, psychological operations, or PSYOP, has played an important role in every major conflict,[1] and there is growing recognition of PSYOP's value to current and future military operations.[2]

Because of increasingly restrictive rules of engagement, violence is often an option of last resort for U.S. military commanders — especially in the growing number of peace operations.[3] In many cases, PSYOP forces offer commanders a more discreet and more politically palatable tool than do conventional military forces.[4]

The sophisticated and ubiquitous nature of today's global information environment and the importance of the "media message" have been demonstrated repeatedly — in Panama, in Iraq, and in Serbia. With many countries entering the information age, U.S. forces can no longer expect to dominate the local media venues when they deploy to foreign lands.[5] In many countries, the local media are as sophisticated as those in "small-town America." Furthermore, international media organizations, which are even more technically adept, are often in place before the first U.S. soldier

Photo by Andrew McGalliard

A U.S. PSYOP soldier distributes newspapers to citizens of Mostar, Bosnia. PSYOP soldiers are the commander's conduit for information to local populations.

Current US Army PSYOP Structure



arrives. These "competitors" make it increasingly difficult for PSYOP forces to gain and hold the attention of the foreign target audience.[6]

Nevertheless, when faced with the need to react quickly to local situations, military commanders rely upon PSYOP forces as their conduit for information to local populations. These commanders depend upon PSYOP officers, NCOs and soldiers to communicate information and expectations, irrespective of local or international competition.

Because theater commanders in chief, or CINCs, are increasingly involved in engagement activities and in peacekeeping efforts, in which information activities often play a key role, requests for PSYOP forces have grown dramatically over the last few years. Unfortunately, the number of PSYOP soldiers has remained constant. PSYOP has thus become what some have described as a "low-density, high-demand" force.

To make matters more challenging, of the approximately 3,500 PSYOP soldiers in the Total Army Force, nearly 70 percent are Army reservists, assigned to either the 2nd PSYOP Group or the 7th PSYOP Group. Further complicating the problem is the current PSYOP organizational structure, a Cold War anachronism.

Previous RPF roles

Until the early 1990s, the Army Reserve PSYOP forces, or RPF, contained a mix of PSYOP product-development capability (regional expertise) and PSYOP tactical-dissemination capability. But based upon an assumption that the RPF was incapable of conducting the sophisticated training that regional PSYOP forces need, the Army stripped the 2nd and 7th PSYOP groups of

their product-development capability. As a result, the current PSYOP force structure is heavily oriented toward tactical PSYOP (see chart on page 29).

Because of the requirements of long-term peace operations and continuous theater-engagement activities (e.g., Bosnia, Kosovo, mine awareness and counterdrug efforts), the regional PSYOP battalions are currently the most heavily deployed segment of the total PSYOP force.

Each regional battalion has an authorized strength of 151 personnel, but in the summer of 1997, the Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC, took 25 personnel slots from each existing regional battalion in order to build a task-organized regional battalion dedicated to the U.S. Pacific Command, or PACOM. Hence, the task-organized strength in each PSYOP regional battalion was reduced from 151 to 126.

Photo by Joel M. Torres

The RPF's 13th EPW Battalion can assist military-intelligence forces in obtaining information from enemy prisoners of war.

Of the eight PSYOP battalions in the Reserves, six are tactical. Normally, one tactical PSYOP battalion is allocated to a corps equivalent. When we consider that there are enough tactical PSYOP forces to support the equivalent of *seven Army corps*, the imbalance between regional and tactical PSYOP forces becomes obvious. Clearly, the RPF should be available to assist in the regional PSYOP role.

But until recently, tactical PSYOP battalions were almost exclusively restricted to providing local PSYOP support (loudspeaker operations and face-to-face discussions), and they were dependent upon the joint PSYOP task force for the development and production of all but the most rudimentary of their PSYOP products. Fortunately, tactical PSYOP forces can now produce limited PSYOP products at the division level. The fielding of sophisticated equipment like the Special Operations Media System-B will allow the RPF to play a more significant role in integrated active- and reserve-component activities. Nevertheless, the RPF is still too tactically oriented, and it is time to reassess the RPF's organizational and training paradigms.

Recommendations

The authors recommend the following actions if the Army is to achieve a more effective RPF in the future[7]:

- USASOC should conduct a study to determine the PSYOP force's requirements for new equipment and new tactics related to loudspeaker operations. Current equipment and tactics are outmoded, potentially placing PSYOP soldiers at extreme risk in mid- to high-intensity conflicts.
- The RPF's regional PSYOP expertise should be revitalized, and the RPF should be used in the regional role to help mitigate the high personnel tempo, or PERSTEMPO, experienced by the four task-organized, active-component regional PSYOP battalions.
- The delegation of PSYOP product-production capability to tactical PSYOP units (both active- and reserve-component) should be accelerated.
- RPF training should also focus on building the capability to "reach outside the wire" during military operations. PSYOP soldiers, even at the tactical level, should focus on influencing the target audience's decision-makers. Training should prepare RPF personnel to integrate PSYOP plans and programs as members of the supported unit's information-operations planning cell. Training should also capitalize on the civilian skills of Reservists.
- The roles of both the 13th Enemy Prisoner of War PSYOP Battalion (2nd PSYOP Group) and the 17th Dissemination Battalion (7th PSYOP Group)

Tactical PSYOP Company Organization



NOTE: 1. Each tactical PSYOP company is capable of supporting a division.
2. Each tactical PSYOP detachment is capable of supporting a brigade.

should remain substantially unchanged. These roles are important and will continue to be important in the future.

Tactical equipment, procedures

On the lethal, modern battlefield, the life expectancy of a three-person PSYOP tactical team, travelling in a lightly armed HMMWV and equipped with a loudspeaker that has a range of only 1,000 meters, would probably be measured in hours, if not in minutes. We need to study and reconsider the survivability of tactical PSYOP forces during mid- and high-intensity conflicts. Traditionally equipped tactical PSYOP soldiers might be relegated to operating only in the rear areas. Should loudspeaker operations be required at the front lines, PSYOP forces could accomplish them remotely, from either a heavily armored manned vehicle or an unmanned aerial or ground vehicle.

Revitalized RPF regional skills

Some Reserve PSYOP tactical forces should be reoriented to perform regional PSYOP missions. Organizational designs currently under analysis by USASOC propose that the regional PSYOP battalions become multicomponent units — a mixture of AC and RC forces. One design calls for adding as many as 77 RC solders to each regional PSYOP battalion. While this concept is admirable, it should not be adopted in lieu of providing additional AC soldiers to the regional PSYOP battalions.

When the 4th PSYOP Group internally task-organized to create a PACOM-oriented regional PSYOP battalion, it "hollowed out" its three original regional battalions. Adding reserve personnel spaces to fill those vacancies would offer only a partial solution. Many regional PSYOP missions fall under the rubric of theater engagement. Unless a presidential selective reserve call-up, or PSRC, were to be initiated, which would not be the case for engagement activities, participation by members of the Army Reserve would be voluntary.

Therefore, USASOC should attempt to recover the AC spaces (75 personnel) lost because of the internal reorganization of 4th POG, *and* complete plans to make the regional PSYOP battalions multicomponent. This action would give the CINCs of the U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command and U.S. Southern Command the same AC regional PSYOP capability that they had prior to the creation of the regional PSYOP battalion for PACOM. In the event of a major theater war or a long-term contingency operation during which a

A Reserve PSYOP interpreter talks with residents of Brcko, Bosnia, to get their opinions of the SFOR-sponsored "Radio Mir."

Photo by Henry S. Block

PSRC were instituted, the extra 77 RC personnel would be available for deployment.

In normal peacetime activities, an RPF unit dedicated to regional PSYOP could train with its AC counterparts, and its soldiers could occasionally volunteer to deploy either as part of their annual training or under temporary tours of active duty. Care should also be taken to integrate AC and RC command positions. The skills required to conduct regional PSYOP do not lie only in the active force.[8]

Tactical production capability

Reflecting the increased recognition of the value of PSYOP and the increased leeway being given to local tactical commanders, especially during peace operations, the tactical PSYOP company (which by doctrine supports a division equivalent) now contains a small tactical PSYOP-development detachment (see chart on page 31).

