



THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF THE MILITARY POLICE CORPS

# MILITARY

# POLICE



HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

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# MILITARY POLICE

Fall 2010

Headquarters, Department of the Army

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| <p>2 <b>Chief, Military Police Corps Regiment, and Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School</b><br/>3 <b>Regimental Command Sergeant Major</b><br/>5 <b>Teamwork and Awareness: Essential Elements of Success Against Terrorist Attacks</b><br/><i>By Colonel Richard Vanderlinden (Retired) and Lieutenant Colonel Craig Benedict (Retired)</i><br/>8 <b>What It Means To Be "A Good Soldier"</b><br/><i>By Command Sergeant Major Edgar W. Dahl (Retired)</i><br/>10 <b>Our Brother's Keeper: Army Law Enforcement Program Helps Those Who Serve</b><br/><i>By Mr. Colby Hauser</i><br/>11 <b>Passing the Torch</b><br/><i>By First Lieutenant Megan Howell</i><br/>12 <b>Dynamics of the DES</b><br/><i>By Major Kevin M. Kreie</i><br/>14 <b>Military Police Efforts in PTT Operations</b><br/><i>By Major Jon Myers</i><br/>16 <b>Achieving Iraqi Police Primacy Through Partnership</b><br/><i>By First Lieutenant Carl F. Yeaney</i><br/>17 <b>COP, COIN, and Afghanistan</b><br/><i>By Lieutenant Colonel Florentino Santana</i><br/>19 <b>I Corps Detainee Release Operations: A Holistic Approach</b><br/><i>By Major Lisa M. Gasque</i><br/>21 <b>Military Police Corps Regimental Prayer</b><br/><i>By Lieutenant Colonel (Chaplain) Michael Yarman</i><br/>22 <b>Doctrine Update</b><br/>24 <b>Key Military Police Manuals Revised</b><br/>25 <b>TF Griffin Support to Detainee Operations; OIF 09-11: The Four Big Milestones</b><br/><i>By Captain Eileen Healy and Specialist Candace Mundt</i><br/>29 <b>The Bundeswehr Military Police and Headquarters Service School</b><br/><i>By Lieutenant Colonel Wolfgang Bayer and Captain Simon Allgoewer</i></p> | <p>31 <b>Empire State Military Police Partner in Safe Iraqi Election</b><br/><i>By Sergeant Neil W. McCabe</i><br/>33 <b>230th Military Police Company Partners With Macedonian Army, Prepares Unit for Deployment</b><br/><i>By Sergeant Adrienne Killingsworth</i><br/>34 <b>Soldier's Creed</b><br/>35 <b>65th Military Police in Haiti: Job Well Done!</b><br/><i>By Captain Maurice Green</i><br/>36 <b>The Bataan Memorial Death March</b><br/><i>By Captain Shea A. Asis</i><br/>37 <b>Iraqi Police Dog Training</b><br/><i>By Specialist Ry Norris</i><br/>38 <b>The USD-N/Iraqi Canine Program Partnership</b><br/><i>By Sergeant First Class Kelly McCargo</i><br/>40 <b>10th Military Police Battalion (CID)—Lineage and Honors</b><br/>41 <b>Profiles From the Past</b><br/><i>By Master Sergeant Patrick V. Garland (Retired)</i><br/>43 <b>Two Selfless Servants of the Military Police Corps</b><br/><i>By Second Lieutenant Amanda M. Bent</i><br/>44 <b>Policing the Border</b><br/><i>By Master Sergeant Patrick V. Garland (Retired)</i><br/>46 <b>The Law Enforcement Combined Interagency Task Force</b><br/><i>By Chief Warrant Officer Three Sean Rafferty and Warrant Officer One Jason M. Nicholas</i><br/>47 <b>545th Military Police Company—Lineage and Honors</b><br/>48 <b>Military Police News and Notes</b><br/><i>Compiled by Ms. Diana K. Dean</i><br/>51 <b>MILITARY POLICE Writer's Guide</b><br/>52 <b>Publication and Subscription Order Form</b><br/>53 <b>Brigade/Battalion Commands</b></p> |
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# Chief, Military Police Corps Regiment, and Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School

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## *Brigadier General David Phillips*

The Military Police Corps continues to “conduct police and detention operations in a full spectrum environment to provide protection, support mobility, and promote the rule of law.” These words, taken from our mission statement, should sound familiar. And they should resonate in the minds of all military police who have spent time at the “tip of the spear” in Iraq or Afghanistan.

We released the first version of our Military Police Corps mission statement a year ago, but continued to refine and synchronize the terminology with joint and Army doctrine. We continually update our written role and purpose so that they reflect common terms and references and are expressed in the language of our profession. Members of a cross section of the Regiment met at an off-site strategic planning conference in St. Louis, Missouri. With an emphasis on a maneuver ethos and the current operating environment, they produced a revised mission statement. They also refined our near- and long-term campaign goals and objectives. As a Regiment, we cannot rest on the success of our latest operation, but must continually evolve to respond to the demands of an uncertain global environment.



Many of you ask where we are going as a Regiment. The answer is evident within our vision statement:

**Military Police Soldiers are technically proficient in policing activities, corrections/detention operations, police/criminal intelligence operations, as well as tactically proficient in field operations, area security, stability, and civil support operations. The [Military Police] Corps is fully nested within the modular Army, the [Army force generation] process and serves as the most demanded enabler for maneuver commanders as they conduct full spectrum operations at home and abroad.**

The Regiment has a very broad and important mission now and into the foreseeable future. Rest assured that those of us at the Home of the Regiment will continue to look out over the horizon as we prepare for what lies ahead.

**Loyalty**  
**Duty**  
**Respect**  
**Selfless Service**  
**Honor**  
**Integrity**  
**Personal Courage**

Army  
Values



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# Regimental Command Sergeant Major

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## *Command Sergeant Major Charles R. Kirkland*



### The Generation Gap

Happy 69th Anniversary from the Home of the Regiment! Once again, it's that time of year to reconnect with our history and renew our commitment to the team. This year's theme, "The Army's Triple Strand of Strength; Military Police Corps Regiment" (see back cover), has received very positive reviews from the field. It is a message of teamwork, communication, and pride in our profession. I want to thank all of you for embracing the premise and moving forward in the spirit of this year's theme.

As this issue comes off the press, our finest young warfighters are conducting final preparations and packing for their journeys to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. There is no doubt in my mind that they will represent their organizations extremely well, solidifying our claim that we have the finest Soldiers and leaders the Army has to offer. It is this young generation of future senior leaders that I would like to address in this issue of *Military Police*. I would like to take this opportunity to generate thought and discussion on the effects of the operational tempo (OPTEMPO) on our future leaders.



Over the past several years, our force has been actively engaged in war on two fronts. Our Soldiers and leaders have been performing remarkably well under very tough conditions and with great sacrifice. Without question, they are motivated, capable, and courageous. They have the combat skills necessary to execute independent, small-unit missions that range from assisting humanity to unleashing fury on the enemy—all at the same time. By all measures, they are talented and adaptive. However, there is a cost associated with such focus and intensity.

With time, we have developed a generation of future leaders that views standards differently than older generations. In an era in which the phrase "take a knee" is synonymous with "back in garrison" and our "roads to war" serve as lockstep training models, we have to wonder how our Soldiers and junior leaders will view traditions, standards, and training in the years to come. Some of you "old Soldiers" probably recall the culture of our post-Vietnam Army—a force that followed a decade of war. Our ranks were full of experienced combat veterans who viewed things differently than those of us who followed. I'm not saying that was a bad thing; I'm just making a correlation and implying that we might be headed down a similar path now. Let's reflect a bit.

*Our Soldiers and leaders have been performing remarkably well under very tough conditions and with great sacrifice. Without question, they are motivated, capable, and courageous.*

Remember when . . .

- . . . you spent an hour each evening preparing your uniform for the next duty day?
- . . . you took pride in your appearance—whether you were on road duty or not?
- . . . you prepared for attendance at professional development courses by stepping up your fitness game so that you would perform well on the Army physical fitness test (APFT) and meet body fat standards?
- . . . junior NCOs made on-the-spot corrections?
- . . . we were not on constant deployment cycles?
- . . . standards were not the flexible "bill payer" for OPTEMPO?
- . . . you actually developed training plans, as opposed to having them handed to you?
- . . . our leaders understood training development—not just its execution?

Although we don't like to admit it, there is an undertone throughout our ranks and within our formations. Maybe it's fatigue. Maybe it's an expanding generation gap that was created because our senior leaders have been so focused downrange that the training of subordinates on the basics of what makes us a professional, well-rounded force has been overlooked. Maybe it's just the environment in which we operate today. Regardless of what "it" is, a discussion is in order.

A Soldier's military appearance offers an immediate visual measure of discipline and pride. Any senior leader who has been around for awhile can, within minutes, get a good sense of a unit's discipline level by observing how the Soldiers present and carry themselves. In general, though, positive impressions achieved through appearance are no longer valued. Albeit a controversial statement, our Army combat uniform has made us lazy. While the Army combat uniform is utilitarian and the associated sewing and laundering costs are minimal, the uniform has provided an excuse for individuals who lack pride in their personal appearance. Some Soldiers wear filthy boots, curled or dirty name tapes, or uniforms that look like they just came from a duffle bag. You've heard the excuses, and you know what I'm talking about. But those who fancy themselves to be "combat Soldiers" need to understand that a concern for their appearance does not make them "pretty" and it does not mean that they are "garrison Soldiers"—rather, it's a mark of pride and professionalism.

Many of our younger Soldiers and junior leaders have never been compelled to put much effort into their appearance. Most of them have not worn a Class A uniform since they went through individual entry training. The disappearance of Class A uniforms from professional development courses and traditional events such as NCO induction ceremonies, coupled with the discontinuation of Class A inspections, has contributed to the devaluation of this basic Soldier skill. We have failed to train our young Soldiers in this area; therefore, it seems unlikely that future senior leaders will train their Soldiers in this area.

Fitness has never been more important. With today's OPTEMPO and yearlong deployments, it is easy to fall out of shape. To a certain degree, this is understandable; but you do not have a blanket license to "let go." Don't allow yourself to misinterpret fitness waivers that were designed to target specific populations. Don't fall into the trap of thinking that, because you are no longer required to take an APFT, you don't need to be physically fit upon your arrival at an NCO Education System course. And leaders, don't regard changes in requirements as a license to send your unfit Soldiers to class. Flag them and enroll them in a weight control program or special-population physical training with the intent to help them succeed. I have a sense that there is confusion in the field in this area. When was the last time you saw a Soldier discharged from the Army due to a failure to meet fitness standards? When did you last see a special-population physical training program in which the leaders were required to be right there with the deficient Soldiers? Is it possible that with all the waivers that have been issued, we have trained an entire generation of leaders to believe that standards are flexible? If we don't understand and embrace the purpose of fitness requirements and don't enforce the standards on those who are capable, we teach our future leaders that the rules can be bent and that fitness is not important. It's all about value, discipline, accountability, and enforcement.

*As senior leaders, we must ask ourselves if we are investing the time required to properly train the next generation of Soldiers—or if we have our heads down, moving forward to our next objective. Are we too busy operating in survival or "mission accomplishment" mode? Maybe we have outpaced ourselves.*

A constant factor in these examples is time—or the lack thereof. As senior leaders, we must ask ourselves if we are investing the time required to properly train the next generation of Soldiers—or if we have our heads down, moving forward to our next objective. Are we too busy operating in survival or "mission accomplishment" mode? Maybe we have outpaced ourselves. Maybe the OPTEMPO has resulted in a "Get R Done" mentality that has led to the bypassing of the midlevel steps necessary to develop our future leaders. Can we slow down? Do we need to adapt?

Think about disciplinary actions, for example. Remember when one of your subordinates "tripped up" and, as a result, was "called to the carpet"? Remember how that was somehow your fault (even though you were on leave and in another state) because you had apparently created a climate that was conducive to bad behavior? Back then, you were upset. But I dare say that, today, you recognize the training value in holding a young leader accountable for the actions of subordinates. Back then, you counseled lower-level Soldiers and provided them with corrective training. But young leaders in the same situation today would likely stand outside and wait to be told what's going to happen; they would be expected to have little or no accountability. These days, officer and NCO evaluation reports contain long lists of achievements (winning boards, maxing APFTs), but no mention of failures to meet weight or APFT standards or the administration of "Articles 15."<sup>1</sup> Why aren't these negative things mentioned? Are we missing a developmental opportunity?

We efficiently train our forces for deployment. Throughout the past nine years, we have streamlined the training process. We have managed to be effective—even with a shortage of organic equipment at home stations and the requirement to build our battle rosters within 90 days of "wheels up." But we have now reached a "T" in the road to training adaptability. Are we providing training on how to develop training? Our junior leaders can articulate what it is that they are doing and why, but they cannot explain how they got there. When I ask them,

*(Continued on page 9)*

# TEAMWORK AND AWARENESS: ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS AGAINST TERRORIST ATTACKS

*By Colonel Richard Vanderlinden (Retired) and Lieutenant Colonel Craig Benedict (Retired)*

*“Terrorists are constantly scheming to attack your Army, your country, and even your family.”*

—Specialist Brandy N. Gayanont,  
289th Military Police Company,  
3d U.S. Infantry Regiment

According to legendary basketball coach John Wooden, “When balance is lost, an organization grows weaker and is made vulnerable.”<sup>1</sup> Just as Coach Wooden’s observation can be applied to basketball teams, it can also be applied to those fighting to protect against terrorist attacks.

For many years, the Military Police Corps has acted as the bulwark against attacks on Army installations. Military police units and Department of the Army (DA) police have adjusted to the terrorist threats of today and continue to serve at the leading edge of current security efforts. But the building and sustaining of security is only a small part of the value of military police to the Army community “team” for which terrorism protection is designed. As the proponent for antiterrorism (AT), the Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG) oversees the Army AT program. OPMG acts as the manager of the team, constantly adjusting and improving security as circumstances dictate.

As the police force for Army communities, military and DA police are responsible for the safety and security of our installations and facilities against criminal and terrorist threats. The traditionally close relationship that military police have with the communities they protect makes them the perfect choice for the “team builder.” By leveraging this relationship, military police can build strength, improve community awareness, and help prevent terrorist attacks. Efforts begin at the DA level with AT policy and program resourcing and are reflected in AT doctrine and the global Military Police Corps AT mission. The common denominator within the strategic, operational, and tactical levels is the Military Police Corps and its responsibility to provide AT security. The community supports the military police mission by understanding the threat, providing information, and responding in a helpful way.

Extremist ideologies and separatist movements continue to have anti-Western and -U.S. orientations that

threaten our Nation and the Army. The attempted vehicle bombing in Times Square, New York, on 1 May 2010 reinforced the homeland defense perspective that terrorism is a persistent, enduring, worldwide threat to our Nation that requires a team effort involving security personnel and the community. And the potential threat of domestic and international terrorism extends from New York City to our Army communities. Therefore, the Army must maintain a strong defensive posture to prevent terrorist acts and protect critical Army assets, including people, information, and infrastructure. Our AT plans must be “team” plans that contain the defensive element of the Army’s combating terrorism program.

The “Army Antiterrorism Strategic Plan”<sup>2</sup> (ATSP), which was developed by OPMG in direct support of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, focuses and supports Army AT policy. The introduction to the ATSP (signed by then Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G-3/5/7, Lieutenant General [now General] James D. Thurman) states, “Through constant awareness and vigilance . . . we will succeed in our goal of preventing terrorist attacks” by including “. . . every person in the Army community” as active participants. Lieutenant General Thurman recognized that the primary building block for implementation of the AT strategy is a community with a basic understanding of potential terrorist act indicators, such as suspicious behavior or activity. The Military Police Corps is capable of leading the AT effort by consistently conveying the message to members of the Army community so that they, through their vigilance, can immeasurably contribute to our overall protection.

## **Enhancement of AT Awareness**

It is difficult to sustain AT awareness throughout our communities—particularly, since most community members feel that they live and work in the safest locations throughout the country. Army efforts to “ramp up” AT awareness began in earnest in 2008 and are now

under full-scale implementation. In October 2008, the AT Branch, OPMG, began taking deliberate steps to instill a heightened sense of awareness and vigilance across the Army. When asked about this new initiative, the AT Branch chief, Mr. Alex Mascelli, explained, “We cannot afford to drop our guard or become complacent. In fact, continuing to prevent future attacks becomes even harder and we must redouble our efforts to ensure terrorist threat awareness and vigilance is maintained. We must ensure that everyone plays in the endeavor.”

The first steps that the Army took to increase focus and resources on AT awareness involved adding “enhance AT awareness throughout the Army community” as an ATSP goal and developing a supporting AT strategic communication plan. Key portions of the Army AT strategic communication plan include the—

- Listing of the commander’s AT strategic talking points.
- Establishment of focused AT communication themes and messages.
- Branding of an AT image (logo and slogan) for awareness and program recognition.
- Approval of senior Army leaders to conduct an Army-wide AT awareness month.
- Implementation of iWATCH ARMY (a new terrorist watch program).

### Community Policing

**D**ue to their status and experience with communities, military and DA police have the lead role in expanding and enhancing criminal and terrorist threat awareness among local communities. By working together, the police and citizens of the community form the first line of defense against terrorist activities. Through their daily interaction with community members, police organizations educate and inform the community about potential threats. A knowledgeable and empowered community, in turn, extends the reach of police and security forces by serving as additional “eyes and ears.” Soldiers, DA civilians, Army contractors, and family members can add tremendous value to Army AT prevention and detection capabilities by serving as “sensors” in the fight against extremists and terrorists. The relationship between police and the community was one area of focus for the recent Army AT Awareness Month.

### AT Awareness Month

**O**n 16 February 2010, DA senior leaders approved the designation of August 2010 as AT Awareness Month. During this month, Army forces, installations, and facilities focused their attention on heightening awareness and vigilance in communities to prevent and protect against acts of terrorism. Areas of focus for AT Awareness Month included—


- Conducting AT training, education, and awareness for military personnel and DA civilians.

- Increasing the emphasis on reporting suspicious activities, describing reportable information, and identifying personnel to whom to report.
- Reviewing and emphasizing the AT roles and responsibilities of unit leaders and staffs across operational units, installations, and stand-alone facilities.
- Enhancing AT preparedness through local civilian and host nation partnerships and emergency response planning.

### iWATCH ARMY

**M**ilitary police have always played an important role in AT awareness by providing leadership, guidance, and advice to commanders and managers who are responsible for the security of Army installations and facilities. Military police leadership will continue to be critical as the Army implements iWATCH ARMY.

iWATCH is a modern, nationwide version of the Neighborhood Watch Program. Modeled after the Los Angeles Police Department’s terrorist watch program, iWATCH ARMY enables and encourages citizens to help protect their communities by identifying and reporting



Department of the Army iWATCH ARMY poster

suspicious behavior associated with terrorist activities. There is a passive element to iWATCH ARMY, which involves individual situational awareness of surroundings. There is also an active element, which involves the reporting of suspicious behavior or activities to military police or other law enforcement agencies for further investigation. Military police play an important role in educating the community about iWATCH ARMY and indicators of potential terrorist activity.

Investigations of successful terrorist attacks reveal that perpetrators conduct reconnaissance and surveillance missions to determine vulnerabilities, select targets, and develop and finalize attack plans. Local community members often have the opportunity to observe unusual or suspicious preoperational terrorist actions such as persons inquiring about security-related issues or photographing or videotaping buildings. By reporting these activities to military police or local law enforcement agencies for investigation, community members extend the “informal sensor system,” allowing for the better detection and prevention of terrorist activities.

The former chief of operations for OPMG, Colonel Chad B. McRee, put iWATCH ARMY into perspective, stating, “The nature of the terrorist threat warrants constant awareness in all missions and all operational environments. The ability to maintain an appropriate level of awareness demands training, education, and leadership. But it also requires a deliberate and sustained outreach effort, which leverages our entire Army community. Collectively, every member of our Army—Soldiers, DA civilians, family members, and Army contractors—plays an important role by watching for and reporting suspicious activity. If they see something suspicious, they should report it.”

In addition to their role in educating the community about AT awareness, military police also receive and investigate initial reports of suspicious behavior or activity. This entails gathering citizen reports, investigating potential terrorist activity, and initiating the suspicious-activity reporting process that is linked to broader, U.S. government terrorist intelligence capabilities.



**Always Ready, Always Alert**  
Because someone is depending on you

## Dissemination of Awareness Products

The AT Branch, OPMG, has developed and disseminated AT awareness products and tools designed to assist leaders in the development and implementation of community awareness programs at unit, installation, and stand-alone facility levels. Recent activities undertaken to ensure that AT awareness messages and products are received by the communities and that they add value at the community level include the—

- Mass distribution of more than one million AT awareness and iWATCH ARMY brochures, posters, and CD/DVD sets containing the products and tools necessary to support local commanders and staffs.
- Publication of high-impact AT awareness and iWATCH ARMY posters in the August 2010 issue of *Soldiers* magazine.
- Provision of AT awareness and iWATCH ARMY information and products to commanders and units through the Army Knowledge Online, AT Enterprise Portal, at <<https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/605757>>.