Moreover, PSYOP doctrine may soon encourage the joint task force commander to delegate some PSYOP-product-approval authority to division-level commanders. Such a delegation would significantly assist PSYOP forces in producing more timely *and* better-targeted PSYOP products. Although there can be danger in delegation, the benefits in this case would far outweigh the potential for harm.[9] Decentralization of PSYOP plans, programs and product development would entrust tactical PSYOP units to develop and produce PSYOP products for their supported units. It would also make it imperative that tactical RPF soldiers receive training similar to that of regional PSYOP personnel.

Reaching outside the wire

One advantage of adding Reservists to the regional PSYOP mix is the multiplicity of civilian skills that are resident in the RPF. Many RPF soldiers are experienced in advertising, marketing, videography and desktop publishing. Others have advanced computer and Internet skills. These soldiers could create state-of-the-art PSYOP products or teach new techniques to AC soldiers. Confining reservists to tactical PSYOP wastes their precious talents.[10]

In the rapidly evolving information age, the RPF must be prepared to work beyond leaflet and loudspeaker operations. During Operation Joint Endeavor, the Kosovo Peacekeeping Force, or KFOR, purchased Radio Galaxia in Pristina, and the PSYOP Support Element, or PSE, operated the radio station. The PSE chief in Skopje, a PSYOP Reservist with a master's degree in

business administration, performed a regional PSYOP role, delivering the KFOR commander's messages to the local population. In the future, as combat commanders seek new and more effective means of disseminating information, PSYOP forces will see increasing opportunities to use local radio and television stations.[11]

Training should reflect the work that Reservists will be required to accomplish when they are deployed. Tactical PSYOP forces will continue to interact with the civilian populace in the area of operations, in order to offer tactical commanders a unique perspective of the mood in the area and the likely actions of the people there. But tactical PSYOP forces should develop other links to the local population. Training in marketing and advertising techniques; in broadcast media, such as radio and television; and in journalism would help PSYOP forces leverage their relationships with local political organizations, television and radio stations, and print media outlets. PSYOP forces would be able to draw from these local links in order to advance the supported commander's PSYOP plan.

Training should be innovative. We should consider university-based marketing and advertising classes offered through distance-learning programs, public affairs training for officers and NCOs at the Defense Information School, cultural and language training, and other enhanced training opportunities, including the Joint Readiness Training Center and the Combat Readiness Training Center. In addition, PSYOP units should always aggressively insert themselves as active partners in the information-operations planning cells during exercises. They should not be cautious bystanders unwilling to interact for fear of "being taken over" by the director of the IO planning cell.

Many soldiers in the RPF are already adept at establishing links to the local community because of their civilian skills in marketing, advertising and business negotiations.[12] PSYOP forces should capitalize on those RPF civilian skills to train regional *and* tactical soldiers in the Total PSYOP force.

The Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command should develop a PSYOP personnel database that includes reservists' skills and abilities. Such a database would lead to improved mission planning and tailored reserve personnel call-ups.

Vital battalions

Two battalions in the RPF should stay as they are: the 13th and the 17th. The 13th provides a unique capability: It uses targeted PSYOP plans and programs to help control enemy prisoners of war, or POWs. Members of the 13th are trained in the art of interrogation, and they can assist military intelligence forces in gaining vital information. The 13th serves an additional PSYOP function: It helps establish measures of effectiveness for PSYOP products through pre- and post-testing of those PSYOP products on enemy POWs.

The 17th, a PSYOP dissemination battalion, is the sister battalion of the active component's 3rd PSYOP Battalion. Like the 3rd, the 17th contains a mix of print, audiovisual and signal specialists who are instrumental in developing and producing PSYOP products. Although these PSYOP soldiers are not regional specialists, they are masters at using computer equipment and software, and they are vital in developing and producing PSYOP products.

Conclusion

Traditional tactical RPF roles are beginning to change. As early as 1996, RPF tactical teams deploying to Bosnia-Herzegovina conducted nontraditional PSYOP missions. During the first RPF rotation of personnel for the KFOR mission in Kosovo, RPF soldiers from the 2nd PSYOP Group replaced active-component forces from the 4th PSYOP Group. The coordination was comprehensive, from the warning order to the mission hand off. The 4th Group made sure that a mobile training team had thoroughly prepared the RPF replacements, and the two groups conducted a fully collaborative exchange that proved to be a model of cooperation for future rotations.[13]

The successful interaction of AC and RC

PSYOP forces clearly requires more opportunities for multicomposition training. The RPF should train with its AC counterparts during periods of inactive duty training, or IDT; during pre-mobilization train-up periods; and during training at the combat training centers. Generally, coordination of such training requires no more than the commander's emphasis and competent staff work.

The greatest perceived obstacle for the RPF, the extraordinarily high-deployment PERSTEMPO, may be leveling off now that the Reserves are becoming more proficient in mobilizations and the Combat Readiness Training Center's training requirements are being standardized. The Department of Defense can help by continuing to make the RC-to-AC transition more seamless. And certainly, reservists who are on active duty should receive the same benefits as AC personnel.

The Army should implement more creative uses of PSRC orders, allowing Reserve commanders to move personnel in and out of theater as required by the mission. Use of PSRC orders would allow RC planners to save resources and to better use available personnel.

For their part, Reserve commanders must ensure that Phase I mobilization requirements are met at the home station (beginning with the weekend IDT period).

It is time for a progressive, innovative examination of PSYOP. The RPF must move toward the future and not become trapped in the past. PSYOP must focus on its available assets, capitalize on the civilian skills of soldiers in the RPF, learn from previous PSYOP deployments, and train and equip soldiers to succeed in an extremely sophisticated media environment. The secret of success will be to integrate the total PSYOP force, capitalizing on the strengths of all.

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Lieutenant Colonel Steven Collins is the PSYOP analyst for the U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill AFB, Fla. He has held a variety of command and staff positions as an Infantry and as a PSYOP officer in the United States and in Europe. He was the primary PSYOP planner at NATO's AFSOUTH headquarters in Naples, Italy, for Operation Joint Endeavor, and he was stationed in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, for nine months, where he served in various PSYOP capacities. Lieutenant Colonel Collins is a distinguished graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, and he earned a master's degree in history from Yale University. From 1992 to 1995 he was an assistant professor in the European History Division at the U.S. Military Academy. He has written and lectured extensively about the impact of media manipulation, perception management and information warfare. His most recent articles include: "The Antenna War and the Transformation of Bosnian-Serb Television," published in Peacekeeping and International Relations: Journal of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre *(August-October 1998); "Capabilities and Constraints: The Role of the US Army PSYOP in Bosnia," published in* Parameters *(Summer 1999); and "Building Stability in southeastern Europe," published in* Strategic Review *(Summer 2000).*

Notes:

[1] For example, a discussion regarding the contribution of PSYOP during the First World War: George G. Bruntz, *Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire in 1918* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1938); Second World War: Daniel Lerner, *Psychological Warfare Against Nazi Germany: The Sykewar Campaign, D-Day to VE-Day* (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1971); Korea: Stephen E. Pease, *Psywar: Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950-1953* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1992); Vietnam: Taro Katagiri, "A Former PSYOP Group Commander in Vietnam Looks Back," in Daniel C. Pollock, ed. *The Art and Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of Military Application* (DA PAM 525-7-1) vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army , April 1976), 137-44.

[2] The Army After Next (AAN) war games held over the last several years have established conclusively the vital contribution PSYOP will make to the future use of military force. See Robert B. Killebrew, "Learning from War Games: A Status Report," in *Parameters* (Spring 1998). Regarding the importance of PSYOP actions in Bosnia, see Pascale Combelles Siegel, *Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations. NATO-Led Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, December 1995-1997* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1998).

[3] "Low-intensity conflict is basically a struggle for people's minds. … And in such a battle, psychological operations are more important than fire power." Quoted by Chris Hables Gray in *Postmodern War: The New Politics of Conflict* (New York: The Guilford Press, 1997), 35.

[4] Retired General John Sheehan stated: "The Pentagon is still too focused on fighting wars with 'kinetics' — missiles and bullets. Instead, the wars of the next century will be won by which nation uses, controls and manipulates information the best." From James W. Crawley, "New Tactics Needed in Persian Gulf, General Says," in *San Diego Union-Tribune*, 15 January 1998.