## Summary

Military police guide and assist commanders and other leaders who are responsible for the protection of units, installations, and stand-alone facilities by helping them assess the nature of the terrorist threat and employ the full defensive potential of the local community. A focused effort on AT awareness can empower Army community members by providing them with information about the constantly evolving terrorist threat and required personal protection measures. By leveraging the full capabilities of the Military Police Corps, the AT awareness and iWATCH ARMY initiatives can be effective tools in the defense against terrorism.

And as John Wooden indicated—by improving balance, we reduce our vulnerability.

### Endnotes:

<sup>1</sup>John Wooden and Steve Jamison, *Wooden on Leadership: How to Create a Winning Organization*, McGraw-Hill Companies, 5 April 2005.

<sup>2</sup>“Army Antiterrorism Strategic Plan,” 10 March 2009 (revised 1 August 2009).

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# What It Means To Be “A Good Soldier”

*By Command Sergeant Major Edgar W. Dahl (Retired)*

**Editor’s Note:** *This article was adapted from Command Sergeant Major Dahl’s farewell speech, which was delivered during his retirement ceremony at Fort Lewis, Washington, in April 2010, after serving more than 27 years in the Army.*

**T**wenty-one years ago, when I was a brand new drill sergeant, my battalion command sergeant major informed me that the most coveted title in the Army is “A Good Soldier.” He believed that a warrior who was remembered as A Good Soldier was one who had reached the apex of the profession. I remembered that command sergeant major’s words and constantly strived to be the best Soldier I could be as I advanced through the ranks.

Back then, I didn’t know what it took to be A Good Soldier. Was it someone who had spit-shined boots and a starched uniform? Was it someone who had short hair? Was it the guy who could recite regulations and field manuals by heart? Was it someone who was a member of the Audie Murphy Club and the Morales Club? Was it the one who won all of the boards? Was it the student who garnered all of the school awards? I didn’t know.

Certainly, a sharp appearance is important. And if you are an old-school military policeman like me, you undoubtedly understand the past significance of spit-shined boots, starched uniforms, and short hair. But what about out in the field? Did the “poster boy Soldier” fade away when his uniform wasn’t so sharp? Familiarity with regulations and field manuals is important—especially when taking care of other Soldiers. But is memorizing these things as important as knowing where to refer Soldiers when they need guidance? Membership in elite clubs is important, and winning boards is important. But is the ability to spout knowledge while seated in front of a panel of senior noncommissioned officers more important than being able to apply that knowledge?

I thought about what it took to be A Good Soldier, and I began to form my own opinion. In my mind, Good Soldiers never need to be reminded to wash their uniforms, cut their hair, or present a sharp appearance in garrison. They always show up on time, at the right place, in the right uniform, and with the right attitude. Good Soldiers work hard during physical training—not just because they want to achieve a high score, but because someday they might actually be required to haul a heavy can of ammunition to a fellow Soldier who is engaging the enemy or need

to carry a wounded Soldier who is in need of medical treatment. Good Soldiers maintain their equipment and clean their weapons without being told. They perform their precombat checks and inspections. And they are equally prepared for training in the field and for conducting missions downrange.

But above all, Good Soldiers remember that the mission comes first and the welfare of Soldiers comes second. When we try to twist that axiom by adopting “feel good” phrases like “mission first, people always,” we run the risk of sounding apologetic when we require that Soldiers do things that are uncomfortable or dangerous. In the Army, the mission comes first and being a Soldier is inherently difficult.

If your fellow Soldiers like you because you’re a nice guy, but wouldn’t trust you to share a foxhole with them in battle—then you probably need to reexamine your soldiering techniques.

So what do you get from the Army in return for your service as A Good Soldier? Well, there are some tangibles—a paycheck, a place to put your head, and three meals a day. The Army also provides you with clothing, equipment, and a weapon. And these things are certainly important.

But it’s the intangible things that are ultimately most important. When you join the Army, you enjoy a share of the glory, valor, and history that the Army has earned through 234 years of service to the Nation. You become a stitch in the Army flag—a piece of the fabric that was earned through the blood, sweat, and tears that were spent across the globe.

The men and women of Valley Forge, Gettysburg, San Juan Hill, the Argonne, Omaha Beach, Pork Chop Hill, Ia Drang, Grenada, Panama, Mogadishu, Afghanistan, Iraq, and a thousand places in between have passed a legacy on to you. Some of those Good Soldiers are buried on battlefields; their headstones serve as a reminder that, along with the benefits of being a Soldier, there is also a potential price to be paid.

And when you join the Army, you get to experience the camaraderie of other Soldiers who entered military service for their own reasons, but who are now drawn together by a common mission, purpose, and set of values. That same camaraderie—especially if forged and tested in battle—does not exist outside the military.

Your fellow Soldiers share heat, cold, thirst, fatigue, fear, and uncertainty about the future with you. For many, the Army obliterates prejudices and differences in demographics and upbringings and replaces these things with relationships that can only result from being a part of the oldest, most battle-hardened, and most powerful military organization in the Nation.

When you choose to join the Army, you receive the respect and admiration of an entire Nation. Americans love their Soldiers; and while they may disagree with some of the missions, they certainly don't begrudge those who stand in front of the flag, take an oath, and pick up a weapon to execute their assigned task.

Good Soldiers are not swayed by those who constantly gripe about the Army. Yes—in spite of the numerous tangible and intangible benefits provided by the Army, there are always those who find fault with what we do and how we do it. Although the Army is not perfect, it's much better than anything else; and we don't need or want

second-guessers, chronic complainers, or those who are not satisfied with our way of life. So, if you are one of those people, please do not enlist or reenlist.

In the end, the Army wants you to be able to shoot, move, and communicate. The Army wants you to salute, accept your mission, and do your best to accomplish it. And in return, you get to experience the satisfaction of serving your Nation; the privilege of joining the ranks of those who have worn Army green, khaki, or dusty blue; the admiration of your fellow Americans; and the love of your family. And sometimes you even get a warm bed, a hot meal, and a cold beer!

I feel honored and privileged to have served alongside many Good Soldiers and their families for the past 27 years. My hope is that I will be remembered as "A Good Soldier."

God bless you, our wonderful Army, and the United States of America.

Army strong!

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*Command Sergeant Major Dahl (Retired) most recently served as the command sergeant major of the 42d Military Police Brigade, Fort Lewis. He holds a master's degree in military arts and science from the American Military University, West Virginia.*

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*(Regimental Command Sergeant Major, continued from page 4)*

"How does this tie into your mission-essential task list?" or "Which collective task does this support?" the usual reply is a blank stare. This lack of understanding is not their fault; it's the result of an adaptive force taking care of business at a fast pace. We need to be aware of this shortfall and realize that we have an expanding gap that might be felt years down the road. We need to deliberately train our subordinates, and our subordinates need to undergo self-development, because there simply isn't time for institutional training in this area. (For example, from one-station unit training through graduation from the Sergeants Major Academy, our NCOs spend a total of only 17 months in a classroom environment.) Take a look at the professional development programs that are in place. Evaluate whether they are effective or whether they are routine and outdated. Test yourself by comparing the last couple of years' worth of quarterly and annual training guidance.

Our Corps is full of talented, courageous Soldiers and leaders. But the OPTEMPO has caused gaps in many areas. We must recognize and mitigate these gaps to ensure that the next generation is on track. The OPTEMPO has also had a somewhat positive impact on leader development. One day, our young team leaders and platoon leaders will be required to understand the details of how and why our Army operates the way it does. They will need to value tradition and understand standards in order to train and enforce them. Institutional training is not always the answer; true learning occurs through operational experience. We do what we can at the U.S. Army Military Police School to fill in the gaps, but the real bridges are built in your own grid square.

As always, please keep our warriors who are in harm's way—and their families—in your hearts and prayers. Be safe, enjoy yourselves, and continue your great service to our Regiment, our Army, and this great Nation.

***Of the Troops! For the Troops! NCOs Lead the Way!***

*Institutional training is not always the answer; true learning occurs through operational experience. We do what we can at the U.S. Army Military Police School to fill in the gaps, but the real bridges are built in your own grid square.*

**Endnote:**

Article 15 of U.S. Code, Title 10, *Armed Forces*, Subtitle A, Part II, Chapter 47, "Uniform Code of Military Justice," governs the issuance of nonjudicial punishment for relatively minor disciplinary offenses.

## *Our Brother's Keeper:*

# Army Law Enforcement Program Helps Those Who Serve

*By Mr. Colby Hauser*

*Stress is a monster. And few professions are as stressful as that of law enforcement or military service during periods of conflict. The exposure to traumatic or horrific events is an ever present reality; yet, there are still men and women who answer the call to service. But what happens when these traumatic events are over?*

A *critical-incident stressor* is an event or combination of events that have the potential to create an overwhelming emotional reaction in an individual to the extent that the individual is unable to function during or following the event or is unable to psychologically cope with the event.

According to Mr. Russell Strand, chief of the Family Advocacy Law Enforcement Training Division, U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, “. . . our special agents, military police, and our first responders . . . don't have the luxury of deciding what type of scene they will respond to. On any given day, they can be responding to a child death scene, a domestic violence scene, or even a mass murder incident like the one in November at Fort Hood.” “We ask a lot from our people,” he added, “so we need to take care of them and each other—not just physically, but in all ways.”

After several years of exhaustive research into steps that could be taken to assist Soldiers, special agents, and first responders in dealing with the stress associated with a critical incident, USAMPS developed the Critical-Incident Peer Support (CIPS) Course. The focus of the five-day course is on the recognition of signs and symptoms of critical-incident trauma and on intervention strategies. Subjects covered by the course include the critical-incident stress debriefing process, psychological effects of critical incidents, symptoms of stress, crisis intervention, peer support functions, coping skills, and communication. Students also learn to develop CIPS standing operating procedures for platoon- through brigade-sized elements. According to Ms. Donna Ferguson, branch chief and course manager for the CIPS Program, “When Soldiers are trained in this area, commanders begin to see less family violence, greater retention, and less medical difficulties as a result of psychological trauma.”

“CIPS has been preparing Army law enforcement professionals for responses to catastrophic incidents and assisting with follow-up with Soldiers after a response to an incident to fill the shortage of psychologists, counselors, and combat stress teams,” Ferguson explained. “The course is not designed to replace Mental Health or the chaplaincy, but to support the process,” she added. “Mental Health operates strongly on intervention, whereas this course is

designed on prevention. Most Soldiers don't seek Mental Health until their situation has become overwhelming [or] unmanageable or they receive a command referral.”

Due to their ability to recognize stress-related problems among their peers, special agents who have completed the CIPS training are better prepared to respond to critical or traumatic incidents. According to Army law enforcement professionals who have been involved with the CIPS Program, the healing process begins immediately for groups who receive a debriefing/defusing within 8 to 24 hours following an incident.

While the CIPS training is considered quite successful by Army law enforcement agencies at all levels, the program is also useful for any Soldier who has been subjected to a crisis situation or endured repetitively stressful circumstances, such as multiple deployments. “We have found over the last two years, after incorporating other [military occupational specialties] into the training, that the same successful results are yielded as with special agents and [military police],” Ms. Ferguson said.

But Ferguson cautions that, to combat any problems, the total problem must be examined. “The Army has specific training in the areas of PTSD [post traumatic stress disorder] and suicide; however, what most people do not realize is that suicide and PTSD are only two of the impacts of CIPS,” she said.

Strand, a leading expert in child abuse and sexual assault investigations, agrees. He stresses the importance of the “whole person approach” in dealing with critical-incident stress. “Not everyone reacts to stress the same way,” he said. “Even not reacting is a reaction, so when we respond to an incident, we try to frame the incident and kind of recreate the event in a way that everyone can understand.”

Although the CIPS Program is peer-based, USAMPS can deploy a quick-reaction team to assist with major incidents, such as the shootings that occurred at Fort Hood, Texas, on 5 November 2009.

“The program has been and continues to be a proven asset to the Army—both in garrison and [while] deployed,” Ferguson said. “This program is saving lives.”

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*Mr. Hauser is the community relations officer for the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. He holds a bachelor's degree in mass communications from the University of Oklahoma.*

# Passing the Torch



*By First Lieutenant Megan Howell*

*To prepare future platoon leaders at the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) at West Point for what they might encounter in their profession, General Fred Franks (Retired) created the semester-long MX400 “Officership” Capstone Course for seniors. This course, which is now in its second year, begins with a battle command focus, including a series of guest speakers—battle commanders ranging from platoon leaders who just completed operations to senior leaders such as the USMA superintendent, Lieutenant General Buster Hagenbeck. The speakers are invited to relate stories about their experiences in leading Soldiers (especially those stories involving the more challenging problems faced by young leaders in Iraq and Afghanistan) and engage the cadets in conversations about those stories. This provides the cadets with the opportunity to think about the types of leadership situations and dilemmas that they may encounter.*

I was one of five privileged platoon leaders invited to participate in a January 2010 iteration of this USMA event. My fellow participants and I spent our first day at USMA reflecting upon our own experiences—with each other and a team of officer mentors. Our conversation was followed by a dinner, during which General Franks thanked us for our service and shared some of his desires and expectations regarding topics to be covered during the event. For example, he asked us to share our feelings about our Soldiers, relay the importance of character, and provide the cadets with a sense of what is expected of a platoon leader who is handed a tough mission. General Franks listened to our stories and shared a couple of his own. It was inspiring to learn that, as a young major, General Franks had been severely wounded in Vietnam, yet continued to press forward.

As for my own background, I was commissioned from USMA in 2008 and assigned as the platoon leader, 3d Platoon, 218th Military Police Company, Fort Campbell, Kentucky. By April 2009, we were deployed to Kirkuk, Iraq. While most of the company remained at Forward Operating Base Warrior in Kirkuk, my platoon moved to the city of Hawijah. As the outlying platoon, we supported a cavalry battalion and an armor battalion and conducted

a police transition team mission for police stations located in the Hawijah Iraqi Police District. Throughout the course of a year, 3d Platoon conducted more than 50 specialized police training classes and completed 575 combat patrols to Iraqi police stations. We also coordinated the acquisition of land, ammunition, and supplies; provided retraining for Iraqi police who needed additional instruction; and controlled the safety aspects of four Iraqi police ranges. Our success depended on our ability to operate in an incredibly decentralized fashion, with young, noncommissioned officers (NCOs) leading patrols and training Iraqi police every day. This was a new concept for an inexperienced platoon leader like me.

Most cadets do not know much about how military police units deploy and conduct operations, but the usual military police mission set of training and peacekeeping is becoming the norm for maneuver units. In addition, the need to “power down” leadership and operate in a decentralized fashion is becoming more and more prevalent across the force. I kept these trends in mind while attempting to connect with a broad range of cadets during the speaking engagement.

*(Continued on page 13)*

# Dynamics of the DES

*By Major Kevin M. Kreie*

*At 0200, the police shift commander called the Director of Emergency Services (DES) to report an incident. While responding to a domestic altercation, one of the police officers discovered that the husband, who was a military family member, was making explosives in the house. Explosive ordnance disposal and fire department personnel responded and began evacuating twenty neighborhood families from their homes.*

The above incident is typical of those encountered by the DES, who is directly responsible for a host of community services, including the law enforcement mission, fire services, access control, and morning crossing guard functions. There are five areas of interest for those who may someday hold this position: administrative issues, logistics issues, law enforcement techniques, community relations, and senior leader communications.

There are a host of DES administrative requirements. One of these is compliance with Army regulations, which generally proves to be most difficult at the beginning of a tour. Unless actively sought, many discrepancies remain undiscovered; however, once a problem is recognized and resolved, compliance can be maintained through periodic review. Another requirement involves the establishment of standing operating procedures (SOPs). While it may seem impossible to write—or even think of—every SOP necessary for the various potential situations, basic SOPs (such as SOPs for handling driving-under-the-influence cases, domestic disputes, and criminal pursuits) can be established. Once these basic SOPs have been completed, additional ones can be created as other situations arise. Because many DES employees are government civilians and contractors, a third administrative requirement consists of Civilian Personnel Advisory Center courses for supervising civilians and Acquisition Corps courses for contracting officer representatives (CORs). Even if the DES does not serve as the actual COR, the COR courses are recommended due to the workforce composition.

Logistics issues are important to any organization, but technological issues are particularly important to the DES. The technology of emergency service systems is advancing at a rapid pace. While it may not be feasible to acquire all technological advantages, it is still possible to “improve the foxhole.” The DES must research available technologies, determine which of them are most likely to benefit the community, and develop a plan to acquire them. Due to the cost of technology, the modernization of an organization is often most practical when conducted in steps; this approach can pay significant dividends. Examples of emergency service systems include digital child identification systems, automated law enforcement dispatch systems, security cameras placed in high-crime areas, access control scanners, and light detection and ranging systems (which can pinpoint speeds of selected vehicles).

Law enforcement is the most challenging DES mission. Technical policing skills are required to successfully complete this mission. Patrols cannot simply drive around and respond when called; they must use their technical expertise to prevent and spot illegal activity. For example, the explosives that were discovered when police responded to the domestic altercation described above would not have been detected if the police officers had not had the proper training and technical skills—skills which can be acquired through numerous local law enforcement classes. In addition, the use of specific policing techniques is based on police intelligence and crime statistics. The particular day, geographic

area, and composition of the population affect the crime rate. Knowing the “hot spots” is vital in determining the timing and location of police patrols.

One way to enhance law enforcement operations is through community relations. Good community relations not only cast the police organization in a positive light, but also allow the organization to obtain valuable information that would not normally be reported by the public. A good rapport with the public can be accomplished through various programs such as the Drug Abuse Resistance Education Program, the Neighborhood Watch Program, and bicycle rodeos. The establishment of a regular juvenile patrol is also advantageous. Assigning a couple of officers to develop a rapport with the juvenile population can help prevent juvenile mischief and assist in collecting information about previous incidents.

Communication with installation leaders is very important. The garrison and senior mission commanders have a vested interest in DES operations; therefore, they must be kept apprised of what happens on the installation. The DES must inform them of the true nature of any problems. For example, for every four physical domestic altercations that are disclosed on a blotter, there may be thirty verbal domestic altercations for which no charges were filed. If the senior leaders do not understand the entire situation, they could direct the redistribution of patrols to focus on what they perceive as the main issues, thereby removing the patrols from areas where they are needed most.

The DES position is very challenging and carries great responsibility—many of the same responsibilities required of a command position, including administrative, logistics, intelligence, and operation aspects of the mission on a 24/7 basis. At the same time, the position is also very rewarding. In addition to the knowledge and experience gained, there is great satisfaction in contributing to the community in which you live.

**For information about the Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, DES, go to <<http://www.wood.army.mil/lec/Default.htm>>.**

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*At the time this article was written, Major Kreie was an Intermediate-Level Education student at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He previously served as the DES, Fort Irwin, California. Major Kreie holds a bachelor's degree in criminal justice from the University of Wisconsin–Oshkosh and a master's degree in theology from the American Christian College and Seminary, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.*

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*(“Passing the Torch,” continued from page 11)*

An important skill for military police leaders is the ability to work directly with maneuver battalion and company commanders. This can be challenging, but our ability to work well with these leaders contributed to our success. Because the training mission is new to many maneuver units, my NCOs and I worked with the battlespace owners, providing them with standard military police training materials as well as guidance and advice from law enforcement professionals and international police advisors who have years of knowledge and experience. This ensured that all U.S. leaders were on the same “sheet of music” with regard to training and that they were all teaching the Iraqi police the same techniques and standards.

Another critical skill is the ability to work well with local security force leaders. Following the 30 June 2009 deadline established in Article 24 of the U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement,<sup>1</sup> Iraqi security forces took charge of area security, while U.S. forces played a supporting role. However, due to the strong relationship we had with Iraqi police leaders in our district, our partners continued to request training and support from coalition forces.

Finally, our success in Hawijah was largely due to the hard work and cooperation of our NCOs. Their experience and dedication caused the accomplishments of the platoon to stand out across Multinational Division–North, and I was able to showcase their exemplary military police service in my USMA presentation. In addition to encouraging the

cadets to work hard and prepare to lead Soldiers, I wanted to inspire them to look forward to the honor of serving as a leader in our profession.

I think the cadets were able to gain some worthwhile insight from the USMA event. But more surprising, and personally worthwhile, was the positive impact that those two days at USMA had on me. I was reminded that, even though the current operational tempo makes it difficult to find the time, it is important that we reflect on our experiences. Reflection prompts new insight and brings new meaning to past events—which in turn, can improve our understanding of, and reaction to, future events. Sharing my knowledge and experiences with future leaders helped reaffirm my own sense of professional identity and pride in the Military Police Corps.

**Endnote:**

<sup>1</sup>The official name of the U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement is the “Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities During Their Temporary Presence in Iraq.” The agreement established that U.S. combat forces would withdraw from Iraqi cities by 30 June 2009 and that all U.S. forces would completely withdraw from Iraq by 31 December 2011.

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*First Lieutenant Howell is a platoon leader with the 218th Military Police Company. She holds a bachelor's degree from the USMA at West Point, New York.*

# Military Police Efforts in PTT Operations

*By Major Jon Myers*

In my most recent assignment as a military police battalion operations and training officer (S-3) with the Multinational Division–North (MND-N), I was routinely involved in visualizing and strategizing the teaching, coaching, and mentoring of more than 82,000 Iraqi police in four northern provinces of Iraq (Diyala, Salah ad-Dinh, Kirkuk, and Ninewa). These efforts were conducted in direct support of a division headquarters and four brigade combat teams (BCTs). I also worked with the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) from 2003 to 2005, so I have witnessed the efforts of Multinational Security Transition Command–Iraq and Multinational Corps–Iraq agencies and units in improving the IPS over time. Based on my experiences, which were confined to the operational environments (OEs) of MND-N and North Babil Province (before the Multinational Division–Baghdad expansion), I have identified three key issues regarding the ability of police transition teams (PTTs) to shape the development of the IPS as a rule-of-law (ROL) organization. These issues, which are not all-inclusive and do not reflect conditions in Baghdad, are as follows:

- The U.S. Department of State (DOS) contribution in the form of quality international police advisors (IPAs) who have managerial skills and experience needs considerable improvement.
- The tendency to cast responsibility for IPS development almost exclusively on military police units leads to confusion and coordination issues.
- Commanders at all levels must set realistic IPS goals that are within the capabilities and cultural norms of the IPS.

## **Key Players**

The DOS in Iraq is charged with supplementing the efforts of the Multinational Security Transition Command–Iraq in the training, equipping, and operational mentoring of Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MoI) units (including the IPS, border police, and national police) and other MoI law enforcement enablers (such as canine, explosive ordnance disposal, and traffic police personnel). However, it is the IPS that will ultimately establish the nation’s ROL after Ministry of Defense military units complete the “clear and hold” portions of the many ongoing security operations in the country.

Initially, DOS-contracted IPAs were managed under two different contracts. DynCorp International handled IPAs who were tasked with the operational mentoring of the IPS in stations, districts, and provincial headquarters (active IPS forces); and Military Professional Resources, Incorporated (MPRI), handled IPA trainers who were responsible for the establishment, operation, and mentoring of Iraqi police instructors within various provincial and MoI-sponsored, initial-entry and specialized police training academies. The Multinational Corps–Iraq contribution consisted of military police companies, battalions, and brigades that executed the PTT mission in various capacities throughout the different OEs in Iraq. A typical MND-N PTT was comprised of a twelve- to fourteen-member military police squad, supplemented by one or two IPAs and one or two local national interpreters. The MND-N PTT was usually tasked to operate at two to six Iraqi police stations. Team members also conducted some district headquarters level mentoring, depending on the OE and PTT forces available.

In each MND-N BCT, there were two to four military police companies that were arrayed according to the BCT commander’s mission priorities. The relationships between the companies and the landowning battalions varied; but in most cases, the company commander and platoon leaders were the coalition force elements responsible for the PTT mission, which included setting goals, recruiting, training, and providing operational mentoring for the IPS within the BCT OE. In MND-N, the military police battalion worked directly for the division headquarters, coordinating various PTT efforts across the four provinces and directly interfacing with the Multinational Security Transition Command–Iraq, Multinational Corps–Iraq and, in some cases, the MoI.

## **Improvement of the DOS IPA Contribution**

In a perfect world, it seems that DOS-supplied IPAs would be an excellent tool that the commander could use to effect the proper development of the IPS in terms of manning, equipping, training, and providing operational mentoring for the Iraqi ROL. However, the first problem I observed during the 30-plus months that I spent in Iraq was the quality of the IPAs that were deployed to Iraq. More than half of the IPAs that I have worked with, supervised, or otherwise encountered were

great Americans; but they had no business trying to teach, coach, or mentor a foreign police force. Many of these IPAs hailed from small towns or police forces; and although they were capable of competently executing technical law enforcement tasks, they were not suited to operate in a varied and harsh OE such as Iraq—nor did they possess the midlevel law enforcement managerial experience that is critical to mentoring a foreign police force. Some IPAs were still trying to teach basic patrol level tasks (such as applying hand restraints or conducting nonfelony, vehicular traffic stops) to the IPS at the station, when what the IPS really needed—especially during and after the coalition force surge—was instruction and guidance in the areas of community-oriented policing programs, criminal pattern analysis, and patrol planning and distribution. These are skills that are necessary for the lone IPA in a military police squad (or equivalent PTT formation) to truly help transform the IPS into a credible law enforcement organization.

### **Military Police as the Primary IPS Development Organization**

Until the 1 January 2009 implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement, U.S. Army military police units in Iraq served as an outstanding force provider for most PTTs. Because the ability of military police Soldiers to teach, coach, and mentor Iraqi police is unparalleled by any other Army unit, working with host nation police forces is a collective task of all combat support military police units. However, I observed a tendency for battalion and BCT commanders to rely too heavily on military police units to tackle the complex and diverse issues of IPS development.

The development of the IPS as one of three critical ROL organizations was often not synchronized with that of the other two—the justice [judiciary] and corrections systems. In countries that seek democratic ideals and principles (such as Iraq), the need for ROL is nearly universal; therefore, police are typically involved in almost all government projects. However, the efforts of military police units in Iraq were seldom coordinated with those of the Multinational Security Transition Command–Iraq or DOS in dealing with the Iraqi judiciary, provincial reconstruction teams, border police, national police, and most other MoI responsibilities outside the specific IPS umbrella.

The typical military police PTT did an outstanding job of training, coaching, and mentoring at the local IPS station level and—with the addition of a platoon leader or company commander—the district level. At the provincial level, BCTs used their own officers or assigned military police units to build PTTs that, in theory, were robust enough to teach, coach, and mentor senior IPS officers and general officers in the areas of police operations, personnel administration, logistics, maintenance, community outreach, and a host of other required police administrative and managerial tasks. In some cases, the scope of influence

of provincial PTTs on the provincial headquarters directly impacted more than 25,000 Iraqi police. Neither company grade military police officers nor field grade officers of other branches had the expertise and experience required to handle such a challenge. Therefore, attempts to organize provincial PTTs around these officers proved ineffective. This resulted in a continuous need for engagements from key division and BCT leaders and military police battalion commanders to effect the desired changes within a given IPS provincial headquarters.


As divisions, BCTs, and military police units rotated in and out of Iraq, PTT dynamics became even more complicated. There were no long-term, guiding principles or goals to elevate the IPS to the level of competence desired by the coalition force. This problem was partially rectified from 2007 to 2008, as Multinational Force–Iraq expectations of IPS development became more pointed. However, many years were wasted by applying Band-Aids as a temporary solution instead of maintaining a dynamic campaign plan with achievable and measurable goals.

### **Realistic Goals for the IPS**

Commanders at all levels had a tendency to issue extremely unrealistic IPS operational tasks and goals for military police and other PTT organizations. In addition to the usual number of IPS policemen to be trained, BCT and division commanders set forth a relatively simple, easily measured, operational requirement to recruit and train thousands of additional IPS policemen from 2007 to 2008. In the MND-N alone, the coalition force (military police, PTTs, and BCTs) trained more than 10,000 Iraqi policemen per year. In a nation with a trained police force of 250,000, this may not seem like many; but it was a powerful effort compared to the number of graduates from American police academies.

Planning for the IPS to accomplish specific tasks and goals was one of the most significant challenges. Part of the problem was that American philosophies of problem solving and task accomplishment do not translate well into the society and organizational customs of the IPS. Regular, daily police operations require thorough criminal network analysis, trend analysis, the analysis of neighborhood and community population statistics, and investigative capabilities that are well beyond the capabilities of any Iraqi police organization that I have observed. However, battalion and BCT commanders expected PTTs to ensure that the IPS prevented kidnappings and emplacements of improvised explosive devices in certain areas. This was an unrealistic expectation—until basic skill sets could be taught and ingrained into the IPS. While eager, intelligent IPS officers can be trained to master technical subjects, the issue of ingraining basic Western policing philosophies into the IPS (which is the typical U.S. commander's expectation) presents a greater challenge. Cultural tendencies of the IPS will continue to

*(Continued on page 20)*



# Achieving Iraqi Police Primacy Through Partnership

*By First Lieutenant Carl F. Yeaney*

**K**irkuk Province is the only province in the U.S. Division–North area of Iraq where police primacy has been achieved. The 3d Infantry Division (the U.S. Division–North headquarters division) defines police primacy as “Iraqi police forces having primary responsibility for internal security under civilian authority in accordance with the constitution and consistent with the rule of law (ROL) within a given area.” Although the Kirkuk police force is organized much like the police forces of other provinces, police primacy has been secured in Kirkuk through professional efforts and working relationships with other Iraqi Security Force units and organizations within the province.

Throughout their deployment, members of the 218th Military Police Company have supported Iraqi police in all areas of operation. They have provided continuous mentorship and offered specific suggestions for addressing particular issues. This enabled Iraqi police leaders to focus their attention on operational areas that could be refined. All actual efforts are carried out by the Iraqi police themselves so that they may build the foundation necessary for future unilateral self-sustainment.

One 218th priority is to improve Iraqi station training programs. The Soldiers of the 218th assist station training officers and provide them with the references necessary to prepare for their classes. They also focus on crime scene management and investigations, conducting biometric certification courses for fingerprinting and encouraging individual police station leaders to take advantage of the Investigative Officer Course—a two-week training program that is independently conducted by Iraqi police trainers at the Kirkuk Training Center.

In addition to the main areas of focus, company police transition teams (PTTs) also review and disseminate information about wanted persons or about vehicles to be used during checkpoint operations, review ongoing investigation packets and track the status of cases, conduct sensitive-item inventories and monitor outgoing logistical requests, and conduct combined operations such as community policing patrols and humanitarian-aid distribution.

The efforts of the 218th Military Police Company have resulted in the validation of eight Iraqi police stations in the Kirkuk Province—a recognition that is based on a mutual agreement between the military police unit and the station’s respective landowning company and battalion. Each validation was accompanied by a ceremony signaling that the station was ready to operate independently of U.S. forces oversight. And each validation marked the culmination of a lot of hard work from each individual station and partnered PTT.

All special policing units at the provincial level of police operations fall under the Provincial Director of Police, Major General Jamal Taher Bakr. The partnered U.S. organization for these units is the provincial PTT, which answers directly to the landowning brigade and acts as the higher element of tactical control. Information and training plans are communicated to the Iraqi and U.S. sides, allowing for a more refined training focus from the top level down. Individual platoons synchronize efforts with company and battalion landowners through weekly meetings, which reduces redundancy in training and information collection efforts. Through the mentorship and development of Iraqi police partners, landowning units are better able to conduct successful kinetic operations across the Kirkuk Province.

Through combined, concentrated efforts and the maintenance of good partnerships, the 218th Military Police Company has succeeded in its efforts regarding the Iraqi police in Kirkuk. The achievement of police primacy is a definitive stance toward a safe and secure nation for all Iraqis.

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*First Lieutenant Yeaney is a platoon leader for the 218th Military Police Company. He holds a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice from Pennsylvania State University, State College, Pennsylvania.*

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# COP, COIN, and Afghanistan

By Lieutenant Colonel Florentino Santana

*During North Atlantic Treaty Organization offensive operations in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, provincial residents asked International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops not to turn their area responsibilities over to the Afghan National Police (ANP) because of a fear of police corruption. The residents were so fearful of the ANP that they actually preferred Taliban rule.*

This situation presents a problem for ISAF counter-insurgency (COIN) operations in Afghanistan. Policing can be an effective COIN tool. According to Field Manual (FM) 3-24, police are the most visible institution of the government's response to an insurgency. Police are—or at least should be—able to determine the individual needs of a community and address each constituency's concerns. In theory, this enhances the government's legitimacy.

Families, tribes, and ethnic identities are the cornerstone of Afghan society. This is due to the rugged geography that results in the presence of autonomous villages throughout the country. "Afghans identify themselves by *Qawm*—the basic subnational identity based on kinship, residence, and sometimes occupation. This instinctive social cohesiveness includes tribal clans, ethnic subgroups, religious sects, locality-based groups, and groups united by interests."<sup>1</sup>

In Afghan culture, social control mechanisms are organized at the local level. The real Afghan social and political powers also reside at the local level. Therefore, policing is a local issue for Afghans, and police development should occur at that level. The central government should establish the conditions necessary to allow the concerns of the populace to be addressed within the communities. Community-oriented policing (COP) is a policing philosophy that is compatible with COIN theory and ISAF strategy. The COP model can assist the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in establishing the conditions necessary for local communities to address local problems. The legitimacy of the Afghan government depends upon its ability to accomplish that objective. The legitimacy of the central government facilitates the accomplishment of ISAF and U.S. strategic objectives in Afghanistan. Therefore, ISAF should place the highest

priority on police training and development. Police are members of the government agency that is closest to the people, and they can serve as a communication conduit between the people, local government, and central government.

Under the COP philosophy, the community is placed at the center of crime prevention. The components of COP are—

- **Strategic-oriented policing (SOP).** Police surge and use directed, aggressive, and saturation patrols to *clear* the criminal element from the community. They then *hold* that effort as they transition to the next phase.
- **Neighborhood-oriented policing (NOP).** NOP, which can be considered the second phase of implementation, can actually occur simultaneously with SOP. This is the heart of COP. For NOP to work, the community must be more than an ally or partner in the fight against crime; it must be at the head of the organization to which police are responsible and accountable. Communities with police *build* mechanisms to identify and prioritize problems. Examples of NOP programs include communication programs, community social control programs, community patrols, and community crime prevention.<sup>2</sup>
- **Problem-oriented policing (POP).** POP is a concept of effectiveness in policing. "Problem-oriented policing addresses a particular problem, analyzes the problem, determines a course of action, implements the program, then follows up in an evaluative manner. If the problem is resolved, the police and community must only keep the problem in check. If it is not resolved, alternative solutions are generated and implemented."<sup>3</sup>

Although COP and POP philosophies were developed separately over the same period of time, the implementation

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of COP requires the implementation of POP. Police departments are just one of the many agencies responsible for improving the quality of life in a community. “The goal . . . is for police and community to work together in solving those particular problems that cannot be solved by traditional police work and need special attention for their resolution by developing a tailor-made response for the particular problem and situation.”<sup>4</sup> Police officers team up with the community to form a broad, problem-solving partnership. The chief of police serves as an advocate for the community, sets the tone for the delivery of law enforcement services and multiagency responses to criminal and noncriminal quality-of-life issues, and ensures that organizational values remain ever present in the minds of the officers.

“The primary COIN objective is to enable local institutions. Therefore, supporting the police is essential.”<sup>5</sup> With COP, police are instrumental in supporting the community by identifying problems at the most local level possible. In essence, the police become the conduit by which other government agencies address quality-of-life issues throughout the community. Therefore, the COP philosophy supports COIN operations not only in the security line of operation, but also in terms of all logical lines of operations (LLO).<sup>6</sup> Police provide civil security while also assisting with the delivery of other essential services, as determined by the community. The people engage in continuous, positive interaction with the government through the police. This leads to economic development and the legitimacy of government.

COP is compatible with the “clear, hold, and build” strategy outlined in the current ISAF campaign plan. As ISAF develops the ANP capability to secure Afghanistan, defeat terrorism, and neutralize the insurgency, an effective police force is critical to the security line of operation. ISAF should assist Afghan National Security Forces to *clear* areas of enemy control, *hold* areas free from enemy control by ensuring that they remain under the control of a peaceful Afghan government with adequate security presence, and *build* the ANP and capacity of local institutions. The ANP should concentrate on solving community problems and becoming a conduit between the people and the government.

COP demonstrates that policing is COIN; there is no separation between the two. Police are not low-cost trigger pullers; they are part of the development of governance and criminal justice. Social control in Afghan society resides at the local level, and policing is a local issue. Local police departments can be tied to a national system through legal and training standards and funding.

Police should train police. The Military Police Corps should be the proponent for police transition team training certification requirements. Reserve Component units should consist of civilian police officers who have been deployed for this specific mission. The number of contracted police trainers should be increased. If the implementation of a police program is limited to the national level, ISAF should enlist countries with national programs (especially Muslim countries) to provide police trainers.

#### Endnotes:

<sup>1</sup>*The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost*, Russian General Staff, translated and edited by Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress, University Press of Kansas, 2002.

<sup>2</sup>Willard M. Oliver, *Community-Oriented Policing: A Systematic Approach to Policing*, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, March 2007.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, 15 December 2006, p. 6-19.

<sup>6</sup>“Commanders use LLOs to visualize, describe, and direct operations when positional reference to enemy forces has little relevance. LLOs are appropriate for synchronizing operations against enemies that hide among the populace. A plan based on LLOs unifies the efforts of joint, interagency, multinational, and [host nation] forces toward a common purpose.” FM 3-24, p. 5-3.

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Robert R. Friedman, *Community Policing: Comparative Perspective and Prospects*, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1992.

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Florentino Santana, “A New Paradigm for the Iraqi Police: Applying Community-Oriented Policing to Iraqi Police Development,” School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 22 May 2009.

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*At the time this article was written, Lieutenant Colonel Santana was serving as a strategic planner and the deputy director of Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5) for U.S. Forces–Afghanistan. He holds a bachelor’s degree in political science and economics from the University of Connecticut; a master’s degree in public service from Cumberland University, Lebanon, Tennessee; and a master of military arts and science degree from the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.*

# I Corps Detainee Release Operations: A Holistic Approach

By Major Lisa M. Gasque

The bilateral Iraq-U.S. Security Agreement, which marked the beginning of a new approach to detention operations in Iraq, was instituted on 1 January 2009. Article 22 of the agreement requires that all U.S.-held detainees be released in a safe and orderly manner or transferred to the care and custody of the government of Iraq (GOI) for prosecution and further detention. Detainees are transferred to the GOI only with a valid warrant, detention, or conviction order issued by an Iraqi judge. GOI-established detainee release and transfer benchmarks have been met by the I Corps Provost Marshal Office (PMO).

The release and transfer of detainees is a combined effort of the I Corps provost marshal, major subordinate commanders, Task Force 134, the GOI, and provincial Iraqi leaders. The requirement to release all detainees in U.S. custody (including those considered to be dangerous) necessitated the development of a plan that would ensure the safety of U.S. forces and the people of Iraq. Simply opening the doors of the theater internment facilities (TIFs) and releasing the detainees was not the answer. Rather, a safe, holistic approach was necessary. The resulting plan involves the categorization of detainees and the prioritization of their release.

The PMO Detainee Operations Cell provides coordination and oversight of the Multinational Corps-Iraq detainee release program. The I Corps PMO receives a list of detainees who are eligible for release and forwards the list to U.S. divisions (USDs) for local vetting through Iraqi provincial authorities to ensure that there are no local arrest warrants for the detainees. USDs also secure a guarantor—typically a GOI official or an *imam*<sup>1</sup>—who takes responsibility for the detainees and their conduct upon their release. If the detainee continues to engage in criminally deviant behavior, the guarantor may be held liable and responsible. Once the guarantor is named, the USD returns the list of detainees for release—along with the name of their guarantor—to the I Corps PMO.

The I Corps PMO coordinates with the division level combatant commander and Task Force 134 regarding the date and location of the release to ensure maximum safety for the released detainee and the general public. Once a detainee is scheduled for release, the I Corps PMO tracks the detainee from the TIF to a release ceremony, which is conducted by the provincial Iraqi authorities at the detainee's home of record or point of capture. During the release ceremony, the guarantor speaks to the detainees about the need for reconciliation. The detainees swear to renounce terrorism and practice good behavior. They sign a statement, swearing their allegiance to the new and sovereign Iraq. They are then released to their guarantor.

Additional oversight of the detainee release program is provided by the Joint Subcommittee on Detainee Affairs. The I Corps PMO sends a representative to meetings of the Joint Subcommittee on Detainee Affairs to brief the Deputy Commanding General for Detention Operations, various GOI officials, and embassy personnel on the status of detainee releases and release ceremonies.