[5] See Joseph S. Nye Jr., and William A. Owens, "America's Information Edge," in *Foreign Affairs* 75 (March/April 1996): 20-36.

[6] In July 1996, during an hour-long trip from Task Force Eagle Headquarters in Tuzla to the NORDPOL Brigade in Doboj, one of the authors counted no fewer than 125 satellite dishes on the rooftops of houses along the way. Many of these dwellings had been war-damaged and were just beginning to be resettled. But the first addition to the houses was often a satellite dish, underscoring the fact that the society there has moved into the information age. Prior to the recent actions in Kosovo, the Kosovar Albanians had one of the highest per-capita satellite-dish rates in Europe.

[7] A recent report by the Defense Science Board analyzes military psychological operations and makes a number of far-reaching proposals. Defense Science Board, "The Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of Information in Support of Psychological Operations in Time of Military Conflict" (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, May 2000).

[8] Currently on the staff of the 2nd POG are two officers who are native Spanish speakers and who work in businesses where they are responsible for daily marketing decisions; a third officer is fluent in German and works as an international banker.

[9] For a more complete analysis of the dangers and advantages of this delegation of authority, see Major Steven Collins, " 'Centrally Planned and Decentrally Executed' – A Dilemma Facing Military Psychological Operations," in *Cyber Sword: The Professional Journal of Joint Information Operations* (Fall 1999): 19-21.

[10] A cursory look at the 15th PSYOP Battalion staff during mobilization planning for the Kosovo mission found the following: three independent business owners, an MBA-trained administrator from a large medical corporation, a stock broker, and a professional intelligence analyst and computer programmer. All were fully PSYOP-qualified, and two had previous deployment experience.

[11] For instance, in Bosnia, local PSYOP commanders supporting the American-led Multi-National Division North arranged for the division to pay for radio time, affording the MND-N brigade commanders the opportunity to speak with the local population. These "call-in" shows were well-documented in the local and international press.

[12] In the summer of 1996, several Reservist NCOs organized an innovative town meeting among competing ethnic groups near Brcko, Bosnia-Herzegovina. One PSYOP sergeant was a Ph.D. candidate in history at the Mershon Center at the Ohio State University; another was an honors candidate of the Ohio State University who was finishing his senior thesis in psychology. The authors argue that the nontraditional PSYOP act of conflict resolution attempted by these enlisted personnel contributed more to positively modifying behavior in this tense area than did the hundreds of hours they spent pasting posters to walls in the traditional tactical PSYOP role. For a similar call for PSYOP soldiers to act in such roles, see Colonel Robert M. Schoenhaus, "The Application of National Power and the Role of Psychological Operations in the Information Age," in *Cyber Sword: The Professional Journal of Joint Information Operations* (Fall 1999): 17-18.

[13] Lieutenant Colonel Robert Stall, the former PSE chief in Kosovo, writes that "from loaning equipment, [to] contact teams, [to] information transfer as well as extending the AC soldiers in NATO to insure mission accomplishment until a force-cap issue was resolved and the RC PDC could arrive in theater, the AC and RC PSYOP leadership cooperated and insured the overall integrity of the PSYOP mission in both KFOR and TF Falcon." This was a textbook deployment in every way, suggesting that the AC/RC paradigm is changing in a positive way.

The Minimize-Maximize Continuum and the Civil Military Operations Mission

by Adam B. Siegel

In an operational environment, a military force's interactions with the civilian population vary according to the situation and the type of operation. The changing nature of a civil-military operation is a key factor in determining the role and the activities of the Civil Affairs elements that are involved. Therefore, in order for CA assets to operate effectively and to advise commanders across the spectrum of operations, they must understand the changing nature of civil-military interactions.

Photo by Marjie Shaw

In humanitarian-assistance operations, such as Operation Provide Comfort, military operations are designed to have the maximum effect upon the civilian population.

Views expressed in this article are those of the author. A version of this article appeared in the September 2000 issue of the Marine Corps Gazette. — *Editor.*

This article will attempt to explain the dynamic nature of civil-military interactions and to plot them on a "minimize-maximize" continuum. The placement of interactions along the continuum will depend upon the type of operation and the circumstances of location and time.

To help readers understand the minimize-maximize concept, we will examine "pure" combat operations (in Clausewitzian terms) and, at the opposite end of the spectrum, we will examine humanitarian-assistance operations and disaster-relief operations. Next, we will turn to more complex situations that military forces might encounter during peace operations (such as Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti or Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia) or during complex humanitarian emergencies (such as Operation Restore Hope in Somalia or Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq).

In examining various operations, we must ask two critical questions:

- How should a military force interact with the local civilian population?
- What interactions should a military force minimize and what kinds should it maximize?

In answering these two questions, we must consider four aspects of civil-military interactions:

- The civilian population's effect on the military operation.

- The military operation's effect on the civilian population.
- The military force's responsiveness to civilian requirements (medical, food, or otherwise).
- The military force's reliance upon host-nation support.

Combat operations

In a traditional combat operation, the military force interacts with civilians in a *minimize-minimize-minimize-maximize* fashion.

First, the military force seeks to *minimize the civilian population's effect on the military operation.* For example, the military force would attempt to minimize the interference caused by a group of refugees who are clogging the lines of communication that the military force requires in order to execute its mission.

Second, the military force seeks to *minimize the military operation's effect on the civilian population.* For example, the military force establishes rules of engagement that are designed to minimize collateral damage to nonmilitary, civilian targets (such as cultural and religious sites, or schools and hospitals).

Third, the military force seeks to *minimize its responsiveness to civilian requirements.* In almost no circumstances would a military force refuse to provide emergency medical care or food supplies to civilians in combat or post-combat environments. However, the force commander should avoid creating or encouraging a civilian reliance on the military force that could detract from the force's ability to execute a combat mission.

Finally, the military force seeks to *maximize its reliance upon host-nation support.* Host-nation support includes logistics support (such as equipment that can be used to off-load ships), communications support (access to phone lines) and people (such as linguists who are attached to the military force).

Humanitarian assistance

At the other end of the continuum, in a humanitarian-assistance operation following a major natural disaster, the military force interacts with civilians in a *maximize-maximize-maximize-minimize approach.*

First, the military force seeks to *maximize the civilian population's effect on the military operation.* The military force may form partnerships with nongovernmental organizations, or NGOs; international organizations, and governmental organizations that are also providing disaster assistance. These organizations may be able to provide a combination of direct and indirect assistance. For example, the organizations may arrange for local civilians to off-load international aid supplies from military vehicles. Or the organizations may sell civilian equipment to the military force. (Upon departure, the military force may decide to leave the equipment with the local civilians.) Maximizing the civilian-military interaction eases the transition from military control to civilian control. In other words, it is a means of achieving the desired end state of military withdrawal.

The changing nature of a civil-military operation is a key factor in determining the role and the activities of the Civil Affairs elements. … in order for CA assets to operate effectively and to advise commanders across the spectrum of operations, they must understand the changing nature of civil-military interactions.

Second, the military force seeks to *maximize the military operation's effect on the civilian population.* In a purely humanitarian-assistance disaster-relief operation, the military force assists the civilian population in its recovery efforts.

Third, the military force seeks to *maximize its responsiveness to civilian requirements* as the operation transitions from the emergency-relief phase into the recovery phase.

Finally, the military force seeks to *minimize its reliance upon host-nation support.* When a host nation is already under stress

from a disaster, imposing additional support requirements only exacerbates the host nation's situation. Thus, to whatever extent possible, the military force should rely on its own logistics support.

Desert Storm

The concept of the minimize-maximize continuum may be easier to understand if we attempt to categorize some recent military operations as combat operations or as humanitarian-assistance operations. While no real-world situation (not even World War II) fits the pure, Clausewitzian model of combat operations, Desert Storm seems to come close. During Desert Storm, minimizing the civilian impact on the battlefield was fairly simple to achieve in the desert. But in Kuwait City, the allied forces had to devote significant psychological-warfare resources to keep Kuwaiti citizens out of harm's way.

Photo by Leslie D. Benito

Military units may want to maximize or minimize their support to mine-clearing operations, depending on whether the operations are military, emergency or humanitarian in nature.