The release of detainees during Ramadan<sup>2</sup> has historically been viewed as an act of forgiveness and has even resulted in the resolution of tribal conflicts. As a gesture of goodwill in support of reconciliation efforts, the I Corps PMO facilitated the release of more than 200 “low threat” detainees during the Eid al-Fitr religious holiday that marks the end of Ramadan. The I Corps PMO coordinated with the Counter Improvised Explosive Device Operational Integration

“The U.S. forces shall provide the Iraqi government with the available information about all the detainees when this agreement is implemented. The specialized Iraqi authorities shall issue arrest warrants for those who are wanted. The U.S. forces will coordinate completely and effectively with the Iraqi government for the hand over of the wanted people to it, according to valid Iraqi arrest warrants and release all other detainees in an organized and secure way unless the Iraqi government requests otherwise under Article 4 of this agreement.”

—from Article 22,  
Iraq-U.S. Security Agreement

Center to provide combatant commanders with a good idea of the number and types of detainees to be released in their areas of operation. This information allowed the commanders to better prepare their areas to receive the released detainees and maintain low recidivism rates. To date, none of the detainees who were released on Eid have been identified as recidivists.

The I Corps PMO has released or transferred custody of more than 6,700 TIF detainees. To facilitate low recidivism rates, the detainees are enrolled in training and education courses including basic education classes, computer classes, vocational training, and work programs that facilitate the reintegration of detainees into the community. The completion of these courses increases the detainees' opportunities for employment after their return home. Recidivism rates remain low.

The drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq resulted in the need for a plan to transfer or release detainees under U.S. custody and control. Article 22 of the Iraq-U.S. Security Agreement has helped solidify the perception of a sovereign Iraq by halting the detention of Iraqis by U.S. forces. The I Corps PMO has played a fundamental role in enforcing the Security Agreement as it pertains to the safe and orderly release and transfer of U.S.-held detainees to the GOI.

**Endnotes:**

<sup>1</sup>An *imam* is an Islamic leader who leads the prayer during religious gatherings.

<sup>2</sup>Ramadan, which takes place during the ninth month of the Islamic calendar, is a period of religious observance during which Muslims refrain from excess or ill-natured eating or drinking from dawn until sunset.

**Reference:**

Iraq-U.S. Security Agreement, 1 December 2008.

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*(“Military Police Efforts in PTT Operations,” continued from page 15)*

preclude the attainment of that goal for some time. The emulation of recruiting, training, and operating methods of the police forces in other “successful” countries in the region (such as Jordan) represents a more sound, realistic approach to leading the IPS to an acceptable proficiency level.

**Conclusion**

Because the PTT approach in Iraq has changed since 1 January 2009, many of the specific points of this article may be dated. However, the U.S. Army will inevitably be involved in the rebuilding of some other nation's police force in the future; consequently, previous lessons learned should be applied in the wargaming of future postconflict scenarios. At a minimum, the Military Police Corps should review the successes and failures of its seven years' experience in Iraq and use the information obtained to build the proper relationships within the DOS and U.S. Department of Justice. Then, during

the next multiagency effort, PTTs might have a more profound and lasting effect, with fewer coordination and continuity issues.

**Recommendations**

I recommend that—

- DOS police advisors be more thoroughly trained and experienced in midlevel police managerial tasks.
- Military police (and other PTT organizations) build on long-range goals that carry over through unit rotations and that the needs of host nation police be placed above constantly changing unit priorities.
- Military police educate landowning commanders about regional police capabilities so that the commanders form realistic expectations of indigenous police forces.

**Acknowledgement:** Lieutenant Colonel Brian Bisacre (former commander of the 728th Military Police Battalion) contributed to this article.

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*At the time this article was written, Major Myers was an Intermediate-Level Education and School of Advanced Military Studies student at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He based this article on his overall experience with the IPS in various leadership positions in U.S. Army military police units in 2003 (battalion plans officer [AS3], 503d Military Police Battalion [Airborne] Mosul, Iraq), 2004–2005 (company commander, 118th Military Police Company [Airborne], North Babil Province, Iraq), and 2007–2008 (battalion S-3, 728th Military Police Battalion, MND-N and provincial PTT, Mosul).*



## Military Police Corps Regimental Prayer

*Heavenly Father, we approach You today because  
You have called us to be a people of prayer.*

*We praise You because You are our Creator,  
our Redeemer, and our Provider.*

*We acknowledge our great need for You  
as we fulfill our mission as Soldiers.*

*We have been called to serve our Nation as Military Police,  
and we are proud of the honored heritage  
of the Regiment and our motto:*

*"Of the Troops and For the Troops."*

*Whether we are fighting an enemy, securing an area,  
patrolling the streets, or helping someone in distress,  
help us, O Lord, to always be men and women of integrity  
who can be counted on to do the right thing.*

*Give us the strength to stand for what is right  
and to oppose those who would do harm  
to our Nation and the people we serve.*

*May we always be truthful in word, deed, and signature  
and bring honor through our service to the memory  
of those in the Regiment who gave the supreme sacrifice  
for their country.*

*Guide us now, Father, by giving us wisdom and knowledge  
from on high that, as Military Police,  
we will always be prepared to  
Assist, Protect, and Defend.*

—Lieutenant Colonel (Chaplain) Michael Yarman

# DOCTRINE UPDATE

## U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence Capabilities Development Integration Directorate Concepts, Organization, and Doctrine Development Division

Publication Number	Title	Date	Description
<b>NEW IN 2010! Military Police Doctrinal Manuals Change From 3-19 Series to 3-39 Series</b>			
<p>The nomenclature of military police doctrinal publications will change this year to support new and ongoing Army doctrinal reengineering efforts designed to reduce the number of Army field manuals (FMs). The U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) will retain two Army FMs and adopt the new Army tactics, techniques, and procedures (ATTP) doctrinal designator for other branch-specific manuals. Publications that essentially contain technical and procedural doctrine may be reflected in a general subject technical manual (GSTM). Additional information will be published in future editions of this Doctrine Update and other USAMPS command information venues and publications.</p>			
<b>Current Publications</b>			
FM 3-19.4 (will be GSTM 3-39.30)	Military Police Leaders' Handbook	4 Mar 02 C1 2 Aug 02	A manual that addresses military police maneuver and mobility support, area security, internment/resettlement (I/R), law and order, and police intelligence operations across the full spectrum of Army operations. It primarily focuses on the principles of platoon operations and the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) necessary. <b>Status:</b> Current.
FM 3-19.6 (will be GSTM 3-39.31)	Armored Security Vehicle	24 May 06	A manual that provides military police forces with the TTP and related information necessary for the employment of the armored security vehicle. <b>Status:</b> Current.
FM 19-10 (will be ATTP 3-39.10)	Military Police Law and Order Operations	30 Sep 87	A manual that addresses each element of the military police law and order mission, including law enforcement, investigation, U.S. military prisoner confinement, and counterterrorism operations. <b>Status:</b> Under revision FY 11.
FM 3-19.11 (will be ATTP 3-39.11)	Military Police Special-Reaction Teams	13 May 05	A manual that serves as a guide for commanders, staffs, and trainers who are responsible for training and deploying military police special-reaction teams. <b>Status:</b> Current.
FM 3-19.12 (will be ATTP 3-39.31)	Protective Services	11 Aug 04	A manual that addresses TTP for special agents of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command and military police assigned to protective services duties. <b>Status:</b> Current.
FM 3-19.13 (will be ATTP 3-39.12)	Law Enforcement Investigations	10 Jan 05	A manual that serves as a guide for military police, investigators, and U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command special agents operating in tactical and garrison environments. <b>Status:</b> Current.
FM 3-19.15 (will be ATTP 3-39.33)	Civil Disturbance Operations	18 Apr 05	A manual that addresses continental U.S. and outside the continental U.S. civil disturbance operations and domestic unrest, including the military role in providing assistance to civil authorities. <b>Status:</b> Current.
FM 3-19.17 (ATTP 3-39.34)	Military Working Dogs	6 Jul 05 C1 22 Sep 05	A manual that addresses the current capabilities of the Military Police Working Dog Program and the potential for future capabilities. <b>Status:</b> Under revision FY 11.

# DOCTRINE UPDATE

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence Capabilities Development Integration Directorate Concepts, Organization, and Doctrine Development Division			
Publication Number	Title	Date	Description
<b>Current Publications (continued)</b>			
FM 19-25 (will be ATTP 3-39.13)	Military Police Traffic Operations	30 Sep 77	A manual that addresses traffic operations in garrison and combat environments. <b>Status:</b> Current (will be incorporated into ATTP 3-39.10 in FY 11).
FM 3-19.30 (will be ATTP 3-39.32)	Physical Security	8 Jan 01	A manual that establishes guidance for all personnel who are responsible for physical security. This manual is the basic reference for training security personnel and is intended to be a one-stop physical security source. <b>Status:</b> Under revision FY 10.
FM 3-39	Military Police Operations	16 Feb 10	A keystone manual that describes military police support to Army forces conducting full spectrum operations within the framework of joint operations. It emphasizes the importance of simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations and contains a critical discussion of civil support operations. <b>Status:</b> Current.
FM 3-39.40	Internment and Resettlement Operations	12 Feb 10	A manual that describes the doctrinal foundation, principles, and processes that military police and other elements employ when dealing with internment populations (including U.S. military prisoners and multiple categories of detainees) and resettlement populations (including multiple categories of dislocated civilians). <b>Status:</b> Current.
FM 3-19.50 (will be ATTP 3-39.20)	Police Intelligence Operations	21 Jul 06	A manual that addresses police intelligence operations which support, enhance, and contribute to situational understanding, homeland defense, and protection of the force by integrating police engagement, police information, and police investigations to support law and order operations and the intelligence process. <b>Status:</b> Under revision FY 10.
FM 3-90.31	Maneuver Enhancement Brigade Operations	26 Feb 09	A manual that provides operational guidance for commanders and trainers at all echelons. It facilitates operations and employment considerations of the maneuver enhancement brigade as it organizes, prepares for, and conducts full spectrum operations. <b>Status:</b> Current.
<p><b>Note:</b> Current military police publications can be accessed and downloaded in electronic format from the Reimer Digital Library at <a href="http://www.adtdl.army.mil/">http://www.adtdl.army.mil/</a> or from the USAMPS Web site at <a href="http://www.wood.army.mil/usamps/">http://www.wood.army.mil/usamps/</a>. Comments or questions about military police doctrine can be e-mailed to <a href="mailto:leon.cdiddcodmpdoc@conus.army.mil">leon.cdiddcodmpdoc@conus.army.mil</a>.</p>			
<b>Emerging Publications</b>			
FM 3-37.2	Antiterrorism Operations	Dec 10 (estimate)	A manual that will establish the Army's guidance on how to integrate and synchronize antiterrorism across the full spectrum of conflict and into the full range of military operations. This manual will show how antiterrorism operations nest under full spectrum operations, the protection warfighting function, and the composite risk management process.

# Key Military Police Manuals Revised

The Maneuver Support Center of Excellence and U.S. Army Military Police School announce the publication of the latest versions of Field Manual (FM) 3-39 (formerly FM 3-19.1) and FM 3-39.40 (formerly FM 3-19.40). A series of internal reviews, conferences, and worldwide staffing processes were conducted to guide the changes in these manuals. The revised FMs are available at the Reimer Digital Library (<http://www.adtdl.army.mil/>) and the Maneuver Support Knowledge Network (<https://www.us.army.mil/suite/portal.do?%24p=500639>).

## **FM 3-39, *Military Police Operations***

FM 3-39 has been modified to be aligned with revisions to FM 3-0, *Operations*, and other Army and joint doctrine. The information in the manual is organized into nine chapters, with five appendixes that provide additional details about selected operational topics. The first four chapters, which follow the flow of FM 3-0, describe military police aspects of the operational environment, the Military Police Corps Regiment, and the foundations of military police operations. The remaining chapters contain discussions on planning, preparing, executing, and sustaining military police operations, with a focus on operational to tactical levels of war.

## **FM 3-39.40, *Internment and Resettlement Operations***

FM 3-39.40 has been modified to be aligned with the military police keystone manual, FM 3-39, *Military Police Operations*. FM 3-39.40 provides guidance for commanders and staffs on internment/resettlement (I/R) operations. It addresses I/R operations across the spectrum of conflict—specifically addressing the doctrinal

paradigm shift from traditional enemy prisoner-of-war operations to the broader, more inclusive requirements of detainee operations. Additionally, FM 3-39.40 covers the critical issue of detainee rehabilitation. It describes the doctrinal foundation, principles, and processes that military police and other elements employ when dealing with internment populations (including U.S. military prisoners and multiple categories of detainees such as civilian internees, retained personnel, and enemy combatants) and resettlement populations (including multiple categories of dislocated civilians).

The information in the manual is organized into ten chapters, with fourteen appendixes that provide additional details about I/R topics. Chapters 1 through 3 describe the military police function of I/R operations. Chapters 4 through 6 focus primarily on detainee operations, including the planning, preparing, executing, and sustaining of all I/R operations. Chapters 7 through 10 focus on the confinement of U.S. military prisoners, rehabilitative programs for U.S. military prisoners and detainees, parole and release or transfer programs, and resettlement operations for dislocated civilians.

## **Use of the Revised Publications**

The foundations of military police operations provided in these manuals and related military police doctrine support the actions and decisions of combatant commanders at all levels. However, the manuals are not a substitute for thought and initiative among military police leaders and Soldiers. No matter how robust the doctrine or how advanced the military police capabilities and systems, it is the military police Soldier who must understand the operational environment, recognize shortfalls, and adapt to the situation on the ground.

# MILITARY POLICE Online

Articles from recent issues of *Military Police* are now available for download online at <http://www.wood.army.mil/mpbulletin/default.htm>.

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# TF Griffin Support to Detainee Operations; OIF 09-11: ***The Four Big Milestones***

*By Captain Eileen Healy and Specialist Candace Mundt*

*The 89th Military Police Brigade and the many battalions that comprised Task Force (TF) Griffin executed a historic detainee operations mission in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 09-11. The process of achieving the milestones that were met by the brigade was challenging and rewarding. The brigade responsibly transitioned two of the largest theater internment facilities (TIFs) and the correctional officer training academy from U.S. control to the Government of Iraq (GoI) Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and set the conditions and standards for the complete transfer of the last remaining TIFs.*

## **Deployment Preparation**

In preparation for deployment, the 89th Military Police Brigade, which is based at Fort Hood, Texas, engaged in several training events. In addition to a formal mission rehearsal exercise at Camp McGregor, New Mexico, the events included tours of four civilian prison facilities, a command post exercise, and a formal detainee operations leader symposium.

At Camp McGregor in Spring 2009, the 89th Military Police Brigade had the opportunity to meet and train with three of their future, in-theater subordinate battalions. The 89th built a solid chain of communication, alliance, and cohesion with the 32d Infantry Brigade Combat Team, Wisconsin Army National Guard, which helped tremendously throughout the deployment.

Although National Guard units typically train for deployment at Camp McGregor, this was the first time the facility was opened for detainee operations training for an Active Army unit. The opportunity for off-site training allowed the Soldiers of the 89th to focus on the instruction.

By many accounts, the training was difficult; but it was also very similar to the conditions encountered in theater. The 5/75th Division provided command and control training to brigade level personnel. TF Outlaw (one of four TFs under the Operation Warrior Trainer Program conducted by the 402d Field Artillery Brigade, Division West, First Army) provided direct training to battalion level leaders and Soldiers who were tasked to run the TIF.

Through scenarios involving riots, medical issues, and media engagements, the brigade and battalions learned how to respond to potential incidents. This training allowed Soldiers to fine-tune the tactics, techniques, and procedures necessary to conduct a successful detainee operation mission.

In February 2009, brigade senior leaders began touring civilian prisons to observe the inner workings of correctional facilities. These facilities included the Texas

State Penitentiary at Huntsville; Federal Correctional Complex, Terre Haute, Indiana; U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and San Quentin State Prison, California. The tours provided the leaders with a firsthand look at the types of logistical, personnel, and operational resources required to run a detention facility.

## **Mission**

The 89th Military Police Brigade and TF Griffin provided brigade level command and control and tactically executed theater detainee operations in support of U.S. Forces–Iraq. They coordinated, supervised, and conducted counterinsurgency (COIN) operations inside the wire. They also supported the national unity effort, operated and provided force protection for forward operating bases (FOBs) and TIFs, and set conditions for capacity building with the Iraqi Corrections System and MoJ to transfer detainee operations to the MoJ. The purpose was to take insurgents off the battlefield and, at the same time, assist the GoI in providing a humane location for detainees to receive adequate care.

This operation helped the GoI assume control and security of prison systems and maintain the ability to operate as an independent organization. Three key tasks and milestones were completed during the mission. The first involved the transition of detainees from Camp Bucca to TIFs at Camp Cropper (located on Victory Base Complex, Baghdad) and Camp Taji and the closing of the Camp Bucca TIF. The second was the turnover of FOB Future (the location of the Iraqi Corrections Officer Training Academy) to the MoJ, which helped set the conditions necessary for the MoJ to take control of training Iraqi correctional officers (ICOs) and staff. The third and most significant task completed during the operation was the transition of the Taji TIF, which allowed for the establishment of a fully functional, self-sustaining Iraqi corrections prison controlled by the MoJ. A fourth milestone—the turnover of Camp Cropper to the GoI—was initiated, but not completed, by the 89th.

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The successful execution of COIN operations inside the wire enabled the successful transition of the Taji TIF. COIN agents and situationally aware Service members constantly collected critical detainee information for assessment through the intelligence and behavioral vetting processes. This allowed for the segregation of moderate and radical detainees, which helped with the maintenance of detainee custody and control, and ensured a safe, secure environment for detainees and guard force personnel. The brigade's efforts were focused along the following lines of effort:

- **Care.** Treat detainees with dignity and respect.
- **Custody.** Produce actionable intelligence and evidence, and transition the legacy detainee population to GoI.
- **Control.** Ensure that detainees and others are safe and secure. Balance risk by synchronizing the detainee drawdown with available forces.
- **Communication.** Conduct effective information operation campaigns inside and outside the wire.
- **Education.** Oversee Theater Internment Facility Reconciliation Center operations.
- **Reconciliation.** Reintegrate detainees back into Iraqi society.
- **Facility/Logistics.** Transition the facility, buildings, and equipment.

### Task Organization

The 89th Military Police Brigade took over a two-brigade mission set on 5 May 2009. However, the commander of Joint Task Force [JTF] 134 had decided in March 2009 to draw down to a one-brigade mission set as the detainee population decreased due to the approved releases of detainees and transfers of detainees to MoJ facilities according to the Iraq-U.S. Security Agreement<sup>1</sup> and in coordination with the GoI. The control of the 89th spanned three geographically separated TIFs, more than 10,000 Service members, and more than 12,000 detainees. The brigade was also responsible for the construction and operation of the Correctional Training Center (CTC). The 89th relieved the 42d Military Police Brigade at Camp Bucca and the 11th Military Police Brigade at Camps Cropper and Taji. Several Active Army and Reserve Component units supported the 89th during its tenure.

### The First Milestone

At its peak operation, Camp Bucca (the largest TIF in Iraq) held about 26,000 detainees. The movement of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and ICOs was constant. Anytime, day or night, the facility was flooded with personnel who were carrying out their duties. In its prime, the Camp Bucca TIF resembled a small city. However, the greatest population at the Camp Bucca TIF during the tenure of the 89th Military Police Brigade was 7,000—the number of detainees housed at the TIF in early May 2009.

The TIF was comprised of three interior facilities—Titan, operated by the 168th Military Police Battalion; Centurion, operated by the 306th Military Police Battalion; and Defender, operated by the 320th Military Police Battalion. In addition, the 3d Battalion, 13th Field Artillery Brigade, provided support for reconciliation services at the Camp Bucca TIF.

Before beginning operations at Camp Bucca, command and control needed to be established. A tactical command post (TAC) was deployed to Camp Bucca. The TAC, which was comprised of ten personnel from the brigade headquarters, provided brigade level management and oversight for the four assigned battalions. The 168th Military Police Battalion served as the TAC support battalion when the Titan facility was closed.

The closure of the Camp Bucca TIF demonstrated that U.S. forces were working closely with the GoI to move forward and make changes in detainee operations in compliance with the Iraq-U.S. Security Agreement that was implemented in January 2009. Under that security agreement, every detainee in the custody of U.S. forces is to be released at the request of the GoI or transferred to an MoJ prison.

The first step in closing Iraq's largest detention facility was the relocation of the detainees. This involved an intensive screening of individual legal requirements to determine the relocation timeframe for each detainee. At the appropriate time, detainees were out-processed and moved by bus convoy to a pickup point for a flight to Camp Cropper or Camp Taji.

Detainee air transfers (DATs) were vast movements that required detailed organization and planning. The difficulty of this demanding task was compounded by security issues, extreme heat and, at times, mission-inhibiting mortar fire and improvised explosive devices that handicapped escort vehicles during convoys to the airfield. DATs originating from Camp Bucca were led exclusively by the 306th, which served as the guard force unit while on convoy and in planes. The 2d Battalion, 127th Infantry Regiment, provided convoy security escorts from Camp Bucca to the airfield at Basra.