To minimize the military operation's effect on the civilian population, the allied forces constrained their bombing campaign in an effort to avoid damaging civilian sites.

For the most part, the military force avoided providing direct support to civilians until after the conflict was over. (The post-conflict situation in Kuwait City was considered suitable for a humanitarian-assistance operation.)

The coalition forces maximized civilian support for the military operation by procuring various types of civilian resources, such as the hundreds of trucks they brought in to move supplies.

Sea Angel

Operation Sea Angel, the 1991 relief effort in Bangladesh following a massive cyclone, provides an example in which civil-military interactions are at nearly the other extreme on the minimize-maximize continuum.

From the beginning of the mission, the U.S. joint task force, or JTF, attempted to maximize the civilian population's effect upon the operation. For example, the JTF coordinated all its activities with the Bengali government and various nongovernmental organizations. In addition to accomplishing the JTF's political objective of reinforcing a new democracy, the coordination facilitated the military withdrawal as the situation transitioned from relief to rehabilitation.

The JTF also sought to maximize the impact of military activities on the devastated civilian population. Civilians were encouraged to trust the military force's ability to provide safe, reliable supplies (such as filtered water). Because of the massive devastation throughout Bangladesh, the JTF commander established a policy that no more than 500 military personnel would remain ashore each night. This policy minimized the military footprint and the burden placed on civil society by military demands. Thus, nearly all of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps personnel from Amphibious Group Three, or PHIBGRU THREE, and from the Fifth Marine Expeditionary Brigade, or Fifth MEB, returned to PHIBGRU Three ships for the night.

While Sea Angel came close to being the ideal model of humanitarian assistance for disaster relief, the operation also revealed some of the complexities inherent in the use of military forces for humanitarian assistance. PHIBGRU Three/Fifth MEB, which provided most of the JTF Sea Angel

assets, came to Bangladesh from the Persian Gulf region, where its forces had been part of Operations Desert Shield/Storm. Thus, those forces had to transition from nearly pure war-fighting to nearly pure humanitarian assistance. Clearly, the force went from one extreme on the minimize-maximize continuum to the other.

Joint Endeavor

A peace-support operation may not always fall clearly on either end of the minimize-maximize continuum. For example, the activities of Joint Endeavor's Peace Implementation Force, or IFOR, fell at various intervals on the minimize-maximize continuum and changed over time. During the first year of NATO operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, IFOR sought to:

• *Minimize the civilian population's effect on the military operation.* IFOR attempted to minimize civilian demonstrations and other situations that could have hampered its activities and freedom of movement.

• *Minimize the military operation's effect on the civilian population.* IFOR followed NATO's established rules of engagement to minimize the possibility that armed force, if required, would cause collateral damage to noncombatants or civilian property.

• *Minimize the military force's responsiveness to civilian requirements.* IFOR avoided engagement with local and international civilians and civilian organizations in a number of areas. For example, IFOR refused to engage in the enforcement of civilian laws and also refused to engage in humanitarian mine clearance. On the other hand, IFOR would not have been opposed to clearing mines for military purposes or assisting with the emergency demolition of a mine if a human life was threatened.

• *Maximize the military force's reliance upon host-nation support.* From the time of its entry into Bosnia, IFOR purchased supplies locally and relied on the local infrastructure for support whenever it was logical to do so. Taking full advantage of the various forms of host-nation support available, IFOR rented buildings in which to house its forces and equipment, hired local labor, used local utilities (when they were operating), and purchased goods on the local economy. (Some of the measures were specifically designed to strengthen the host-nation's capability to support IFOR's future operations.)

• *Maximize the civilian population's effect on the military operation.* IFOR hired large numbers of civilians (including laundry workers, translators and headquarters-berthing managers); maintained regular contact with international and local civilian organizations; and coordinated activities (such as refugee movements and civic-assistance projects) with numerous civilian organizations, including the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.

While Sea Angel came close to being the ideal model of humanitarian assistance for disaster relief, the operation also revealed some of the complexities inherent in the use of military forces for humanitarian assistance. PHIBGRU Three/Fifth MEB … came to Bangladesh from the Persian Gulf region, where its forces had been part of Operations Desert Shield/Storm.

• *Maximize the military operation's effect on the civilian population*. IFOR attempted to create general security by enforcing Annex 1 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (essentially, security and cease-fire issues such as the cantonment of heavy weapons). International and indigenous civilian organizations were then able to work on other elements of the peace process. IFOR also attempted to create a secure environment so that the civilian populace could experience, to the maximum extent possible, the positive effects of peace. Some of IFOR's efforts, such as building bridges and repairing roads, also benefited IFOR.

• *Maximize the military force's responsiveness to civilian requirements.* On a num-

ber of occasions, IFOR responded to civilian requirements. For example, IFOR provided its own aircraft to transport civilian employees of international organizations. In one particular case, the movement of employees of the Office of the High Representative actually took priority over the movement of military personnel. IFOR provided significant support to the international organizations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In fact, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe could not have accomplished its tasks without IFOR's support.

• *Minimize the military force's reliance upon host-nation support.* After having endured years of warfare, the Bosnian infrastructure was either under stress or completely shattered, depending on the area. Although IFOR had attempted to maximize host-nation support, IFOR elements had brought with them much of their own logistics support (as any military force will do). Having its own support enabled IFOR to minimize its demands upon the local economy.

Conclusion

If operations were purely combat or purely disaster-relief, the desired civil-military interactions would be clear: In combat operations, the military force would seek to minimize-minimize-minimize-maximize; in disaster-relief operations, the military force would seek to maximize-maximize-maximize-minimize. But in real-world operations, such as those in northern Iraq, Haiti or Bosnia, civil-military interactions tend to be more complex and more fluid. The challenge for CA forces is to determine where on the minimize-maximize continuum an operation's civil-military interaction should fall. CA must conduct this mission analysis not only across the spectrum of operations, but also across time and space. The minimize-maximize analysis will enable the CA staff to advise the commander on the most effective procedures for dealing with the local populace. In turn, the commander will be better prepared to plan an essential factor in the achievement of the mission's objectives — the military force's interaction with the civilian populace. ✂

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Commentary: A Mission Order for Filling the SF Force

by Colonel David E. McCracken

Situation: According to an article in the *Army Times* (July 3, 2000) Army Special Forces has cut its operating capacity from six A-detachments per company to five — 13 percent — and is still being challenged to fill the ranks after that radical surgery.

Mission: Everyone who ever earned an SF tab should demonstrate positive leadership.

Execution: Effective immediately, we should take three actions:

a. Set the example with our actions, our pride and our professional capabilities. We must ensure that our "walk" matches our "talk."

b. Employ interpersonal communications — our greatest asset — to influence SF soldiers to continue to serve and to encourage non-SF soldiers to volunteer for SF. Every one of us is an SF recruiter, and we are our own best marketing capability.

c. Get the word out about how important SF is to the success of our national-security strategy of shape, deter and respond. SF is the most important factor in the "shape" component, and it is a key ingredient in the "deter" and "respond" components. Why don't prospective volunteers know how important we are? Because we haven't told them: We keep our message hidden in the team room. Every A-detachment has at least one computer. We should write articles for every legitimate publication that might print our story. SF Command has an organic public-affairs element. Get them to "clear" your story. Your foreign-internal-defense mission to the ends of the earth is news, and it will show potential volunteers why they should put themselves through the ordeal of SF Assessment and Selection, and the SF Qualification Course — so that they can join SF and serve the nation!

Service support: *Special Warfare*, *Military Review*, *Army*, *Armed Forces Journal International*, *Joint Force Quarterly, Parameters* — any reputable publication.

Command and signal: This is a challenge to all in SF. Let's pull up our bootstraps and get our membership on a positive trend. Our nation needs SF to preserve our freedoms and to demonstrate American values worldwide. Throughout Africa, Europe and Latin America, I have heard: "We like you Americans, you treat us with dignity and respect." We are the best at what we do; no other capability can match ours. It's time to get up, get writing, and lead. Special Forces can make it happen! ✂

Colonel David E. McCracken is a professor at the National War College. His previous assignments include chief of the Special Operations Division, J-33 Operations Directorate, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; commander, 3rd Special Forces Group; two assignments in Panama with the 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group; two assignments in the Special Warfare Center and School's 1st Special Warfare Training Group; and two assignments in the National Capitol Region.