From 21 May to 12 September 2009, the 89th Military Police Brigade relocated more than 7,000 detainees from Camp Bucca. Following these relocations, the next step was the disassembly of the TIF. This colossal task was performed by Service members who were relieved of their guard force duties. They quickly began dismantling the compounds, where they had once guarded detainees, and relocating the resources and equipment to Camps Cropper and Taji. But with the imminent closure of Camp Bucca, the guard force was drawn down as fast as the detainee population; consequently, the task of disassembling the TIF and relocating the resources and equipment was much more demanding for the remaining personnel. The well-coordinated, five-month process officially ended on 17 September 2009—in concert with the Ramadan holiday.

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## The Second Milestone

With the transfer of additional detainee facilities to the MoJ looming on the horizon, the need to develop an abundant, well-trained Iraqi guard force was identified. Following the closure of Camp Bucca, the 89th partnered with the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program and began to focus on the construction, operation, and transfer of the Iraqi CTC—a facility where various Iraqi correctional training programs (including the Iraqi Corrections Officer Training Academy) would be consolidated in one location with one standard for excellence—at FOB Future, Victory Base Complex. Just months later, ground was broken on the CTC.

The 1st Battalion, 128th Infantry Regiment, was tasked to construct the CTC. Unlike most of the brigade's units, which took over established missions, the 1st Battalion was responsible for the academy from the groundbreaking ceremony to its final transfer to the MoJ.

The CTC was built to closely resemble a correctional facility. It includes housing for students, several modern classrooms, four computer labs, a dining facility, a mock correctional facility, and a nonlethal firing range.

The 89th knew that, to operate a correctional facility, it would be necessary to train more than the guard force. In conjunction with the JTF 134 staff, they would also need to develop programs of instruction for training wardens, engineers, midlevel supervisors, and administrators. The CTC provides a training venue that accommodates all of those requirements and also allows for the development of first-rate correctional officers. ICOs receive on-the-job training that is specific to the real-life scenarios they are likely to encounter while performing their duties. For example, ICOs learn to conduct head counts, move detainees to appointments, process detainees, and implement emergency action plans. At any given time, about 1,000 students are enrolled in training at the CTC. Following graduation, they go on to work in MoJ prisons or the U.S. detention facilities at Camp Cropper or Camp Taji, where they continue to receive on-the-job updates to ensure that their skills remain current.

U.S. authorities transferred control of the CTC from Multinational Forces–Iraq to the MoJ on 15 December 2009, marking another milestone in cooperative efforts between the United States and GoI. The MoJ now operates the CTC, with the United States serving a small advisory role with regard to the operation of the training academy.

## The Third Milestone

When the 89th Military Police Brigade arrived, the Camp Taji TIF—which has a capacity of 5,600 prisoners—was in its infancy, housing fewer than 300 detainees. As part of the Iraq-U.S. Security Agreement, American forces were transferring detainees from U.S.-operated detention facilities to Iraqi authorities, who then decided whether to hold or release them. The staffing, operation, and transfer of the TIF proved to be a major undertaking for the 89th.

The transfer of the Camp Taji TIF was the most historic project completed by the brigade.

The TIF was under the control of the 508th Military Police Battalion, one of the primary driving forces behind using the K-Span concept for TIF operations—a concept not previously used in the Iraqi theater of operations. On 3 September 2009, the 508th transferred authority of the Camp Taji TIF to the 705th Military Police Battalion, which was assigned the primary responsibility for care and custody of the detainees.

The 89th also placed an element at Camp Taji to prepare for the imminent transfer. The Taji TIF Transition Team was formed to plan, coordinate, and execute the strategic-level aspects of transferring the Camp Taji TIF to the GoI.

Due to the closure of Camp Bucca, the Camp Taji TIF detainee population grew from 300 to 4,700 in three short months. The U.S. guard force—alongside their Iraqi partners from Camps Bucca, Cropper, and Taji—worked in concert, day and night, to get the Camp Taji TIF into full operation. Care and custody with dignity and respect remained at the forefront of operations.

The 211th Military Police Battalion joined the brigade and the 705th in mid-September 2009, assuming all of the supporting functions of the TIF (DATs, detainee movements, vocational services) and performing mayoral duties for the northern portion of Camp Taji.

The transfer of the Camp Taji facility to the GoI was initially scheduled for 15 January 2010; however, due to the lack of an adequate Iraqi correctional guard force to properly staff the facility, the transfer was delayed until 31 March 2010. The delay allowed the brigade to better prepare and train the ICOs and administrative staff for the mission that they were to assume.

The arduous task of transferring individual detainees and their personal property to the GoI began in early March 2010. Over the course of about three weeks, the brigade transferred 2,600 detainees and the facility itself over to the GoI. This was the first time in history that the United States had transferred a facility and its detainees to a host nation government.

On 31 March 2010, the 89th closed a significant chapter in its mission and in history. The GoI had taken control of the Camp Taji TIF, including the 5,600-capacity detention facility; a 2,600-capacity, state-of-the-art ICO housing complex; a modern medical facility to be staffed and operated by the Iraqi Ministry of Health; and various vocational resources such as a brick-making factory, agricultural grounds, and carpentry and masonry assets. The 211th remained at Camp Taji after the TIF transition to provide operational and maintenance oversight to the Iraqis during the infancy of what is now a fully operational MoJ prison.

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## The Fourth Milestone

Camp Cropper served as the center of operations for the 89th Military Police Brigade and as the location where U.S. forces detainee operations would eventually end. All detainees under the control of the 89th were, at one time or another, processed through Camp Cropper. In addition to its role as the hub of activity, Camp Cropper also housed the high-value detainees (HVDs) that fell under U.S. control, including former members of Saddam Hussein's regime who were some of Iraq's most infamous war criminals, including former Iraqi Minister of Defense, Ali Hassan ("Chemical Ali"), and former Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz. The headquarters of the 89th arrived at Camp Cropper at the height of its operation.

The 89th was faced with many challenges at Camp Cropper. The day-to-day operations were not typical of the detainee operations experienced in the Camps Bucca and Taji TIFs. The brigade not only provided care and custody of the detainees, but also facilitated movements that allowed detainees to attend visitations, medical appointments, and scheduled court dates in the heart of Baghdad's International Zone, formerly referred to as the "Green Zone." And the HVD compound often received international attention, which served to remind the brigade of the strategic impacts of the mission.

Despite the unique challenges and unsolicited attention from outside entities such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and international media agencies, the brigade continued to focus primarily on the care and custody of detainees with dignity and respect. This paid dividends when the detainee population attempted to interfere with facility operations by demonstrating or causing disturbances.

The task of providing an adequate guard force for such a large detainee population was daunting in itself. The 89th was supported by several battalions within the year. Most of the units assigned to conduct detainee operations were not military police or even Army units—they were referred to as "in lieu of" units. More than 10,000 Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen provided guard force and support personnel to the brigade. And they all worked toward the common goal of care and custody with dignity and respect.

Camp Cropper continued to serve as the epicenter for detainee releases and transfers to the GoI. During the brigade's tenure, more than 5,000 detainees were released to their points of capture. These releases were essential

for promoting national unity and building U.S.-GoI partnerships. Some of the releases were conducted under conditions set by the U.S. Forces-Iraq Provost Marshal's Office and Force Strategic Engagement Cell. More than 9,000 detainees, who were not eligible for release, were transferred to GoI prisons. The transfer process was a continuous challenge for the brigade due to the general lack of suitable infrastructure for detainment in Iraqi prisons.

To further assist in the transition of detainees to GoI prisons, the brigade (under the direction of JTF 134 and in close coordination with the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program) formed corrections assistance transition teams that traveled to prison facilities throughout Iraq to train the Iraqi guard force and help facilities meet acceptable humane detainment standards. Their efforts resulted in the ability of the Iraqi prisons to accept additional transfers.

After the closure of the Camp Bucca TIF and the transfer of the CTC at FOB Future, the brigade was left with the final milestone of setting the conditions for Camp Cropper to be turned over to the GoI—leaving only the HVD compound under the control of U.S. forces. The task involved splitting Camp Cropper so that the portion containing the detention facility could be transferred to the GoI, while the other portion remained under the control of U.S. forces. Because Camp Cropper comprised only a portion of the overall Victory Base Complex footprint, the transition plan and security issues needed to be thoughtfully considered and clearly defined. Although the 89th Military Police Brigade did not witness the final turnover of the Camp Cropper TIF/FOB, the planning and preparation they had done provided the foundation for success.

## Conclusion

The 89th Military Police Brigade successfully completed their OIF 09-11 mission on 24 April 2010. The Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen who contributed to the success of the brigade will always be a part of its history. The 89th was relieved by the 49th Military Police Brigade TAC, marking the second time during the tenure of the 89th that a TAC was used to replace a brigade. The staff was provided by the 705th from Camp Taji. Detainee operations at an organic brigade command level in Iraq were over.

### Endnote:

<sup>1</sup>Iraq-U.S. Security Agreement, 1 December 2008.

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*Specialist Mundt is the public affairs specialist and print journalist for the 89th Military Police Brigade. She is working toward an associate's degree with a focus on journalism and communication at Central Texas College. She is also a graduate of the Basic Public Affairs Specialist Course, Defense Information School, Fort Meade, Maryland.*

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A black and white photograph of a large, three-dimensional sign for the Emmich-Cambrai-Kaserne. The sign features a stylized eagle emblem on the left and the words "EMMICH-CAMBRAI-KASERNE" in large, block letters on the right. The background is a textured wall.

# The Bundeswehr Military Police and Headquarters Service School

*By Lieutenant Colonel Wolfgang Bayer and Captain Simon Allgoewer*

In 2009, the Bundeswehr (or German Federal Defense Force) Military Police and Headquarters Service School moved from Sonthofen, Germany, to newly renovated and modernized barracks in Hannover. Although the actual movement of cadre and equipment was completed within four months, it took three years of rebuilding, renovation, and modernization of the Hannover barracks to convert them into some of the most modern facilities within the Bundeswehr. But the school is now equipped with the latest in classroom technology, and realistic military police and headquarters staff training is conducted across the full spectrum of operations. In addition, the school leads the way in developing advanced distance learning programs and courses. These improvements provide soldiers of all ranks with the best training opportunities available and have made the Bundeswehr Military Police and Headquarters Service School the most modern school in the German Armed Forces.

Shortly after the Bundeswehr was founded in 1955, the Bundeswehr Military Police and Headquarters Service School was established at the Generaloberst-Beck-Kaserne in Sonthofen—a castle-like installation in the picturesque Bavarian Alps. In 2001, the German Department of Defense decided to move the school from Sonthofen to Hannover. But it was clear from the outset that this move would involve more than just a simple relocation; the leaders agreed that the move represented an opportunity to build the most modern school in the German Bundeswehr. The German government spent about 90 million Euros (currently the equivalent of about 135 million U.S. dollars) to achieve that goal.

Hannover, a city with a population of more than 500,000, is the capital of the federal state of Lower Saxony in northwestern Germany. From 1974 until 1997 (when the Army Officer's School moved to Dresden), German army officers received their Army Officer Training at Emmich-Cambrai-Kaserne, located in northern Hannover. The first part of this double-name barracks was designated in honor of Albert Theodor Otto von Emmich, a Prussian general who participated in the German-French War from 1870 to 1871 and attained the rank of general of infantry in 1909, when he took command of the 10th Army Corps in Hannover. He successfully led the first real battle of World War I and, in 1914, was awarded the first *Pour le Mérite* of that war—the highest military order of the Kingdom of Prussia until the end of World War I. He died one year later. The second part of the barracks name refers to a small city in northern France known for the World War I Battle of Cambrai, which took place in late 1917. The battle was significant in that it marked the first successful use of tanks.

Following the 1997 departure of the Army Officer's School, Emmich-Cambrai-Kaserne remained mostly unoccupied until the arrival of the Bundeswehr Military Police and Headquarters Service School in 2009. More than 250 distinguished guests, including key military and political leaders, attended the official opening of the new school in Hannover on 23 October 2009. In addition to operating the Hannover location, the school conducts training in the cities of Stetten am kalten Markt, Garlstedt, and Strausberg; however, the Bundeswehr intends for those courses to also be moved to Hannover within the next couple of years.

All military police career courses (ranging from advanced individual training to precommand courses) and functional courses covering all Feldjaegertruppe (German Military Police Corps) missions are taught by the Bundeswehr Military Police and Headquarters Service School. As the name indicates, the school is also the center for headquarters staff training within the Bundeswehr; and as such, personnel from all military branches—including the army, air force, and navy—are trained there. Each day, a total of 300 military instructors and 100 civilian cadre train an average of 1,400 students who represent all components of the Bundeswehr.

The school consists of three main elements:

- **Headquarters Staff.** In addition to traditional staff functions, the Headquarters Staff organizes meetings and conferences and establishes and maintains contacts with foreign schools and training facilities.
- **Support Group.** The Support Group provides logistical and material support and other crucial services such as library, visual information, and media services.
- **Directorate of Training.** The Directorate of Training is split into two divisions:
  - **Training Division A.** Training Division A conducts all course-based, military police-specific training at the school. This includes a total of 167 iterations of 48 different types of courses each year. Course types include branch-specific, professional military education courses that range from advanced individual training to precommand courses, including Reserve Component courses. In addition, the school offers a wide variety of branch-specific, functional courses that cover all military police functions and missions such as civil disturbance operations, special-reaction team operations, protective services detail operations, criminal investigations, and convoy operations. Because English language skills are important in today's contemporary operational environment (in which multinational forces are deployed worldwide), Training Division A also offers military police-specific English language courses. And the division hosts international military police courses and meetings to provide professional forums for the exchange of ideas, best practices, and lessons learned and to foster relationships with allied nations. In addition to providing training for military police soldiers, Training Division A also provides training to soldiers from other branches that have been tasked to conduct civil disturbance operations downrange.
  - **Training Division B.** Training Division B serves as the center of headquarters staff training for the entire Bundeswehr. A joint team of instructors conducts 270 iterations of 27 different types of courses per



**German military police investigators participate in crime scene training at the new facility.**

year for a joint group of students. A large portion of these students are first sergeants and human resources personnel. Other students receive training on Standard Application Software Product Families (SASPF)—a standard Bundeswehr software application. Training Division B also leads the Bundeswehr in the development and implementation of modern distance learning programs and concepts, including the training of instructors for distance learning courses. Distance learning is not characterized by simple, online classes in which students merely click through slides or follow linear learning programs. And distance learning students are not passive recipients of the information presented; rather, their active participation is critical to the process. While distance learning courses are led by an instructor, the students do not sit in an actual classroom; rather, they meet (via a series of webcams and the Internet) in a virtual classroom, where they directly interact with each other and the instructor in an online forum. The instructor, or “teletutor,” organizes and presents the training; so in addition to subject matter proficiency, the teletutor must also have a firm understanding of the technology involved and how to use it to enhance the training. The online forum provides students with a large database of information and the opportunity to remain in contact with other students, exchanging information long after the course is completed.

The new school in Hannover contains facilities for training all aspects of military police duties, including those conducted in garrison and during deployments. The new, state-of-the-art classroom equipment offers an entirely new set of training opportunities. Therefore,

*(Continued on page 32)*

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# Empire State Military Police Partner in Safe Iraqi Election

*By Sergeant Neil W. McCabe*

*As tens of thousands of residents of Basra, Iraq, voted in the 7 March 2010 national elections, Soldiers from the 206th Military Police Company (a New York National Guard unit based in Albany, New York, and deployed to Contingency Operating Base Basra, where they fall under the 203d Military Police Battalion, which is attached to the 17th Fires Brigade) joined their Iraqi security force partners at the Provincial Joint Coordination Center (PJCC) to monitor the elections that were taking place in the second largest city in the country.*

The PJCC is a compound consisting of many facilities, including barracks, a jail, a modern crime lab, a criminal intelligence center, and administrative offices. The compound does not serve as a mission execution staging area; rather, it is a place where representatives from the Government of Iraq law enforcement, public safety, and military forces come together in a single command room to look at the same map, hear the same reports, and keep each other informed.


The commander of the 203d (an Alabama National Guard unit) spent about 8 hours at the PJCC on election day—in case any peace-breaking incidents should occur. To assist the Iraqis with tracking the movements of their military units and teams of election observers, the commander of the 203d brought postage stamp-sized pieces of paper with him, each of which was labeled with the name of a military element or election observer team. The tabs were placed on the large, high-resolution satellite image that had been laid out on the map table in the command room. As reports came in,

the commander often moved the tabs himself, using the updates as an opportunity to brief the PJCC shift commander.

Military police from the 206th were also available at the PJCC to answer the Iraqis' questions about the posture and missions of U.S. forces. This allowed the Iraqis to also keep track of U.S. military movements on election day. For example, after the polls closed, a report was received which indicated that an untracked U.S. military convoy was spotted just outside the Basra city limits. An Iraqi police commissioner plotted the reported location of the convoy on the map and—together with an Iraqi navy lieutenant commander, other Iraqi police, and U.S. military police—compared that location with the positions and movements of other U.S. forces that had already been delineated on the map. At the same time, other U.S. military police called to query their battalion tactical operations center. Within minutes of receiving the report, the police commissioner was able to inform the PJCC shift commander that the U.S.



Lieutenant Colonel Manaa and the commander of the 203d Military Police Battalion review a map of Basra.



Lieutenant Colonel Manaa participates in a video conference call with the national operations center in Baghdad.

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military vehicles were part of an Iraqi team which was securing ballots from polling stations.

Throughout the day, the PJCC shift commander, Lieutenant Colonel Awooda Abdal Hafeel Manaa, conducted video conference calls with the national operations center in Baghdad, providing periodic updates regarding the security situation and public safety. Personnel in Baghdad repeatedly inquired about whether there were any reports of violence and, after consistently receiving negative responses, dubbed Basra the “white province,” referring to the lack of trouble or violence throughout the province. They said that Basra was the model for all other provinces.

After the polls closed, Lieutenant Colonel Manaa asked the commander of the 203d for an honest assessment of the day’s operation. The commander indicated that the Iraqi security force officers and patrolmen had carried

themselves with professionalism. He also stated that he was glad everything went well and that there were no accidents. Using the Iraqi police as the inner ring, with primacy in the city, while the Iraqi army provided security around the outer ring, worked out very well. He said, “I think you had a very good plan. Now we just have to work together to secure the ballots.”

For the voters, the day was over; but for the Iraqi security forces and their partners from New York, it was on to the next phase.

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*(“The Bundeswehr Military Police and Headquarters Service School,” continued from page 30)*

instructors must assess all courses and training materials to fully capitalize on the new assets available and achieve new standards of training. For example, each classroom is equipped with an active board that communicates with a computer, allowing the instructor to write on the screen during PowerPoint presentations, engage the students in the training, and conduct timely checks on learning. In addition to the classroom facilities, the school contains new, outside-the-classroom, “advanced skills trainers.” For example, a mock military police station allows realistic, daily business and special-situation police training. Buildings and facilities that resemble hotels, housing areas, or factories can also be used to train military police soldiers. And advanced-skills trainers for military police investigators allow instructors to set up fake crime scenes. The school gymnasium, which is equipped with a special floor to allow the training of soldiers in combat boots and full gear, is used to conduct combatives and officer survival training. Light, sound, and fog effects can be applied to scenarios that are displayed on a big screen; students are expected to react to the simulated situations just as they would in an Engagement Skills Trainer or shoot house. Infrared cameras allow instructors to record the training and conduct thorough, after-action reviews.

In addition to the Bundeswehr Military Police and Headquarters Service School, Hannover also serves as the home of the national office of the Kameradschaft der Feldjaeger (German Military Police Association) and Feldjaegertruppe museum, where branch history is taught.

The Bundeswehr Military Police and Headquarters Service School in Sonthofen provided quality training



**A student uses a virtual shoot house with typical military police scenarios.**

to soldiers, but its relocation from there to the Emmich-Cambrai-Kaserne in Hannover allowed a good school to be transformed into a great one. It also allowed the creation of the most modern training facility in German Armed Forces.

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# 230th Military Police Company Partners With Macedonian Army, Prepares Unit for Deployment

*By Sergeant Adrienne Killingsworth*

“First, we will drink coffee.”

Those were the words of Major Slavco Cvetanoski, the commander of the Republic of Macedonia’s Army Training Area Krivolak, when he met with leaders of the 230th Military Police Company, 95th Military Police Battalion, on 12 March 2010. Before any actual issues could be discussed, the business of forging friendships and partnerships needed attention. Only after a tray of fresh Macedonian coffee had been delivered to the table and every soldier had taken a seat could the true work begin.

The primary purpose of the meeting was to work out the details and update the logistics and schedules associated with a joint training exercise to be conducted by the Soldiers of the 230th for the Macedonian army. But, as with many successful interactions between foreign militaries, cultural protocol was considered just as important as military protocol—during the meeting and throughout the upcoming exercise.

From 11 to 22 March 2010, thirty-six Soldiers from 1st Platoon, 230th Military Police Company, deployed

to Krivolak and Pepelishte, Macedonia, to take the lead in a crew-served, weapon training exercise designed to prepare Macedonian military police, ranger, and special forces soldiers for their upcoming Special Operations Regiment deployment to Afghanistan with the 86th Brigade Combat Team from the Vermont National Guard.

The exercise, which consisted of several days of training in the classroom and on weapon ranges, introduced more than ninety Macedonian soldiers to the U.S. Army M2 .50-caliber machine gun; M249 light machine gun, squad automatic weapon; MK19 automatic grenade launcher; and M240B machine gun—all U.S. Army weapons that the Macedonians would need to be familiar with when they linked up with the 86th Brigade Combat Team in Afghanistan. Because the Macedonian soldiers were already experienced marksmen, the familiarization training was merely a supplement to their already extensive knowledge of weapons. The success of the Macedonian soldiers at the weapon ranges was a testament to their readiness and to the hard work and dedication that they put into the classroom training.

Macedonian army Lieutenant Colonel Zoran Blazevski, the chief of operations for the Special Operations Regiment, said that the Macedonian army may receive its own supply of crew-served weapons in the future and that having ninety-two trained and experienced personnel would be very beneficial to the force. Blazevski also said that the Macedonian army hopes to replicate the weapon range training for other soldiers in the future.

The military-wide importance of the training was emphasized when a delegation from Allied Joint Force Command Naples visited the Krivolak weapon range on 19 March. The delegates were led by their commander, Admiral Mark Fitzgerald.

The U.S. military relies on strong partnerships with other militaries to successfully complete the mission in Afghanistan.



**A team leader with the 230th Military Police Company instructs a Macedonian soldier while another Macedonian soldier looks on.**

The involvement of the 230th Military Police Company in Macedonia was a testament to the U.S. dedication to these partnerships.

As important as the weapons training was from a strictly military perspective, the exercise also provided American and Macedonian troops with a chance to expand their horizons and interact with each other on a more personal level. Many of the Soldiers who participated in the exercise recognized the value in the duality of the mission and appreciated their unique opportunity to visit Macedonia with Macedonian soldiers as their “tour guides.”

According to a platoon sergeant from 1st Platoon, 230th Military Police Company, in spite of the language barrier, a “common language among soldiers” helped the training to run smoothly and the mission to be a success. As seen time and again, the camaraderie between

soldiers—of any countries—can transcend borders and language barriers to quickly form bonds that are nearly impossible to break.

The friendships that had been established were obvious as the 230th Military Police Company prepared to depart Macedonia. The soldiers traded unit patches, exchanged e-mail addresses, and said their final goodbyes, expressing their hopes of seeing one another again. And as the Macedonian soldiers make their way to Afghanistan, they leave behind a unit of U.S. military police Soldiers who are proud to have provided support for their mission and who are personally invested in their success.

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*Sergeant Killingsworth is a public affairs specialist with the 18th Military Police Brigade, Mannheim, Germany. She holds a bachelor's degree in English literature from California State University–Northridge.*

## **Soldier's Creed**

**I am an American Soldier.**

**I am a warrior and a member of a team.**

**I serve the people of the United States  
and live the Army values.**

**I will always place the mission first.**

**I will never accept defeat. I will never quit.**

**I will never leave a fallen comrade.**

**I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough,  
trained and proficient in my warrior tasks and drills.**


**I always maintain my arms, my equipment, and myself.**

**I am an expert, and I am a professional.**

**I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy  
the enemies of the United States of America in close combat.**

**I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life.**

**I am an American Soldier.**



# 65TH MILITARY POLICE IN HAITI: JOB WELL DONE!

*By Captain Maurice Green*

The Soldiers of the 65th Military Police Company (Airborne), 503d Military Police Battalion (Airborne), Fort Bragg, North Carolina, support the global response force (GRF) mission of the XVIII Airborne Corps by providing a platoon that is ready to respond to any contingency operation in the world within 96 hours of notification. As part of the GRF, the 65th recently deployed to the island nation of Haiti in support of Operation Unified Response.

On 12 January 2010, an earthquake with a magnitude of 7.0 on the Richter scale<sup>1</sup> overwhelmed Haiti, resulting in a disaster of epic proportions. The devastation resulted in an estimated 212,000 deaths, with millions more affected. The 65th Military Police Company deployed to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Once on the ground in Haiti, the 65th partnered with the Haitian National Police United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and several local community leaders to provide immediate assistance to more than 500,000 Haitians who were displaced by the earthquake. The company was initially responsible for providing support in the northeastern region of Tabarre, where there were more than 50,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs). The 65th conducted more than 70 humanitarian assistance missions to IDPs, distributing more than 1,000 tons of food, 500 shelters in a box, 5,000 personal hygiene kits, and 5,000 tarps. In addition, the company's medics provided treatment to several Haitians affected by the earthquake.

After the immediate needs of the IDPs were satisfied, most of the GRF redeployed; however, the 65th and the

2-325 Airborne Infantry Regiment remained in Haiti, where they helped the Government of Haiti and MINUSTAH prepare Haitian citizens for the impending rainy and hurricane seasons. The company partnered with MINUSTAH and NGOs to facilitate decongestion and mitigation efforts aimed at reducing suffering and preventing deaths inside designated at-risk camps during the rainy season. For example, at Champs De Mars (an IDP camp located outside the Haitian presidential palace), the 65th assisted MINUSTAH and Save the Children (an NGO operating in Port Au Prince) with the posturing of about 40,000 displaced inhabitants for the upcoming rainy season. In addition, the company provided momentum, advice, and security to help prevent deaths at Champs De Mars and maintain conditions for reconstruction in Port Au Prince. The 65th Military Police Company also assisted in the relocation of several hundred IDPs to Corail Cesselesse from various IDP camps throughout Port Au Prince.

#### **Endnote:**

<sup>1</sup>The Richter scale, developed by Charles F. Richter, is a logarithmic scale that expresses the magnitude of a seismic disturbance in terms of the energy dissipated. A 1.5 magnitude earthquake is the smallest disturbance that can be felt, a 4.5 magnitude earthquake is capable of causing slight damage, and an 8.5 magnitude earthquake is considered very devastating.

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*Captain Green served as the commander of the 65th Military Police Company during Operation Unified Response. He holds master's degrees in human resource management from the University of Phoenix and business and organizational security management from Webster University, St. Louis, Missouri.*

# The Bataan Memorial Death March

*By Captain Shea A. Asis*

Soldiers from the 728th Military Police “Warfighters” Battalion, 8th Military Police Brigade, recently competed against 5,000 others in the 21st Annual Bataan Memorial Death March held near Las Cruces, New Mexico.

The competition consisted of four categories—individual light, individual heavy, team military, and team civilian. Each of the individual categories was further divided by gender and age, and each of the team categories was further divided into male, female, and coed subcategories—each with light and heavy divisions. Participants in light categories and divisions could wear standard distance-running apparel, while participants in heavy categories and divisions were required to carry a rucksack weighing at least 35 pounds. Members of military teams were required to wear Army combat (or other Service-equivalent) uniforms. Five Soldiers from the 728th competed in the coed, heavy division, team military category; the command sergeant major of the 728th competed in the individual heavy category.

The coed team (Master Sergeant Robert Mattson, Sergeant Jesse Kurtz, Sergeant Ashley Ward, and Specialist Ryan White, 13th Military Police Detachment; and Sergeant Kyle Daun, 58th Military Police Company) was the first to cross the finish line in their division, with a time of 6 hours, 21 minutes. Command Sergeant Major Gerald Stegemeier completed the march in 6 hours, 13 minutes, finishing third overall in his category.

The original Bataan Death March acquired its gruesome title when Japanese forces transferred nearly 75,000 American and Filipino prisoners of war between prison camps located along a 60-mile route from Mariveles to Capas, Phillipines, in 1942. Traveling mostly by foot, many of the estimated 54,000 that actually arrived in Capas witnessed the horrific deaths of their comrades at the hands of their captors—or watched them fall victim to natural limitations and causes of death, including dehydration and starvation. A monument to the fallen men of the march has been erected in Las Cruces.

Nine survivors of the original march attended the start of the Bataan Memorial Death March, and their presence provided motivation for the competitors. Additional motivation was provided by wounded warriors and amputees.

The competitors from the 728th collectively agree that the memorial march left them with a better understanding of the actual Bataan Death March, and they resoundingly vow to participate again.

The 22d Annual Bataan Memorial Death March is scheduled for 27 March 2011. Registration details are available at <http://www.bataanmarch.com/r09/reg.htm>.

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*Captain Asis is the public affairs officer for the 8th Military Police Brigade, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. He holds a bachelor's degree in public affairs from Boise State University, Idaho.*



# Iraqi Police Dog Training

*By Specialist Ry Norris*

Iraqis use dogs mainly to protect their houses and sheep. “We do not feed them. We do not care for them,” said Mr. Emad Matlum, an interpreter with the Diyala Provincial Police Transition Team. “When we are praying and a dog’s saliva touches us, we have to go take a shower. Dogs are considered unclean. The *Koran* says so.”

Considering this attitude, the August 2008 establishment of the Diyala Provincial Canine Unit to help Iraqis target insurgents and detect drug and explosives caches is particularly remarkable. It demonstrates the willingness and progress of the Iraqi police in accepting combat multipliers and adapting to measures intended to help maintain security in Iraq.

To maximize the effectiveness of their working dogs, the Diyala Provincial Canine Unit conducts regular training. The training compound is surrounded by barriers, and there is a sign marked, “Danger: Military Dog Area” at the front entrance. The ground is covered with smooth, golf ball-sized rocks. On 5 January 2010, an Iraqi police sergeant and two of his fellow Soldiers sat at a picnic table at the far end of the compound, ready to take notes. They were joined by two U.S. military instructors and six assistants.

“We want to assist the Iraqis in understanding why they should provide proper medical care for their dogs,” said the officer in charge of the 51st Medical Detachment Veterinary Treatment Facility, which is under the leadership of the 248th Medical Detachment Veterinary Services, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, but is located at the training compound. “The health of the working dog must be optimized in order to protect their investment,” she added.

The officer in charge demonstrated the step-by-step techniques for treating soft-tissue wounds and stabilizing distal-limb fractures using a military police dog from the 51st Military Police Detachment, Fort Lewis, Washington. The two-hour training session also included instruction on recognizing and providing first aid for shock.

During the hands-on portion of the training, a canine handler from the 51st Military Police Detachment kept the working dog calm as the dog patiently allowed one of the Iraqi policemen to wrap his mock leg injury.



The Iraqi sergeant stated, “I’ve never learned how to give first aid to a dog in the 20 years I’ve worked with them. Whenever a dog was hurt, we would clean it up and slap a Band-Aid on it.” However, one Iraqi soldier who participated in the training event has worked with his dog for a year. He is aware of her capabilities and understands her value to the unit. With his dog’s help, he was able to locate an explosives cache during a previous mission. He indicated, “I have a very good relationship with [her]. I treat her like one of my own kids.”

Although the Diyala Provincial Canine Unit is new, the Iraqi soldiers have excelled in their training and have applied the information they have learned to their daily missions. A U.S. Army Soldier who coordinates the logistics and provides training assistance at the training compound said, “You can see their dedication and determination. Each time we train with them, they remember the things we’ve taught them. They may not have the same supplies as we do, but they work with what they have.”

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*Specialist Norris is a public affairs specialist assigned to 3d Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia. He is working toward a bachelor’s degree in accounting and business.*

# The USD-N/Iraqi Canine Program Partnership

By Sergeant First Class Kelly McCargo

Just a few years after the successful U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, insurgents exchanged their ineffective conventional attack methods for simpler, but deadlier, improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The insurgents placed IEDs alongside roadways and covered them with debris—or they directed suicide bombers to detonate them. U.S. and Iraqi security forces quickly responded to this new threat by “up arming” troop transports. However, a more long-term solution involved locating the explosives before they were detonated.

Military working dogs (MWDs) could potentially locate explosives and munitions caches; therefore, forces from U.S. Division–North (USD-N)—an area of northern Iraq that includes Ninewa, Salah ad Din, Kirkuk, Dahouk, Irbil, Diyala, and Sulaymaniyah Provinces—initiated an informal canine partnering program with Iraqi police. The U.S. and Iraqi police intermittently met two or three times per month. However, inconsistent meeting locations and times resulted in logistical problems with scheduling the use of training equipment, acquiring specialized subject matter experts, and reserving weapons ranges and obstacle courses.

In November 2009, the USD-N/Iraqi Canine Program was formally established to build a better bond between the United States and the Iraqi Police Canine Corps “brothers in blue,” shape the way Iraqi canine policing is conducted, and allow for collaboration (information sharing and interagency problem solving) that benefits both agencies. Meeting times and locations have now been standardized so that both forces can plan and prepare accordingly.

Iraqi police canine teams are no longer certified by U.S. forces; certification is now acquired at the Baghdad Police College and is granted by the Government of Iraq. However, USD-N Task Force Marne MWD teams provide training in the areas of basic dog obedience, elementary detection, and veterinary medicine.

Veterinary classes, which address the care and maintenance of dogs, are tailored to specific Iraqi canine teams. The focus of the first ten classes is on basic dog care (checking temperature, inspecting teeth), but later classes cover splinting broken legs, treating open wounds, and addressing dog trauma.

One of the U.S. Army Staff sergeants from the 51st Military Police Detachment, Fort Lewis, Washington,

was skeptical about whether some of the experienced Iraqis from the Diyala Province would be receptive to U.S. training—especially from a female. Two of the Iraqi students had 16 years’ experience with dog handling, and the captain who was in charge of the Iraqi program had 20 years’ experience. The female staff sergeant began by teaching basic dog obedience, using commands such as *sit* and *stay*, and progressed to the point where the Iraqi students verbally led their dogs through obstacle courses. “We started to train them, and they just listened to what we had to say, and they took our recommendations,” she said. “They were very, very receptive to our training and asked a lot of questions because they really wanted to learn. They wanted to know how we work because they want to make their program as successful as ours.”

To further facilitate the partnership, Iraqi police canine teams have an open invitation to “shadow” U.S. dog handling teams during daily operations. This grants the Iraqi teams access to more than forty U.S. Army dog handling teams throughout the USD-N region.

Will all of the effort and money required to train and finance this program pay off? “Absolutely,” said the Task Force Marne MWD program manager. “I see successes just about every day . . . because of the [dog handling] teams.” For example—

- An 885th Military Police Detachment sergeant and her MWD found an explosive cache near the Iraqi village of al-Kafia in Ninewa Province. U.S. and Iraqi security forces confiscated a 1-pound bag of ammonium nitrate; a rocket-propelled grenade launcher; 6 antitank land mines; 2 100-millimeter, high-explosive artillery rounds; a 122-millimeter, high-explosive round; and 17 empty land mine casings.
- Iraqi police canine teams were mobilized to help avert attacks during the most recent festival of Ashura.<sup>1</sup> “There was an IED explosion several weeks ago [in Diyala Province] that hurt and killed a lot of people, so they sent an [Iraqi army] patrol through the area to clear it. The patrol said it didn’t find any bombs, but when one of the [Iraqi army dog] teams went through, they found a 155-millimeter artillery round—modified into an IED—covered in trash beside the road. The [explosive ordnance disposal team] was called in and destroyed it, and no one was hurt,” said the staff sergeant from the 51st.



**A U.S. MWD team accompanies a combined U.S. and Iraqi police patrol through an Iraqi neighborhood.**

- An Air Force staff sergeant from the 9th Security Forces Squadron and his MWD discovered eight mortar rounds buried at a farm east of Hawijah in Kirkuk Province.
- A 148th Military Police Detachment sergeant and his MWD discovered 132- and 152-millimeter, high-explosive artillery rounds that had been modified with a radio control detonation device along a highway located 20 miles south of Rabiya in Ninewa Province.

Iraqi police intend to mirror their canine program after that of the U.S. military police. Some U.S. Soldiers compare the current state of the Iraqi program to the state of the U.S. Army program when it was created on 13 March 1942. “If you break the Iraqi Police Canine Corps program into crawl-walk-run phases, we could place the Iraqis at an ‘accelerated walk’ phase,” said the senior enlisted advisor for the Task Force Marne Provost Marshal Office. “Their program is in its infancy; it’s fairly recent and growing just as ours was then.”

But, according to a staff sergeant from the 51st, “They definitely have the leadership and the willingness to learn. Slowly but surely, they are having successes; and you can definitely tell that [the program] is growing stronger as time goes on. The fact that the program is between the ‘walk’ and ‘run’ phases is due only to the lack of dogs and funding. Once they get more dogs and funding, then they will be totally running.”

When the Iraqi people see how many lives can be saved and understand the importance of the dogs, the program will receive more support. Eventually, it will be as successful as the U.S. military dog handling program.

**Endnote:**

<sup>1</sup>Ashura is a Shi’a Muslim festival that takes place on the tenth day of the holy Muslim month of Muharram. It marks the death of the prophet Muhammad’s grandson, Imam Hussein.

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*Sergeant First Class McCargo is the operations noncommissioned officer, Public Affairs Office, 3d Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia.*

# 10th Military Police Battalion (CID)

## Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment

### Lineage and Honors

Constituted 12 August 1943 in the Army of the United States as the 10th Military Police Section, Criminal Investigation.

Activated 14 August 1943 at Fort Custer, Michigan.

Reorganized and redesignated 19 March 1944 as the 10th Criminal Investigation Section.

Reorganized and redesignated 15 September 1944 as the 10th Military Police Criminal Investigation Section.

Reorganized and redesignated 29 December 1944 as the 10th Military Police Criminal Investigation Detachment (CID).

Inactivated 25 February 1946 in Germany.

Activated 2 January 1947 in New York, New York.

Allotted 1 August 1951 to the Regular Army.

Reorganized and redesignated 16 August 1954 as the 10th Military Police Detachment.

Inactivated 24 December 1965 in New York, New York.

Activated 16 January 1968 at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.

Inactivated 25 July 1969 at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.

Activated 1 August 1973 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Reorganized and redesignated 1 September 1996 as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 10th Military Police Battalion.



### Campaign Participation Credit

#### *World War II*

Normandy  
Northern France  
Rhineland  
Ardennes-Alsace  
Central Europe

#### *War on Terrorism*

Campaigns to be determined

### Decorations

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army),  
Streamer embroidered SOUTHWEST ASIA 2005–2006

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army),  
Streamer embroidered CENTRAL AND SOUTHWEST ASIA 2008–2009

# Profiles From the Past

By Master Sergeant Patrick V. Garland (Retired)

*“The maintenance of good order among our troops under the peculiar condition of service in France was most important, and for this purpose, a military police was essential. Such a force, under the control of the Provost Marshal General, corresponded to the police department in a well-organized city, except that its jurisdiction included only those in the military service.”*

—John J. Pershing<sup>1</sup>

In the early stages of World War I, it became apparent that an organization of military police was needed. As the American Expeditionary Forces were organized, military police duties were considered additional duties or temporary assignments. Two military police companies were assigned at the division level, and their responsibilities consisted of supporting that particular division. A military police corps, including a centralized division of criminal investigation (DCI), was necessary to provide area-wide police services. However, locating suitable leaders and troops for such an organization was problematic.

In his *Report of the Provost Marshal General*, which was written after the war ended, General Harry H. Bandholtz states, “Conduct of operations on a large scale in foreign territory introduced into military administration the necessity for military police control and administration far beyond any requirements ever encountered at home.”<sup>2</sup> He later adds, “In May 1917, an attempt was made to organize a criminal investigation section within the military police services. Its members were to be selected from the military police personnel in each command and to operate coordinately within the military police unit. A chief of this section was appointed on the staff of the Provost Marshal General, but the system or organization was faulty in that it lacked centralized control and was wholly dependent upon the initiative of individuals for its operation. No means of securing trained personnel, nor of training it, was in force, and the effort was fruitless.”<sup>3</sup>

This early attempt to create an organized criminal investigation section took place while Brigadier General William H. Allaire was serving as Provost Marshal General. His DCI staff was made up of Major Allan Pinkerton and Lieutenants Bernard A. Flood and Walter Dunne Gelshenen.<sup>4</sup>



**Brigadier General  
Harry H. Bandholtz**

Before America entered the war, Pinkerton (who was the grandson of President Lincoln’s chief spy during the Civil War)<sup>5</sup> was the president of the New York office of the Pinkerton Detective Agency. He had assumed a leadership role in that organization when his father, Robert S. Pinkerton, died and left his estate (which was worth more than 3 million dollars) to his wife, son, and two daughters.

The younger Pinkerton, who was an avid sportsman, owned and rode racehorses and polo ponies. He also raced his 36-foot sloop, “Pinkie,” and was a member of a yacht club on Long Island.