Letters

Urban warfare should be attached to larger role

In the article "Warrior Ethos: The Key to Winning" (Spring 2000), the authors link the Special Forces community's current emphasis on training for urban combat to our warrior culture. They state that the SF Advanced Urban Combat Course "prepares SF A-detachments to conduct urban assault on a single-story, single-entry building consisting of several rooms." They further note that "SFAUCC is designed to train detachment collective tasks, not individual tasks."

What should concern our entire community is the development of a combat skill for SF that appears to be unattached to any larger tactical or strategic role. Where, for example, are the SF leaders getting training in urban-warfare planning, in intelligence analysis of urban areas, or in coordination with conventional units in urban warfare?

The field of urban warfare is one in which the U.S. Army has yet even to identify a critical need to catch up with the rest of the world. Development of an SF-unique skill could lead to the deployment of our detachments by non-SOF commanders who have little understanding of the skills and limitations of SF. What would have happened in Somalia had conventional commanders thought SF could conduct urban warfare?

The history of SF is full of examples of our skills being wrongly used by high-level leaders who had an imperfect knowledge of unconventional warfare. For instance, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson thought that forces designed to raise, arm and train guerrilla bands facing conventional occupying formations (the World War II model) could also train and lead indigenous forces to support an unpopular government against a peoples' revolutionary movement. That thinking led to thousands of SF troops being tied to static bases in Vietnam. Despite their disproportionately high casualties and awards for valor, those troops ultimately had little impact on the outcome in Southeast Asia.

It is hard to understand how an SF capability to conduct urban warfare, without a thoughtful integration into national strategy, would make our detachments anything more than highly paid Ranger squads. It seems that we went through a similar situation two decades ago, regarding the questionable strategic-reconnaissance mission in support of land warfare against the Soviets.

SGM Albert C. Weed II
U.S. Army (ret.)
Lovingston, Va.

Peacekeeping can develop some soldier skills

The debate continues regarding the pros and cons of employing combat troops in peacekeeping roles. The argument that peacekeeping is responsible for the degradation of combat skills fails to take into account the positive impact that peacekeeping has on soldier skills.

I had the opportunity to serve for two years with British forces in Europe as a member of the cadre of a NATO school. The experience opened my eyes with respect to peacekeeping and its effect upon the British Army and the Royal Marines. What I learned from my British counterparts is that a policy of true engagement in peacekeeping duties actually requires performance at a higher standard.

True engagement requires the acceptance of risk and decentralized execution. It does not advocate a sandbag mentality under the guise of force-protection. Certain skills, such as tank gunnery, are obviously degraded during peacekeeping, but other skills, such as decentralized small-unit performance and leadership, are developed a great deal. It is important to note that some post-conflict peacekeeping operations also provide highly unique opportunities for training "in theater" with significantly less training distraction and restriction than that found at one's home station.

In addition, peacekeeping's restrictive rules of engagement raise the bar and greatly complicate the use of force as compared to a traditional combat operation at the mid- or high-intensity level. In fact, some of the legal aspects of peacekeeping challenge soldiers in the performance of their tasks by exponentially raising the standard for success. For example, a dismounted nine-man patrol in Northern Ireland engaged by a sniper in a semi-rural environment reacts to contact, and during the

patrol's consolidation and reorganization must think to preserve evidence and to protect the area around the contact, just as the police do at a crime scene. Similarly, any operations short of general war conducted in an urban environment, such as counterinsurgency or noncombatant evacuation, will increasingly require a surgical application of force. The British train-up for Northern Ireland is intense and fine-tuned in order to prepare troops for the complexities of service in Northern Ireland.

By comparison, mid- to high-intensity military operations in an urban environment where the constraints have been removed would actually be easier. Restrictive considerations found in low-intensity operations, such as heightened concerns over collateral damage and the subsequent political fallout, become secondary in mid- or high-intensity operations. In effect, the standard becomes lower, and the application of force becomes more simplistic and straightforward when compared to peacekeeping. In addition, the soldier is free in this more familiar environment to unleash all of the tools in his arsenal in order to achieve his objective and to protect the force. As a result, more traditional combat operations should, in theory, become comparatively easy to transition to. To use the British example again, the average British soldier who had served in Northern Ireland demonstrated a great deal of discipline and professionalism that had been shaped in that complex and uncertain operational environment.

If a soldier can be trained to effectively employ deadly force based upon restrictive rules of engagement in a complex, uncertain environment where noncombatants abound, he can certainly transition to the task of firing the final protective fire in the defense.

MAJ Scott A. Morrison
Columbia, S.C.

Special Warfare *is interested in receiving letters from its readers who would like to comment on articles they have read in* Special Warfare *or who would like to discuss issues that may not require a magazine article. With more input from the field, the "Letters" section could become a forum for new ideas and for the discussion of SOF doctrinal issues. Letters should be approximately 250 words long. Include your full name, rank, address and phone number. Address letters to Editor,* Special Warfare; *Attn: AOJK-DT-MDM; JFK Special Warfare Center and School; Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.*

Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

Analysis of 2000 MSG promotion board yields lessons for CMF 18

The review and analysis for the 2000 master-sergeant promotion board provided the following information regarding records of CMF 18 soldiers:

- *The NCOER remains the primary instrument for evaluating an NCO's performance and potential*. The panel found that successful performance, as noted by the rater's and the senior-rater's block check and bullet comments, was the norm. In some cases, however, raters inflated evaluations to a level that "excellence" was the norm, and NCOs with "success" blocks were almost cast in a negative light.
- *Judgment of an NCO's potential for promotion to MSG was based on the rater's block check and bullet comments*. There were numerous instances in which raters and senior raters gave block checks that did not correspond to their bullet comments. The board encountered a range of problems, from nonspecific bullet comments (such as "unlimited potential") to inconsistencies (such as senior raters who checked the "3" block but recommended that the NCO be promoted ahead of his peers). These "disconnects" send mixed signals. In instances in which the reviewer wrote a nonconcurrence, the panel gave great weight to his comments.
- *Unsubstantiated bullet comments continue to be a problem*. Unsubstantiated comments damage the credibility of the rater and/or the senior rater.
- *NCOs assigned to TDA units or to non-SF-team assignments in TO&E units should be allowed to return to a team upon completion of a normal tour*. NCOs who had served in longer-than-normal non-team assignments or in back-to-back non-team assignments were at a disadvantage when compared to their peers.
- *Excellent/successful performance in team assignments was critical*. NCOs who had performed successfully in MSG positions, especially as team sergeants, were considered to have demonstrated the potential for promotion. Excellent/successful performance as a SWCS instructor and as an operations NCO (at both company and battalion levels) was also considered important in the development of future SF team sergeants, provided the NCOs had coupled those experiences with repetitive troop-leading assignments on a team.
- *The NCO's lack of static-line jumpmaster qualification was a negative discriminator*.
- *Additional advanced skills were a positive discriminator, especially when they were related to the requirements of the NCO's MOS, the NCO's mission or the NCO's regional expertise*. Ranger training and the award of the Expert Infantryman Badge or the Expert Field Medical Badge were also considered positive performance indicators.
- *Language competence was a positive discriminator*. When appropriate, raters should include language-competence bullets to reinforce the "success" and "excellence" bullets. NCOs should update their Enlisted

Record Brief, or ERB, and Form 2-1 to reflect their current language ratings.

- *The panel gave favorable consideration to APFT scores above 290*. Soldiers who repetitively scored above 290 (or above 270 with the new standards) were perceived as individuals who truly lead their units from the front. The panel strongly urged all raters to address and list the soldier's APFT score on the NCOER.
- *Many NCOs had not reviewed their files*. In some cases, the ERB and/or the Form 2-1 was missing or incomplete.
- *Many NCOs had not updated their photographs*. Many of the ERBs contained no photographs, contained photographs that were more than five years old, or contained photographs of NCOs when they were staff sergeants. Some NCOs had been photographed in ill-fitting uniforms that made them appear overweight. Others had been photographed wearing awards and decorations incorrectly. Some were shown wearing foreign badges or unauthorized awards and decorations.

For additional information, telephone the CMF 18 manager in the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office, MSG Brian Nulf, at DSN 239-8423 or commercial (910) 432-8423.

2000 MSG promotion board analyzes CMF 37 records

The review and analysis for the 2000 master sergeant promotion board provided the following information regarding records of CMF 37 soldiers:

- *Performance and potential*. The board recognized that NCOs in the primary and secondary zones were doing well. It noted that some NCOs in the primary zone were working above their pay grade and doing an outstanding job.
- *Utilization and assignments*. The panel noted that although opportunities exist for CMF 37 NCOs to serve in assignments outside the 4th PSYOP Group, most NCOs in the primary zone were attempting to stay in the 4th PSYOP Group beyond their allotted tour length, and most NCOs in the secondary zone were seeking reassignment to the 4th PSYOP Group.
- *Training and education*. The biggest problem regarding education was that between one-third and one-half of the NCOs in the primary zone were not jumpmaster-qualified. Most secondary-zone NCOs were jumpmaster-qualified.
- *Physical fitness*. Nearly everyone was physically fit.
- *Overall health of CMF 37*. The health of the MOS is good. The panel saw CMF 37 as a strong and vibrant force; however, it recommended that the 4th PSYOP Group look into the issue of "homesteading" to determine whether there is a problem or if the situation is consistent with the manning of the 4th PSYOP Group.

For additional information, telephone the senior CMF 37 manager in the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office, MSG John A. Condroski, at DSN 239-9002 or (910) 432-9002.

Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

Operations career field best for SF assignments

The career-field designation, or CFD, process is nearing completion for past year groups. Special Forces officers who wish to remain in the operations career field should select SF as their first basic-branch selection. This is the only category in which they will receive SF operational assignments. Once an officer has been career-field designated outside of operations, the gaining career-field manager manages the officer's assignments. Read the preference sheet carefully: The CFD board is conducted at DA, and it is difficult to change a CFD. The CFD board for officers in year groups 1982 and 1983 convened Oct. 3, 2000. Officers in those YGs can appeal their CFD up to 180 days after the adjournment of the CFD board (material errors only). For more information, go to the OPMS XXI web site (www.perscom.army.mil/opmsxxi).

26 FA 39 officers selected for promotion to LTC

The fiscal year 2000 lieutenant colonel promotion board selected 26 FA 39 officers for promotion, compared to 22 officers selected in last year's board. Of those selected, 19 were fully trained, and 11 were graduates of the fully funded FA 39 master's-degree program. For the second consecutive year, the FA 39 promotion-zone selection rate exceeded the Army's average.

FY 2000 board selects 82 SF officers for MAJ

The fiscal year 2000 major promotion board selected 82 Special Forces captains for promotion. The SF Branch surpassed the Army's average again this year. The statistics are as follows:

	Considered	Selected	Percent Selected
SF (AZ)	20	8	40
Army (AZ)	475	152	32
SF (PZ)	80	70	87.5
Army (PZ)	1891	1506	79.6
SF (BZ)	108	4	3.7
Army (BZ)	1854	89	4.8

SF warrant officers eligible for SDAP

Special Duty Assignment Pay, or SDAP, for SF warrant officers has become a reality. USASOC Policy No. 13-00 states that SF warrant officers are entitled to receive SDAP equal to the amount they were receiving at the time of their appointment to warrant officer, provided that they continue to perform the duties for which their enlisted SDAP was authorized. In other words, SF warrant officers who remain eligible for assignment to SF A-detachments are also eligible for SDAP. To be eligible, a warrant officer must have received at least one payment of SDAP as an enlisted soldier. This entitlement applies only as long as the officer remains assignable to an A-detachment. Because CW4s currently cannot be assigned to ODAs, they are ineligible for SDAP. The policy allows an NCO who is receiving SDAP to avoid a significant pay loss upon his appointment to SF warrant officer. For example, an E6 with eight years' active federal service receives, with all pay and

allowances (including SDAP), $3,078.38 per month. Upon appointment to W1, he would receive, with all pay and allowances (including SDAP), $3,398.44, an increase of $320.06. An E7 with eight years' AFS receives $3,368.72 per month. Upon appointment to W1, he would receive $3,398.44, an increase of $29.72 per month. However, within two years, and after being promoted to W2, he would receive $3656.07, an increase of $287.35 per month.

FY 2000 board selects 56 SF officers for LTC

The fiscal year 2000 lieutenant colonel promotion board selected 56 Special Forces majors for promotion. The overall selection rate for the SF branch was 11 percentage points higher than the Army's overall selection rate. The SF Branch has 190 lieutenant colonels; under OPMS XXI, the branch needs 224. Thus, the inventory is 85 percent of the strength required by the OPMS XXI model, but the shortfall is the result of smaller year groups entering the zones of eligibility for promotion. The statistics are as follows:

	Considered	Selected	Percent
SF (AZ)	17	0	0
Army (AZ)	1288	73	5.7
SF (PZ	63	52	82.5
Army (PZ	1596	1145	71.7
SF (BZ)	55	4	7.3
Army (BZ)	1529	96	6.3

New rules govern degree-completion program for WOs

The rules governing the degree-completion program for Army warrant officers changed Aug. 20, 1999. Warrant officers must meet the following criteria:

- Have three years in grade as a CW2.
- Be in Regular Army status or voluntary indefinite status and have a minimum of three years' active federal commissioned service before requesting the degree-completion program.
- Have no more than 24 years' active warrant-officer service on the school start date.
- Warrant officers not in RA status must have no more than 16 years' active federal service on the school start date.

FY2000 board selects 29 FA 39 officers for MAJ

The fiscal year 2000 major promotion-selection board selected 29 FA 39 officers for promotion. Of those, 23 possess either FA 39 training or FA 39 training and utilization. The FA 39 selection rate exceeds the Army's average selection rate in the promotion zone and below the zone.

Foreign SOF

Russian arms trafficking takes new twist

Illegal weapons trafficking, a prominent feature of the continuing conflicts in Chechnya and in the Caucasus, is profitable for a number of "entrepreneurs," including organized crime, the Russian military and Russian government organizations. While arms have poured *into* Chechnya *from* all directions, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs recently discovered that weapons, ammunition and explosives were being transported in large numbers *from* Chechnya to Moscow itself. The discovery linked the long-time smuggling operation to Russia's Ministry for Emergency Situation, or EMERCOM, a rough equivalent of the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency. Arms delivered from Chechnya to organized-crime groups in the Moscow area were disguised as returned shipments of "rescue" equipment — a deception that would have required the cooperation of EMERCOM personnel.

Brazil plans future border counterdrug operations

Faced with continuing and in some cases increased drug trafficking and smuggling from neighboring countries, Brazil is reportedly planning a series of six long-term counterdrug operations along its borders with Guyana, Surinam and Colombia. These operations, which will be led by the Brazilian Federal Police, are expected to disrupt the production and the delivery processes of drugs, primarily cocaine. The police will also attempt to identify clandestine airstrips and so-called private-air-service or air-taxi ventures, a number of which have already proven to be covers for drug-smuggling. The size, timing and duration of the six operations will depend on the financial resources available. Counterdrug operations can be complicated in some regions because of the activities of Colombian guerrillas. Some regional specialists have raised the possibility that Colombian President Pastrana's "Plan Colombia" might score major successes against insurgents and drug smugglers, forcing them across the border into Brazil. While other observers have dismissed that concern, the Brazilian armed forces are nevertheless said to be prepared to reinforce Brazil's affected border regions on short notice.

South Africa concerned about IO threat

The threat posed by "cyberterrorism" has become a major concern for the South African National Defense Forces, or SANDF. Specialists are particularly concerned about the number of guerrilla groups that have turned to the Internet as a means of winning international support, communicating with other groups, planning operations and directly attacking opponents. South African commentators cite the Zapatista guerrillas in Mexico, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia as prominent examples of groups that have successfully mobilized support abroad using the Internet. A further concern is the potential for attacks on communications systems, including "mail bombs," various forms of hacking, and the dissemination of viruses. The SANDF has reportedly established a special division to counter cyberterrorism. To enhance the capabilities of the new division, the SANDF sought the assistance of South African computer specialists, including those from the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research. Although the envisioned cyber threats have not

yet materialized, the link between political agendas and the Internet was confirmed when hackers not only shut down a South African web site critical of Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe but also threatened further actions. Because the hackers were located abroad and their identity is uncertain, it is doubtful that they will ever be apprehended.