New York authorities arrested the young Pinkerton twice during 1904. In April, he and others were arrested during a raid at a cockfight that was held in his father’s stables in Brooklyn. In November, he was arrested for creating a disturbance.<sup>6</sup>

As America prepared to enter the war, Pinkerton volunteered for Army service and was appointed “major of infantry.” He served as the assistant provost marshal at Tours and Bordeaux, France, before being assigned to the DCI. Sometime during his service in France, Pinkerton was injured in a gas attack; the injury eventually led to his death. After the war, he returned to his position with the detective agency.

Pinkerton died in New York City on 7 October 1930, leaving his mother, wife, and son. His death was attributed to the effects of war gas. He was buried in Section C, Lot 572, Grave 3, Graceland Cemetery, Chicago, Illinois.<sup>7</sup>

Lieutenant Bernard A. Flood was a well-known New York City Police Department detective whose exploits are described in a previous *Military Police* article entitled “Who Was Barney Flood?”<sup>8</sup> Flood entered the Service through the Army Reserves, New York Division.

Walter Dunne Gelshenen was more difficult to track down. He was born to multimillionaire banker William H. Gelshenen and Katherine Dunne Gelshenen on 1 December 1888 in New York City. He was the youngest of four children. In addition to William’s position as president of Garfield National Bank and Trust Company, the family was very involved in a variety of

business enterprises and in social and political activities. They also frequently vacationed in Europe, visiting France on many occasions.

When Walter was just 13, his father passed away, leaving Mrs. Gelshenen and her four children as beneficiaries to an estate worth more than 10 million dollars. At the time, Walter was a student at Phillips Academy, Andover, Massachusetts.<sup>9</sup> Since he was a minor, his share of the estate was placed in a trust—although, he also received a substantial amount of cash and jewelry. On 1 June 1907, Mrs. Gelshenen married another wealthy man, Henry J. Braker, who was an importer.<sup>10</sup> Mr. Braker died the following year, and his wife and her children inherited additional millions in cash and personal belongings.<sup>11</sup>

Walter Gelshenen married Alein Lawson at the St. Regis Hotel in New York on 14 September 1912. The newlyweds honeymooned in Paris. But Walter lived the “high life,” joining the Atlantic Yacht Club and several other social organizations. On his passport applications, he listed his occupation as “None at this time.” His marriage suffered, and the couple went their separate ways.

During Summer 1914, war broke out in Europe. By September, German troops had entered Belgium and France. Although many in the United States were outraged, the government remained neutral and adhered to a “hands off” policy. Some Americans felt that they owed France their support. Many of the ultra rich donated huge amounts of money to man and equip an American hospital near Paris and to provide ambulances to transport wounded allied soldiers. Ivy League colleges and universities joined in the effort, urging students and alumni to volunteer as ambulance drivers. Led by Harvard University, as many as 300 colleges contributed men to what became known as the *American Field Service*. These men funded their own way to France. They were not paid, but were provided with uniforms and rations in the same manner as French army troops. The earliest volunteers arrived in France in 1914; most arrived within the following two years. Ambulance sections were formed and assigned to support French army divisions.

Gelshenen, who was proficient with the French language, was one of the volunteers. He applied for a passport to travel to France effective 25 July 1917. Upon his arrival in France, he found that American ambulances were well-manned and that new drivers were being assigned to transport materiel units (TMUs) (units that were transporting munitions to French army units) rather than the Section Sanitaire Units (SSUs) of the ambulance



Walter D. Gelshenen

drivers.<sup>12</sup> The TMU drivers were referred to as *camion drivers*. Gelshenen was assigned to TMU 397, where he served for two months.

When the U.S. Army arrived in France, American Field Service volunteers had the option of remaining with their units or joining the U.S. Army. Gelshenen selected the latter option, was commissioned as a second lieutenant, and returned to the United States for training. He completed his training in March 1918 and returned to France, where he was initially assigned to the Army General Ordnance Depot and eventually to the DCI, Office of the Provost Marshal General. He served there until February 1919, when he returned to the United States for discharge at Camp Dix, New Jersey.<sup>13</sup> While with the DCI, Gelshenen was promoted to first lieutenant.

Gelshenen applied for another passport to travel back to France for specialized medical treatment in 1919. (At that time, it was apparently necessary to obtain a new passport for each overseas trip!) He died in Paris on 7 June 1920. He left most of his estate to his mother and older brother, William. His will specified that his estranged wife, Alein, was to receive no more than one dollar.<sup>14</sup>

#### Endnotes:

<sup>1</sup>John J. Pershing, *My Experiences in the World War*, Vol. 1, Frederick A. Stokes Company, New York, 1931, p. 132.

<sup>2</sup>*Report of the Provost Marshal General: American Expeditionary Forces Commander in Chief's Report*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1942, Part I, p. 3.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>4</sup>*Report of the Provost Marshal General: American Expeditionary Forces Commander in Chief's Report*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1942, Part II, p. 13.

<sup>5</sup>Patrick V. Garland, “Genesis of Criminal Investigation in the U.S. Army,” *Military Police*, Spring 2008.

<sup>6</sup>“Allan Pinkerton Arrested?” *The New York Times*, 10 November 1904.

<sup>7</sup>“Allan Pinkerton Dies of War Gas,” *The New York Times*, 8 October 1930.

<sup>8</sup>Patrick V. Garland, “Who Was Barney Flood?” *Military Police*, Spring 2010.

<sup>9</sup>Tim Sprattler, e-mail, 8 December 2009.

<sup>10</sup>“Today Will See Many Weddings,” *The New York Times*, 1 June 1907.

<sup>11</sup>“H.J. Braker Leaves \$1,500,000 to Charity,” *The New York Times*, 23 September 1908.

<sup>12</sup>*History of the American Field Service in France*, Houghton-Mifflin Company, Boston and New York, 1920.

<sup>13</sup>Passport Application #11856, U.S. State Department, 16 September 1919.

<sup>14</sup>“Cuts Off Widow With \$1,” *The New York Times*, 26 May 1921.

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*Master Sergeant Garland retired from the U.S. Army in 1974. During his military career, he served in military police units and criminal investigation detachments and laboratories. At the time of his retirement, Master Sergeant Garland was serving as a ballistics evidence specialist at the European Laboratory. He remained in this career field until retiring from civilian law enforcement in 1995.*



**Ms. Clarke and Mr. Schroedel, dressed in vintage uniforms, stand next to a 1957 Chevrolet military police sedan.**

## Two Selfless Servants of the Military Police Corps

*By Second Lieutenant Amanda M. Bent*

In the 1990s, the U.S. Army officially adopted seven core values—loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. These values are considered to be the basic traits of a warrior. They describe what being a Soldier is all about. But two civilians—Mr. Chuck Schroedel and Ms. Joanne Clarke—have been demonstrating their selfless service to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, the Military Police Corps, and the Army for more than 13 years. Mr. Schroedel and Ms. Clarke volunteer their time, spirit, and vehicles at absolutely no cost to anyone but themselves.

Mr. Schroedel, a Scarsdale, New York, high school graduate of 1958 and an alumnus of the University of Florida, has worked on cars since he was just a boy. He voluntarily joined the Army as a military policeman in 1958. He served on a military police patrol until 1961 and then conducted absent-without-leave (AWOL) apprehensions and performed escort duties until he was honorably discharged in 1961. After leaving the Army, Mr. Schroedel earned a degree in journalism and worked as a marketer for the International Business Machines (IBM) Corporation for 25 years.

Ms. Clarke, a 1954 graduate of Red Hook Central School, New York, and an alumnus of Oberlin College, Ohio, is a former teacher. She also served as a Washington, D.C., staff member for Senator Lowell Weicker Jr.

Mr. Schroedel and Ms. Clarke have volunteered with the Directorate of Emergency Services since 1997, offering


their services for Army football games; high-profile, very important person (VIP) escorts; cadet events; tours; graduations; and parades. At his own cost, Mr. Schroedel has restored five military police vehicles—1956 and 1957 marked Chevrolet military police sedans, a 1957 black Criminal Investigation Division sedan; a 1993 military police humvee M1044; and a black 1996 Chevrolet Caprice 9C1 LT1. Mr. Schroedel and Ms. Clarke use these vehicles in the course of their volunteer work, which they take very seriously. They also dress in vintage uniforms that match those that were worn during the time periods represented by historical events.

Their love for military police, military academies, and West Point prompted Mr. Schroedel and Ms. Clarke to begin their volunteer work. They both claim that their favorite aspect of the work is “constant satisfaction.” They especially favor VIP and alumni class escorts.

These volunteers are not paid with money, but with gratitude. Mr. Schroedel and Ms. Clarke are truly fine examples of individuals who exhibit selfless service and dedication to West Point, the Military Police Corps, and the Army.

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*Second Lieutenant Bent is the company commander of the West Point Military Police Company and the officer in charge of the Special Reaction Team, U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York. She holds a bachelor's degree in sociology of law, crime, and deviance from the University of Minnesota.*



# Policing the Border

By Master Sergeant Patrick V. Garland (Retired)

*“The Congress shall have power to . . . declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water; to raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years; to provide and maintain a navy; to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces; to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions; to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress . . .”*

—Constitution of the United States of America<sup>1</sup>

Our founding fathers sought to establish a small, standing army that would be supported by various state militias during times of emergency; this arrangement prevailed throughout history. According to a 1916 description of the New York state militia, “Upon attaining the age of 18, every able-bodied, male citizen becomes ipso facto a member of the militia. It is an important duty of the State to see that, insofar as possible, every male citizen shall reach the age of 18 able-bodied. It is important also that he should be imbued with the ideals of duty to the State.”<sup>2</sup> These early state militias, which have since evolved into the present-day National Guard, could only be used in the defense of U.S. territories.<sup>3</sup> However, that changed with the passage of the *National Defense Act of 1916*.<sup>4</sup>

During the Punitive Expedition<sup>5</sup> into Mexico in 1916, the “Regular Army” was sent to Mexico and National Guard forces were federalized. The Secretary of War, Mr. Newton D. Baker Jr., ordered the mobilization of the Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona militias on 9 May 1916. Troops from these states were called for service along the American-Mexican border, where they protected against counterattack. A little more than a month later, the militias of the remaining states were also ordered to mobilize for federal service.

The New York Army National Guard was one of the National Guard divisions called up for federal service along the border. The *Annual Report of the Adjutant General of the State* for the year 1916 states, “Since the last report, the National Guard of the State has been subjected to every test of warfare except the actual clash upon the battlefield. For

the first time in eighteen years, the President summoned it to the national colors to meet a grave emergency. The Guard was assembled almost overnight, recruited, equipped, concentrated in mobilization camps, mustered in part into the federal service, and transported thousands of miles to the extreme southern frontier of the country.”<sup>6</sup>

What does all of this have to do with military police? The commander of the New York National Guard, Major General John F. O’Ryan, received assistance from the following Regular Army officers who were assigned to his command: Major Harry H. Bandholtz as colonel, chief of staff; Captain Daniel W. Hand as colonel of the 3d Field Artillery Regiment; Captain William E. Welsh as lieutenant colonel of the 23d Infantry Regiment; Captain William N. Haskell as colonel of the 69th Infantry Regiment; and Colonel Gordon Johnston as colonel of the 12th Infantry Regiment. Major General O’Ryan had his division mobilized and on the ground in Texas by 6 July 1916. Four days after arriving in McAllen, Texas, Major General O’Ryan issued General Order (GO) 2, which directed the establishment of military police. This order brought the division into compliance with the *Field Service Regulations* of 1914.<sup>7</sup> He also issued GO 7, “prohibiting officers and enlisted men of the division using alcoholic drink in any form during their service on the border and entering houses of prostitution or places where liquor was sold.”<sup>8</sup> These orders were enforced by posting a permanent military police presence at the front and rear doors of any establishment where alcoholic beverages were served or prostitution was conducted. Within three weeks, all houses of prostitution within the division sector were reportedly out of business; liquor stores and saloons soon followed.

Similarly, the Illinois National Guard also patrolled the Texas-Mexican border, with Regular Army officers assigned as inspector-instructors. One such officer was a young lieutenant who had just graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point a year earlier. On one dark summer night, the lieutenant was leading a military police patrol down Matamoros Street—a Mexican red-light district in San Antonio. People were milling about, and everything seemed normal. Suddenly, a sergeant grabbed the lieutenant and jerked him backward as a shot rang out and a bullet “zipped by” the lieutenant’s nose. The patrol rushed the darkened doorway where the shot originated, but the door was slammed shut and bolted. The shooter was never located.<sup>9</sup> The lieutenant who narrowly escaped casualty status that night was Dwight D. Eisenhower, who went on to become the Supreme Allied Commander Europe during World War II and later the President of the United States.<sup>10</sup>

The lack of tolerance for alcohol and prostitution was quite a change from the policies of the Regular Army that had first entered Mexico. In *Blood on the Border*, Clarence C. Clendenen describes a camp at Colonia Dublan, Mexico, where there were “numerous Mexican prostitutes who followed the troops,” explaining that “To prevent the men from leaving camp, [General John J.] Pershing had the prostitutes rounded up and placed under guard in a specially created, barbed wire stockade. Soldiers wishing to visit the stockade were required to show the guard on duty that they had the necessary fee that was regulated by the provost marshal. After completing business with one of the visiting ladies, a Soldier was required to take a prophylactic provided by the Army. The result of this strict sanitary measure was one of the lowest venereal disease rates an army has ever known.”<sup>11</sup>

To handle the expected refugees and prisoners of war, the Army established detention camps in various locations, such as Camp Bliss, Texas. These camps were manned by military police and provost guards.

The New York Division Trains and Military Police continued to serve on the border until after most of the other New York units had returned home. The military police did not make it home until early 1917, but shortly after mustering out, the New York Division was again called to federal service—this time for actual warfare. The division was reconfigured to match the conformation of a Regular Army division, renumbered as the 27th Infantry Division, and sent to Camp Wadsworth, South Carolina, for additional training. The military police were renamed the 102d Division Trains and Military Police and later the 102d Military Police Company.<sup>12</sup> The unit returned to New York in 1919. Today, the 102d Military Police Company remains assigned to the New York National Guard.

**Acknowledgements:** Mr. Andy Watson, U.S. Army Military Police historian, and Captain Sam Reinert, 545th Military Police Company Association founder and historian, contributed to this article.

## GO 2

- I. A detachment of military police is organized to police the towns of Pharr, McAllen, and Mission and the roads connecting the same. The detachment will be organized and commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert McLean, 7th Infantry, and will consist of three lieutenants of the line, one medical officer, four noncommissioned officers and fifteen privates of cavalry, [and] eight noncommissioned officers and fifty privates of infantry, three of whom shall be provided with motorcycles.
- II. Details of officers for service with the military police will be made on recommendation of the commanding officer of the detachment. Detail of enlisted men will be made on an equitable basis among organizations at the three stations of the division, by organization commanders after conference with the detachment commander. Enlisted men will be selected for their physical bearing, judgment, and previous experience. The personnel of the detachment will mess with their organizations and will be changed in part from time to time.
- III. In addition to the functions prescribed for military police, Article VII, [*Field Service Regulations*], the detachment is charged with reporting violations of all camp orders and, where the offenses warrant such action, to arrest Soldier offenders. The detachment will cooperate with the civilian police authorities.
- IV. Officers and enlisted men of the military police, when actually performing their duties, will wear a blue brassard on the left arm, halfway between the elbow and shoulder, bearing the letters “M.P.” in white.
- V. In cases of emergency, the military police may call on any troops to assist them. All persons belonging to the military service are required to give every assistance to the military police in the execution of their duties.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL O’RYAN:

EDWARD OLMSTED,  
Major, Assistant Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:  
FRANKLIN W. WARD,  
Major, Assistant Chief of Staff

Source: “O’Ryan’s Roughnecks,” 27th New York Division, 107th Regiment Web page, <<http://www.oryansroughnecks.org/index.htm>>, accessed on 29 June 2010.

## Amendment to GO 7

- I. Par. III, GO 7, New York Division, is amended to read as follows:

Officers and enlisted men of this division are directed not to use, or have in their possession, alcoholic drink in any form during their service on the border, except on prescription of a medical officer given in the line of duty.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL O’RYAN:

H.H. BANDHOLTZ,  
Colonel, Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:  
FRANK E. BAMFORD,  
Major, 28th U.S. Infantry, Acting Adjutant

Source: John F. O’Ryan, *The Story of the 27th Division*, Wynkoop Halckenbeck Crawford Company, New York, 1921, Vol. II, p. 574.

## Endnotes:

<sup>1</sup>*Constitution of the United States of America*, Article 1, Section 8, 17 September 1787.

<sup>2</sup>Charles S. Whitman, *Annual Report of the Adjutant General of the State*, New York, 31 December 1916.

<sup>3</sup>Patrick V. Garland, *A Forgotten Soldier: The Life and Times of Major General Harry Hill Bandholtz*, Infinity Publishing Company, Pennsylvania, March 2009, p. 23.

<sup>4</sup>*National Defense Act of 1916*, U.S. Department of Justice, 1918.

<sup>5</sup>The Punitive Expedition into Mexico was a 1916 American attack on northern Mexico in retaliation for the slaying of several U.S. Soldiers and civilians during a Mexican attack (led by General Pancho Villa) on Columbus, New Mexico.

<sup>6</sup>Whitman.

<sup>7</sup>*Field Service Regulations*, Article VII, "Military Police," U.S. Army, 1914.

<sup>8</sup>Report of Major General John F. O'Ryan, Commanding Division, National Guard, Appendix A, 31 December 1916.

<sup>9</sup>There are other various accounts of this incident, including one which describes the shooter as a National Guard lieutenant who was detained by military police (Carlo E'Este, *Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life*, Henry Holt & Company, 4 June 2002, p. 113).

<sup>10</sup>Alden Hatch, *General Ike: A Biography of Dwight D. Eisenhower*, Henry Holt & Company, New York, 1944, p. 56.

<sup>11</sup>Clarence C. Clendenen, *Blood on the Border: The United States Army and the Mexican Irregulars*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1969, p. 330.

<sup>12</sup>John F. O'Ryan, *The Story of the 27th Division*, Wynkoop Halkenbeck Crawford Company, New York, 1921.

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*Master Sergeant Garland retired from the U.S. Army in 1974. During his military career, he served in military police units and criminal investigation detachments and laboratories. At the time of his retirement, Master Sergeant Garland was serving as a ballistics evidence specialist at the European Laboratory. He remained in this career field until retiring from civilian law enforcement in 1995.*

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# The Law Enforcement Combined Interagency Task Force

*By Chief Warrant Officer Three Sean Rafferty and Warrant Officer One Jason M. Nicholas*

After deploying from Fort Lewis, Washington, to various locations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other areas in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and the War on Terrorism, select members of the 22d Military Police Battalion (U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command [USACIDC] [commonly referred to as "CID"]) established the Law Enforcement Combined Interagency Task Force (LECIATF) in Baghdad, Iraq, in August 2009. The LECIATF was initiated under the guidance of the commander of the 22d Military Police Battalion to support U.S. Forces–Iraq (USF-I) and Task Force 134 detainee operations. The LECIATF is comprised of a diverse group of investigators, experts, and leaders who, together, offer a wide variety of knowledge and expertise gained through innumerable years in law enforcement and other professions.

The mission objective of LECIATF is to conduct and complete expert criminal investigations of dangerous radical and enduring security threat (DR/EST) detainees who are being held for suspicion of terrorist-related crimes, attacks on coalition forces, or other general criminal activity. The goal of the LECIATF is to compile solid criminal evidence such as eyewitness statements, fingerprints, DNA evidence, weapons, digital media (video recordings, e-mails), photographs, and other items to be presented during a criminal prosecution. The members of LECIATF work in conjunction with USF-I, Task Force 134 (division provost marshal office, USF-I attorneys assigned to the task force, brigade combat teams that are responsible for the areas of operation), military unit commanders, the

Department of State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Government of Iraq to locate and identify all witnesses and information necessary to build a successful criminal investigation.

Some of the DR/EST-related crimes that have been investigated by the LECIATF include the falsification of identification, displacement, weapons smuggling, financing of terrorist-related activity, attacks against coalition forces, improvised explosive device manufacture and emplacement, kidnapping, torture, and murder. One high-profile investigation uncovered a major terrorist cell that was suspected of various criminal activities. Further investigation by LECIATF members revealed a network of individuals who were linked to area crimes such as kidnapping, torture, and mass murder. The crimes were related to a mass grave site that contained the remains of several hundred area victims.

Upon completion of the investigations, LECIATF members help support the USF-I attorneys who prosecute the cases before an Iraqi judge at the Central Criminal Court of Iraq, thereby obtaining a sense of justice and closure for the Iraqi people.