Indian state forms new commando unit

A police organization characterized as a special commando battalion is being formed in the Indian state of West Bengal. The battalion will track the increased militant activity in the state — activity that authorities fear will surface in increased levels of subversive actions. Indian reporting attributes the formation of the commando battalion to alleged Pakistani plans to shift activities from India's northwest frontier areas to the eastern and northeastern regions. The arrests of growing numbers of militants in West Bengal, and the flow of arms and ammunition into the state, have also received special note in the local press. The battalion's initial complement of personnel, drawn in part from existing state police organizations, has received a year of basic training and an additional three months of specialized "commando training." It is possible that the army may also be used to augment the training of the battalion's personnel.

Malaysian Armed Force improves 'special unit'

Malaysia is restructuring its special unit, the "Grup Gerak Khas," or GGK, in an effort to improve its capabilities. The GGK, which is charged with combating terrorists, armed militants, pirates and other low-intensity threats, will also receive better weapons and specialized training. The restructuring process, motivated in part by high-visibility subversive activity that includes kidnapings and thefts of military arms, comes at a time when piracy is increasing in the Strait of Malacca. According to statistics from the first six months of 2000, piracy activities have shifted from the Singapore Strait to the Strait of Malacca. During this period, 14 pirate attacks were reported in the Strait of Malacca and none in the Singapore Strait. This figure represents an almost exact reversal in the number of pirate attacks for the previous year. Responsibility for dealing with the increased acts of piracy is being shared by a number of states in the region, including Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia.

Chinese conduct 'lightning war' airborne exercise

A Chinese airborne exercise conducted this summer demonstrated China's continuing use of heavy equipment and logistics airdrops to give its airborne forces greater firepower and mobility. Reportedly, the exercise featured a parachute drop of a new, unspecified type of airborne assault vehicle. Using the new vehicle, "special combat detachments" demonstrated greater mobility and speed, both in assembling their forces after the airdrop, and in attacking enemy missile and radar positions. A 120-man force landed and was ready to fight in less than three minutes. The exercise also featured airborne personnel descending into an area by means of "paraglider infiltration" to conduct reconnaissance and direct-action missions. According to the Chinese, the special detachments will be able to carry out complex missions, will possess greater sustainability and will be able to defend themselves from a variety of threats on the ground and in the air.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. of the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Update

Brown takes command of USASOC

Lieutenant General Bryan D. Brown took command of the U. S. Army Special Operations Command during a change-of-command ceremony at Fort Bragg Oct. 11.

Brown, formerly commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, replaced Lieutenant General William Tangney, who is now deputy commander in chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill AFB, Fla.

Brown's other assignments include duty with the 129th Aviation Company; 17th Field Artillery; 158th Aviation Battalion; 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment; 101st Aviation Battalion; and the U.S. Special Operations Command. He served combat tours in Vietnam, in Grenada and in the Persian Gulf.

Brown pledged that USASOC units will continue to train to ensure that every time the nation calls, Army special-operations forces will answer, "Trained and ready." — *Specialist Jon Creese, USASOC PAO*

USSOCOM welcomes Holland as new CINC

Air Force General Charles R. Holland became the sixth commander in chief of the United States Special Operations Command Oct. 27, taking the guidon from Army General Peter J. Schoomaker during a change-of-command ceremony held near MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.

Holland's military career includes assignments as commander, 1st Special Operations Wing; deputy commanding general, Joint Special Operations Command; commander, Special Operations Command Pacific; and commander, Air Force Special Operations Command. Prior to assuming command of USSOCOM, Holland served as vice commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe.

U.S. Army photo

LTG Bryan D. Brown (left) accepts the USASOC colors from Army Chief of Staff GEN Eric Shinseki.

Schoomaker retired from the Army in November with more than 30 years of service. — *Technical Sergeant Ginger Schreitmueller, AFSOC Public Affairs*

USASOC names NCO, Soldier of the Year

The U.S. Army Special Operations Command has announced the winners of its competition for NCO and Soldier of the Year.

The NCO of the Year is Staff Sergeant Daniel D. Ibach of Company B, 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment. The Soldier of the Year is Specialist Lilton L. Moore, Company A, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment.

Runners-up were Sergeant David L. Snyder, Group Support Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group; and Specialist Michael A. Wengerd, Company C, 3rd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment.

96th CA Battalion gets new commander

Lieutenant Colonel John D. Henshaw Jr., took command of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion from Lieutenant Colonel Thomas G. Knight Jr., Nov. 17.

Henshaw's previous assignments include battalion intelligence officer, 14th Engineer Battalion; assistant operations officer, 82nd Engineer Battalion; company commander, 96th CA Battalion; and Civil Affairs operations officer, 377th Theatre Support Command.

SWCS revises PSYOP manual for digital library

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School has recently released Army Field Manual 3-05.30, *Psychological Operations*, for publication on the Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library.

The manual is the keystone publication for the principles of psychological operations, or PSYOP. It illustrates the way PSYOP forces can function for the supported commander and demonstrates PSYOP's impact on the operating environment. The new manual is both a revision and a renumbering of the former FM 33-1.

The new manual describes PSYOP planning procedures, the employment of PSYOP forces, and PSYOP intelligence and logistics-support operations.

FM 3-05.30 provides the foundation for PSYOP doctrine, training, leader development, organizational design, materiel acquisition, and soldier systems. In developing and conducting training, PSYOP commanders and trainers at all levels should use the manual in conjunction with Army mission-training plans. FM 3-05.30 is not intended for the exclusive use of the PSYOP community, however. To a great degree, it is intended for supported commanders at all levels, regardless of their branch of service.

As the proponent for PSYOP doctrine and training, SWCS will publish FM 3-05.301, *Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques and Procedures,* to disseminate the specific tactics, techniques and procedures necessary in planning and conducting PSYOP. SWCS will also publish Army training and evaluation programs (for specific unit-level training) and the soldier training publications for the PSYOP military occupational specialty, 37F.

TPIAL sheds new light on targets

New technology will soon allow special-operations soldiers to accurately illuminate and engage targets from 300 to 2,500 meters.

The Target Pointer/Illuminator/Aiming Light, or TPIAL, is a dual-laser system designed to be used in conjunction with night-vision goggles or with a monocular night-vision device.

TPIAL can be hand-held or mounted on a weapon. When hand-held, it can be used either as a pointer or as an illuminator for command and control. When mounted on a weapon, it can be used to direct fire, to illuminate, or to designate targets. TPIAL can be used with the M-16 and M-4 rifles; with the Modular Weapon System; and with the M-2, MK-19, M-60, M-249 and M-240B machine guns.

TPIAL produces an illumination beam that is circular and free of the shading often found in laser illuminators. Precise adjusters enable users to zero TPIAL's aiming light and its pointer/illuminator. The TPIAL is waterproof and can be submerged without risk of leakage.

The Special Forces groups and the Special Warfare Center and School are scheduled to begin receiving the TPIAL during the fall of 2000. The Force Modernization Branch, USASOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Force Development and Integration, is responsible for planning, coordinating and managing the fielding of the TPIAL to SOF units. For additional information, telephone Jonathan James, chief of the Force Modernization Branch, at DSN 239-6144 or commercial (910) 532-6144.

SWCS to conduct ARSOF writing-awards program

The Special Warfare Center and School will conduct a writing-awards program to promote quality writing that supports the professional development of Army special-operations forces.

The theme for the 2001 ARSOF Writing Awards Program will be "ARSOF and Peacekeeping." Topics may include national-defense policy; tactics and strategy; education and training; weapons; communications and equipment; logistics; task-force organization and doctrine; leadership; foreign military forces; or history.

Submissions must be original, typewritten compositions of not more than 5,000 words. Awards will be given in three categories: officer, senior NCO, and E6 and below. Winning essays will be published in *Special Warfare*. Deadline for submissions is July 17, 2001.

For details, telephone the SWCS Directorate of History, Archives, Library and Museum at DSN 236-3911 or (910) 396-3911.

Name of fallen SF soldier added to memorial wall

Family, friends and comrades of Staff Sergeant Joseph E. Suponcic gathered at Fort Bragg's Meadows Memorial Plaza Oct. 10 to see his name added to the U. S. Army Special Operations Command Memorial Wall.

Suponcic, a member of Company C, 3rd Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group, died as a result of injuries sustained Dec. 15, 1999, when the vehicle in which he was riding ran over a land mine in Kosovo.

The USASOC Memorial Wall lists the names of Army special-operations soldiers who have died in the line of duty from World War II to the present. Suponcic's name is the 859th on the wall.

SWCS to publish new CA mission training plan

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School will issue a new mission training plan, or MTP, to Civil Affairs units.

MTP 41-701-10, *Mission Training Plan for a Civil Affairs Team*, will give CA company commanders and their subordinate leaders guidance in preparing, conducting and evaluating the training of CA teams. Two years in the making, the MTP consists of six chapters that provide a descriptive, mission-oriented training program for CA teams at all echelons. Produced by the SWCS Civil Affairs/Civil Military Operations Division, the new MTP was prepared in accordance with the Automated Systems Approach to Training.

The last CA MTP to be published, MTP 41-701, *Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Civil Affairs Command*, came out in September 1994. Since then, the family of CA MTP manuals has been streamlined from eight to three to eliminate redundancy.

MTP 41-701-10 is available through the Reimer Digital Library (www.atsc.army.mil/HELPDESK/Training Delivery/GRDL/index.htm).

For more information telephone Martha Levister or Major Tamara Cotcher at (910) 432-1548/1654.

Book Reviews

Code-Name Bright Light: The Untold Story of the U.S. POW Rescue Efforts During the Vietnam War. *By George J. Veith. New York: Bantam Books, 1998. ISBN 0-440-22650-3 (paper). $6.50.*



Early in *Code-Name Bright Light*, the author describes a briefing presented during the Vietnam War by the newly assigned chief of the Joint Personnel Recovery Center, or JPRC, to General William Westmoreland, commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command-Vietnam. After the briefer enumerated previous prisoner-recovery attempts and their resultant heavy casualties, Westmoreland asked, "Colonel, how many men do you think one American's life is worth?"

The briefer replied, "If I had to give a number, six or seven, but that's not the point. From a morale standpoint, a captured man has to know that someone is always out there coming after him; he has to have that hope." Westmoreland accepted the answer.

That brief exchange suggests a number of the questions concerning personnel recovery, or PR, particularly the recovery of aircrews. Whose life is worth only a sixth or a seventh of a captured American's? An indigenous soldier's? An American soldier's? A Special Forces NCO's? A pilot's? Certainly those individuals might question the validity of the equation, as might the moralist who weighs all lives equally. Even those who strongly believe in the Christian ethic that to give one's life for a friend is the greatest good would question the equation when the sacrifice is involuntary. And are lives to be sacrificed only to support the *morale* of those who fall into enemy hands? The high price would seem to be less defensible because it is based neither on military necessity nor on the objective of preserving the greatest military capability. Other questions arise: "At what point in a recovery effort has enough been endangered or lost?" "To what extent should recovery efforts be allowed to impinge on concurrent combat operations?" "Who makes these decisions?"

These PR questions are heavily tied to the development of air power. In all of America's wars, ground-reconnaissance personnel have routinely gone into hazardous areas with no expectation of rescue by other forces. During World Wars I and II and in Korea, airmen also went into enemy territory with no expectation of rescue.

But during the Vietnam conflict, the availability of the helicopter and the absence of enemy air power made possible expanded and sometimes exceptional efforts toward personnel recovery. The guiding principle seemed to be that if PR was remotely feasible it should be attempted. Differences in the functions and in the organic recovery capabilities of the services resulted in essentially two service-based levels of effort.

Initial attempts to rescue downed airmen were performed by dedicated, routinely heroic, Air Force search-and-rescue, or SAR, units. Unsuccessful SAR efforts were sometimes followed by supplementary efforts, usually JPRC-organized, when intelligence indicated a possibility of recovery. JPRC was a staff element and had no directive authority. Thus, the JPRC always had to seek the authorization and, because dedicated recovery forces were nonexistent, the allocation of forces to make the attempt.

The history of JPRC's accomplishments, failures and frustrations in the constantly changing Southeast Asia PR environment is described in chronological order and in extensive detail in *Code-Name Bright Light.* The book begins with the early efforts to establish a capability during the advisory period prior to the deployment of major American forces, and it ends during the Vietnamization period, when American forces (and recovery capabilities) were greatly reduced.

Between those landmarks, the book

unfolds tales of dedication and determination by JPRC personnel; of difficulties of organization, authority and subordination; of diplomatic obstruction; of intelligence efforts; of attempted embezzlement; of political exploitation and obstruction by U.S. "peace" groups; and of frequent demonstrations of undaunted courage by prisoners and by the various peoples (American, Vietnamese, Nung and Montagnard) who attempted to free them.

George Veith performed an excellent job and a great service in recording this often overlooked aspect of a very long war. The book is well-written, and it is enjoyable reading. More importantly, it is full of lessons, many of them of the "don't-do" type, for those who may work in PR or in joint commands' operations, intelligence or plans sections.

COL J. H. Crerar
U.S. Army (ret.)
Vienna, Va.

Secret Army Secret War: Washington's Tragic Spy Operation in North Vietnam. *By Sedgwick Tourison. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995. ISBN: 1-55750-818-6. 424 pages. $29.95.*

A CIA instructor once introduced the craft of human intelligence by asking his students to define an *agent*. The instructor then patiently answered his own question: An agent is first and foremost a *human being*. The students had not had the opportunity to meet an agent, and the instructor's question and answer were, by design, morally instructive.

So, too, is Sedgwick Tourison's *Secret Army Secret War,* a compilation of agent operations in which the Pentagon bureaucracy was blinded to the human dimension of espionage. Tourison uses interviews with participants to reveal the human face of Operation Switchback, the U.S. "secret war" in North Vietnam.

Following the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the CIA lost favor with President John F. Kennedy, and Kennedy's preferred weapon for handling the nascent confrontation with North Vietnam became U.S. Army-directed paramilitary operations. In 1962, the responsibility for paramilitary operations in Vietnam was transferred to the Department of Defense.

The "secret army" consisted of agents dispatched to fight a covert war against North Vietnam. Tourison reveals that despite the fact that more than 500 of those agents were captured and that the "handlers" knew that the program had been compromised, the operation continued.

Tourison contrasts the paramilitary environment of World War II with that of North Vietnam, but his reflections neglect the fact that the CIA had also misdirected its paramilitary operations in Albania a decade earlier.

Crippled by a flawed analysis that the communist government in Albania could be overthrown by a popular uprising, the CIA clandestinely infiltrated scores of Albanian agents. But the notion of establishing organized resistance in Albania was absurdly inaccurate. Too frequently, the Albanian communists knew that the agents were coming. Repeatedly, Albanians were dispatched by handlers who knew that the Albanians likely faced certain capture and death, remarkably foreshadowing the later U.S. effort in North Vietnam.



Tourison never satisfactorily explains why the operations in North Vietnam continued, or what went wrong. His explanation is that the concept was flawed at the outset. In fact, Tourison never strays far from his central theme that people were abandoned. He provides interviews with Vietnamese survivors, some of whom were left in prisons while their families were told that they had been killed.

The author does note in his epilogue that recent U.S. government revelations provide evidence that the agents were dispatched to protect CIA operations in Laos — not, as Kennedy was led to believe, to take the fight to North Vietnam. Unfortunately, Tourison only plants the seed, providing the reader with a lead worthy of further research. His explanation is short on details, and the result is too many unanswered questions.

Still, *Secret Army Secret War* is a welcome addition to the Vietnam-era literature, and it may be destined to become a human accounting for a yet-to-be-written, more comprehensive work. Although Tourison neglects some of the details of Operation Switchback, his extensive interviews are important from a human perspective. The author has performed a valuable service in putting a human face on the profound cost of espionage.

LTC Christopher P. Costa
Washington, D.C.

Special Warfare

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