To date, the LECIATF has supervised and investigated more than 200 DR/EST cases, with more than 50 cases already processed through the Central Criminal Court of Iraq. Three individuals have been convicted of their crimes. The successful investigation and prosecution of these crimes help illustrate to the government and people of Iraq that U.S. forces are committed to ensuring a safer Iraq for the future.

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*Chief Warrant Officer Three Rafferty is the assistant special agent in charge of the CID Office, Fort Lewis.*

*Warrant Officer One Nicholas is the chief of the Drug Suppression Team, CID Office, Fort Meade, Maryland.*

# 545th Military Police Company

## Lineage and Honors

Constituted 15 February 1939 in the Regular Army as Military Police Platoon, Headquarters Troop, 1st Cavalry Division.  
Redesignated 4 July 1942 as Military Police Platoon, 1st Cavalry Division, and activated at Fort Bliss, Texas.  
Redesignated 4 December 1943 as Military Police Platoon, 1st Cavalry Division, Special.  
Reorganized and redesignated 25 March 1949 as the 545th Military Police Company and remained assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division.  
Inactivated 15 October 1957 in Japan and relieved from assignment to the 1st Cavalry Division.  
Assigned 15 July 1963 to the 1st Cavalry Division.  
Activated 1 September 1963 in Korea.  
Inactivated 15 October 2005 at Fort Hood, Texas, and relieved from assignment to the 1st Cavalry Division.  
Activated 16 August 2008 at Fort Richardson, Alaska.



## Campaign Participation Credit

<i>World War II</i>	Communist Chinese Forces	Counteroffensive, Phase VI
New Guinea	Spring Offensive	Tet 1969/Counteroffensive
Bismarck Archipelago	United Nations Summer–	Summer–Fall 1969
Leyte (with arrowhead)	Fall Offensive	Winter–Spring 1970
Luzon	Second Korean Winter	Sanctuary Counteroffensive
	<i>Vietnam</i>	Counteroffensive, Phase VII
<i>Korean War</i>	Defense	<i>Southwest Asia</i>
United Nations Defensive	Counteroffensive	Defense of Saudi Arabia
United Nations Offensive	Counteroffensive, Phase II	Liberation and Defense of Kuwait
Communist Chinese Forces	Counteroffensive, Phase III	Cease-Fire
Intervention	Tet Counteroffensive	<i>War on Terrorism</i>
First United Nations	Counteroffensive, Phase IV	Campaigns to be determined
Counteroffensive	Counteroffensive, Phase V	

## Decorations

Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered PLEIKU PROVINCE  
Valorous Unit Award, Streamer embroidered FISH HOOK  
Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1967–1968  
Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1968  
Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered SOUTHWEST ASIA 1990–1991  
Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered IRAQ 2004–2005  
Philippine Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered 17 OCTOBER 1944 TO 4 JULY 1945  
Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered WAEGWAN-TAEGU  
Chrissyoun Aristion Andrias (Bravery Gold Medal of Greece), Streamer embroidered KOREA  
Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1965–1969  
Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1969–1970  
Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1970–1971  
Republic of Vietnam Civil Action Honor Medal, First Class, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1969–1970



# Military Police News and Notes

*Compiled by Ms. Diana K. Dean*

## **USF-I Activated and JTF 134 Inactivated**

U.S. Forces–Iraq (USF-I) was activated and Joint Task Force (JTF) 134 was inactivated in Baghdad on 1 January 2010. Major General David E. Quantock served as the final commander and Command Sergeant Major Jeffrey A. Butler as the final command senior enlisted leader of JTF 134—a joint team comprised of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Civilians, Contractors, and Iraqis.

During the time that JTF 134 was active, Iraqi detainee operations evolved from a scattered, poorly managed operation to a consolidated, well-trained organization. Although JTF 134 was inactivated, the conversion was largely transparent to most former JTF 134 personnel. And Major General Quantock’s duties remained essentially unchanged as he transitioned to the USF-I Deputy Commanding General for Detainee Operations and Provost Marshal General—conducting detention operations to assess, reconcile, and transfer or release detainees in Iraq, consistent with the need to protect Iraqi society.

The activation of USF-I is part of the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq to 50,000 by 31 August 2010 as stipulated in the Iraq-U.S. Security Agreement.

## **CID Special Agent Recognized for Excellence**

Special Agent Michelle Chowanec of the Major Procurement Fraud Unit (MPFU), 701st Military Police Group (U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) (commonly referred to as “CID”), Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and her fellow investigators were awarded the 2009 Award for Excellence in Investigation by the Council of the Inspector General on Integrity and Efficiency and recognized by the U.S. Attorney General’s Office for their contributions to investigations into the abuse of federal grant money and military procurement and grant fraud. The team’s investigative efforts resulted in the recovery of more than \$8 million.

The MPFU, which is comprised of civilian special agents, is the Army’s premiere organization for conducting worldwide investigations into allegations of fraud associated with the U.S. Army’s major acquisition programs (weapon systems, support systems) and civil and military construction contracts that are awarded or administered by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. In addition to investigative experience, MPFU members also have special skills in areas such as business administration, finance, or accounting. To date, MPFU investigations have resulted in the recovery of more than \$1.5 billion.

According to the MPFU director, Mr. James Podolak, Special Agent Chowanec “is an excellent example of an [MPFU] special agent who vigorously pursues investigations.” But, humbled by the recognition, Chowanec credits the success to her fellow investigators, stating that the “investigations were truly team efforts” and explaining that “the end result was very rewarding.”

## **19th Military Police Battalion (CID) “Swordsmen” Make History**

The Soldiers of the 19th Military Police Battalion (CID) deployed from Wheeler Army Airfield, Hawaii, on 26 January 2010 and uncased their colors at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, on 4 March 2010. The deployment was historic in that the 19th is the first military police battalion headquarters to be deployed to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

The battalion is conducting forensic exploitation and rule-of-law criminal investigations while simultaneously conducting felony U.S. Code, Title 10 (*Armed Forces*), investigations and commanding and controlling law enforcement programs. Although the battalion commands all CID detachments throughout Afghanistan, sufficient personnel remain behind to accomplish critical daily operations in Hawaii, the Republic of Korea, and Japan.

## **218th Military Police Company Ends OIF Mission and 512th Military Police Company Takes Command**

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A 28 March 2010 transfer-of-authority ceremony held in Kirkuk, Iraq, marked the end of a year-long deployment in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) for the 218th Military Police Company, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and the beginning of an OIF mission for the 512th Military Police Company, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

Under the command of Captain Early Howard Jr., the 218th participated in more than 1,500 combat support missions that provided Iraqi police transition training support. The unit worked with more than 30 police stations and 1,700 local investigators. They validated or maintained the validation of 28 police stations. They also conducted more than 50 humanitarian drops, distributing food, supplies, and other necessities to schools and outlets. One of the primary missions of the 218th was to supplement the security efforts of Iraqi police during the Iraqi national elections in early March 2010. Yet, much work also awaits the 512th Military Police Company. The 512th was reactivated in October 2008, and this mission represents its first OIF deployment.

### **CID Names Special Agent for Key Position**

As part of CID's major transformation to meet new and emerging challenges associated with the Overseas Contingency Operation, the Provost Marshal General of the Army and CID commander, Brigadier General Colleen McGuire, announced the selection of Chief Warrant Officer Five T.L. Williams as the CID command chief warrant officer. Williams, who was previously the Regimental Chief Warrant Officer at the U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, will serve as the senior technical and policy advisor for felony criminal investigative operations and investigative support programs at CID.

Chief Warrant Officer Five Williams will be the first special agent to hold the singular title of command chief warrant officer. She will provide the same level of insight and oversight for CID warrant officer special agents that the command sergeant major provides for CID enlisted special agents. In her new role, she will be charged with advising the CID commander and senior leadership on trends and challenges associated with the professional development of special agents, promoting the command with interagency and multinational law enforcement agencies, integrating new investigative technologies, and sustaining the force through the next decade. She will also assess and provide advice on other issues related to training, retention, and readiness.

### **Crime Lab Director Recognized by Secretary of the Army**

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On 14 April 2010, Secretary of the Army John M. McHugh presented Mr. Larry Chelko, director of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory (USACIL) and leading Department of Defense (DOD) forensic scientist, with the Exceptional Civilian Service Award—the highest award that can be bestowed upon civilian personnel by the Secretary of the Army. The Exceptional Civilian Service Award, which is awarded for a demonstrable pattern of excellence and achievement, is comparable to the military's Distinguished Service Medal.

According to Mr. Chelko, the primary USACIL challenge is currently the forensic science mission that is conducted in support of warfighting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The importance of the forensic science mission on the battlefield and its criticality to asymmetric warfare efforts led the DOD to establish a Forensic Executive Steering Group and appoint Mr. Chelko as its science advisor. In this capacity, he directed and hosted the first of several DOD forensic science workshops, established the framework of the DOD forensic program, led the charge for the certification program for forensic examiners and laboratories, and initiated an expeditionary forensics concept plan that led to the creation of a standing force of examiners and the fielding of joint expeditionary forensic facilities (deployable laboratories for expeditionary forensic operations). In addition to managing USACIL and serving as the science advisor for the Forensic Executive Steering Group, Mr. Chelko also serves as the DOD executive agent for the Convicted Offender DNA Index System, chairs the DOD Forensic Science Committee, and represents the DOD on the President's Subcommittee on Forensic Science.

Mr. Chelko indicated that his receipt of this award is a direct reflection of the dedication and professionalism of the men and women of USACIL and their contributions to the Army's law enforcement mission at home and abroad.

## **USAMPS and USACPA Receive FLETA Accreditation**

The U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) and U.S. Army Civilian Police Academy (USACPA) were recognized during an awards ceremony at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation (FLETA) National Conference, in Annapolis, Maryland, on 22 April 2010. With the accreditation, the U.S. Army Military Police Corps Regiment became the largest member of FLETA.

FLETA originated in 2000 with the development of a model that established procedures and standards for the evaluation of academies and training programs used to train federal law enforcement agents and officers. The intent was to develop an independent accreditation process that allows agencies to voluntarily demonstrate their set of professional standards and receive appropriate recognition.

The USAMPS and USACPA accreditation process began in November 2009 when the agencies completed a self-assessment. FLETA conducted a January 2010 on-site accreditation visit to review, observe, analyze, and make recommendations on the training development and implementation processes. The panel of federal experts determined that USAMPS and USACPA were in full compliance with FLETA standards.

According to Mr. Reginald Cole, USAMPS Deputy Director of Training, “The FLETA accreditation is an intensive review of our methodologies in design, development, and implementation of law enforcement training for our military and civilian personnel. The fact that we were able to accomplish both accreditations is, in large measure, due to USAMPS and training in general across the U.S. Army being developed to the highest professional standards, using succinctly structured processes that have always been successful in adult learning.”

## **Military Police Corps Member Assumes Command of MSCoE**

On 7 May 2010, Major General David Quantock assumed command of the Maneuver Support Center of Excellence (MSCoE), Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, from acting commander Brigadier General David Phillips, who returned to his position as the commandant of USAMPS.

The deputy commanding general of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Lieutenant General John Sterling, commended Brigadier General Phillips on the stand-up of the post’s first general staff during his tenure and recognized the positive effect it will have on MSCoE’s future.

Major General Quantock, the former USF-I Deputy Commanding General for Detainee Operations and Provost Marshal General, described his vision by stating, “In an era of persistent conflict, we cannot afford to take our eye off the ball of destroying our enemies and providing our Soldiers with the best equipment and training required to prosecute our Nation’s business. Our mission is simple: Prepare expertly trained, professional Soldiers ready to deploy and serve with honor. We will accomplish that mission by training Soldiers who are experts in their technical craft, while remembering that we are Soldiers first and foremost, trained with a warrior focus through demanding and realistic training and ready to deploy by ensuring that their families are taken care of and our Soldiers are confident in the unit’s ability to accomplish its mission.”

## **CID Announces Next Command Sergeant Major**

CID announced the selection of Command Sergeant Major Thomas Seaman as the next senior enlisted advisor for the Army’s premier criminal investigative agency. Command Sergeant Major Seaman assumes responsibility from Command Sergeant Major Leslie Koonce.

CID special agents investigate felony level crime of Army interest worldwide, serving a population of more than 1 million Soldiers, civilians, contractors, and family members. As recognized federal law enforcement officers, the noncommissioned officers, warrant officers, and civilian special agents are considered some of the most highly trained criminal investigators in the world.

# *MILITARY POLICE* Writer's Guide

*MILITARY POLICE* is a professional-development bulletin designed to provide a forum for exchanging information and ideas within the Army law enforcement and investigation community. We include articles by and about officers, enlisted Soldiers, warrant officers, Department of the Army civilian employees, and others. Writers may discuss training, current operations and exercises, doctrine, equipment, history, personal viewpoints, or other areas of general interest to military police. Articles may share good ideas and lessons learned or explore better ways of doing things.

Articles should be concise, straightforward, and in the active voice. If they contain attributable information or quotations not referenced in the text, provide appropriate endnotes. Text length should not exceed 2,000 words (about eight double-spaced pages). Shorter, after-action-type articles and reviews of books on military police topics are also welcome.




Include photographs (with captions) and/or line diagrams that illustrate information in the article. Please do not insert illustrations or photos in the text; instead, send each of them as a separate file. Do not embed photographs in PowerPoint or Microsoft Word. If illustrations are in PowerPoint, avoid using excessive color and shading. Save digital images in a TIF or JPG format at a resolution no lower than 200 dpi. Images copied from a Web site must be accompanied by copyright permission.

Provide a short paragraph that summarizes the content of the article. Also include a short biography (full name, rank, current unit, job title, and education), your mailing address, a fax number, and a commercial daytime telephone number.

Articles submitted to *MILITARY POLICE* must include a statement from your local security office stating that the information contained in the article is unclassified, nonsensitive, and releaseable to the public. *MILITARY POLICE* is distributed to military units worldwide, is offered online at <http://www.wood.army.mil/mpbulletin>, and is available for sale by the Government Printing Office. As such, it is readily accessible to nongovernment and foreign individuals and organizations.

We cannot guarantee that we will publish all articles, photographs, or illustrations. They are accepted for publication only after thorough review. If we plan to use your article in an upcoming issue, we will notify you. Therefore, it is important to keep us informed of changes in your e-mail address or telephone number. All articles accepted for publication are subject to grammatical and structural changes as well as editing for style.

*MILITARY POLICE* is published biannually in March and September, and articles are due by 1 December and 1 June. Send submissions by e-mail to [leon.mdotmppb@conus.army.mil](mailto:leon.mdotmppb@conus.army.mil), or send an electronic copy in Microsoft Word on a compact disk and a double-spaced hard copy of the manuscript to *MILITARY POLICE* Professional Bulletin, 464 MANSCEN Loop, Building 3201, Suite 2661, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8926.





MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE LEVEL AND ABOVE COMMANDS

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM	UNIT	LOCATION
Colleen L. McGuire	Thomas J. Seaman	HQ USACIDC	Ft Belvoir, VA
David D. Phillips	Charles Kirkland	USAMPS	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
LaTonya D. Lynn	Norwood Patterson	8th MP Bde	Scofield Barracks, HI
Jerry D. Stevenson	Gerald Stegemeier	14th MP Bde	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
John F. Garrity	Brian K. Lambert	16th MP Bde	Ft Bragg, NC
Thomas P. Evans	Brenda K. Curfman	18th MP Bde	Mannheim, Germany
Robert Taradash	Dawn Rippelmeyer	42d MP Bde	Ft Lewis, WA
Patrick Williams	Michael E. Ashford	89th MP Bde	Ft Hood, TX
Jan F. Apo	John F. Schoenrock	3d MP Gp (CID)	Ft Gillem, GA
Thomas H. Tatum	Timothy S. Fitzgerald	6th MP Gp (CID)	Ft Lewis, WA
Timothy J. Chmura	Paul W. McDonald	701st MP Gp (CID)	Ft Belvoir, VA
Dan McElroy	Anthony Mason	202d MP Gp (CID)	Heidelberg, Germany
Eric R. Belcher	Jonathan O. Godwin	USDB	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Donnie L. Thomas	Mark E. Porrett	Joint Detention Group	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
Mark S. Inch	Jeffrey N. Plemmons	Army Corrections Command	Ft Belvoir, VA
Deborah B. Grays		Garrison, Ft McPherson	Ft McPherson, GA
Charles Williams		Garrison, Ft Leavenworth	Ft Leavenworth, KS

RESERVE COMPONENT MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE LEVEL AND ABOVE COMMANDS

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM	UNIT	LOCATION
Gary S. Carlson	Steven Dinkins	2d MP Bde	Ft Snelling, MN
Robert Kenyon	Thomas Legare	11th MP Bde	Ashley, PA
James E. Keighley	David R. Morgan	*43d MP Bde	Warwick, RI
Donald J. Currier	Robert D. Liles	*49th MP Bde	Fairfield, CA
Michael R. Nevin	Dale V. Clarmont	*177th MP Bde	Taylor, MI
John E. Cornelius	Virgil Akis	800th MP Bde	Uniondale, NY
Mandi A. Murray	Daniel G. Lincoln	*46th MP CMD	Lansing, MI
Adolph McQueen	Brendan Toth	200th MP CMD	Ft Meade, MD
Robert Hipwell	Theodore Copeland	300th MP CMD	Inkster, MI

MILITARY POLICE BATTALION LEVEL COMMANDS


COMMANDER	CSM/SGM/1SG	UNIT	LOCATION
Erica C. Nelson	Donald Wallace	40th MP Bn (I/R)	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Carl Packer	Blaine Harvey	91st MP Bn	Ft Drum, NY
William J. Benner III	Angelia Flournoy	92d MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Vernon F. Lightner	Myron J. Lewis	93d MP Bn	Ft Bliss, TX
Noel C. Smart	Robert Mester	94th MP Bn	Yongsan, Korea
Duane R. Miller	Henry Stearns	95th MP Bn	Mannheim, Germany
David L. Chase	Thomas S. Sivak	97th MP Bn	Ft Riley, KS
Eugenia K. Guilmartin	William A. Fath	385th MP Bn	Ft Stewart, GA
William R. Black	Todd E. Spradling	503d MP Bn	Ft Bragg, NC
John G. Voorhees Jr.	Albert Nelson	504th MP Bn	Ft Lewis, WA
Zane H. Jones	Christopher Muller	508th MP Bn (I/R)	Ft Lewis, WA
David J. Detz	William Jordan	519th MP Bn	Ft Polk, LA
Christopher Wynder	Daniel J. Borrero	525th MP Bn (I/R)	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
Thomas P. Lombardo	Michael Cospers	701st MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Dawn Hilton	William F. Hutchings	705th MP Bn	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Roger P. Hedgepeth	Timothy J. Lamb	709th MP Bn	Grafenwoehr, Germany
Ignatius M. Dolata Jr.	Richard Woodring	716th MP Bn	Ft Campbell, KY
Eric D. Brunken	Peter Ladd	720th MP Bn	Ft Hood, TX
Ross T. Guieb	Scott Dooley	728th MP Bn	Scofield Barracks, HI
Christopher Burns	Jonathan Narcisse	759th MP Bn	Ft Carson, CO
Randall Thrash	Barry Oakes	787th MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
David M. Oberlander	Richard E. Epps	793d MP Bn	Bamberg, Germany
Bryan O'Barr	James Schultz	795th MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Robert L. Schiller	Bruce A. Sirois	LEC, Ft Knox	Ft Knox, KY
John D. Adams	Dennis Higgins	5th MP Bn (CID)	Kaiserslautern, Germany
David E. Heath	Lance R. Brown	10th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Bragg, NC
Peter C. Lydon	Crystal L. Wallace	11th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Hood, TX
Robert G. McNeil Jr.	Gail A. Dippel	19th MP Bn (CID)	Wheeler Army Airfield, HI
Nieve F. Knell	Clyde Wallace	22d MP Bn (CID)	Ft Lewis, WA
Stephen J. Green	Peter D. Harrington	1000th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Campbell, KY
Kenneth J. Tauke	Christopher S. Heldt	1001st MP Bn (CID)	Ft Riley, KS
Sonya K. Friday	Robert L. Code	1002d MP Bn (CID)	Bamberg, Germany
David F. Koonce	Christopher L. Perkey	Benning CID Bn	Ft Benning, GA
Ronald T. Cuffee Sr.	Brian K. Garon	Washington CID Bn	Ft Myer, VA
Thomas A. Denzler	Janet M. Tanner-Booska	Protective Services Bn	Ft Belvoir, VA
Richard Felices	Christopher Dozier	USAR-Japan MP Bn	Camp Zama, Japan

\*National Guard Unit

Current as of 1 August 2010

For changes and updates, please e-mail <leon.usampspgo@conus.army.mil>.

# 69TH MILITARY POLICE CORPS ANNIVERSARY



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## THE ARMY'S TRIPLE STRAND OF STRENGTH MILITARY POLICE CORPS REGIMENT

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